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THE TRIUMPH OF PRAGMATISM: CHINA'S LINKS WITH THE WEST*

T. B. Millar

DRAMATIC though they may appear in nature and in effect, recent changes in the foreign policy and relations of the People's Republic of China are logical and even perhaps retarded conclusions to more than twenty years of movement within and around the Chinese polity. The chronic hostility between China and the Soviet Union, which has led to the former publicly denouncing the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance,[1] began during the late 1950s with disputes over ideology (the ' Great Leap Forward '), India, the Chinese off-shore islands, and nuclear warfare, and was sealed by the withdrawal of virtually all the Soviet technical advisers from China in 1960. Within ten years Russia moved from ally to enemy. The split from its communist partner led the Chinese government to reassess its policy towards Japan and Japanese conservatives, and to encourage trade and other contacts. This movement, with all its subsequent vicissitudes, resulted in the acquisition by China after 1971 of considerable Japanese technology, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations in 1972, and in 1978 the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Despite John Foster Dulles's refusal to shake hands with Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) at Geneva in 1954, American-Chinese discussions at that time, and subsequently in Warsaw and elsewhere, punctuated the long period of mutual suspicion and animosity. It is now more than seven years since President Nixon visited Peking (February 1972) and signed a joint communiqué envisaging the normalisation of relations which occurred last December.[2]

The split with its Soviet ally became the preoccupying factor in many aspects of China's domestic and foreign policies. It led initially to the hard decision for ' self-reliance '. It produced vituperative rivalry between the two governments for leadership, influence and aid among other communist and Third-World countries. It made them competitive rather than co-operative allies of the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam. It has resulted in the

* This article went to press before China's invasion of Vietnam

1 Under the Treaty of Friendship Alliance, and Mutual Assistance concluded in February 1950, China and the Soviet Union undertook (Article 1) that should either be attacked by Japan or by states allied with Japan [potentially, the United States], the other would immediately render all possible military and other assistance Both parties undertook (Article 3) not to conclude any alliance directed against the other or to take part in ' any coalition or in acts and measures ' directed against the other

2 A detailed but concise analysis of the development of China's relations with the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States is given by Arthur Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington Brookings Institution, 1977)

present situation where each sees war with the other as more likely than war with a Western power; where Communist China is a supporter of anti-communist Nato; and where the People's Republic has pocketed its pride and is reaching out, like many other developing states, for the investment and skills of the capitalist world. This is not simply an example of the traditional Chinese aim of ' using barbarians to regulate barbarians ', but rather of using them, in ways not wholly dissimilar from those employed by Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, to promote China's own capacity to achieve and secure national greatness.

Yet for all their history, these results were never inevitable. They are a triumph—perhaps temporary but probably lasting—for the pragmatism that lay in much of what Zhou Enlai tried to do, a pragmatism that has been emphasised and accelerated since the death of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), the downfall of the predominantly Shanghainese radical-left leaders symbolised by the ' Gang of Four ', and the second ' resurrection ' to status and power of Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) and his supporters. Whether the coalition of which Deng is currently so formidable a part is sympathetic to all his methods, it is committed to the same objective, defined as the ' modernisation ' of China—in industry, agriculture, science and technology, and defence—by the year 2000. The events of the past ten years, like the ' Great Leap Forward ' ten years earlier again, have shown that revolutionary processes, ideology and rhetoric have not been able to create sufficient capital, technology, or incentives for such an objective, imprecise though the objective is.

The new leaders, despite past frictions between them, are in the process of establishing their legitimacy and their authority, and appear to have done so in the eyes both of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Mao's alleged testament to Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng)— ' With you in charge I am at ease '—will be useful so long as Mao, buried but decreasingly praised, is useful. These things may be sufficient for the short term, but the new leaders know that in the long term they will also need first, to contain the radical left currently biding its time and looking for vulnerabilities; and second, to satisfy the people by ' delivering the goods '—whatever those goods may be, whether consumption items or the more psychological rewards of the kind demanded on Peking's wall posters. There are always risks in a government trying to meet rising expectations of either kind The judgment of this government would appear to be that not to try at least to meet the material expectations, and not to meet the Soviet ' threat ' with countervailing power, would impose even greater risks—to themselves, to the revolution, and to the nation—and that the new links with the West are necessary to both processes. The Western powers, of course, including Japan, are receptive to the new Chinese policy because it meets their own pragmatic assessment of their (sometimes competing) individual and collective interests.

The Sino-Japanese Treaty

The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed last August and ratified in October was six years in the making, and it is ironical that it was held up over the question of whether or not to include in it a statement that had been part of the Chou-Nixon ' Shanghai communiqué ' of February 1972 and of the Tanaka-Chou communiqué of the following September leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations. This was the assertion that neither party would seek hegemony in the Asian Pacific region, and each was opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. China and the United States probably saw this as a moral restraint upon each other, but much more as a declaration aimed at the Soviet Union. Kakuei Tanaka, supported by his Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira, was prepared to see the statement in a communiqué but not in a treaty, and Mr. Tanaka's next two successors, Takeo Miki and Takeo Fukuda, bombarded with Soviet objections and threats,[3] shared this position. Japan, much more vulnerable than the United States to Soviet pressures, was reluctant to offend its superpower neighbour which thirty years after the Second World War still occupied Japanese islands adjacent to the Hokkaido coast and controlled large areas of sea traditionally open to Japanese fishermen.

On considerations of trade, investment, cultural exchanges or tourism, China did not need the treaty with Japan. A whole series of official and unofficial agreements already existed, both with Japan and increasingly with Western Europe and the United States, and trade had expanded considerably. China pressed for and obtained the treaty presumably with three objectives in mind: (1) to align Japan psychologically with China against the Soviet Union; (2) to mark a formal end to more than eighty years of hostility between the two Asian neighbours; and (3) to commit Japan, with its remarkable technological capacity and foreign exchange surplus, to the modernisation of China. In the last year of negotiations (1978), the Chinese used the carrot of an expanded trade treaty with the prospect of still greater expansion, and the stick of an incident at the Senkaku (or Tiao-yu-t'ai) islands, where several hundred Chinese fishing boats unfurled banners declaring the islands to belong to China. In the final negotiating stages, Peking apparently assured Tokyo that there would be no further such incidents, and agreed to Japan inserting in the treaty—which apart from its ' hegemony ' clause was a document of typical blandness—an article which the Japanese government presumably hoped (unsuccessfully) would go some distance towards assuaging Soviet wrath. Article IV stated: ' The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.' Additionally, the Japanese gained the impression that while China would retain its links with

3 For example, a broadcast in Japanese from Moscow Radio on June 30 1978, included the following ' the conclusion of the Japan China peace and friendship treaty runs directly counter to the interests of the USSR The USSR does not intend to remain an indifferent bystander '

North Korea it would use its influence there to restrain President Kim Il Sung from further military adventures.

Before signing the treaty, Japan seems to have weighed up the military balance. A document prepared by the Japanese Foreign Office for the Diet set out the comparative military strengths of China and the Soviet Union. This document was either leaked to the press or made available in a sanitized form, and it was published in the *Mainichi Shimbun* (evening edition) of October 13. It included remarks attributed to Lieutenant Belenko, who in September 1976 landed his Soviet MIG-25 at Hakodate airport, to the embarrassment of the Japanese and the astonished delight of the Americans.

The document stated that along their common border the Russians have 43 divisions of about 400,000 men, while the Chinese deploy 72 divisions of about 1,260,000 men. Soviet tanks are said to outnumber the Chinese by three to one and armoured personnel carriers by ten to one. The Chinese do not have anti-tank missiles. The Soviet tank units are deployed in areas most suited to advance on Peking. According to Belenko, Soviet air bases near the border are ' of the underground type ', and bases for bombers are located deep in Siberia. China does not have mobile surface-to-air missiles; is conspicuously lagging behind in its air-defence systems; its military aircraft are two generations behind the Russians; and in naval power China is some fifteen years behind. Its extensive underground shelters have no offensive capacity. The balance of combat power is thus heavily weighted to the Russians for the initial stages of combat.

The document said that the Russians have some 430 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on the Far East front, and 265 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the Pacific. Deployed against Soviet targets, China has 30–50 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and 20–30 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). It has also recently deployed ICBMs capable of reaching Moscow—a claim which, in the light of the Chinese satellite programme, is credible even if not as yet verified publicly from official sources.

The Japanese document concluded nevertheless that the Soviet Union is not in a position to engage in offensive operations against China. It does not have the necessary numerical superiority; it is concentrating its best troops and aircraft on the European front; if the war became protracted, supplies via the Trans-Siberian railway would be vulnerable, and Chinese nuclear capacity, though small, is a deterrent.

If this assessment indicated that on land the Soviet bark was worse than its bite, since 1945 the Japanese have never been left in any doubt as to the nature of the Soviet bite across the Sea of Japan. In the past year, according to Japan Defence Agency sources, Japanese military aircraft had to ' scramble ' on some 200 occasions as Soviet aircraft approached Japanese airspace—almost invariably to turn away at the last minute or to fly on reconnaissance parallel to the coast. Soviet intelligence ships are regularly located just outside Japanese territorial waters. Hundreds of Japanese fishing boats have been confiscated

and their crews jailed. The government has been intransigent over fishing agreements, and totally unco-operative over the question of the northern islands, even while seeking Japanese investment and technology for the development of Siberian oil, coal, and timber resources. Including as they did a steady flow of invective against Japan, China and the United States, Soviet policies towards Japan during this period have been an object lesson in how not to engage in diplomacy, and have provided strong incentives for Japan to do the very thing to which the Soviet government objected. It is sometimes necessary to stand up in public against a bully. It is all the more difficult, therefore, to understand how the Japanese government could have provided the Soviet base at Vladivostok, on credit, with an 80,000-ton dock capable of servicing a Soviet aircraft carrier which will make maritime Japan still more vulnerable. It was a curious example of the ' omnidirectional ' policy which has allegedly replaced ' equidistance ' between China and the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Japanese treaty is not a military treaty, and Japan's Foreign Minister, Sunao Sonoda, also declared in the Diet: ' We will not cooperate in the modernisation of China's armed forces '. Japan cannot be expected, in the short term, to provide defence equipment to China, and this restraint will presumably be reinforced by the dove-ish predilections of the new Prime Minister, Mr. Ohira. Yet it was Mr. Ohira who encouraged Mr. Tanaka to jump the fences with China seven years ago. In the face of Soviet threats, Japan may feel as reassured by the partnership with China as China does. And if Japan can sell a dockyard to Russia, if the British can build a Rolls Royce factory in China and if—as seems likely—they sell China the jump-jet Harrier aircraft, what may Japan not sell, with defence implications, to China? We may even see a scramble among the Nato powers to sell military equipment to China on credit.

For all its necessary desire to keep on the best possible terms with the Soviet Union, the Japanese government is geared like all its postwar predecessors to economic survival and advancement. In this respect, despite the problems that have arisen or will arise, despite Japan's residual sense of guilt towards China, the 900-million Chinese now appear to offer far greater opportunities, on a far more stable basis, and within a far more compatible cultural milieu, than do the Russians. At a time when Japanese exports were running into heavy obstacles in Europe and America, the China treaty offered welcome relief. And although the Senkakus, with their suspected oil potential, constitute a small cloud on the horizon of Sino-Japanese relations, there is no visible or foreseeable threat from China to Japan's security.

' Normalisation ' with the United States

In Peking in October 1978 I asked a senior Chinese official what difference it would make to China if it and the United States had full diplomatic relations, since the contacts under the existing quasi-diplomatic arrangements were so comprehensive. He replied, in effect, ' status '. China wanted to have a proper

embassy in Washington, and to be able to send senior ministers and officials there openly. This they would not do unless relations were ' normalised '. I then asked what difference normalisation would make to the United States, which did not show the Chinese diffidence and had indeed sent two successive Presidents to China. The only advantage the official could see was that, other things being equal, Chinese contracts would be awarded to firms from countries with which China had full diplomatic relations. We both knew that other things almost never are equal, and that contracts would be awarded on the basis of economic advantage. All officials I spoke to insisted that China would not relax its three conditions for recognition: the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan, abrogation of the American security treaty with Taiwan (which perhaps would follow automatically, because how can one have a treaty with a government one does not recognise?), and the withdrawal of American military forces from the island. One official said, almost in an aside, ' We have told the Americans we will look after their interests in Taiwan. What more do they want? ' What they wanted was revealed in the Joint Communiqué of December 15, 1978, announcing mutual recognition as from January 1, 1979.

In accordance with the terms of the Shanghai communiqué, the United States had in fact been running down its forces in the island until there were only a few left, but the abrogation of the security treaty raised difficult international as well as domestic problems. President Carter weighed the electoral aspects and believed, correctly, that he had the numbers. Like Mr. Fukuda, he was pressed by commercial interests eyeing the assessed Chinese opportunities. Constitutionally, there was no problem about letting the Taiwan treaty lapse at the end of the allowed one year's notice, whereas abrogation may have raised difficulties with the Senate. But Mr. Carter could not as easily weigh the implications for the strategic balance, or for America's reputation and self-image as an ally, and here he was helped by the Chinese who accepted under protest that normalisation could occur even though the United States went on supplying arms to Taiwan, so long as it did not provide the means for attacking the mainland. The problem is not eliminated but deferred, and in the meantime the United States can fairly claim not to be deserting Taiwan, not to be handing it over to communist control, but giving it the means, within the spirit of the Nixon or Guam doctrine, of defending itself. The parallel with the Republic of (South) Korea is not exact, in that Korea faces an armed and hostile enemy across a demilitarised zone, whereas China appears to have given every indication short of a formal statement that its many other preoccupations will take precedence for a long time over the question of resolving the sovereignty of Taiwan. America's commercial and cultural links will remain, and presumably other quasi-diplomatic arrangements such as the Japanese, British and other governments have will be established. Nor is there a parallel between Taiwan and Japan, the independence of which is universally recognised, which

does not claim to be something it is not, and which is needed for the American strategy in the Western Pacific.

Normalisation, although an event of a different kind, gave to the China-United States relationship something of the character given to the China-Japan relationship by the treaty of peace and friendship. It marked the end of a long estrangement. It provided the psychological atmosphere for mutual activities already developing, and a formal umbrella under which they could take place and expand. The Soviet Union could scarcely object to the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, but it could and did object to what it saw, with reason, as the growth of an East Asian trilateral association unsympathetic to Soviet interests in that region. It was one more, flagrant, feather in the Chinese cap; one further step by the other major socialist power away from the socialist path.

In his public statements in Japan in October, Vice-Premier Deng reiterated what Chinese leaders had been saying for several years: that Japan needed to be militarily strong. He supported the United States-Japan treaty, and deeply offended Japanese Communists in the process. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron, Chief of the British Defence Staff, spoke in Peking last May, with more truth than tact, of Britain and China having the same ' enemy ' at their door. It is not surprising therefore that the new arrangements and the euphoria accompanying them have suggested to suspicious Soviet minds the possibility of a hostile and powerful alliance arising in the East comparable with that in the West, an alliance that would compensate in good measure for the increasing naval power of the Russians compared with the Americans in East Asia and the Western Pacific and for the reluctance of Japan to arm itself beyond an acceptable minimum.

Yet this is far more psychological than real. There is no military alliance in being or in contemplation between China and Japan, nor between China and the United States. There *is* a de facto military alliance, patently and publicly (by Mr. Brezhnev) directed against China, between the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The 25-year ' Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation ' signed on November 2, 1978, is but the most recent of a series of developments linking the Soviet Union with Vietnam since the latter broke openly with China early in 1978 over the repatriation of Vietnamese Chinese, border incidents and the cessation of Chinese economic aid. Vietnam became a member of Comecon in June 1978, and has received food, economic and military aid from the Soviet Union. It depends on the Soviet Union for most of its oil. Article 6 of the new treaty states: ' In the event that one of the countries is the object of aggression or is under threat of aggression, the high contracting parties will immediately enter into mutual consultations with the aim of eliminating this threat and of taking corresponding effective measures for the maintenance of the peace and security of their countries.' The Soviet treaty is the insurance Vietnam has for centuries sought against China, an insurance last provided by the French. It aroused Chinese fears of ' encirclement ' by the Russians, and may well have

stimulated Peking to make the concession over American arms to Taiwan, apparently during the period December 13–15, which in turn made normalisation possible. It also provided Vietnam with the insurance it needed against China while it conqured Kampuchea (Cambodia) and installed in Pnom Penh a regime to its (and the Soviet Union's) liking.

Again, Hua Guofeng's visit to Iran, Yugoslavia and Romania last August/September, the Sino-Japanese treaty of August/October, and the prospect of United States-China normalisation, may well have prompted the Soviet Union to delay signature of a SALT II agreement, and to propose to the Warsaw Pact meeting in late November that the Pact's military expenditure should be increased; and the same events could equally have encouraged President Ceausescu to refuse that request and to stress that Romania would not surrender control over its armed forces. Thus do suspicions arouse counter-suspicions, chickens and eggs change places in the scheme of things and come home to surprising roosts.

Independent Taiwan or China Irredenta?

So where does all this leave the Republic of China, or Taiwan? In many respects Taiwan's position has not changed since normalisation. As from 1980 it will no longer be protected by an American treaty or American armed forces, but most observers would calculate that Taiwan has for the foreseeable future an adequate capacity to protect itself. The United States will go on selling to Taiwan arms of a defensive nature, including sophisticated aircraft, and the country's economy will be able to support such purchases, or purchases from other states if the Americans decide to suspend sales. Taiwan's international status has been reduced, so that it will shortly be almost a non state in international diplomacy, but it will continue to trade, to attract investment, to develop cultural relations, to improve by enviable proportions both the living standard of its people and the spread of wealth among them.

As American critics were quick to note, the Chinese government was not prepared to renounce in all circumstances the use of force against Taiwan, which both it and the government in Taipei regard as being part of China. It has stopped using the word ' liberation '—long a synonym for assumption of control by military action. It has indicated that it seeks ' eventual unification ' of Taiwan with China and preferably by peaceful means, but it is clearly in no hurry. It is at present using the approach of the sun rather than the wind to get Taiwan to take off its coat, through a variety of conciliatory moves and statements, many at an informal, personal level. There is some trade via Hongkong, and perhaps even, surreptitiously, direct. In fact it is in China's interest that Taiwan, its government and people, should feel secure at this time, for if they felt substantially otherwise they would almost certainly not seek rapprochement with the mainland but protection from it through establishing new links (such as with the Soviet Union) or new defence measures (perhaps nuclear weapons). If by threatening gestures the People's Republic were to

arouse Taiwanese fears of invasion or nuclear attack, this would damage China's relations with the United States and with Japan, both of which have heavy investments in the island and both of which are essential to the Chinese modernisation programme and the ' containment ' of the Soviet Union. An actual conventional attack by China on the island would involve a massive diversion of effort and would be possible only if there were a substantial relaxation of tension on the border with the Soviet Union.

It is by no means certain that the objective of the present Chinese leadership is that Taiwan should be part of China, integrated within it in the same way as mainland provinces. For nearly thirty years Chinese communist leaders have accepted the anomaly of Hongkong, a British colony on Chinese territory, the epitome of capitalist enterprise. They have accepted it because of the economic advantages involved for China itself and perhaps also because it constitutes something of a safety valve. Taiwan, though much larger and different in character, is physically more remote, and would perhaps best serve the Chinese economy as an autonomous enclave much in its present character, if such an ambiguity could be managed. Deng indicated as much to the *New York Times* last December, giving assurances that American economic interests would be protected. Taiwan is no longer a rival to the People's Republic, in status, in diplomatic effort, or as ' China ', and it is no longer a military threat. The government, armed forces, economy, and the sixteen million people on the island may well manage to ensure the present status quo through the rest of this century and beyond, but as animosities die down it is not impossible to conceive of Taiwan as an exporter of capital, technology and enterprise to the mainland with which, for only four of the past 84 years, it has been united. A different government in Peking could however decide one day to force the issue of sovereignty.

Balance sheet

A profit and loss assessment of the internal effects of the new agenda will take some years. The longer the agenda continues, the harder it will be to revise or amend significantly. While the ' hundred flowers ' of twenty years ago are a chilling memory, it seems highly unlikely that there will be a return to Maoist doctrine and radical communist policies. This would need a leader of Mao's stature, and he does not exist. It would require the support of the PLA, but the PLA is committed to its own and the country's modernisation, and to the strongest possible national defence against the Soviet Union. The policies of the past ten to twelve years are anathema to many of the intelligentsia and the bureaucracy. In so many respects the policies have not only not worked: they have been immensely counter-productive, among other things depriving the country of a generation of trained scientists and social science graduates. The effects of exposing the country to Western technology, educational influences, trade, tourists, capital, culture, economic and even political ideas, are impossible to gauge, but they cannot fail to disturb the present political system

and ideology, and they will not provide a quick solution to any of China's problems. The new policies will therefore meet considerable resistance, inviting reaction. There is no tradition in China of a ' loyal opposition '. The wall posters offer as yet only one cheer for democracy. Also, as exhibitors at successive Canton trade fairs have discovered, the Chinese tend to drive hard bargains, to play competitors off against each other and to take advantage of foreign enthusiams. If China is pressing its developing Western links, it will not do so to its own disadvantage. There is no reason why it should. One can therefore neither expect nor hope that China will quickly become ' one of us ' or ' just like us ': we might shudder at the possibility. China will take time and may undergo turmoil to accommodate to the tide of new ideas.

It will also have to pay, somehow or other, sooner or later, for the massive new imports. Here again, pragmatism has triumphed over principle. Substantial loans from foreign governmental and private institutions have been or are being negotiated. Aid has been sought from the United Nations. China's oil production is being mortgaged years ahead to the import bill, in the hope that the reserves discovered and exploited with Western and Japanese help will be far greater than the needs of the expanding domestic industrial economy. China will need access to the American market, and to be competitive it will need most-favoured-nation treatment. This has not been accorded to the Soviet Union. Can an American administration discriminate between the two major communist powers? Would a desperately underdeveloped China understand if the United States does not so discriminate? Can the West rewrite the Cocom list of prohibited exports to let China off the hook while keeping Russia on it? One suspects that the new pragmatism extends equally, indeed more euphorically, to the West.

Sino-Soviet competition and tension, which have spurred China's new links with the West, have been reinforced by those links. Recent Soviet successes—in Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan and especially in Indochina—have further demonstrated to the Chinese leaders the importance of powerful friends, and there is nowhere to turn but to the West. There are two evident dangers in the dramatic changes that have occurred in Chinese policies: (1) that China will feel riveted into a new great-power configuration and conventional wisdom that will keep the Soviet relationship in unstable tension at a time when Soviet leadership is about to undergo change; and (2) that the new ideology and links with the West will produce a ferment within Chinese society while not adequately satisfying consumer needs. On the other hand, that ferment surely had to come at some time. The stultifying aridity of so much of Maoist doctrine and its accompanying intellectual repression could not continue indefinitely among so vigorous and individual a people. The new technology and capital should help make ' modernisation ' more rapid and its economic benefits more accessible; the new links offer a measure of external security while ' modernisation ' takes place; the new relationships will add a measure of restraint to the Chinese Communist Party's traditional support of

non-governmental revolutionary forces in South and South-east Asia. The stability of the central balance of power in the world has been strengthened by these developments, although the Soviet Union, seeing itself increasingly embattled, may push harder at the margins.

The new diplomacy and the new links are not only with the developed states. A much more pragmatic set of relationships has developed between China and the non-communist states in Africa, Asia, and South America. China has become a far more representative member of the world community with its forms and norms. Undoubtedly, if unmeasurably, ideology has retreated before interests, communism before Chinese-ness. It is now more important to be expert than to be Red. As Deng has said, in what would only two years ago have been punishable heresy: It does not matter whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY TO 1985

THE following contribution continues *International Affairs'* series of articles prepared in connection with Chatham House's current programme on the external policy options facing Britain during the period up to 1985. They commit no one except their particular authors. Previous contributions appeared in the issues of October 1977, January, April, July and October 1978 and January 1979.

VIII: THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM: FROM CONCEPTION TO BIRTH

Jocelyn Statler

THE European Monetary System (EMS) went through a difficult gestation period only to find itself at birth consigned immediately to the incubator, awaiting its parents' pleasure before trying its strength in the turbulent world of the late 1970s. Few observers, a year earlier, foresaw that the European Community would attempt to return to a system of fixed exchange rates within twelve months. The EMS's chances of coming so close to a successful start and then being delayed by one of its former supporters on a technical point connected with the Common Agricultural Policy, would have seemed an even more unlikely prospect. Yet this happened The British government, after proposing a major new initiative early in 1978 to tackle the problems of the international economic and monetary system, based on co-ordinated contributions to economic expansion among all the leading industrial countries, found itself isolated from its European partners. The rest of the Community favoured the EMS, a regional approach, based on a zone of monetary stability.

The discussion of the technical aspects of the EMS, and the accusations against Britain of lack of commitment to European union which accompanied the debate, often obscured the more general principles guiding the different approaches of those concerned. It is now possible, one year from the time at which the EMS was first proposed, to make at least a preliminary survey of how these different approaches evolved in the context of the problems of the international economic and monetary system, and, in the light of developments during the past year, to assess the position in which Britain finds itself.

The background to the EMS

During the late 1970s the leaders of the industrialised world have faced a formidable set of problems: the difficulty of sustaining economic growth

without fuelling inflation and the related problem of reducing high levels of unemployment; the large imbalances in trade surpluses and deficits which have been particularly evident since the oil price rise of 1973; monetary instability; the creeping encroachment of trade protectionism on the free trade system; the threat of energy shortages; and the growing gap between the economies of the advanced and less developed countries.

The break in 1971 with the Bretton Woods system based on gold and fixed exchange rates was followed by a system of floating rates which has been variously blamed for exacerbating the problems of currency instability and praised for helping the Western world to survive the disruptions of the 1970s with a system of relatively free trade still intact. Even after the move to floating rates, the system was still a hybrid one, with the ' dollar overhang ' an unwelcome and increasing ' hangover ' from the days when the dollar was the cornerstone of the Bretton Woods system.[1] Since the dollar has been the chief medium of trade and financial intercourse of the industrial world since the Second World War, its growing weakness has thrown all other international economic and monetary problems into sharper relief. Though the difficulties which were likely to result from its central position as the reserve currency of world finance were foreseen as long ago as 1959,[2] the political and economic strength of the United States numbed any sense of urgency in tackling these problems.

Towards the end of 1977, there were indications that the feeling that ' something must be done ' was about to bear fruit. German criticism of the way the American economy was being run, and the problems of the dollar handled, was becoming more audible; Roy Jenkins had the temerity to suggest that the European Community could help itself through troubled times by reviving the idea of Economic and Monetary Union;[3] the amended Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave it new powers of surveillance over members' exchange rate policies; and in Britain, convalescent after the near-disaster of 1976 when sterling fell to $1.58 to the pound, the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, was beginning to feel that Britain might well share some of its hard-won wisdom with the rest of the world.

Mr. Callaghan was aware of the tensions existing between Bonn and Washington as a result of their differing attitudes to economic problems. His view was that since the international economic system was now integrated to a high degree, a successful approach to its problems required the participation of all its leading members. He used the analogy of a ' convoy ' moving together to describe this approach, as opposed to the earlier suggestion, current in the

1 The Eurocurrency market was estimated by Geoffrey Bell writing in the *The Times*, March 14, 1978, at around $650 billion, 80 per cent of this being in dollar denominated deposits

2 Testimony of Robert Triffin before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress reprinted in Robert Triffin, *Gold and the Dollar Crisis The Future of Convertibility*, rev edn (New Haven Yale University Press, 1961) pp. 3-14

3 The Jean Monnet lecture given by Roy Jenkins in Florence, Oct 1977

OECD and elsewhere in 1977, that the strong economies, by increasing their growth, should act as ' locomotives ' to drag forward the weaker ones. Britain being a country highly dependent on external trade and a large holder of dollar reserves, he was particularly concerned to ensure the co-operation of Japan and the United States.

Mr. Callaghan had been Chancellor of the Exchequer during the 1967 sterling crisis, and Prime Minister in 1976 when sterling's vestigial reserve currency role again caused problems. This had made him sensitive to the difficulties facing the dollar and much aware of the problems which exchange rate fluctuations and large flows of capital from one reserve asset to another could cause. However, unlike the West German Chancellor, Helmud Schmidt, he was not thinking in terms of a return to fixed exchange rates and a regional solution. His five-point plan for economic regeneration[4] was a broadly-based programme, co-ordinating the differing contributions which could be made by all the leading Western industrialised countries. Its main emphasis was on generating higher economic growth, without which he felt the other problems could not be settled. It included energy policies to conserve supplies, an expansion of trade to help guard against protectionism, and an increase in capital flows to developing countries. Currency stability would be promoted within the framework of the IMF, where American involvement could be ensured, as Mr. Callaghan believed that any lasting solution in this area must include the dollar. World economic confidence had to be re-established and, in his view, the way to generate the necessary political will was through careful preparation among Western leaders.

Growth strategy at the IMF and the Bonn Summit

This approach to the problems of the Western economies, based on recovery through economic growth and the use of existing international institutions to carry through these plans, was supported, not surprisingly, by the foremost of these bodies, the OECD and the IMF, and in its main thrust, by the United States.

The results of the IMF's Interim Committee meeting in Mexico City at the end of April illustrate both the extent to which Mr. Callaghan's ideas were in harmony with those of the IMF, and the divergence of opinion between this group and those who agreed with the German approach.[5] The Committee was

4 Made public in his speech at a Finance Houses Association dinner on March 14, 1978. See *The Financial Times*, March 15, 1978.

5 In attempting to clarify the different approaches of the two groups, it is not my intention to suggest that there was a complete dichotomy between them or that elements of each could not be implemented simultaneously. How fundamental the difference was, of course, is a debatable point, though clearly the solutions being put forward by the two leaders reflected the differing economic conditions in their countries and their priorities in dealing with these problems – Germany more concerned in early 1978 with inflation and the effect of dollar depreciation on its export competitiveness, Britain with slow growth and unemployment. The leaders themselves at this time were making every effort to appear to differ on nothing more than a matter of emphasis. At a press conference after their Chequers meeting of April 1978 (*Financial Times*, April 25, 1978), Herr Schmidt said that the two approaches could go hand in hand. He had no wish to organise a European currency zone which would be hostile to the US dollar, in fact the aim of the new arrangements he favoured

chaired by Denis Healey, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, whose report of the meeting[6] emphasised the consensus reached on the general outlines of a co-ordinated strategy for the world economy in the medium term up to 1980. The aim was for non-inflationary growth and decisions were needed to increase demand. However, the risks, both inflationary and to their balance of payments, which would be involved for some countries in stimulating demand, would be reduced if countries with fewer problems in these areas took simultaneous action to increase demand. He then noted the one important disagreement in members' diagnosis of the world situation: a few countries believed that currency instability in itself was the main cause of flagging growth, though there was agreement that adjustments in currency relationships should not be prevented so long as there was divergence in economic performance.

Mr. Healey stressed the British view that it was essential to involve the United States in any solution to these problems when he said, ' the fact that the United States belongs to the majority in the IMF means that any attempt to deal with the world's current problems through action on currency alone is doomed to failure '. He outlined the measures being taken to improve the United States's external economic performance, such as reducing the energy import bill, raising short-term interest rates, and financing the current account deficit through bilateral intervention arrangements with the West Germans and through sales of gold stock. But returning to the need for simultaneous action, he said that even if these measures were successful, ' there will still remain a significant American trade deficit so long as the American economy is growing very much closer to its capacity than the economy of some of its major trading partners '

The Germans did make some concessions in their position during the summer, using their potential for growth as a bargaining counter. When they took over the Presidency of the Community, they announced that they were ready to move their growth rate in return for undertakings from other industrial nations that trade protectionist measures would be renounced.[7]

Further concessions were made at the Bonn economic summit in July at which Japan and the United States were present. In his report to the House of Commons after the meeting,[8] Mr. Callaghan referred to the five-point plan he had put to President Carter and Herr Schmidt in March and described the outcome of the Bonn meeting in terms of progress on these points. Mr. Callaghan announced that there had been agreement that combined action to

would be to stop speculators moving out of dollars into individual European currencies by confronting them with a European block Mr Callaghan said he supported moves to reduce monetary instability, but the economic elements of a new international package must not be forgotten His priority was tackling unemployment through economic growth The Germans also wanted to tackle unemployment, he acknowledged, but not through expansion which they thought would only lead to inflation

6 *IMF Survey*, May 8, 1978, p 129

7 This was announced at a press conference given by Count Lambsdorf, the West German Economics Minister, on July 1, 1978, when discussing what could be done about the EC's economic problems during the German Presidency of the EC beginning from that date

8 *Hansard* July 18, 1978, col 266

reduce inflation and promote growth would contribute to greater currency stability and lessen the pressure for protectionist measures. Germany had agreed, subject to acceptance by its legislature, to boost demand by up to one per cent of its gross national product, or DM 13 billion; Japan undertook to meet its increased growth target of 1·5 per cent over that of 1977 (an increase from 5·4 to 6·9 per cent): Britain would continue to try to control its inflation; and the United States would reduce dependence on imported oil by 2½ million barrels a day by 1985 and raise its oil price to world levels by 1980. If these measures were carried out, Mr. Callaghan could claim some progress, but whether the commitments made at Bonn were entirely realistic was open to doubt.

The OECD was quickly into the field, warning in its economic forecast of July 1978 that there would be a ' growth recession ' if the Bonn pledges were not implemented in full. In fact the German government did act quickly, its cabinet agreeing on a package of tax cuts and increased government spending on July 28, though these could not be implemented until January 1979. The prospects that Japan would be able to reduce its trade surplus, while an appreciating yen was increasing the value of its exports, seemed less likely, as did the chances of President Carter persuading the US Congress to accept his energy policy, which had been meeting opposition ever since he first put forward proposals in April 1977.

While Mr. Callaghan was claiming that his strategy was being carried through, some commentators thought that the summit marked the formal abandonment of the traditional Keynesian belief that by pursuing the right sort of demand management policies the international economy could be rescued from recession.[9] Even if the measures were implemented in full, growth would be lower than had been predicted six months earlier and no country would commit itself to any overall growth target. The weight of opinion of those countries, such as Germany and Japan, which did not think that stimulating demand would be helpful was gaining ground, but the outcome of the conference was also disappointing for the Germans, as the United States made no new commitment to firm measures to counteract the decline of the dollar.

Again it was the British who were pleased with progress made at the IMF's annual meeting in September. Denis Healey, once more taking the chair at the Interim Committee meeting, described the gathering as the best he could remember.[10] Although the record of the past twelve months had been disappointing, he found it encouraging that growth rates were converging and that there had been agreement to work together, if in different ways, those with low inflation rates and a strong balance of payments giving higher priority to faster growth than their less fortunate partners. He referred to a general feeling that currency instability had been one reason why growth had not been faster during the year, but it was also thought that the more convergent performance

9 David Blake, ' Demand Management Takes a Beating ', *The Times*, July 18, 1978.
10 *IMF Survey*, Oct 2, 1978, p 309

of the major industrial countries would reduce this instability in the next year.

With regard to problems more strictly in the monetary sphere, it was the British view that the IMF was the proper forum for settling these, but there were drawbacks to this from the German point of view, because the United States still had a very loud voice in the Fund, and this organisation had not so far proved successful in dealing with the sort of problems which were worrying the Germans. Three of the focal points for problems in the international monetary system are the exchange rate system, international capital movements and the reserve system. On the first point, the IMF was still adapting itself to take control of the system of floating exchange rates it had officially recognised in 1976 and over which, under its new Articles of Agreement, it had been given powers of surveillance. Just as the Committee of Twenty[11] had been recommending a return to fixed rates when floating was *de rigueur*, so now the IMF was coming to terms with floating as Europe was turning back to fixed rates. On the second point, the IMF does not control international capital movements or regulate international banking, so those who were worried about the destabilising effects of capital flows found nothing to comfort them in the outcome of the annual meeting. Finally, on measures to alleviate the problems of the international reserve system, the outcome at the time did not seem a great deal more promising, although the significance of the measures adopted did not become clear until the following January, a point taken up in the conclusion of this paper.

The IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR) is a unit of account which the Fund hopes will one day successfully fill the role of international reserve asset, and it was agreed at this meeting to increase the interest rate on the SDR in order to make it a more attractive asset for central banks to hold. It was also agreed to increase world liquidity by adding about 20 billion SDRs ($25 billion) to the IMF's total resources once the seventh annual quota review was ratified. This move was hardly calculated to lessen German anxiety about excess liquidity in the system, although the Germans found themselves voting for it in the process of bargaining to prevent an even larger rise. The British, and especially Mr. Callaghan, have favoured an increased role for the SDR.

The British had also supported the IMF's other scheme for attempting to do something about the dollar overhang through the Witteveen substitution account. This scheme, put forward by Johannes Witteveen, the former Managing Director of the IMF, would have allowed central banks to convert some of their dollar holdings into SDRs, with the IMF keeping the dollars in a substitution account. The Germans opposed this plan because it did not place any obligation on the United States to reduce its balance-of-payments deficit, and by the September meeting the British had also lost interest in it. The Americans had no wish to see the IMF emerging as the United States's main

11 Set up in July 1972 by the Governors of the IMF to advise on the reform of the international monetary system. See Brian Tew, *The Evolution of the International Monetary System 1945–77* (London, Hutchinson, 1977).

creditor, so it was left to IMF officials to support a scheme to which everyone else was indifferent.[12]

Just before the IMF conference, President Carter introduced policies which it was hoped would help to maintain the value of the dollar. At the meeting, he expressed support for the IMF in its strengthened role and said he realised the importance which a strong dollar had for the nations represented there. At this stage, however, his words were not sufficient to displace, so far as sceptics like the Germans were concerned, an already firmly established view of American attitudes to the reform of the international monetary system and the reserve role of the dollar. These attitudes were reflected in a speech made earlier in the year by Michael Blumenthal, US Treasury Secretary, in which he expressed the opinion that the only responsible choice for the United States was to make the flexible exchange rate system work. 'We do not look to a revision of the international monetary system, nor to a change in the role of the dollar in that system, nor to other devices such as the introduction of a substitution account to replace dollars with SDRs.' The impression this speech gave was that any reforms which did occur would be in the very long term and that those who saw the dollar as at the heart of the problem of instability in the international monetary system would get little encouragement from the United States in their search for immediate remedial action.[13]

The German approach

The German attitude to economic policy during the 1970s has been much influenced by a fear of inflation, stemming from the experiences of the 1920s, and, more recently, by a conviction that progress in dealing with the problems of the international economy could only be made by a basic restructuring of economies and not through demand-led growth. Herr Schmidt's attitude to monetary reform developed from his assessment of America's policies and a growing conviction that Europe must take some remedial action on its own if progress were to be made. His criticisms of the way the Carter administration managed its economic policies was motivated by the direct effect the plight of the dollar was having on the German economy. For some time the German government had been urging the Americans to take firm measures to stem the decline of the dollar by correcting the United States's large balance-of-payments deficit, by implementing effective energy conservation policies and by more determined intervention in the currency markets.

The early emphasis which the Carter administration put on curing the underlying causes of the loss of competitiveness of American goods, rather than preventing the decline of the dollar, which, for the time, made their goods more competitive in world markets, did not reassure the Germans. They had

12 See J. de Vries, 'Saving the Dollar', *The World Today*, Jan 1979.

13 Michael Blumenthal's speech was reported in *The Financial Times*, May 25, 1978. Again speaking later that year, an official of the Federal Reserve said that there was no point in building up the SDR into an alternative reserve asset as this might precipitate abandonment of the dollar with highly disruptive consequences. *Guardian*, Sept. 11, 1978.

seen the D-mark appreciate by some 26 per cent against the dollar from the end of 1975 to the beginning of 1978. It was feared at that time that American success in winning back a larger share of world markets in manufactured goods would be at the expense of German products. Although the Americans would have liked to see the Germans expanding their economy in order to absorb more American exports and thus help the dollar, the Germans took the view that the rising value of the D-mark was one of the factors which squeezed industrial profits and discouraged investment, making expansion very difficult. The Germans would have preferred to see the United States supporting its currency vigorously, since switching funds into the D-mark, which occurred when the dollar declined, not only forced up the value of the D-mark, but increased the trend towards using that currency for reserve and trading purposes. The Germans have resisted the development of a reserve currency role for the D-mark with controls on currency inflows and ownership of financial assets, but this has not prevented the D-mark from replacing the pound sterling as the second most widely held currency in foreign exchange reserves.[14] The Germans feared the inflationary impact this could have on their domestic economy and wanted to avoid the prominence it would give their economic leadership of Europe, a role in which they still felt uneasy.

One of the strongest arguments for a fixed exchange rate system is that it will bring about a revival in business confidence (though this argument is very difficult to document) and Herr Schmidt was much aware of the complaints from the German business community early in 1978 over the adverse effects of fluctuating exchange rates on new investment. The rise in value of the D-mark caused difficulties for large industries such as the German chemical industry, but Herr Schmidt made the plight of small to medium sized firms, which did not have the large resources of the big firms to help them adjust, his particular concern.[15]

During 1978 Herr Schmidt's lack of confidence in the Carter administration's ability to implement satisfactory policies was increased when the series of measures referred to by Mr. Healey at the IMF in April proved ineffective. Even the much delayed anti-inflation programme, introduced on November 1 and welcomed by the Germans, did not stop the continued decline of the dollar. There was an evident anomaly in the position of a group of

14. *World Foreign Exchange Reserves*

1970	*per cent*	*1977*	*per cent*
US dollars	80.9	US dollars	81.2
Sterling	9.0 ($3.23bn)	Sterling	1.5 ($2.6bn)
D Marks	2.1 ($747.6m)	D Marks	6.9 ($11.93bn)
Total	$35.6bn	Total	$173.1bn

Commerzbank Report. *The Financial Times*, July 29, 1978.

15. In an interview given to *The Financial Times* of Jan. 2, 1979, Herr Schmidt said, "We cannot remain indifferent to the difficulties of these small and medium sized businesses in coping with the incalculable risks caused by exchange rate turbulence. Many of these entrepreneurs oriented their business to Community markets at a time of fixed exchange rates. In my view EMS will provide us with a good opportunity to give them the conditions in which they will be able to calculate and plan more reliably — and hence give a new incentive to their spirit of enterprise."

countries, potentially an economic super-power, which if enlarged to twelve members would have a gross domestic product almost equal to that of the United States itself, yet which found itself less than fully independent because of its vulnerability to the strengths and weaknesses of the dollar. Although Herr Schmidt did not think the time was right for Germany to take too prominent a role in the leadership of Europe, the situation was frustrating for a man with clear ideas on what ought to be done. His feeling that Europe should begin to take care of its own interests was strengthened by differences of opinion with the Carter administration on other non-economic issues such as the neutron bomb and nuclear non-proliferation policy, which made it increasingly clear that Europe's interest was not always identical with that of the United States. It was against this background that Herr Schmidt's own Euro-centric plan was evolved.

The Bremen proposals

Mr. Callaghan's efforts to reconcile the views of President Carter and Herr Schmidt and bring them together under the umbrella of his five-point plan were not sufficient to prevent the German leader from going ahead with his ideas for closer monetary union in Europe. The broad outline of his plan was first put to other members of the Community at a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen on April 7, 1978. The previous weekend the German Chancellor had been discussing with President Giscard d'Estaing the possibility of France's return to the ' snake '.[16] This suggests that the ideas he put to his colleagues at Copenhagen developed from that meeting with Giscard d'Estaing when it was made clear to him that France desired to co-operate in a ' zone of monetary stability ', as the French President described it, but did not wish to suffer the ignominy of returning to precisely the same arrangement from which it had already been twice forced to withdraw. Herr Schmidt's plan was certainly still in seminal form at Copenhagen and was not made known to the general public until after the Bremen meeting of EC heads of government on July 6 and 7, when it was described in an annex to the communiqué, which still left many points to be defined more precisely.

Although the new arrangement was to be at least as strict as the ' snake ' with regard to exchange-rate movements, other features in it allowed the French to claim that it was something more than the old ' snake ' under a new name. The European Currency Unit (ECU), having the same definition as the already existing European Unit of Account (EUA), was to be at the centre of the system and was to be used as a means of settlement between Community monetary authorities. This could be regarded as a possible ' earnest of

16 The ' snake ' was an arrangement set up in April 1972 to reduce exchange rate fluctuations by restricting members' currencies within a narrow band of 2¼ per cent within the wider band of 4½ per cent (known as the ' tunnel ') allowed by the Smithsonian agreement. EC members of the ' snake ' in 1978 included West Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries. France had previously been a member, but had to withdraw once in 1974 and again in 1976.

intention to move to a common currency some time in the future '.[17] There was to be a pooling of members' reserves to the extent of 20 per cent of their gold and foreign currency holdings and an equivalent amount of their national currencies, which promised to offer more than the rather meagre amounts available to back exchange rates for members of the ' snake ' through swop arrangements and mutual assistance among central banks. A European Monetary Fund was to take over from the European Monetary Co-operation Fund not later than two years after the start of the scheme, and this might be seen as a precursor of a central monetary authority. Already the arrangement called for intensified consultations to co-ordinate exchange rate policies vis-à-vis third countries and for co-ordination of dollar interventions to avoid simultaneous reverse interventions. The scheme had the makings of a significant advance on the ' snake ', but much depended on the way it was interpreted and implemented.

Although France had economic problems similar to those of the other weaker members of the Community, the French President gave his enthusiastic support to Herr Schmidt's proposals. After the Copenhagen summit meeting, when the form of the proposed arrangement had still not been made clear to the public, Giscard d'Estaing commented that a ' zone of monetary stability ' in Europe was essential for economic recovery, thus indicating the main focus of his interest in the scheme. His aim and that of Raymond Barre, the Prime Minister responsible for the ' Plan Barre ', was to restructure the French economy so that by the late 1980s, France would be able to compete with Germany and Japan in the top industrial league, rather than with countries producing less sophisticated goods. A period of relative exchange rate stability would be needed to build confidence in the commercial and industrial sectors, and for this purpose the French President preferred a system of fixed to one of floating exchange rates.

Giscard d'Estaing wanted to see France sharing the leadership of Europe with Germany, partly from national pride and partly from fear of German dominance if France did not keep pace with its powerful neighbour, and while he is more of an Atlanticist than his predecessors, the opportunity to assert Europe's independence would always be regarded as an asset by a section of his domestic political audience.

Unfortunately Mr. Callaghan's initial reactions to Herr Schmidt's proposals set a negative tone, which made the other EC members suspicious of British intentions. The ideas put to him at Copenhagen must have seemed quite out of tune with the approach he himself favoured and for which he felt he had international backing in the form of support from the IMF. But he agreed to

17 Geoffrey Denton, ' European Monetary Co-operation The Bremen Proposals ', *The World Today*, Nov 1978, p 442

See also an extract from an address given at the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Sir Jeremy Morse, reprinted in *The Banker*, January 1979, where he describes one of the more fundamental, long term aspects of the EMS as ' the development of the ECU as an infant European currency which may one day stand beside the dollar '

appoint one of the 'three wise men' who were to explore further the Schmidt plan. The French and German representatives, Bernard Clappier, Governor of the Bank of France and Horst Schulman, Schmidt's economic adviser, were to concentrate on the details of how the plan might work, while the British representative, Ken Couzens of the Treasury, was to subject their suggestions to close technical examination. The Treasury had played an active part in developing Mr. Callaghan's five-point plan and some of its members were not in favour of the alternative scheme which looked to them very like a return to a mini-Bretton Woods. Ken Couzens was not present at the last meeting of the three wise men, when the version of the EMS presented to heads of government at Bremen was put together and Mr. Callaghan was left ill-prepared for that summit. Herr Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing met in Hamburg at the end of June to add their finishing touches to the proposals. Though Denis Healey did something to improve the image of the British negotiators by taking a more constructive approach at meetings of the EC Finance Council in May and June, in the period leading up to the Bremen meeting the Prime Minister and his advisers underestimated the strength behind other Community members' resolve to push on with the plans for the EMS. The ill-feeling at Bremen over the EMS did not prevent the Nine from arriving at a united position for the Bonn international summit on July 16-17, but it was evident that it would be very difficult to reconcile Britain's approach with that of its EC partners sufficiently for the British to be able to join the EMS from the proposed starting date of January 1979.

During the summer and autumn of 1978, the Community's financial and economic experts were putting the Bremen proposals into a form which could actually be implemented on January 1. The British negotiators believed that if the Community continued with the concerted action set out in Mr. Callaghan's five point plan to increase growth and reduce inflation, the right foundation for the introduction of European monetary union would be laid.[18] However, if the EMS were to go ahead before these conditions had been achieved, it must contain provisions to help bring about convergence of economic performance among the members of the Community. At British insistence, the Presidency statement following the Bremen summit called for studies of the measures needed to strengthen the economies of the less prosperous member countries, which were to be carried out at the same time as the preparatory work on the exchange rate and credit aspects of the system.

In its Green Paper the government laid down the characteristics which the system must incorporate to bring it into line with the British approach. The order of priorities was consistent with Britain's policy on economic regeneration. First, the emphasis was on growth to counter unemployment and on symmetrical obligations to ensure that surplus countries did their share to help those in deficit, followed by a reference to the need for adequate funds for intervention and freedom to realign exchange rates. Finally, points which

18 See the Green Paper *The European Monetary System* Cmnd 7405 (London HMSO Nov 1978)

had been neglected in the negotiations, but which were important to Britain, such as relations with other currencies and the IMF, and progress towards convergence of economic performance, including transfers of resources, were called for.

The main points of controversy

To many people, one of the surprising things to emerge from the debate over British membership of the EMS was the fact that although one of the fundamental issues was the nature of the scheme as a fixed exchange rate arrangement, the government itself did not seem very disturbed over the prospect of maintaining sterling within the prescribed narrow bands. If Britain had become a member, it was made clear that sterling would not have joined the lira in the concessionary 6 per cent fluctuation margin which was offered to members who had previously been floating their currency. Then, after the decision was taken not to go into the scheme, it was announced that in any case it was Britain's intention to hold sterling steady against its main trading partners, including those participating in the EMS. This was to be done with the help of restrained wage claims, and through firm control of the money supply. It seemed that the government did not intend to allow the value of the pound to fall, yet the issue round which domestic debate had fretted was whether the government should give up its freedom to devalue. This had been the central theme in the argument of Britain's three leading economic research institutes, which all came down against immediate membership of the EMS for Britain.[19]

Although the pendulum of fashion in monetary policy was swinging away from floating rates, there was a feeling among these institutes that the growing awareness of the inflationary repercussions of a depreciating currency had tended to overshadow the evidence that, with an effective price change, depreciation of the exchange rate could have a beneficial effect on price competitiveness and that this advantage was only eroded after a period of some years. The government would not be justified in giving up the freedom to devalue, since there was no evidence that the simple tying together of the exchange rates of a high-inflation country with those of a low-inflation country would result in convergence on the lower rate. The institutes rejected the concept of external discipline as a means of forcing the government to stick to low inflation policies which would otherwise be politically unpopular.[20]

19 The General Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee conducted hearings in November 1978 on the proposed EMS. The evidence was brought together in the First Report from the Expenditure Committee Session 1978-79. *The European Monetary System* (London: HMSO, Nov. 1978). Among those presenting papers were the three institutes mentioned above, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge, and the London Business School. The last of these, while concluding that immediate membership of the EMS would require deflationary policies which would be too costly in terms of slower growth and unemployment, favoured phased entry over a period of two years during which time the inflation rate could be brought down to 4 per cent (a rate which would make participation in the scheme feasible) without unacceptable consequences.

20 In contrast, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, in their pamphlet, '*The Case for EMS*' (London: Nov. 1978) expressed the view that external discipline in the form of the requirement to

The pendulum had not, in fact, swung back all the way to rigidly fixed rates. The EMS was not designed to prevent necessary parity changes.[21] Adjustments of central rates were to be allowed, subject to mutual agreement, and those who needed to make changes were likely to receive a sympathetic response, since it was far more generally accepted by 1978 than it had been under the Bretton Woods system that it was unwise to try to resist market forces when there was a genuine need for parity changes.[22]

The aim of the new system, which would be better described as an adjustable peg than a fixed rate system, was to give greater assurance to business and manufacturing industry of a period of stability during which forward planning could be carried out with greater confidence. The simple act of fixing the exchange rates would not of itself produce stability. Any government committed to fixed rates would have to follow anti-inflationary policies in all spheres of the economy to achieve the necessary conditions to prevent the rate falling. Had the emphasis of the government's discussion been on the costs and feasibility of following these policies, there would have been more consideration of the sort of phased entry to the scheme that the London Business School suggested. This, however, would have committed the government publicly to achieving a series of targets for reducing inflation. It preferred to express the hope that inflation would be suitably reduced.

The other technical issue connected with exchange rate mechanisms which received a great deal of attention was the ' grid ' versus ' basket ' controversy. It has been doubted whether this problem justified the amount of time spent on it, but it was in fact of central importance in determining whether the scheme which finally emerged would be more in line with Mr. Callaghan's or Herr Schmidt's approach to economic problems.

The ' snake ' arrangement had worked on the basis of a parity ' grid ' under which, when exchange rate divergence occurred, two currencies always reached their intervention margins at the same time, even if the divergence were caused by a strong currency rising in value. The weak currency country would have to draw on its reserves or adopt deflationary policies to correct the situation. The strong currency country could expand its reserves and might over-shoot its money supply targets in the process, but would not be under any obligation to expand its economy. It was this situation, reminiscent of a weakness of the Bretton Woods system, which the British government was referring to when it said it wanted ' symmetry of obligation ' in the new scheme which it believed would be imposed if the ' basket ' mechanism were adopted. Under this system, currencies would fluctuate within agreed margins against the ' basket ' of currencies making up the European Currency Unit

defend the exchange rate would be very helpful ' EMS offers some immediate chance of imposing a much needed discipline on British governments to resist short term political palliatives at the expense of long term economic stability '

21 Neither was the Bretton Woods system, but, in practice, there was no pressure on strong currencies to revalue and the climate of opinion worked against devaluing weak currencies, except in extreme cases

22 The West German Bundesbank supports this attitude, as was made clear by its President, Dr Otmar Emminger in a lecture on the EMS at the London School of Economics on Dec 12, 1978

and when one currency reached its permitted margin, there would not necessarily be another currency at the other end of the band. As the D-mark was most likely to be the divergent rising currency, this system would place strong pressure on the Germans to adopt policies of internal monetary expansion and/or capital exports.[23]

Although at first Britain had some backing for this approach from the weaker members of the Community, a compromise was adopted when the French decided not to stand out against the Germans in support of the ' basket '.[24] After a weekend meeting at Aachen with Herr Schmidt in mid-September, the French President decided that it was not worth the risk of weakening German commitment to the overall scheme by pressing too hard for the ' basket '. Instead, a compromise arrangement suggested by Jacques van Ypersele of Belgium was accepted, in which the new system would operate under a parity ' grid ', but the ' basket ' mechanism would be incorporated to act as a warning, or ' rattle snake ', to indicate when an individual currency was getting out of line. This did not entirely settle the question, however, for having made this concession, the weaker countries then tried to ensure that the obligation to take corrective action after a warning from the ' rattle snake ' should be as strong as possible, while the Germans were determined not to be coerced. This was finally settled by an agreement which stated that when a currency crosses its threshold of divergence, this would result in a ' presumption ' that the authorities concerned will take corrective action. This would not be an absolute obligation, but if a country did not take action, ' the reasons for this shall be given to the other authorities '.[25]

The external relations of the EMS

The increased stability that the EMS is intended to bring to currencies within the scheme will be useful, since a high proportion of EC members' trade is intra-Community trade. However, their currencies will not be insulated from fluctuations in currencies outside the scheme, though they will move in greater unison than under a floating rate regime.

Mr. Callaghan's preference was to deal with monetary and economic problems together and at an international level, and from the start he regarded the EMS as too narrow an approach. The conditions set out in the Green Paper specified that the EMS should reinforce efforts to improve currency stability

23 The arguments on this point have been set out in a paper by Andrew Shonfield put before the General Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee in its hearings on the EMS In it, Professor Shonfield argues that ' the adoption of the " basket " system would have made it clear from the start that Germany was buying European collaboration in the business of resisting the international movement to turn the D Mark into a key currency, and was ready to adapt its own internal policies to that end ' In favour of the scheme, he argued that with Germany committed to a sustained policy of economic expansion, fulfilling its potential as an *engine of economic growth, there was a chance of getting the other members to conduct their* affairs in such a way as to reduce steadily their rate of inflation

24 Two useful articles for those interested in the mechanics of the final exchange rate arrangements are, ' EMS Brief: What's Left of the ECU? ', *The Economist*, Dec 9, 1978, p 20 and Samuel Brittan, ' How EMS Will Work ', *The Financial Times*, Jan 4, 1979, which goes into some detail on the subject

25. *The European Monetary System*, Cmnd 7419 (London HMSO, Dec 1978), Section 3 6

world-wide and should not be detrimental to other currencies such as the dollar, or to the standing of the IMF. These aspects of the system, which the British regard as very important, received little discussion before the December summit. It was accepted that the system should not challenge the authority of the IMF, but there were suspicions that the EMS would undermine that body's surveillance powers and threaten its policy of phasing out gold from international transactions with its own exchange rate and reserve fund arrangements.

Considering that the importance of relations with the dollar was among Herr Schmidt's reasons for promoting the scheme, this aspect was given remarkably little attention, perhaps because it was such a sensitive topic. American attitudes to the EMS have varied from a cautious welcome, to guarded hostility at the time of the Bonn summit when it became clear that it was largely concern about the state of the dollar that was behind the proposals for the EMS. The general tone of American reactions—a desire to see the scheme in a positive light so long as it did not have a directly detrimental effect on the dollar or on the role of the IMF—was reflected in a speech by Cyrus Vance, US Secretary of State, at a Chatham House meeting in London in December 1978 when he reasserted the long-established American policy, 'a strong Europe is good for a strong America'.

At this level, the EMS was not seen as necessarily presenting a threat to the dollar or the stability of the international system. The American administration was satisfied that the current account of the United States would soon show an improvement over the large deficit for 1978 as the economy slowed down and exports were helped by a revival in Europe and Japan. Private bankers, however, were concerned about the state of the capital account[26] which they feared would show a worsening trend unless diversification out of the dollar were controlled. If the EMS were successful and helped to stabilise European currencies, the move out of the dollar into new and more attractive reserve assets could accelerate. Dr. Emminger, the President of the West German Bundesbank, was not prepared to offer much consolation to the Americans. He made known his opinion that ultimately it was up to them whether or not the new EMS brought disadvantages for the dollar. If in the long term the Europeans achieved more price stability and the Americans had less success in their battle against inflation, some dollar holders might orientate themselves on the EMS instead.[27]

The problem of trying to find a way of smoothing the adjustment process in the international monetary system has occupied economists increasingly since the dollar overhang began to burgeon. At the end of 1969, US government indebtedness and banks' liabilities to foreigners was $78 billion, and by the end of 1977 had reached $363 billion. The obverse of this coin, at that time, was the large surpluses of countries like Germany, Japan and some OPEC states.

26 *Business Week*, Oct 9, 1978

27 *The Financial Times*, Dec 22, 1978

Within the EMS, as has been mentioned, one of Mr. Callaghan's main points in the early stages of bargaining was that there must be a symmetry of obligation among member countries to adjust, falling on both surplus and deficit countries. A basket arrangement would have helped to ensure that surplus countries with strong currencies were obliged to take corrective measures to expand their economies rather than increasing their surpluses. The Germans only agreed to a weak version of this arrangement and continued their policy of intervention to keep the D-mark rate from rising as fast as it might have done, thus slowing the decline in profitability which was already encouraging a switch to investment overseas. So internally, the EMS is only a first step in the adjustment process, and at the international level, though it may have a stabilising influence, there are doubts about the extent of the contribution it can make. Ironically, for a scheme which originally arose out of uncertainty over the American currency, its success will depend very much on the stability of the dollar.

If the value of the dollar should increase, the weaker currencies in Europe will come under pressure. If the dollar should fall, the upward pressure on the D-mark will increase. This does not mean that the EMS is in itself unhelpful. If business confidence in Europe is restored and particularly if the Germans expand their economy, this could help the Americans. Clearly, co-ordination of policies will be necessary - one of the elements of Mr Callaghan's plan which continues to be relevant.

In the later stages of the bargaining over the EMS, the weaker economies of the Community began to press for the transfer of resources through direct subsidies, one of the points Mr. Callaghan had insisted should be studied after Bremen. Britain made this a major issue in its decision on membership, though some economists questioned the extent to which transfers of this sort could help to bring about the industrial restructuring and regeneration that Britain needs.[28] Within countries like Britain, there are resource transfers from the prosperous to the less prosperous regions, but the EC budget is not nearly large enough to bring about a redistribution of wealth on anything like a similar scale.[29] In his Mansion House speech of November 13, Mr. Callaghan took the opportunity to point out that on his calculations Britain will become a net contributor to the budget by 1980. Seventy per cent of the EC's small budget goes to agriculture, from which allocation Britain does not greatly benefit. With arrangements as they were, the situation for Britain and the weaker countries was not set to improve. However, the level of transfers necessary to

28. Frank Blackaby in his evidence to the General Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee, reprinted in *The Banker*, Jan. 1979, pp. 21-27, argued that the "competitive weakness of the United Kingdom appears to arise from factors which cannot easily be remedied by resource transfers from other countries - unless, say, West Germany were prepared to transfer one of its successful exporting plants from Germany to the United Kingdom. This is hardly likely."

29. See Sir Donald MacDougall's Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration, Brussels, April 1977. In a letter to the *Financial Times* of December 6, 1978 Sir Donald pointed out that in order to bring about within the Community the sort of support for depressed areas which occurs within individual countries, a budget of some 5-7 per cent of Community gross domestic product instead of the present 2-2½ per cent would be necessary.

make a significant contribution of the sort that was being called for, would only be possible within a much closer federal union of European states, something which Britain was arguing against in other contexts. Britain's tactics—on the one hand, expecting more help from the Community and on the other, unwilling to show any enthusiasm for the benefits that it could provide—are not calculated to convince its partners that it has grasped the significance of the *acquis communautaire*.

The Brussels summit—Britain's decision

The leaders of the Nine met once more on December 4-5 in Brussels to consider the product of their officials' labours and their own negotiations. In its final form[30] the EMS is an improvement on the original Bremen proposals from the point of view of those who feared the deflationary effects of a fixed rate system and wanted greater emphasis on measures to aid growth in the weaker countries, though the improvement was perhaps more to be seen in the doors it left open for the future than in its immediate commitments. It allows for the adjustment of central rates, subject to agreement by other member countries and, though rates are based on a ' grid ' parity system, it contains the compromise, referred to earlier, which incorporates some elements of the ' basket ' arrangement. Once again, much will depend on the attitudes of the members in implementing these provisions. The ECU is still to be at the centre of the system and will be used as a means of settlement between monetary authorities of the Community, leaving open its future as a possible reserve currency unit. A Reserve Fund of reasonably impressive proportions will be set up and credit arrangements giving access to a total of 25 billion ECU will be available—a satisfactory response to Mr. Callaghan's condition that adequate funds should be provided to back the scheme. Britain's requirements with relation to other countries and organisations have been recognised in that intervention will be carried out in participating currencies to help take some strain off the dollar, policies are to be concerted with those of other authorities as far as possible, and the EMS is to be fully compatible with the relevant articles of the IMF.

Section B of the European Council's resolution on the EMS is entirely concerned with ' Measures designed to strengthen the economies of the less prosperous member states ', but belies the promise of its title by stating that although steps must be taken to strengthen the economic potential of the less prosperous countries of the Community, ' this is primarily the responsibility of the member states concerned '. Italy and Ireland found the final provisions in this section disappointing. They were offered loans over a five-year period of up to 1 billion EUAs, (EUA = US 1.31171 as at December 6, 1978) through the EMS and the European Investment Bank and also interest rate subsidies for these loans, but France vetoed any use of the Regional Development Fund to

30. See *The European Monetary System*, Cmnd 7419, *op cit.*, and the European Council Resolution on EMS, Dec 5, 1978

transfer aid to them on a larger scale, something which West Germany would have been willing to consider. The French position has always been that France should be a net beneficiary of this fund, and at a time when President Giscard d'Estaing was under criticism from the Gaullists and Communists for his weakness towards the Community, he could not afford to allow this further concession.

At the summit, Germany, France and the Benelux countries, which had never had any serious doubts about joining the EMS, accepted the scheme. But neither the Italian nor the Irish prime minister would commit himself. They returned home, Signor Andreotti to assess whether he could get enough support in the Italian Parliament to ensure acceptance of the terms offered, and Mr. Lynch to negotiate for additional bilateral loans from some of the richer members of the Community. By mid-December both governments had decided that it was better to go in than to stay out and become members of the lower tier of a two-tier Community. The Irish had obtained sufficient concessions to offset the costs of breaking with the pound sterling, and the Italian government, having assured itself of the necessary support in parliament, welcomed the external constraint (which the British had rejected) to help with its three-year economic reconstruction plan.

When Britain's decision on membership was taken, Mr. Callaghan, having consulted with his Cabinet during the week before the Brussels summit, may have decided that the EMS could not be reconciled with the sort of strategy for economic recovery that he favoured and that its deflationary effects, even though it was no longer a ' fixed ' exchange rate system, were too great to risk until the British inflation rate had been brought down to something closer to the German rate. Or he may have felt that, even though the final form of the EMS meant that there would be little difference in actual economic policy whether Britain was inside or outside the scheme, the strength of feeling against membership among the left wing of the Labour Party made membership at that stage politically impossible.

At all events, Britain did not join. Neither did the EMS get off the ground on January 1. France, at a meeting of Community agriculture ministers on December 20, insisted that the future of Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs) within the Common Agricultural Policy must be settled before the scheme could commence.[31] This apparent *volte face* from ardent support for Herr Schmidt's initiative, to uncompromising pursuit of national self-interest, should have surprised no one, coming as it did from the country that in 1965 kept the EC institutions suspended for seven months when it did not approve of

31 MCAs are subsidies and levies on farm exports which neutralise the effects on national farm prices of currency fluctuations, and it had been agreed in principle at the Brussels summit that these should be phased out gradually However, when it became a matter of taking immediate action on MCAs, national interests were so much at variance among the Germans, French and British over a settlement of this issue, and the problems of the CAP with which it was entangled, that France's stand threatened to prolong the delayed introduction of the EMS until some political trade-off had been arranged between heads of government, or as part of the annual farm price review

a proposal from the Commission.[32] The consequence was that Britain no longer stood out as a lone defender of national self-interest. Mr. Callaghan was able to tell the House of Commons, when reporting on the Brussels meeting, that ' national considerations by all nine members prevailed over their attempt to get international agreement '.

The decision to allow countries which were not full members of the scheme to join in the partial pooling of reserve funds and the medium-term credit facilities has enabled Britain to retain a toe-hold in the arrangements and to participate in discussions on its future development. This, plus the provisions for late entry included in the final agreement, has left Britain in a far more favourable position than seemed likely during the more rancorous moments of the negotiations early last year. It will still be possible to join the EMS at a later date if and when Britain's inflation rate is more in line with that of the EMS's stronger members.

Conditions for the establishment of the EMS are now more favourable. In Europe generally there is greater acceptance that price stability and monetary stability have to be given a higher priority in economic policy planning and there is increased determination to fight inflation, although it must be admitted that at present there are local difficulties over the wage restraint element in several anti-inflation programmes. The basis for the new system has been strengthened by improvements in the balance of payments of the major European countries, where there is now equilibrium or surplus, and a further development is the acknowledgment that where exchange rate changes are inevitable, they should be made without delay.[33] At the international level, there is a more positive attitude by the United States to developments in the international monetary system, which would include the EMS as a regional organisation, possibly supplying one of a diverse new range of reserve assets to remove gradually some of the burden from the dollar.[34] With the United States ready to accept the EMS as a preferred partner in international bargaining, the prospects of being left outside a successful union would give Britain serious pause for thought.

Mr. Callaghan saw the EMS as the precursor of a wider scheme to include the dollar, but he may, once again, have underestimated the forces working towards the establishment of a regional arrangement, more feasible in the medium term and more adaptable to the requirements of its members than an international arrangement. British policy-makers are still faced with a choice. Either they can commit themselves to a new endeavour as part of ' one important group of countries achieving conditions of monetary stability for the

32 See Roy Pryce, *The Politics of the European Community* (London Butterworth for the Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Sussex, 1973), p 18

33. Similar points were made in Dr Emminger's lecture, *op cit*

34 Significant changes of emphasis in the United States' attitudes to reform of the international monetary system were made clear in an address to a Chatham House meeting given by Anthony M Solomon, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs, US Treasury, on January 12, 1979, when he indicated that the United States now supports a stronger role for the IMF, with the SDR and other national or regional currencies developing as alternative reserve assets alongside the dollar

greater part of their trade ',[35] or they can wait for progress at the international level, hoping that they do not get left behind if the rest of the Community moves ahead within its zone of monetary stability. The opportunity to join the EMS remains open after the Brussels summit. The logic of developments in the international system point in favour of working from within a strong regional grouping, even if this particular attempt at an EMS proves no more than a trial run. But a clear national consensus on Britain's place either inside or outside Europe is lacking; so is the will within either of the major parties to build such a consensus.

35 Paul Volcker, President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, in the Fred Hirsch Memorial Lecture, given at the University of Warwick on Nov 9, 1978

' COLLUSION ' AND THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 *

Geoffrey Warner

TWO of the most frequent objections levelled at contemporary historians when they attempt to illuminate the recent past are that they do not possess sufficient perspective and that, in many cases, the archives are not yet open for research. The first implies that some necessary interval has to elapse between an event and the historian's attempt to discuss it, but proponents of this view rarely enlighten us as to the length of the interval in question. Are we now able, for example, to see the First World War in proper perspective? Or the French Revolution? To ask these questions is to expose the falsity of the problem, for our perspective is of course continually changing. The second objection presupposes that we do not have enough information to reconstruct what happened with a reasonable degree of accuracy, but that if we wait until that day—thirty, fifty or one hundred years after the event—when the historian is allowed into the archives, all will be revealed. Neither of these presuppositions is in my view correct.

As far as the first is concerned, the reader is simply invited to contrast what is already available in the form of first-hand testimony on the subject of this article—the Suez crisis of 1956—with the sources available for the study of, say, the British Isles in the fifth century AD. Historians of that period would give a great deal to have the equivalent of even the most partial of the Suez memoirs, but its absence quite rightly does not prevent them from producing a great deal of valuable history.

The second presupposition—that the truth is only to be found in the archives—displays an excessive faith in the integrity and procedures of the politicians and officials responsible for producing the documents which eventually find their way there. Confining ourselves to British policy, we would do well to bear in mind Lord Tedder's strictures upon the integrity of official records. These ' are not perhaps the ideal, and certainly not the whole, source on which to have to rely ', he wrote in the preface to his war memoirs. ' I expect that most of us have seen, sometimes with amusement and sometimes with anger, reports and orders obviously worded with an eye to the future historian, or, as we used to call them, " for the record ". The wording of signals and orders " for the record " is a very fine art and well calculated to fox the historian.'[1] There are doubtless many documents on the Suez crisis which were written ' for the record '; indeed, we shall have occasion to refer to one in due course.

* An earlier version of this article was delivered as an inaugural lecture at the University of Leicester on Oct 24, 1978.

1 A W T Tedder, *With Prejudice* (London Cassell, 1966), p ii

When we turn to procedures, we find that these sometimes conceal as much as they reveal. One might suppose, for example, that since the Cabinet is reputedly the principal locus of decision within the British system of government, its records are particularly informative. In reality, however, Cabinet minutes are among the blandest official records in existence. As Patrick Gordon Walker, himself a former Cabinet minister, has written, they ' give no indication of the order in which the points were made: they are always marshalled pro and con. There is no way of telling who spoke or even how many Ministers spoke. Not all the points made in argument are recorded. No indication is given of the tone or temper of the debate '.[2] Two of Lord Gordon Walker's Cabinet colleagues, moreover, are on record to the effect that the minutes can sometimes be quite misleading even in what they do say.[3]

In the case of the Suez crisis, there are some even more intractable problems. Evidence exists, as we shall see, that normal bureaucratic routines were not always observed: officials were purposely excluded from important meetings and not told what had taken place; records were deliberately not kept of certain vital discussions, and so on. There are even suggestions that documents have been wilfully destroyed. The Israeli Prime Minister in 1956, David Ben-Gurion, told the American journalist, Cyrus Sulzberger, almost twelve years later that ' Eden sent over to Paris after the affair in order to have all the original documents destroyed. But he found that I had copies. And I may note that it was only then that he became friendly to Israel.' [4] There would, of course, have been nothing to prevent the destruction of documents in British hands, and indeed, the Whitehall correspondent of *The Times*, Peter Hennessy, reported last year that ' For years there have been persistent rumours among those in the know that what little genuinely sensitive material was committed to paper during the build-up to the invasion of Egypt was destroyed at the time or shortly after. The little that has survived is said to be kept in the closely guarded registry of the Secret Intelligence Service, or MI6 . . .' [5] As Mr. Hennessy remarked, the archives of that particular organisation are unlikely ever to be opened.

While the opening of the normal run of British government records for 1956, which will take place on January 1, 1987, will therefore yield some new information, it is doubtful whether it will compel us drastically to revise what we already know about Suez from existing first-hand accounts. Some of these accounts are a lot more precise than others, and all are self-serving to a greater or lesser degree, but there are enough of them to enable the historian, by a

2 Patrick Gordon Walker, *The Cabinet*, 2nd edn (London Fontana, 1972), p 51

3 Richard Crossman, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister*, Vol 1, *Minister of Housing 1964-66* (London Hamish Hamilton and Cape, 1975), pp 103 4, Richard Marsh, *Off the Rails* (London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), p 92

4 Cyrus L Sulzberger *An Age of Mediocrity Memoirs and Diaries 1963-1972* (New York Macmillan, 1973), p 319.

5 *The Times*, June 20, 1978

process of comparison and confrontation, to establish a reasonably full reconstruction of what happened and why.[6]

It might be helpful if a little more was said about some of the more important of these accounts. On the British side, the earliest memoirs—those of the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden,[7] and the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir[8]—deliberately glossed over or ignored some of the vital issues. It was Anthony Nutting, who resigned his post as Minister of State at the Foreign Office over Suez, who in a book published in 1967 first provided an authoritative British account of much that had hitherto only been suspected.[9] Even then, as senior a member of the Eden Cabinet as Harold Macmillan could totally ignore Nutting's revelations in the volume of his memoirs which dealt with the Suez crisis and which appeared in 1971.[10] We have had to wait until last year for one of the chief architects of Britain's policy during the Suez crisis, the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, to produce anything like a comprehensive account of what happened.[11] He did so only just in time, moreover, for he died shortly after completing the manuscript and never saw it through the press.

On the French side, the most useful account is that of General Paul Ely, the Chief of Staff of the French armed forces. It appeared in 1969.[12] The memoirs of the French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, which were published in 1976,[13] are a curious phenomenon. Their author had been one of the most forthcoming of informants in private interviews with the many journalists and contemporary historians writing secondary accounts of Suez, but when it came to putting pen to paper himself, he became so coy that parts of his book are more like the children's fairy stories he is well known in France for writing than a serious contribution to our understanding of events.

General Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli armed forces, published the first authoritative Israeli account of Suez in an expurgated version in 1965.[14] A much fuller account is contained in his memoirs, which appeared in 1976.[15] In the meantime, the Director-General of the Israeli Defence Ministry, Shimon Peres, had shown his diaries to a journalist, Yosef

6 There are of course some excellent secondary accounts of the Suez crisis which make good use of a research method open only to contemporary historians as opposed to those working on remoter periods: the personal interview. These accounts have deliberately not been used in this article, however, as it is rarely possible for the reader to check the sources personally.

7 Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, Memoirs, Vol. 3 (London: Cassell, 1960).

8 Kilmuir, *Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964).

9 Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (London: Constable, 1967).

10 Harold Macmillan, *Riding the Storm 1956–1959*, Memoirs, Vol. 4 (London: Macmillan, 1971). Macmillan was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1956.

11 Selwyn Lloyd, *Suez 1956: A Personal Account* (London: Cape, 1978). This book is reviewed below, p. 301.

12 General Paul Ely, *Memoires*, Vol. II, *Suez ... le 13 mai* (Paris: Plon, 1969).

13 Christian Pineau, *1956 Suez* (Paris: Laffont, 1976).

14 Moshe Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign 1956* (London: Sphere Books, 1967). The original Hebrew version appeared in 1965. For the expurgated nature of the account, see p. 9 of the English edition cited.

15 Moshe Dayan, *Story of My Life* (London: Sphere Books, 1977). The original Hebrew version appeared in 1976; first English edn., London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976.

Evron, who printed extracts from them in a book published in 1968.[16] Peres himself produced his own much less precise account in 1970.[17] Finally, the copious diaries and papers of David Ben-Gurion were made available to another journalist, Michael Bar-Zohar, who cites them in his recently published multi-volume biography of the Israeli Prime Minister.[18]

The question of Israeli participation

The aspect of the Suez crisis which has attracted most attention over the years is of course the question of ' collusion '; or, in other words, whether the British, the French and the Israelis were acting in concert when they invaded Egypt in 1956. When this possibility was raised in the House of Commons at the time,[19] it was vigorously denied by British government spokesmen. ' It is quite wrong to state that Israel was incited to this action by Her Majesty's Government ', Selwyn Lloyd declared on October 31. ' There was no prior agreement between us about it '.[20] Sir Anthony Eden went even further on December 20. ' I want to say this on the question of foreknowledge, and to say it quite bluntly to the House ', he stated, ' that there was not foreknowledge that Israel would attack Egypt—there was not '.[21] No foreknowledge; no prior agreement; and no incitement: that was the British government's position in 1956 and for many years afterwards. The remainder of this article attempts to assess the truth of these claims in the light of the accounts mentioned above.

To some extent, it would have been hardly surprising if the British, French and Israelis had colluded in 1956, for even before the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July, all three had reasons for striking a blow at Colonel Nasser's regime in Egypt. The British believed it was deliberately seeking to undermine their position throughout the Middle East and Africa; the French were certain that it was aiding and abetting the rebels in Algeria; and the Israelis knew it was organising terrorist raids into their territory as well as preventing their shipping from using either the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba. At the same time, however, if France and Israel had been moving closer together, there was still an enormous legacy of mutual suspicion between Israel and Britain which went back to the days of the Palestine Mandate and which found its current justification in the alliances which Britain had concluded with Arab countries like Jordan and Iraq, both sworn enemies of the Jewish state. The existence of

16 Yosef Evron, *Beyom Sagrir Suez Me'ahorei Haklayim [At a Stormy Time Suez Behind the Scenes]* (Tel Aviv Otpaz, 1968).

17. Shimon Peres, *David's Sling The Arming of Israel* (London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970)

18 Michael Bar Zohar, *Ben Gurion* Vol III Hebrew edn (Tel Aviv Am Oved, 1977) An abridged English translation of all three volumes of Bar Zohar's book was published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson at the end of 1978 I have, however, retained my earlier references to the Israeli edition In this connection, I should like to express my gratitude to Avi Shlaim of the Department of Politics at the University of Reading for making this and other Hebrew language sources available to me

19 It should be noted that contemporary accusations of ' collusion ' were prompted primarily by information from the United States and not, as might be expected, from Egypt See *Evening News*, Oct 31, 1956, *The Times* Nov 1 20, 1956

20 HC Deb , 5th series, Vol 558, col 1569

21 *Ibid* , Vol 562, col 1518

these alliances did not encourage the Israelis to negotiate with Britain. By the same token, it made the British highly sensitive about any dealings with Israel.

Anglo-French military planning for a possible joint operation against Egypt in retaliation for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal began early in August 1956. The French told the Israelis that ' the British insisted that Israel shall not participate in the operation; and at this stage will not even be informed.' [22] This implies that the question of Israeli participation was raised right at the beginning, but there is no direct evidence from a French or British source that this was the case. Since we know that the French themselves preferred not to involve the Israelis until the last moment,[23] it may well be that their communication was no more than a convenient fabrication which, given the nature of relations between Britain and Israel, was unlikely to be challenged by the latter.

We do know, however, that some members of the British Cabinet were contemplating some form of Israeli intervention by the first half of September. On the 3rd, Selwyn Lloyd told the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, that ' he rather wondered whether, if things dragged on, Israel might not take advantage of the situation by some aggressive move against Egypt ' and ' seemed to think that this might help Britain out of some of her more immediate difficulties . . .' Not long afterwards, an unnamed Cabinet minister asked Colonel Robert Henriques, a leading British Jew who was about to visit Israel, to tell Ben-Gurion that ' at all costs, Israel must avoid war with Jordan. But if, when Britain went into Suez, Israel were to attack simultaneously, it would be very convenient for all concerned.' Pearson, however, claimed that he succeeded in convincing Lloyd that both the short-term and long-term consequences of Israeli intervention would be ' deplorable and dangerous ', while Henriques did not believe that his interlocutor was expressing the Cabinet's official view, but only that of a body of opinion within it.[24]

By the middle of September, the French had serious doubts as to whether the British would ever resort to force, for the latter seemed more interested in pursuing various diplomatic initiatives—such as the proposed Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA)—which the French regarded as futile. On the 23rd, the French Defence Minister, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, told Shimon Peres that, two days earlier, just as he was leaving London at the conclusion of the international conference to discuss SCUA, Pineau had seen Eden and told him, in a state of high dudgeon and disappointment, ' It looks as if we [i.e. the French] have no choice but to work hand-in-hand with the Israelis.' ' Provided they don't hurt the Jordanians ', the British Prime Minister is said to have

22 Ben Gurion diary, August 3, 1956, cited in Bar Zohar *op cit*, p 1212

23 Ely, *op cit*, p 91

24 Lester Pearson, *Memoirs*, Vol II *The International Years 1948 1957* (London Gollancz, 1974), pp 231 2; Robert Henriques, ' The Ultimatum A Dissenting View ', *The Spectator*, Nov 6, 1959, p 623, and letter, *ibid*, Dec 1, 1959, p 823 Compare Selwyn Lloyd's account of his conversation with Pearson in *Suez 1956*, *op cit*, pp 123 4.

replied.[25] But Bourgès-Maunoury was trying to persuade Peres of the possibility of a joint Franco-Israeli military operation against Egypt if the British dropped out. It was in his interest, therefore, to allay the Israeli fear that Britain might try to prevent it. Thus, he may simply have been telling Peres what he wanted him to believe.[26]

It is possible that the question of Israeli intervention was raised and discussed in more detail at the Anglo-French ministerial conversations in Paris on September 26 and 27, 1956. These conversations were shrouded in more than the customary secrecy. The Paris correspondent of *The Times* reported that for most of the three hours of discussions on the evening of the 26th, the four ministers—Eden, Lloyd, Pineau and the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet—were alone, and he commented: ' These talks evidently mark a return to the secret diplomacy which has been so absent from international statesmanship in recent times.' [27] Given that the French knew that a high-level Israeli delegation was coming to France a couple of days later, it would have been natural for them to have raised the possibility of Israeli intervention, if only to discover the British reaction. They certainly intimated to the Israelis that they had done so. On the other hand, there is no direct evidence that they did. Indeed, one British source which can scarcely be accused of trying to conceal the truth about ' collusion '—Anthony Nutting's book—states specifically that the matter was not raised.[28] Nutting, however, did not accompany his superiors to Paris, so we still cannot be certain.

Although the ostensible purpose of the Franco-Israeli conversations in Paris on September 30 and October 1 was to explore the possibility of a purely Franco-Israeli operation against Egypt, the impression which emerges from the accounts we have of the talks is that the French were really trying to engineer Israeli participation in a form which would trigger off that of the British. This was perhaps not surprising, for General Ely had informed Bourgès-Maunoury when the conversations began that a Franco-Israeli operation without British participation was so fraught with risk that he could not recommend it, even from a purely military point of view.[29] At any rate, Pineau reminded the Israelis that ' under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 195[4], in time of war Britain had the right to seize the [Suez] Canal by force, so that war between Israel and Egypt could provide Britain with the juridical pretext to put her army back in the Canal Zone.' The French Foreign Minister wanted Israel to start military operations ' on her own before the British and French. If Israel were prepared to do this, he was confident that it would strengthen the chances of a British decision to participate.' [30]

25 Peres diary, cited in Evron, *op cit*, p 74

26 It is perhaps worth adding in this connection that neither I nor the skilled staff of the Chatham House press library have been able to trace a contemporary press report of a private meeting between Eden and Pineau when such an exchange could have taken place, although this is of course not proof that there was no meeting

27. *The Times*, Sept 27, 1956

28 Nutting, *op cit*, p 68

29 Ely, *op cit*, pp 121-2

30 Dayan, *Story of My Life*, *op cit*, pp 206 8

The French proposal

It is tempting to conclude that these points were made as a result of the earlier conversations with the British, but as we have seen, there is no firm evidence that this was the case. Such ideas, moreover, could just as easily have come from the French. General Ely, for example, tells us that he felt that the Suez crisis had been mismanaged at the diplomatic level and believed that there was only one way in which any form of military intervention could be justified to the world at large: namely, if either Egypt or Israel attacked the other and Britain and France occupied the Canal Zone in order to separate the combatants.[31] As we shall see, this was the very scenario eventually adopted.

It was put to the British at a secret meeting at Chequers, the British Prime Minister's official country residence, on October 14, 1956, by General Maurice Challe, the Chief of Staff of the French air force, and M. Albert Gazier, who was acting as French Foreign Minister during Pineau's absence at the UN Security Council in New York. The British participants were Eden, Nutting, and one of the Prime Minister's private secretaries. According to Nutting, whose account is likely to be as authoritative as any in the apparent absence of any official record,[32]

> Challe . . . proceeded to outline what he termed a possible plan of action for Britain and France to gain physical control of the Suez Canal. The plan, as he put it to us, was that Israel should be invited to attack Egypt across the Sinai Peninsula and that France and Britain, having given the Israeli forces enough time to seize all or most of Sinai, should then order ' both sides ' to withdraw their forces from the Suez Canal, in order to permit an Anglo-French force to intervene and occupy the Canal on the pretext of saving it from damage by fighting. Thus the two powers would be able to claim to be ' separating the combatants ' and ' extinguishing a dangerous fire ', while actually seizing control of the entire waterway and of its terminal ports, Port Said and Suez.

Nutting adds that the timing of this proposed operation was not discussed, although the French made it clear that they wanted to act as soon as possible. He also states that they did not say whether the Israelis had agreed to play the role allotted to them, although he got the impression that preliminary soundings had been taken and that the French had received sufficient encouragement to broach the matter with the British.[33]

Eden's reaction to Challe's proposal certainly suggests that this was the first occasion upon which anything so precise had been put to him. Nutting describes a great state of excitement on the Prime Minister's part, while Challe told Ely on his return to Paris that Eden genuinely seemed not to have thought

31 Ely, *op cit*, p 111

32 Nutting, *op cit*, p 92, states that, in response to a nervous look from Gazier, Eden instructed his private secretary to stop taking notes just before General Challe began speaking

33 *Ibid*, p 93 General Challe confirms the essence of this conversation in his memoirs, *Notre Revolte* (Paris Presses de la Cite, 1968), pp 27-8

of this possibility before. ' If M. Gazier had not been there and had the same impression ', he said, ' I should have wondered whether Mr. Eden wasn't making fun of me.' [34]

A small group of British ministers met on the morning of October 16 to discuss the French proposal. Since there has been a great deal of controversy about who was privy to the decisions taken during the Suez crisis, and since Selwyn Lloyd fails for once to provide his customary list of the participants, we are fortunate to have a contemporary press report of who was present: namely, Eden, Kilmuir, Macmillan, the Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Home, and Nutting. Selwyn Lloyd who, like Pineau, had been at the Security Council in New York, flew to London for the meeting and arrived half way through. Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templar, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was also called in. [35] Unlike some of their colleagues perhaps, these men cannot claim to have been kept in the dark about what was going on.

At the meeting, Nutting argued strongly against participation in what he called ' this sordid manoeuvre '. It would, he claimed, cause a rift with the United States, split the Commonwealth, jeopardise British oil supplies, and unite the Arab world against Britain. Lloyd evidently agreed, telling Nutting on his arrival, ' You are right . . . We must have nothing to do with the French plan.' Nevertheless, it was decided that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary should both go to Paris that same afternoon for further talks with the French. [36]

On Eden's and Mollet's insistence, all officials were excluded from the Anglo-French conversations on October 16, and, according to Nutting, no record was kept. [37] Explaining that the Israelis were on the point of attacking Egypt, the French asked the British what their reaction would be. Eden replied that the British government had repeatedly made it clear that if Israel attacked Jordan, it would have to honour its treaty obligations, but that ' an Israeli attack on Egypt was a different matter '. The two sides agreed, subject to approval by their respective cabinets, ' that if this happened Britain and France would intervene, putting into operation the plans already prepared, the object being to safeguard the Canal and stop the spread of hostilities '. [38]

This summary is taken from Selwyn Lloyd's account. What he does not say is what he told Nutting on his return to London: namely, ' that further consultations would take place in Paris between French and Israeli representatives. He hoped that we would not have to be directly associated with these talks, at any rate at the political level; but he could not rule this out, as there were a number of crucial political as well as military problems involving us which would have to be settled in a very short space of time.' [39]

34 Ely, *op cit*, pp 137-8

35 *Daily Telegraph*, Oct 17, 1956 For Lloyd's late arrival, see *The Times*, Oct 17, 1956

36 Nutting, *op cit*, pp 96-8. Lloyd, *op cit*, p 166 It is interesting to note that Lloyd confirms his opposition to the French plan

37 Nutting, *op cit*, p 98

38 Lloyd, *op cit* pp 173 4

39 Nutting, *op cit*, p 98

The omission is, of course, of vital importance, for it enables Lloyd to claim that he was unaware of the nature and extent of the contacts between the French and the Israelis and that the British had no proposals of their own to put forward, simply reacting to suggestions put to them.

When the full British Cabinet met on October 18, the likelihood of an Israeli attack upon Egypt was described as ' probable '. If Lloyd's summary of the minutes is full, and if the minutes themselves are accurate, there was no mention of the Chequers meeting, or of the fact that the French and Israelis, with British approval and possibly participation, would shortly be negotiating the details of the attack in question. To this extent, therefore, it can perhaps be maintained that, with the exception of those few ministers already in the know and those subsequently added to their number, the Cabinet was misled about what was taking place. At any rate, it agreed that if Israel did indeed attack Egypt, Britain and France would intervene to protect the Canal.[40]

The French had in the meantime communicated the British position to the Israelis in the form of a written declaration signed by Eden. This made it clear that the British would only participate in a military operation with Israel if—as Challe had suggested at the Chequers meeting—they and the French could issue an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to withdraw their forces from the area of the Canal, thus providing a justification for their intervention.[41] Lloyd claims that this declaration was ' embroidered on the way beyond all recognition ', presumably by the French.[42] He does not, however, explain how a written and signed declaration can be so ' embroidered ' in transmission.

According to General Dayan, Ben-Gurion was far from enamoured of the British proposition. ' He insisted that we should not be the ones to launch the campaign and fill the role of aggressor, while the British and French appeared as angels of peace to bring tranquillity to the area. He was not prepared to accept a division of functions whereby, as he put it, Israel volunteered to mount the rostrum of shame so that Britain and France could lave their hands in the waters of purity.' [43] Nevertheless, he agreed to lead a delegation to France to see whether a satisfactory agreement could be negotiated with the French, and eventually with the British as well. These negotiations took place, in the greatest secrecy, at a private house in the Paris suburb of Sèvres between October 22 and 24, 1956.

On October 21, Selwyn Lloyd was summoned to Chequers for a meeting with Eden, Macmillan, the new Minister of Defence, Anthony Head, and the Lord Privy Seal, R. A. Butler. Two senior civil sevants, Norman Brook, the Secretary to the Cabinet, and Richard Powell, the Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, were also present, as was General Sir Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief of the British land forces in the Middle East and the

40 Lloyd, *op cit*., pp 175-177
41 Dayan, *op cit*., p 224
42 Lloyd, *op cit*., p 175
43 Dayan, *op cit*., p 223

Supreme Commander of the Anglo-French expeditionary force which was preparing the invasion of Egypt. The meeting was told that the Israeli leaders were due to arrive in Paris on the following day and that the French thought it important that Britain should be represented at the discussions with them. It was agreed that Lloyd should go incognito, and he excused himself from his previous engagements by pretending to have a cold.[44] The importance of this meeting is twofold: it shows that there had been further contacts with the French about Israeli intervention since the Paris conversations of October 16-17 and the British Cabinet meeting of the 18th, and that other senior ministers and officials in addition to those present at the meeting on the 16th must have known what was happening.

The Sèvres meetings

Accompanied by one of his private secretaries, Donald Logan, Selwyn Lloyd arrived at Sèvres on the afternoon of October 22, after the French and Israelis had begun their talks. The French briefed him on the Israeli position and he then met their delegation. According to his account, ' Ben-Gurion wanted an agreement between Britain, France and Israel that we should all three attack Egypt. In particular, he wanted an undertaking from us that we would eliminate the Egyptian Air Force before Israeli ground forces moved forward. He said that otherwise Israeli towns like Tel Aviv would be wiped out. British prior air action was a *sine qua non*.' The British Foreign Secretary pointed out that military action of the kind proposed would almost certainly be brought to a halt by United Nations action, if not in the Security Council, where Britain and France had a veto, then in the General Assembly. A tripartite agreement was ' impossible ', moreover, because Britain ' had thousands of subjects in Arab countries with valuable property, and oil installations of great strategic importance '. If there were a joint attack, these people might be slaughtered and the installations destroyed.[45] What the British wanted—although Lloyd does not say so in his memoirs—was a sufficiently long interval to elapse between the Israeli attack and the Anglo-French intervention in order to preserve the illusion that the latter was a response to the former and not part and parcel of the same operation.

The Israelis put forward a compromise proposal which slightly narrowed the gap between the two sides, but when Lloyd left for London at about midnight, he allegedly told Pineau that he did not think that his colleagues would accept it. The French Foreign Minister told Ben-Gurion that he did not trust Lloyd and would go to London himself in order to brief Eden. The Israeli Prime Minister was pessimistic. ' I fear that Pineau's trip will be in vain ', he noted in his diary, ' since Lloyd will secure the decision that he desires as opposed to the view of the French and ourselves.' [46]

44 Lloyd, *op cit*, p 180
45 *Ibid*, pp 181-184
46 Ben-Gurion diary, Oct 22, 1956, cited in Bar-Zohar, *op cit*, p 1240

After reporting to his senior colleagues, Lloyd attended a full Cabinet meeting on October 23. He records that he told ministers that he ' was doubtful whether Israel would launch an attack against Egypt in the immediate future '. Did he, one wonders, explain why? Did he say that he had just returned from negotiating with the French and the Israelis at Sèvres? We do not know. The Cabinet was told, however, that Pineau was coming to London that evening, and Eden said that he and Lloyd would report on their talks with the French Foreign Minister the following day.[47]

Pineau's meetings in London, which are once more said to have taken place in the absence of officials and without a record being kept,[48] resulted, according to Lloyd, in ' greater precision about the actions which we would take if Israel attacked Egypt ', together with a decision that a further tripartite meeting at Sèvres was worthwhile.[49] In other words, the French Foreign Minister's gamble had paid off. He told the Israelis on his return that he ' had found [Eden's] approach far warmer than that of Lloyd ',[50] a comment which the latter cites with no attempt at denial.[51] Indeed, the Foreign Secretary told Nutting that Eden had been ' greatly put out about the meeting with Ben-Gurion ', but had sent Pineau back to Paris ' with an assurance that Israel need have no fear of being left in the lurch and that, if she led the way with an attack in Sinai, Britain would lend her fullest support '.[52] The only condition, as Eden explained on the following day to the delegation he was sending to Sèvres, was that there must be ' a clear military threat to the Canal '.[53] How much the Cabinet was told of all this at its meeting on October 24 is unclear. Lloyd merely states that Eden ' concluded by saying that . . . further talks with the French were necessary '. He evidently said nothing about the Israelis.[54]

Lloyd states that the reason he was unable to return to Sèvres himself was that he had to answer questions in the House of Commons.[55] In the light of what had happened on the occasion of his first visit, however, one cannot help wondering whether he wanted to go again, or even whether the Prime Minister wanted to send him. Be that as it may, his place was taken by two officials: Donald Logan and Sir Patrick Dean, a Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. At the end of their discussions with the French and the Israelis on the evening of October 24, a document was signed embodying the conclusions which had been reached. Lloyd maintains that this was a quite unexpected development, the document in question being produced out of the

47 Lloyd, *op cit*., pp 185-186
48 Nutting, *op cit*., p 104
49 Lloyd, *op cit*., p 186
50 Dayan, *op cit*., p 345
51 Lloyd, *op cit*., p 188
52 Nutting, *op cit*., p 104
53 Lloyd, *op cit*., p 187
54 *Ibid*., pp 187 188
55 *Ibid*., p 186

blue, and that Dean only agreed to sign it as a record of the discussion.[56] The Israeli sources tell a rather different story. According to Ben-Gurion's diary, he suggested that a protocol be prepared of the joint plan ' which will be signed by the three parties and which will be ratified by the three governments' and the British delegates participated in the drafting.[57]

By far the most valuable section of Pineau's memoirs gives a summary of this document which is so full that it must be based on the text itself. It comprised seven articles. Article 1 announced the Israeli intention of launching an important military action on October 29, 1956, with a view to reaching the Canal Zone on the following day. This, of course, was in response to the British insistence upon ' a clear military threat to the Canal '. It was to be achieved by means of a parachute drop near the Mitla Pass, which was about 40 miles to the east of the southern entrance to the Canal. Article 2 registered the intention of the British and French governments to issue simultaneous ultimatums to Egypt and Israel, calling upon them to cease fire, to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal, and, in the case of Egypt, to submit to a temporary Anglo-French occupation of the Canal Zone in order to safeguard navigation through the waterway. Article 3 stated that if Egypt rejected this ultimatum, the British and French would begin military operations against its territory in the early hours of October 31. No sanctions were to be implemented against Israel, for it would accept the Anglo-French demands. In any case, its principal military objective was not the Suez Canal at all, but the Gulf of Aqaba, and Article 4 gave the Israelis permission to occupy its western shore, together with two important islands just off the coast. Article 5 pledged Israel not to attack Jordan during the period of hostilities with Egypt. By the same token, Britain agreed not to go to Jordan's aid if it attacked Israel during the same period.[58] Article 6 stipulated that the agreement reached at Sèvres should remain secret, and Article 7 provided for its ratification by the three governments.[59] This was the document which Lloyd assures us was no more than a record of the discussion.

It was ratified at a Cabinet meeting on October 25, although to judge from Selwyn Lloyd's account, it is doubtful whether ministers were actually shown the text or even informed of its existence. According to him,

> Eden said that on 18th October he had told the Cabinet that he thought Israel would attack Egypt; on 23rd October he had said he thought it less likely. Now he believed that the Israelis were advancing their military preparations with a view to attacking Egypt, and the date might be 29th October. The French felt strongly that if that happened we should both intervene, as we had agreed between us on 18th October . . . Eden

56 *Ibid*., p 188

57 Ben-Gurion diary, Oct 25, 1956, and other material cited in Bar-Zohar, *op cit*., p 1248

58 This provision had recently acquired crucial importance, for the Israelis had launched a reprisal raid against Jordan on October 10 in response to terrorist attacks and the Jordanians had appealed to the British for help It took skilled diplomacy to reduce the level of tension

59 Pineau, *op cit*., pp 149-153

> therefore suggested that, if Israel did attack, we and the French should issue an ultimatum to both sides. If Nasser complied, his prestige would be fatally undermined. If he did not, there would be ample justification for Anglo-French action to safeguard the Canal. It was better that we should seem to hold the balance between Egypt and Israel rather than be accepting Israeli co-operation in an attack by us on Egypt.

Selwyn Lloyd supported the Prime Minister and the Cabinet agreed.[60]

Official notification of the ratification of the Sèvres agreement was sent by Eden in the form of a signed letter to Mollet. As if to preserve the fiction that there had been no contact with Israel, no communication was sent to Ben-Gurion and Israel was not even mentioned in that sent to Mollet. The French Prime Minister, however, thoughtfully provided a copy for his Israeli opposite number, and it is from the latter's archives, as released to Michael Bar-Zohar, that we know the contents. 'Her Majesty's Government has noted the information about the progress of the talks which were held in Sèvres between 22 and 24 October', it read. 'It affirms that in the situation which was envisaged then, it will take the planned action. This is in accordance with the declaration attached to my announcement of October 21. Signed, Anthony Eden.'[61]

Two of the three claims which the British made at the time—that there was no foreknowledge of the Israeli attack upon Egypt and no prior agreement about it—are thus seen to be manifestly untrue. The third claim—that Israel was not incited to attack—is more difficult to assess. When Pineau visited London on October 23, he was given a letter by Lloyd which stated: 'It must be clear. . . that the United Kingdom has not asked the Israeli government to undertake any action whatever. We have merely been asked what our reactions would be if certain things happened.'[62] This, however, seems as clear an example as any of the kind of document 'for the record' referred to at the beginning of this article; for if we can agree with Lloyd that the Israelis needed little prompting to attack Egypt, they did, as we have seen, need a great deal of prompting to attack it in the precise way that they did.

Does all this amount to 'collusion'? Not according to Selwyn Lloyd, who tries to argue that 'the test of "collusion" is the motive. Was the action fraudulent or disreputable?'[63] But is this the test? One of the government's back-benchers, Sir Robert Boothby, was surely more accurate when he wrote to *The Times* on December 24, 1956—albeit in complete ignorance of nearly

60 Lloyd, *op cit*, pp. 188-190

61 Eden letter, cited in Bar Zohar, *op cit*, p 1254 The reference to 'the declaration attached to my announcement of October 21' is obscure, for no text of this declaration or announcement can be found in the available sources It is unlikely that it refers to the declaration transmitted to the Israelis after the Paris conversations on October 16 and 17 (see above) for the date is too late It may have been a statement drawn up at the Chequers meeting of senior ministers and officials on October 21 (see above) and sent, or brought by Lloyd, to Sèvres Its existence, however, serves to undermine still further Lloyd's attempt to deny any British agreement with Israel

62 Pineau, *op cit*, p 137, Lloyd, *op cit*, p 186

63 Lloyd, *op cit*, p 248

everything set out in this article—in order to defend it against the charge. ' Collusion is defined in the dictionary ', he wrote, ' as a secret agreement or understanding for the purposes of trickery or fraud. If the British and French governments had decided, last October, to attack Egypt, for the purposes of getting rid of Nasser and occupying the Suez Canal, and to use Israel as an instrument of their policy by giving her the green light for an invasion of the Sinai Peninsula in order to justify their own intervention in the eyes of the world, they would have been guilty of collusion in the accepted sense of the word.' One could hardly improve upon this as a concise statement of what the British and French governments actually did in October 1956.

' TO ADVANCE THE SCIENCES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS . . .': CHATHAM HOUSE'S EARLY RESEARCH *

Roger Morgan

FOR some students of international affairs, especially outside Britain, Chatham House research is virtually synonymous with the Institute's output of distinguished books by distinguished authors. The annual *Survey of International Affairs* by Arnold Toynbee and his successors, the same author's monumental *Study of History*, or Andrew Shonfield's *Modern Capitalism*, are outstanding and widely-known examples. This impression that Chatham House's research has always consisted mainly of individual studies by great authors was perhaps confirmed in the early 1970s by two surveys of the Institute's research record which both discussed Chatham House studies essentially in terms of books of this kind.[1] However, as a former Director has put it, referring to the Institute's early years, ' for most Chatham House members, especially those most actively involved in current decision-making or journalism, the books were only a part, and often a minor one, of what Chatham House provided. The coverage of all aspects of the world scene in lectures and discussion groups, and in memoranda and articles in the Institute's journals, was more nearly comprehensive than its research programme.' [2]

This article will examine how the production of books—the most characteristic output of the postwar Chatham House research programme—grew out of other forms of the ' scientific study of international questions ', and other forms of research, in the Institute's early years. It will also explore the question of what kinds of subjects were given priority in Chatham House's research activity, and what methods were used to study them, although it should be emphasised that a single article can only offer a very selective sample of the whole story, which the Institute's records will one day allow to be studied in much greater detail.

The Council's 1926 *Report*, surveying a year which had seen several

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1 Wilfrid Knapp, ' Fifty Years of Chatham House Books ', *International Affairs*, Special 50th Anniversary Issue, Nov 1970, pp 138-49; Roger Morgan, ed , *The Study of International Affairs: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Younger* (London, Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1972)

2 Kenneth Younger, ' The Study and Understanding of International Affairs ', *International Affairs*, Nov 1970, p 154

important developments (including the granting of the Institute's Royal Charter, Sir Daniel Stevenson's endowment of the Directorship of Studies, and the provision of the meetings hall by Sir John Power), included a statement of Chatham House's functions which lists them in a significant order of precedence: as the first of three main functions the Council describes the Institute as

> a centre where those engaged in politics, the great industrial and philanthropic agencies, directors of banks and concerns . . . and men in public life may all come in touch with each other . . .

Next, after discussing the Council's responsibility to maintain the level of 'the discussions to be arranged, and to extend the range of the sectional group system in order that every part of the world and every suitable international subject may be covered (the 'group system' will be discussed below), the Report continues:

> secondly, it is the function of the Institute to record current international history. This is the primary purpose of its publications.

These publications are then discussed—notably the annual *Survey*, the Institute's *Journal* (which was to become *International Affairs* in 1931), and the *British Year Book of International Law*—and the Report proceeds:

> the third function of the Institute is to promote research and enquiry into current international affairs. These objects are already in part served by the Library; the Press-Cutting Library . . .; and the constant work of dealing with specific enquiries . . . as to the sources . . . from which . . . special information may be obtained.[3]

To the reader of half-a-century later, the pronounced emphasis on the recording of 'current international history' is striking, as is the equation of 'promoting research' with providing information and guidance for members and other enquirers. The emphasis on contemporary historiography was, however, characteristic of the Institute's approach at a time when the academic study of international relations was still in its infancy, and when the writing of the annual *Survey* was the main function of the Director of Studies, Arnold Toynbee.

At the Inaugural Meeting of the British Institute of International Affairs in July 1920 no less an authority than Viscount Grey of Falloden had urged the new Institute

> to try to do for the present something like what history does for the past . . . if year by year it will . . . produce something like an annual register of foreign affairs, showing what has happened in the previous year, and accompanying it by an explanation or preface, which will not only tell the facts, but show their relation to each other and give us an idea of the value of the respective facts, it will be doing a most important

3 *Report of the Council*, 1926, pp 5-8

> work. It will not interfere with policy, but provide materials from which politicians, statesmen and journalists can form sound opinions in regard to policy.[4]

In the spring of 1924, when the sixth and last volume of the Institute's *History of the Peace Conference* was published, the Executive Committee appointed Toynbee as editor of the first annual *Survey*, for 1924, and of the linking volumes which appeared in 1925 as *The World After the Peace Conference* and *Survey of International Affairs, 1920–23*. The importance attached to the *Survey* is indicated by the fact that it was originally financed by money borrowed from Sir John Power's donation for the building of a meetings hall.[5] It is confirmed, *inter alia*, by a letter of October 1924 from James Headlam-Morley to Toynbee, reflecting concern on the part of the Institute's main sponsors that the latter might be tempted to leave Chatham House for a University Chair in America:

> there is a general agreement that the Institute is committed to a continuation of the Annual Survey, that it is strongly desired that you should continue the work, and that for this reason they are prepared to recommend to the Executive Committee a continuation of your appointment. Under the present state of the finances it would, however, not be possible to make any commitment beyond the minimum necessary for the continuance of the *Survey* itself, and for this it is considered that a sum of £500 a year should suffice. It is clearly out of the question that at the present moment the Institute should undertake the serious additional financial responsibility which would be required in order to secure the full-time services of someone to act as general director of studies.[6]

When Sir Daniel Stevenson's endowment, in November 1925, ensured that Toynbee's appointment could be continued, the Directorship of Studies was specifically linked with the authorship of the *Survey*: of the endowment's annual value of £1,000, ' one half is to be devoted to the salary of the Director of Studies in his capacity as author of the annual *Survey*, while the other half is allocated to the Chair of International History at the University '.[7] This identification of the Directorship of Studies with the authorship of the *Survey* was to be unbroken for over twenty years; the 1946 report of the Institute's postwar Planning Committee recommended that Toynbee (with an augmented staff including two Deputy Directors of Studies) should commit himself for five years to a series of *Survey* volumes covering the war years and the peace

4 Quoted in ' Survey of International Affairs ' (Research Committee, June 7, 1955, Appendix B/1), Chatham House archives (CHA), section 2/1'1e

5 *Ibid*

6 Headlam Morley to Toynbee, Oct 7, 1924, CHA/1/Toyn/32

7 *Report of the Council*, 1926, p 2 From 1925 Toynbee held the Stevenson Chair at the London School of Economics, but he was full time at Chatham House by 1928

settlement, leaving the handling of the Institute's ' individual studies ' to the Deputy Secretary (later Research Secretary), Miss Margaret Cleeve.[8]

The *Survey's* place as what the 1946 report called ' the major item in the research programme ' was established as soon as Toynbee began to write the annual volumes in 1924. The ensuing discussions of research projects frequently refer to the way in which ' in the ordinary course, subjects for individual study derive directly from the writing of the *Survey* . . . , where the interpretation of events frequently reveals the need for detailed investigation of their underlying causes '.[9]

Spin-offs from the *Survey*

Sometimes the ' spin-off ' from the *Survey* was a further historical study: in December 1933, for instance, the Institute's publishers, Oxford University Press, proposed that a history of international affairs since 1920, based on the *Survey* volumes, should be prepared: the result was G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's *Short History of International Affairs, 1920–34*, which first appeared in November 1934, and became a standard work, going into four editions and selling over 28,000 copies by 1955.[10] In other cases, material from the *Surveys* was re-assembled and updated to make an independent book: for instance, the sections on ' World Economic Tendencies ', which H. V. Hodson contributed to each *Survey* from 1930 to 1937, were revised and re-published as *Slump and Recovery, 1929-1937* in July 1938.[11]

By the late 1920s, when ' Professor Toynbee . . . felt the need for separate studies of subjects which required more intensive treatment than could be given in the *Survey* ',[12] the Institute's methods of work included an active growth of what the Council's 1926 *Report* had called ' the sectional group system '. This system, which reflected the active involvement of the membership in planning the Institute's programme of activities, was based on the principle that members with an expert interest in any aspect of world affairs could and should form a group to keep their knowledge up to date and preferably to keep the rest of the membership informed too. A document of 1929 on the ' origin and development ' of Chatham House (apparently drafted for fund-raising purposes) lays heavy stress on the Institute's function in ' the collection of information ', by the process which it describes as follows:

(a) The whole field of international affairs is gradually being mapped out into a number of subjects.

8 *The Future of Chatham House. Report of a Planning Committee to the Council*, 1946, pp. 23–24. In a note written ten years later, Miss Cleeve recalled that as early as 1932, when Toynbee began to combine writing the *Survey* with writing *A Study of History*, she had taken over part of the administration of the general research programme, though ' Dr. Toynbee still gave his time to discuss projects with authors ' (' Chatham House Studies in Philosophy and Politics ', Oct. 1956, CHA/2/1/le).

9 ' Research ' (paper by Miss Cleeve, Jan. 1946, referring to the situation both before and after 1932), CHA/2/1/lb.

10 ' Survey of International Affairs ', May 1955, CHA/2/1/le.

11 ' Studies on International Economics ', June 1955, CHA/2/1/le.

12 ' European and Atlantic Studies, 1919–1956 ', May 1956, CHA/2/1/le.

> (b) For each of these subjects study groups are formed by members who have first-hand knowledge of the subject assigned to them. By meeting periodically they keep abreast of their subject.[13]

By 1926–27 the number of these groups had grown to 19, and they held during that year a total of 99 meetings, the administration of which was facilitated by a grant from John D. Rockefeller of £3,000 over three years. Some groups naturally met more often than others: the ' Economics ' group held only five meetings in that year, and the ' USA ' group only four, but a new group on ' Pacific Problems ', formed under the impact of developments in China, met no less than twelve times.[14]

In the following year the total number of group meetings rose to 139, and the Council's *Report* for 1928 introduces a new note in describing the groups' purposes:

> The machinery of the Institute is at the disposal of any group of members who desire to make a special study of any problem connected with international affairs. The more usual purpose of group meetings, however, will continue to be that of providing an opportunity for those who are continuously concerned with events in individual countries or progress in particular problems, to meet persons who have fresh information or special points of view.[15]

The feeling that the work of the study groups ought to be more fully reflected in the Institute's publications, notably the *Journal*, was expressed in a letter of November 1928 to Headlam-Morley from Charles Webster (at that time Woodrow Wilson Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth), commenting on the next agenda of the Institute's Publications Committee. The *Journal*, said Webster, should not include

> articles which can find a place in other publications. It would preserve its special character . . . by confining itself to papers actually produced or read in the Institute. There must be a good deal of information given to the Groups, which would be an even richer material after contact with them. Some of this is no doubt confidential and the informality of many of the discussions is one of their principal merits. But others are more regular and I wish some means could be found of giving this information, properly sifted, to a wider audience through the *Journal*.

Remarking on the agenda item ' Research Work ', Webster commented sagely that this was a large subject, and that the Institute should establish a separate Research Committee ' if it is intended to proceed far in this direction '.[16]

13 ' Origin and Development ', Jan 1929, CHA/2/1/le

14 *Report of the Council*, 1927, Appendix 3 p 16

15 *Report of the Council*, 1928, p 2

16 Webster to Headlam Morley, Nov 16, 1928, CHA/4/Toyn/32 The Research Committee was set up in 1946, replacing the Publications Committee

The Institute *did* intend to proceed with research, and by 1931, in addition to the spontaneously-established groups for the ' special study of any problem ', and the ' more usual ' purpose of groups meeting for the up-dating of information and opinions, the Council's *Report* announces a new approach towards ' research by the Group method ':

> In future the Study Groups will work towards the preparation of written reports. In this way the Council hopes to deal with each of the major international problems of the day and the reports of the Groups should form an important contribution to the scientific thought on these subjects.[17]

In order to give the necessary direction to the new study group programme, one of the Institute's senior staff, Stephen King-Hall, was relieved of his duties as Secretary of the Meetings Department to become Secretary of a new Study Groups Department servicing, with the help of the Director of Studies, ' Study Groups, Members' Private Groups and the Economic Division ' (a new special group dealing with world economic questions, presided over by Sir Josiah Stamp). Four years later, after very active experience of developing ' research by the Group method ' (a Chatham House technique which was explicitly praised by Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, at the Institute's Annual Dinner in July 1931),[18] King-Hall summarised its modus operandi by comparing the study groups with ' unofficial Royal Commissions charged by the Council of Chatham House with the investigation of specific problems '. Once the Council had selected a subject for study, he explained, a Group Secretary (from the Chatham House staff) would be appointed, the programme for the study would be worked out by the Group Chairman, the Secretary of the Study Groups Department, and other advisers, and the group's report would be drafted and re-drafted (taking account of its discussions and of comments from outside authorities), and finally published.[19]

It is not surprising that the majority of the group reports produced during the 1930s dealt with economic issues, in view of the business concerns of Chatham House members and the world economic situation. The first Chatham House group to prepare a collective report was established in December 1929, two months after the Wall Street crash: its subject was ' The International Functions of Gold ', and it considered papers by Sir Josiah Stamp, Professor (later Sir) Dennis Robertson, Sir Otto Niemeyer, R. H. (later Lord) Brand, and the eminent French Professor Charles Rist, before producing its report in September 1931.[20]

The 1932 *Report* of the Institute noted with gratification that ' a growing proportion of the members are engaged in study-group work ', but added that

17 *Report of the Council*, 1931, p. 13

18 *Ibid*

19 Stephen King Hall, Chatham House: *A Brief Account of the Origins, Purposes, and Methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1937), pp. 36-39

20 *The International Gold Problem* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA)

' further successful development depends on finding more members of Chatham House who are competent and who wish to do this work, and are able to give the necessary time '. The report continued (perhaps in order to encourage members to volunteer?):

> An interesting innovation in the study-group work was the arrangement of a weekend conference of the members of the group studying the International Agricultural Situation, who met at Cliveden as the guests of Viscount Astor, the Chairman of the group.[21]

This group duly completed its work, and produced a report in January 1933.[22] A further group dealing with international monetary affairs, chaired by Sir Charles Addis, produced a first report in May 1933, analysing different schools of thought about the way out of the depression,[23] and a second, on *The Future of Monetary Policy*, in January 1935. A further large-scale report on a related subject was *The Problem of International Investment* (published in 1937), and the Institute had a new study group on ' International Economic Policy ' in progress when war came in 1939.

A subsequent review by Chatham House of the work of the prewar economic study groups noted that ' views on these questions were diverse and the reports were criticised by some reviewers on the ground that they were colourless and had been sacrificed to an attempt to record agreement among the members of the Group ',[24] but there is no doubt that on balance these reports contributed substantially to the contemporary debate, both in their published form and through the mutual enlightenment of members of the groups.

As well as the topics already mentioned, the study-group method was applied to such questions as unemployment (on which a group chaired by Lord Astor met from 1932 onwards, and reported in 1935);[25] a number of issues in comparative colonial administration (on which reports appeared from 1933 onwards); and also international sanctions, a highly topical subject suggested by the Abyssinian crisis of 1935 and which the Spanish Civil War made even more topical by the time the report was published in 1937.[26]

Some of the early study groups tackled subjects where the material was more elusive, or not suitable for the group method of work, and found the going harder. For instance, a group assessing British public opinion and the League of Nations, which met under Sir Norman Angell's chairmanship, earned this reference in the Council's *Report* for 1931: ' The Group has completed its preliminary work and, incidentally, has found how very difficult it is to deal with this subject. It is proceeding with its investigations.' [27] A few

21 *Report of the Council*, 1932, p 18 Lord Astor was at this time also Chairman of the Council
22 *World Agriculture An International Survey* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA)
23 *Monetary Policy and the Depression* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA)
24 ' Studies on International Economics ', June 1955, CHA/2/1/le
25 *Unemployment An International Problem* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA)
26 *International Sanctions* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA).
27 *Report of the Council*, 1931, p 13

years later this undertaking was listed under ' Group Studies Unpublished ', with the mention ' Material available in Information Department for use of students '.[28]

Another group dealing with somewhat intractable material had a more successful outcome. As the European political situation worsened, the Council decided to undertake a study of nationalism as an international force, and a group on ' the limitations of nationalism ' started its work in June 1936. Its chairman, E. H. Carr, had just resigned from the Foreign Office to take up the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, and its Secretary was M. G. Balfour, a new member of the Chatham House staff (later to be a distinguished *Survey* contributor and a Professor at the University of East Anglia). Even though the book which emanated from this group, published three years later,[29] was not one of the Institute's best products, the Chairman candidly revealed how much the enquiry had contributed to his own pioneering (and enduring) work *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, published in the same year: ' my colleagues in this Group and other contributors to its work have, in the course of our long discussions, unwittingly made numerous valuable contributions to the present book.' [30]

One of the last prewar products of the study-group system was a comprehensive survey of the *Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom*, published in 1939. This volume, originally produced for a conference of Commonwealth Institutes of International Affairs at Sydney in 1938, was edited by a group whose secretary was Martin Wight (later to be the author of Chatham House's profound little study *Power Politics*, and Professor at Sussex University). The 1939 report makes impressive reading forty years later, as a lucid record of how a group of well-informed members of the British Establishment saw their country's international position during the last months of peace

Study-group method or individual studies?

Despite all its merits, however, research by the study-group method was seriously questioned by the Institute's postwar Planning Committee, partly on the grounds that it induced ' a tendency to compromise between the various views stated by members of the Group, a tendency invaluable on a Committee which has to decide on a course of action but unsatisfactory as a method of research '.[31] The Committee commented on the group method normally used at Chatham House that

> It is most appropriate to subjects about which the facts are not easily

28 Stephen King Hall, *op cit* , p 138

29 *Nationalism A Study by a Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1939)

30 E H Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, Macmillan, 1939), p xi

31. *The Future of Chatham House Report of a Planning Committee to the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 1946, p 18

> accessible and can be contributed from the personal knowledge of the members, or to subjects on which there exists a wide range of opinion not divided by fundamental cleavages. It makes great demands on both Chairman and rapporteur. It is particularly unsuitable to subjects of a philosophical kind,

and recommended that the Institute's Executive Committee should only decide that a piece of work should be carried out by the group method ' after it has received advice from the Research Committee which is equally competent to recommend that the work be done by some other method '.[32]

The principal ' other method ' available was of course the study written by an individual author. Even though the first Chatham House work of this kind (apart from the *Survey* and associated volumes) had appeared as early as 1927, they had for several years been overshadowed by the researches of the study groups. An independent survey published in 1933 said of Chatham House's research simply that the Institute ' conducts important research work in international affairs, through small groups of experts on specific questions, and through the work of the Stevenson Director of Studies '—in the latter case, the *Survey* volumes.[33]

The first individual studies were in fact (as often in the history of Chatham House) produced in response to particular circumstances. Sir Frederick Whyte's *China and Foreign Powers, an historical review of their relations*, the first of the ' Chatham House Monographs ' series, appeared in 1927 as a contribution to international discussion of the subject stimulated by the clashes between Chinese and foreigners in Shanghai in May 1925, and carried on *inter alia* at the first conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Honolulu later the same year. Chatham House acted as the British section of this influential body, and sent delegations to its second conference in Honolulu in 1927 (where Whyte's monograph was presented) and to ensuing meetings, including one at Kyoto in 1929, where the British representatives were led by the then Lord Hailsham, and which was connected with the second Chatham House Monograph, *A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria* (1929). The third in the series, *Naval Disarmament: a brief record from the Washington Conference to date*, was produced in connection with the London intergovernmental conference on this subject in 1930, which modified the Washington Agreement of 1922.

The year 1932 saw an important new development in the research programme, based on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation of £8,000 per annum for five years, ' to enable the Institute to finance an extension of its research by the study group method and by individual scholars '.[34] The

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.

33 S. H. Bailey, *International Studies in Great Britain* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 1. (The author, a lecturer at the London School of Economics, gave his name to the ' Bailey Conferences ' held in the years after his early death.)

34 *Report of the Council*, 1932, p. 3.

Council's *Report*, which explained that the subjects requiring further research would continue to emerge in the course of work on the *Survey*, added that while some of them would be best studied by the Institute's established group method, ' others, which may involve prolonged research over a term of years and often necessitate investigations on the spot, are best studied by a single scholar '.[35]

The broad definition which Toynbee gave to such research subjects is indicated by the fact that his own *Study of History* was one of the first individual studies to be financed from the Rockefeller grant. He had for some years been designing and working at ' a study of the history of civilisations in the light of our knowledge and experience in this generation ', as a complement to the contemporary *Survey*, and from 1932 onwards he devoted part of his time to completing the first three volumes, which appeared in 1934.[36]

Another project which was initiated at the same time, and which had been included in the first application to the Rockefeller Foundation, was also very sweepingly-designed, by modern standards: this was ' a study of the effects of Western influence on Turkey and the Arab countries of the ex-Ottoman Empire '.[37] Work on this was begun in 1932 by Professor H. A. R. (later Sir Hamilton) Gibb, but the historical scope of the study was so large that by the outbreak of war in 1939 the author and his assistant, Harold Bowen, had only completed part of their analysis of the nature and working of Islamic institutions in the Ottoman Empire in the period before 1790. Publication even of this partial analysis was to be delayed by the war until 1950, and even the second part, published in 1957, did not carry the story into the nineteenth century.[38] The result was a work ' as indispensable as it is authoritative—but not for students of modern international relations '.[39]

A much more topical undertaking, and a more successful one in terms of early publication, was a study in several volumes of the territorial provisions of the post-1918 European peace settlement, which was by now being subjected to intense pressure from Germany, Italy, and other dissatisfied powers. This series of investigations, which fell very clearly into the category of those requiring ' prolonged research . . . on the spot ', produced five important studies, starting in 1935 with *Geographic Disarmament: A Study of the Demilitarization of National Frontiers* by Major-General J. H. Marshall-Cornwall, and ending in 1942 with *The International Experiment of Upper Silesia* by George Kaeckenbeek. The intervening volumes appeared between

35 *Ibid.*, p. 19

36 ' Chatham House Studies in Philosophy and Politics ', CHA/2/1/1e

37 ' The Middle Eastern Studies Programme ', CHA/2/1/1e

38 H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*. Vol. 1 *Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, Part 1: 1950, Part 2: 1957)

39 Knapp, *op. cit.*, p. 142

1936 and 1938,[40] at a time of mounting international conflict in the area they described: in the case of one of them, Elizabeth Wiskemann's study of the German minorities in Czechoslovakia, the Foreign Office, in May 1938, put unsuccessful pressure on Toynbee to delay the publication of findings that were likely to strengthen Czech resistance to Hitler in the Sudeten crisis.[41]

At the same time as sponsoring this elaborately-planned series of studies (and a parallel one on the conflict between the European dictatorships and Christian Churches), the Institute was beginning the practice of pragmatically adopting studies in its field of interest which were already in progress. In one early case, that of C. A. Macartney's *National States and National Minorities* (1934), Chatham House published under its auspices a work that was already completed, the Publications Committee noting that it was ' the kind of study which Chatham House would probably have wished to promote if Mr. Macartney had not undertaken it himself '.[42]

The more common source of subjects for research, of course, was the Institute itself, and particularly Arnold Toynbee, who produced ideas for more projects than could actually be undertaken. In 1929, for instance, some years before the programme of individual studies began, he wrote to Gilbert Murray, after a session of the International Studies Conference (a body including representatives of a dozen countries) in London:

> I wonder what you think of my idea of a ' Survey of Cultural Relations ' . . . ? I threw out the idea of a ' Survey of International Economic Relations ', including private as well as governmental economic affairs, and it looks as though they [the Conference] would take this up, though of course it is a much more formidable affair to tackle than a cultural survey.[43]

The Institute, however, was always responsive to external suggestions for research topics, especially if they came from those in charge of British policy. From 1930 onwards a tradition was established by which the Foreign Secretary of the day (or sometimes another minister) would address the Institute's Annual Dinner, and would offer suggestions for its forthcoming programme of research. In 1930, on the first of these occasions, Arthur Henderson indicated as urgent topics, first, ' the economic relations of nations ' and, second, Britain's position in the Far East, especially in India and China.[44]

A year later, addressing the second Annual Dinner at the Savoy Hotel, the Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, felt constrained (perhaps wishing to

40 I. F. D. Morrow, *The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1936); C. A. Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919 1937* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1937); Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1938)

41 Christopher Thorne, ' Chatham House, Whitehall, and Far Eastern Issues ', *International Affairs*, Jan 1978, p. 2

42 Committee Minutes, July 14, 1933, CHA/2/1/1e

43 Toynbee to Murray, March 14, 1929, CHA/4 Toyn/6a

44 First Annual Dinner of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in ' Chatham House, Objects and Aims, 1930 ', CHA/2/1/7

outdo his Foreign Secretary) to offer no less than eight suggestions for research, going from ' Disarmament and Security ' to ' The Education of the Native as a problem of Colonial Administration ': the eight subjects included several economic themes, for instance, ' The international consequences of national rationalisation of industry ' and also ' National standards of life, with particular reference to the difficulties involved in maintaining a high standard of life in Great Britain, despite the fact that Great Britain is obliged to have economic relations with nations maintaining a lower standard '.[45] In 1932 the speaker was an eminent ex-Foreign Secretary, Sir Austen Chamberlain (Sir John Simon being engaged in the Disarmament Conference in Geneva): as well as formally announcing the new Rockefeller research grant, Chamberlain recommended the Institute to undertake ' an objective study of the spirit of nationality ', including a comparative examination of the peace settlements of 1815 and 1919.[46]

In 1933 it was the turn of Sir John Simon to suggest research on ' The Theory and Practice of Frontiers ' and on relations between white and non-white races, and in 1934 the Lord Privy Seal, Anthony Eden, commended a thorough study of international sanctions[47]; but the most striking of these early ministerial orations remains Arthur Henderson's advocacy of economic studies in the first speech of the series. In terms which still have a contemporary ring forty years later, Henderson pointed out to the Institute's assembled membership that ' though everyone knows that the world has become a single economic unit, no one has worked out the real meaning of this important fact '. He pointed to the growing web of international trade, investment, and the ' employment of labour on foreign soil ', creating ' an immense mass of contacts, of relations, between the citizens of different states '. Governments, however, tried to deny this fact of interdependence (although Henderson did not use this term, he expressed the essence of the concept), and

> No one has worked out systematically the real meaning of those facts, or given us a coherent body of thought about the real national and international interests which are involved in all the vast and delicate mechanism of international banking, production and exchange. In other words . . . no one has as yet succeeded in bringing order into the chaos of ideas that exists . . . Here is a task which the Royal Institute might very usefully undertake.[48]

Chatham House's record of research, even the small sample portrayed in this article, shows that the Institute did respond vigorously to the challenge Henderson outlined (and to many others too); but history to some extent repeats itself, and challenges are renewed in a way which lends powerful support to Arnold Toynbee's cyclical view of the historical process.

45. *Report of the Council*, 1931, pp 7-8
46. *Report of the Council*, 1932, pp 8-9
47. *Report of the Council*, 1933, p 8, 1934, p 13
48. First Annual Dinner, *op cit*

BOOKS

ADOLF HITLER: THE CONTINUING DEBATE

John P. Fox

Hitler Among the Germans. by Rudolph Binion. *New York, Oxford, Amsterdam. Elsevier. 1976 207 pp. $12.00.*

Adolf Hitler: A Family Perspective. By Helm Stierlin. *New York: Psychohistory Press for the Institute of Psychohistory, New York. 1976. 163 pp. $9.95.*

The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler. By Robert G. L. Waite *New York: Basic Books. 1977. 482 pp. $13 50*

Hitler's Ideology: A Study in Psychoanalytic Sociology. By Richard A. Koenigsberg. *New York: Library of Social Science. 1975. 105 pp. $7.95.*

The War Path: Hitler's Germany 1933-39. By David Irving *London. Michael Joseph. 1978. 301 pp. £7 50.*

Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches. Edited by Manfred Funke. *Düsseldorf: Droste, Kronberg, Ts. Athenäum. 1978. (Revised reprint of work publ. 1976 in the Bonner Schriften zur Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Bd 12) 861 pp. Pb: DM 26.00.*

Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics. By William Carr. *London Edward Arnold. 1978. 200 pp. £8·95.*

ADOLF HITLER has always been something of a mystery, to his immediate followers, his contemporaries (German and non-German [1]), and of course to historians. Part of his fascination, at least for his followers and his early audiences, lay in the sheer dynamism of the man, his charisma,[2] and his impassioned, stirring, and unrivalled powers of public speech,[3] a quality acknowledged even by his opponents Yet thirty four years after the end of the Second World War Hitler and the Nazi Party continue to exert an overwhelming degree of fascination for historians and others which hardly corresponds to the quality of the private life and public actions of the man and the movement. Why is this? Part of the attraction, or challenge, lies in the fact that Hitler was an extremely complex and politically gifted man with an insatiable lust for power But this is not enough to explain the unceasing stream of Hitlerian studies.

In simple terms the matter can be reduced to two basic factors: war and the Jewish question. Without a doubt everybody's historical interest is heightened by the study of a nation's or leader's involvement in war, simply because it relates to a fundamental

1 Writing in 1937 Winston Churchill wondered whether, for all the criticisms and doubts about his political methods, Hitler might yet come to be regarded as one of those ' great figures whose lives have enriched the story of mankind ', *Great Contemporaries* (London Butterworth, 1937), p 261, quoted by Klaus Hildebrand, ' Hitlers Ort in der Geschichte des Preussisch Deutschen Nationalstaates ', *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 217, Heft 3, Dec 1973, pp 584 632.

2 Cf Joseph Nyomarkay, *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party* (Minn Minnesota University Press, London Oxford University Press, 1967)

3 Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich* (London Sphere, 1971), p 16 Cf Irving *op cit*, p 173: ' nobody could doubt that Germany's leader cast a spell that no other had in the past, and certainly none since '

animal characteristic which we all recognise, the fight for survival. But this provides only half an answer in the case of Adolf Hitler, and the rest, or at least some of it, is to be found in the deliberate extermination of European Jewry during the Second World War. War and the destruction of the Jews, both of which can be traced back to the two *leit-motivs* of Hitler's basic political *Weltanschauung*[4] (I prefer to avoid the use of the word ' programme ' for the moment), and all that followed in their wake, led to what Professor Norman Rich has accurately summed up in these words: ' the Nazi catastrophe shattered whatever illusions men may have held about the moral progress of human kind, starkly revealing how thin was the veneer of humanitarian civilisation in the modern world '.[5] That it was Hitler who succeeded in tearing away this veneer, and who encouraged his followers and contemporaries to pursue a totality of evil hardly without equal in history, goes a great deal of the way towards explaining the fascination of the man and his movement. At the same time, of course, it says a great deal for the rest of us that our own interests are often only intensified by the worst that has happened in human history.

One can go further: had the Second World War *not* involved the destruction of European Jewry, then the fascination exerted by Hitler, and the later directions taken by historical research, would have been completely different. But then we should not have been dealing with the historical reality that was Adolf Hitler, for without Hitler *there would surely have been no Second World War*.[6] *It is therefore the* ***Endlösung*** and all that it meant in human terms and moral problems at the time, ***and its implications for human behaviour in political societies since then***, which has acted as the catalyst for historical research, determines its directions, marks out the singularity of Hitler and the NSDAP (Nazi Party) in history, and ensures the continuing interest of historians (and other observers) in all aspects of Nazism.[7]

It is relatively simple to indicate why Hitler exercises such a fascination; it is less easy to provide completely satisfactory answers to the many questions which still perplex us about the man and those years, which are summed up rather simplistically but effectively in that one favourite: ' how was it possible? '. Again, it is worth making the point: such a question would not have been necessary had it simply been a question of the Nazi dictatorship and the outbreak of the Second World War. The point is made even clearer when one considers the ***relative*** lack of historical and public interest in Mussolini and the Italian Fascist state It is the fact of the Nazi ***Endlösung*** which, consciously and sub consciously, produces the question and shows the extent to which later observers are constantly troubled by the assertion that ' the Nazis demonstrated how easy it is for man to find rational, even idealistic and moral, motives to carry out inhuman actions '.[8]

Nor is it a case of not enough people (with varying degrees of expertise) trying to provide us with the answers We have available to us a whole range of inquiries into the phenomenon of Hitler, the Nazi Party, and modern Germany;[9] and the fact that

4 Cf the essential study by Eberhard Jackel, *Hitlers Weltanschauung* Entwurf einer Herrschaft (Tübingen 1969)

5 Norman Rich, *Hitler's War Aims* Vol 2 *The Establishment of the New Order* (London Deutsch, 1974), p 422

6 For some of the debates about this subject, see E M Robertson, *The Origins of the Second World War Historical Interpretations* (London: Macmillan, 1971)

7 It is worth noting that had it not been for the Second World War, Germany's *total* defeat in 1945 (unlike the situation of 1918-19), and the Allied capture of Germany's public and private archives, the veritable flood of studies on Hitler, Nazism, and modern Germany would have been well nigh impossible

8 Rich, *op cit*, p 422

9 Since this is not a bibliographical essay I shall only refer to individual studies as and where necessary For more detailed bibliographical references (apart from those in the books under review), as well as excellent discussions on the whole range of the debate about Hitler and Nazism see the following Hildebrand, *op cit*, and, ' Hitler's War Aims ', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol 48, No 3, Sept 1976, pp 522 530, and further,

there are no extant psychiatric reports on him. As Robert Waite baldly puts it, ' consequently, any diagnosis must come after the fact and without benefit of consultation with the patient ' (p. 351).[19] The psychohistorical ' diagnosis ' is therefore pursued on the basis of clinical and psychological experience with patients whose personality, behaviour patterns and traits compare closely to those of the historical subject chosen for study; and this experience is then ' applied ' to the ' case study ' of that historical figure. Frankly, this makes one gasp. But there is more to come. Binion claims to eschew reliance upon documentation, that is, *until* he has obtained an ' insight ' after ' immersing ' himself in Hitler's words and deeds. Only then did he go to the documents which ' clinched the insights that led to them ' (p. xi). And yet again: ' often an interpretation called for new facts which then checked out. This at least proves the heuristic value of psychohistory—if that matters to its detractors.'[20]

It proves nothing of the sort. But can anything be said for this approach to the perpetual mystery of Hitler? The new ' science ' has been justified on the grounds that ' conventional historical categories of conceptualisation ' have proved inadequate in dealing with the levels of irrationality manifested by the Third Reich '[21]; and that the mention of irrationality in the subject should not terminate a discussion but ' rather initiate the most serious inquiry into the irrational bases for such historic decisions ' as Hitler's orders to kill the Jews and invade Russia (Waite, p. xvi). And indeed, *how* else can one begin to associate Auschwitz with the sweet cherub from the family photograph, the haughty and proud schoolboy fond of playing cowboys and Indians, and the foppish ' artistic ' dandy that were the young Adolf, except through the use of psychology? Again, *the* question, ' how was it possible? '

In other words, one concedes, as one must, the psychohistorians their starting point, since we have to admit that there are aspects of Hitler's career and political actions which are not explicable by the parameters of traditional historical analysis and research But it is their methodology, their paucity of reliable sources and evidence, and finally their conjectures, their hardly proven (or even provable) hypotheses about Hitler and the motives for his anti-Semitic and *Lebensraum* policies (a concentration of interests they share with other historians) which finally cast a cloud over their conclusions

They share several points of focus to their inquiries into the primal motives of Hitler's anti Semitism and the striving after *Lebensraum* in Russia. the relationship between Adolf's parents and his own position in the family, Adolf's extremely close relationship with his weak, indulgent, but rather kind-hearted mother, Klara; her terminal illness and its treatment by Dr. Bloch, a Jew; the lasting and terrible effect on Adolf of Klara's death in 1907; Adolf's gassing and temporary blindness in October 1918; Germany's defeat and the end of the Great War in November 1918; the German invasion of Russia in 1941, and finally the *Endlösung*, the gassing of the Jews in special camps.

This complex leads Stierlin to conclude that the key to Hitler's political actions lies in understanding that throughout he was acting as his mother's ' bound delegate ', compensating her (in death) for the deprivations and guilts (especially vis-à-vis Adolf's father, Alois, and on account of three of her babies which died in infancy in quick succession) of her own life. Binion's analysis likewise concentrates on the key role of

19 Waite takes issue with both Binion and John Toland (*Adolf Hitler*, New York Doubleday, 1976), who contend that Hitler was directly under the psychiatric care of Dr Edmund Forster at Pasewalk in Oct /Nov 1918 He dismisses their evidence for this, ' an inconsequential and factually inaccurate report on Hitler made for U S Naval Intelligence in 1943 by a Viennese " nerve specialist " named Karl Kronor ' *ibid* , p 350

20 Rudolph Binion, ' Hitler's Concept of *Lebensraum*. The Psychological Basis ', *History of Childhood Quarterly*, I, 1973, pp 187 215

21 Loewenberg, *op cit* , p 229

Klara, and he together with Stierlin and Waite argue that such was the effect of Klara's death on the young Adolf that he transferred his strong maternal attachment to Germany, which became a kind of psychic mother-substitute for him. This is an interesting line of thought but it is hardly provable. Binion imposes a more tightly causative sequence on the factors mentioned in the previous paragraph, and pursues his arguments relentlessly on the basis of his basic analytical assumption, but at the cost of incorporating a more developmental analysis of Hitler's political and psychological growth.[22] His basic analytical, psychological, assumption is that of trauma, an experience that is too painful to be assimilated but which, being denied or suppressed, in turn sets up the traumatic neurosis. An attempt to come to terms with all this is to ' relive ' the old experience, to ' contrive a new experience that is unconsciously taken to be the old one even while consciously the connections between them go unnoticed ' (p. xii).

If the discipline of history is anything to go by one can be quite sure that psychologists are as divided on that thesis as they are on almost everything else. But Binion holds fast throughout and argues that the gassing of the Jews during the Second World War and the German invasion of Russia in 1941 can be traced back to a series of personal traumas experienced by Hitler, and to the *shared* traumas of Hitler and the German nation in defeat in 1918. Binion argues that his gassing and temporary blindness in 1918 traumatised Hitler to such an extent that it caused the repressed guilt conflict of 1907 to surface. In that year Hitler evidently played some role in the decision to use on his seriously ill mother (who had been operated on for breast cancer) the chemical iodoform, administered by the Jewish Dr Bloch, after which she died; Binion further argues that Hitler's personal trauma was accompanied by the collective trauma occasioned by Germany's defeat in November 1918; that his hallucinations at the hospital at Pasewalk and the restoration of his sight caused him to resolve both to avenge Germany's defeat and his mother's death (' poisoned ' by the iodoform) at the hands of a Jew; that he therefore set out to murder the Jews and restage the Great War, an enterprise in which the German nation acquiesced because it, too, had to ' relive ' the trauma of the defeat of November 1918. As Binion succinctly puts his case, ' Hitler's two political tracks both took off from his mission hallucinated in Pasewalk They ran to Auschwitz and Stalingrad respectively ' (p 85).

If true, Binion's thesis would certainly add to our understanding of the ' essential ' Hitler It would help round out the case of those historians who maintain that Hitler ' always ' intended to kill the Jews,[23] especially since their arguments have continually begged the questions many have failed to answer satisfactorily, ' if so, precisely *why*, and *since when*? '—and dating the idea from the writing of *Mein Kampf* and the *Zweites Buch* as some of them do is not a total explanation Likewise, Binion's argument would seem to demolish completely the case of other historians who maintain that, despite (or even because of) the nature of Hitler's anti-Semitism and Nazi policies after 1933, the *Endlösung* only emerged as a solution to the Jewish

22 Cf Loewenberg, *op cit*, pp 242 243, for a criticism of Binion's early work on psychological grounds

23 It is remarkable the degree to which the imagery of cancer and poison appears so often in Hitler's speeches and writing And why the word ' love ' in his speech of September 1, 1939, when referring to England's rejection of his offers of friendship? Erhard Klöss, *Reden des Fuhrers Politik und Propaganda Adolf Hitlers 1922-1945* (Munich 1967, Deutscher Taschenbuch), pp 208-16 (I must admit that this latter point suddenly struck me when playing my own record of Hitler's Reichstag speech of September 1, 1939)

24 Jäckel, *op cit*, p 140, Andreas Hillgruber, ' Die *Endlösung* und das deutsche Ostimperium als Kernstück des rassenideologischen Programms des Nationalsozialismus ', VfZ, 20 Jhg, April 1972, pp 133-153, Lucy S Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews 1933 1945* (London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1975)

question during the period 1940–41 and should therefore be seen within the context, and as a ' function ', of the wartime situation.[25]

Historians, like everybody else, prefer simple answers, but what finally nags at one here is the lack of a developmental analysis (on the psychological side as well) and an historical dimension and context. Jäckel, for instance, argues that in 1919 we can see the 30-year old Hitler ' as a conventional anti-Semite and in foreign policy as conventional revisionist ', and though more radical than most, his ideas then did not contain ' that originality which they later acquired '—this conventional foundation providing the starting point in 1920 for the long process of the ' development and completion ' of his *Weltanschauung*.[26] If we are to see, as Binion would have it, a ' psychological continuum ' for Hitler from 1907, 1918, through to the Final Solution of 1941–44, how are we to explain the fact that accompanying the Nazi campaign of hatred against the Jews in the 1920s the Nazi parliamentary delegations in the Reichstag, Bavaria, Saxony, and Prussia pressed for legislation expelling from Germany *only* (my italics) those Jews who had entered Germany after August 1, 1914 and dismissing Jews from public office, as well as the fact that from 1933 to even 1940 Nazi policy against the Jews was directed at emigration?[27] Reservations about the lack of a developmental analysis on the Jewish question apply as well to the Russian issue, and it is noticeable that Binion chooses to ignore Hitler's statements on Russia until in 1921–22 a gradual shift in his attitudes can be discerned in the direction of those crystallised in *Mein Kampf* and the *Zweites Buch*.[28] Likewise, how can one possibly prove that the German nation of 1918–19, consciously or unconsciously, worked towards June 22, 1941? What happened to German and international military and political history in the meantime? And why did the Nazi government feel it necessary in June 1941 to mount an intensive propaganda campaign justifying the attack on Russia which, as the *Sicherheitsdienst* reports showed, hit the German public like a bomb?[29] ' Traditional ' history-writing already runs the risk of seeming to impose an order and direction that need not have been there, but Binion goes further by imposing the somewhat fashionable notion of preconceived ' concepts ' on the material. It may well be, of course, that Binion has ' discovered ' Hitler's point of ' conversion ' on the road to Damascus—or should that be ' Auschwitz '?—but nobody, including Binion, can be that sure.

Binion's study will at least provoke debate and force us to re-examine our previous views and arguments. But it is difficult to see the Waite book being brought very much into the Hitler debate. It is a reworking of the Hitler story from the cradle to the grave,

25 Uwe Dietrich Adam, *Judenpolitik im Dritten Reich* (Dusseldorf 1972)

26 Jäckel, *op cit*, p 155 Jäckel's views on the evolution of Hitler's foreign policy ideas have recently been taken further, and in some cases challenged, by Axel Kuhn, *Hitlers aussenpolitisches Programm* (Stuttgart 1970)

27 C C Aronsfeld ' Perish Judah Nazi Extermination Propaganda 1920–1945 ', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol 12, No 5, Sept Oct 1978, pp 17 26, Shaul Esh, ' Designs for Anti-Jewish Policy in Germany up to the Nazi Rule ', *Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance* (Jerusalem 1967), Vol VI, pp 83 120, Karl A Schleunes, *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz Nazi Policy toward German Jews, 1933 1939* (Urbana, Ill University of Illinois Press, 1970), Eliahu Ben Elissar, *La diplomatie du III Reich et les Juifs, 1933 1939* (Paris 1969) The whole debate on this question took a completely new turn with David Irving's, *Hitler's War* (London Hodder and Stoughton, 1977) For a critique of this, as well as for some important documentary finds for 1941, see the excellent analysis by Martin Broszat, ' Hitler und die Genesis der *Endlosung* Aus Anlass der Thesen von David Irving ', VfZ, 25 Jhg, Oct 1977, pp 739 75

28 Cf Binion, pp 17 19, but then see Jäckel, *op cit*, pp 35–40 It is to be particularly noted that in a speech on April 17, 1920, Hitler said that ' an agreement between us and Russia is not possible because the international Jewish press combines prevent this ', and again on July 27, 1920, ' an alliance between Russia and Germany can only occur if Judaism [in Russia] is removed ' Reginald H Phelps, ' Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920 ', VfZ 11 Jhg, July 1963, pp 274–330, document 3 (p 297) and document 9 (p 308)

29 Ernest K Bramsted, *Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda, 1925–1945* (East Lansing Michigan State University Press, 1965), pp 234–245, Marlis G Steiner, *Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen Stimmung und Haltung der deutschen Bevölkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Dusseldorf 1970), pp 204–209

and selected parts at that, seen from a psychological perspective. Although well written and researched, and offering periodic insights, at the end one is left with a feeling that somehow the subject has slipped through the author's fingers. Apart from the number of suppositions and hypotheses he is forced to make, there is a total lack of cohesion to the book; it takes off in all directions and repeatedly backtracks on itself. There is no space for a detailed critique here, but with regard to the general themes pursued so far, Waite follows Binion in attesting to the importance of the association between Klara's death and her treatment by a Jewish doctor. He goes further, however, in a psychological direction when he suggests that through a complicated series of Oedipal conflicts and difficulties and displacement processes, Dr. Bloch became a substitute for Adolf's hated father, Alois, so that ' in attempting to destroy the Jews, Hitler was attempting to destroy his father ' (pp. 188, 365).[30] Waite at least makes an original point, and one that even other historians can grasp, when he emphasises the importance of ' suggestion ' for determining a person's actions. He disagrees with those historians who dismiss the relevance of the stories of Hitler's alleged Jewish ancestry. On the contrary, he thinks it is of crucial and staggering significance, for if Hitler really believed he *might* be part Jewish—in 1930 he ordered Hans Frank to make a thorough investigation of the rumours (pp. 126-127)—the consequences of that belief, ' along with other psychopathological factors, produced the greatest deliberate mass murder of history '; ' to convince himself that such a direct threat to his personal identity and his life work was an utter impossibility, he became history's greatest scourge of the Jews.'[31] Waite finally concludes that Hitler was a ' borderline personality ' (the border between neurosis and psychosis), somebody mentally ill but able to function effectively in some areas. As to the question of *Lebensraum* and nationalism, Waite is less interesting but relates Hitler's own ideas more directly to the German historical context up to 1933. But was it really necessary to go back to the year 800?

As to the Koenigsberg book, it is really a curiosity, consisting of page after page of tables of quotations from *Mein Kampf* and the collection by Norman Baynes of Hitler's speeches. Yet there is some fascination to it since the author shows Hitler's obsession, in his speeches and writings, with things like living organisms, the disintegration of the national body, the national body being diseased, consumed, or poisoned, Germany being rescued from death, and so on. And the connection with what I have been commenting upon is striking.

* * *

While one must view the work of the psychohistorians with justifiable reserve, there is no doubt that they have opened up new perspectives in this field, especially since there are aspects of Hitler's character, personality, and politics which even his most authoritative biographers have failed to get to grips with. But however much we would like to think that they may have found the missing answers, or at least are on the right track, we (and they) shall probably never really know for certain. We are, however, on more familiar ground with the works by Irving, Funke, and Carr. In criticising those historians who seek to show that the state system was of greater importance for the Third Reich than the leadership and policies of Hitler, Professor Hillgruber has remarked that a dangerous by product of their work is the tendency to ' normalise ' Hitler.[32] This has always seemed to be the intention of Irving's work in his own

30 This harks back to an original, and Oedipal, interpretation of Hitler's family relationships. Gertrud M. Kurth, ' The Jew and Adolf Hitler ', *Psychoanalytical Quarterly*, XVI, 1947, pp. 11-31. See my reference to the word ' love ' in fn. 23 above.

31 Robert G. L. Waite, ' Adolf Hitler's Anti-Semitism: A Study in History and Psychoanalysis ', in, B. B. Wolman, ed., *The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 192-229, esp. p. 215. Waite, p. 370.

32 Hillgruber, ' Tendenzen ', *op. cit.*, p. 617.

personal search for the ' essential ' Hitler, and in fact this book is a personalised, ' Führer focused ', account of the crisis years 1938–39. The subtitle is, however, totally misleading: from page 66 we enter 1938 while ' Germany ' (and even Europe for that matter) provides only an extremely shadowy backcloth for the main performer, Hitler. But before the star appears the author steps forward to receive his acclaim for according Hitler the kind of ' fair hearing ' he might receive in an English court of *law*, for eschewing ' as far as possible ' all published literature in favour of the ' available primary sources ' (do not other historians use basic documentary material?), and for the entirely new primary sources he has tracked down. All this leads him to state portentously, ' I make no apology for having revised the existing picture of Adolf Hitler '. He has done nothing of the sort, and his point that Hitler's victories in central Europe ' were won without the sword— they were won by power-politics and opportunism, by bluff, by coercion, by psychological operations and by nerve-war ' (p. 89), is the stock-in-trade, indeed it has to be, of all studies of Hitler.

What does emerge is a well-written book, and one which shows Irving, in the main, to be a true-blue traditionalist so far as the interpretations of Hitler's main foreign policy objectives are concerned, i.e. the striving for supremacy in Europe, *Lebensraum* and empire in Russia. So much so that one's eyebrows are involuntarily raised when one reads that after March 15, 1939, ' the next items on Hitler's *list* were, *of course*, Memel, Danzig and the Polish Corridor ' (p. 192), (my italics). Nor is Irving out of step with those who argue that it is possible to reconcile Hitler's moments of relative unpreparedness and indecision as to which way to go next, or if at all (which he charts extremely well), with the long-term objectives the Führer set himself.[33]

Nevertheless, one finishes the book with a sense of irritation and disappointment that is difficult to specify, although certain pointers can be given. Partly it is the near-journalistic style of writing, because one never quite shrugs off the feeling that Irving is putting words into the mouths of his characters, and partly it is his grand claims for his new sources—adjutants, secretaries and so on—which in most cases turn out to add nothing more than tit-bits. Throughout there is as well the over-riding sense of familiarity, although Irving is to be congratulated for at last putting into English much documentary material hitherto only available in German publications and archives. But the few references in the notes to articles in the *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, the glaring omissions of other ' published literature ' and comparison with the wealth of scholarly debate and material in the Funke *Sammlung* show that Irving (for this period at least) is simply not in the mainstream of the current Hitler *Forschung*. This is glaringly shown by the one or two brief references to the German economy and its significance for military and foreign policy, which serve only to underline the total absence in this book of an adequate discussion of this crucial issue. His two or three sentence comments on Germany's role in Spain and the Far East are other cases in point (pp. 54–56). He touches briefly upon other important points of principle and historical interpretation which are the subject of debate elsewhere, but fails to develop them.

One is also irritated by the author's avowed intention to write history ' from behind the Führer's desk ', as it were. Since Hitler kept no diary or memoirs, or even *Table Talk* for the prewar years, this is nonsense. Since, therefore, we are forced to see him through the eyes of other close or distant observers, the ' essential ' Hitler always seems to be disappearing down an inverted telescope, hidden deep behind the surface narrative of events. Nor is it true to say that the ' monolithic solidarity of Führer and Volk persisted right to his end ' (p. 207); one has only to read the Goebbels diaries for

33 Cf. H. R. Trevor-Roper, ' Hitlers Kriegsziele ', VfZ, 8 Jhg. April 1960, pp. 121–33, Alan Bullock, *Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War* (The Raleigh Lecture on History, British Academy, 1967), pp. 260–262.

1945 to see how wrong this conclusion is.[34] And as to Irving's statement that Hitler had no compunction about riding the ' evil horse ' of anti-Semitism to the doors of the Chancellery in 1933, ' but that once inside and in power, he " dismounted " and paid only lip service to that part of his creed ' (p. xv), this really makes one wonder whether Irving has any deep understanding of his subject at all.

Yet there are periodic insights, and Irving has made one important contribution to the history of those years, which other historians, especially those rewriting the history of British appeasement in the 1930s, would be well advised to note. He has used the records of the Nazi wire-tapping and decoding agency, the *Forschungsamt*[35] with real effect to show just how much Hitler and other leading Nazis knew of the intentions and policies of the British, French, and Czech governments in 1938-39, and how this knowledge enabled Hitler to adjust not only his own policies and actions but even his manner and tone of voice for subsequent diplomatic confrontations. Much as recent work on the intelligence services after 1939 will have a profound effect on interpretations of Allied and German policies during the Second World War,[36] so it is to be expected that Irving's findings will have a similar effect for the 1930s. This is a real contribution, and it shows that Mr. Irving would do far better to be on the inside and in from the cold.

* * *

Nevertheless, and in terms of the ' essential ' man, Irving's Hitler tends to be a shadowy figure and to disappear behind the narrative of events To some extent as well, the Hitler who emerges from the weighty Funke *Sammlung* (especially) and the Carr study is a distant and political figure. Here we are back in the field of academic scholarship: Funke's volume (previously published in hardback in 1976) containing forty-three essays by mainly German specialist scholars on the ultimate focal point of all studies on Hitler and National Socialism, foreign policy; while the succinct but stimulating study by Carr seeks to explore the ' interrelationship between the personality of Hitler and those social forces which made National Socialism possible '. Both books return us to the point made earlier, that Hitler can only be fully understood as the politically active Hitler: what were his objectives, how did he approach their attainment, and in what did he succeed or fail and why? These last points place the analysis of Hitler firmly within the context of ' Germany ' and all the political, social, economic, and military forces with which the Nazi regime had to deal. The essays in the Funke *Sammlung* are representative of the intensity with which present German academics are studying these subjects, their debate, as I understand from a friend who is a participant, sometimes having the quality of those mediaeval dissensions in theology over which conclaves had a monopoly of doctrinal infallibility

One sees what he means. So refined have some of the arguments become, and so disparate and multifarious the issues, that apart from being tempted to ask who belongs to Avignon and who to Rome, it is difficult to know where to begin. Only the merest hint of the wealth of debate and information to be found in the Funke volume can be given here. Broadly speaking, the issues boil down to these. After all the years of intense study and research since 1945, can the ' traditional ' picture of Hitler be maintained, the Hitler with a fixed and unalterable set of foreign-policy aims, establishing the authoritarian, monolithic and totalitarian state in which the attainment of these foreign-policy aims took absolute priority? Or does the

34 H R Trevor Roper, ed, *The Goebbels Diaries The Last Days* (London. Secker and Warburg, 1978).

35 Cf David Irving, ed, *Breach of Security The German Secret Intelligence File on Events Leading to the Second World War* (London Kimber, 1968)

36 Cf R. V Jones, *Most Secret War British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978)

increasingly detailed and documented research invalidate this picture to such an extent that in many or even most respects our former image of the man and the regime must be drastically revised? For instance, must one see Nazi foreign policy not in terms of Hitler's *Endziele* but as the result of internal pressures? Or is it more a question of this increased knowledge refining our total picture without necessarily invalidating the basic premises with which most scholars approach the subject? Few scholars would now maintain the first viewpoint in its totality. The debate therefore is between those who hold the second and third points of view and who, respectively, have been rather loosely labelled the 'revisionists' and 'traditionalists'. At the end of the day, however, the evidence must give the latter the victory, as indeed it should.

One of the so-called revisionists, although he vehemently rejects such a label,[37] is Hans Mommsen, represented in Funke's volume by an essay discussing the 'state of emergency' as a governing technique of the National Socialist regime. Mommsen argues that Hitler was a weak dictator who, as Chancellor, did not exercise the function of party leader but carried over into the Reich Chancellery the mentality and methods of *Parteiführer* (p. 38); that he lorded over a regime where the Nazi Party, apart from the SS, far from being the power in the land was in fact absorbed (and therefore 'lost') in the machinery of the German state (p. 36); that since the Nazi Party was unprepared for political power on January 30, 1933, and its basic aims did not go beyond those of the acquisition of power (p. 30), the consequence was a regime whose internal and foreign policies lacked clear priorities and direction, so that in the final analysis one could certainly not talk 'in a constructive sense of a National Socialist European policy' (pp 42, 44-45); and that in fact the only device which kept the whole thing together was the establishment, through propaganda, of a whole series of crises.

Much of this really goes too far and, as with some of Irving's points, one begins to wonder whether we are in fact dealing with the historical reality that was Hitler. While Binion imposed a concept and a continuum on the material that were not necessarily there, Mommsen pulls the rug out from under almost everything in sight, thus creating a lack of order and direction that were also not necessarily there either. But in one respect he is at one with Binion, and certainly with Broszat[38] who argues that the Third Reich's foreign policy must be seen as an 'ideological metaphor', a process of continual action to act as a guarantee of integration and even diversion, as a means of coalescing the competing factions in the Third Reich. All three, therefore, seem to reject out of hand the notion that a developmental analysis in history is worthy of consideration Mommsen, for instance, totally rejects the Jäckel interpretation of the development of Hitler's foreign-policy ideas (p 44) But in the final analysis one must go back to Hitler's views about the primacy of foreign policy and that 'the State is only a means to an end', that end being for the Nazi Party the organisation of the national forces to 'set them on the path which will lead them away from that territorial restriction which is the bane of our national life today, and win new territory for them'[39]

The essays by Karl Bracher, Charles Bloch, and Klaus Hildebrand are, in the main, representative of that generation of 'traditionalists' who are prepared to accept that much of the documentary material used in the last two decades does change the usual picture of Hitler and the Nazi Party in some respects, but without altering in a fundamental way certain basic premises about Hitler's role and aims in political life, and the nature of the Nazi regime in Germany and Europe. As Bracher pinpoints it precisely, the problem with the revisionist approach is that by trying to diminish the

37 Bosch, *op cit* p 62

38 See fn 14 above

39 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (London Hurst and Blackett, 1938), pp 330, 526

ideological and totalitarian dimensions of National Socialism, not only does one begin to ' normalise ' the Third Reich but also to diminish, as a ' moral phenomenon ', the barbarities of the years 1933-45 (pp. 17-18). This point can be taken further. By trying to get us to look at the Third Reich in a ' realistic ' sense the revisionists completely misconstrue the role and character of Hitler because they ignore the relevance of his *Endziele* in foreign policy—a case in point is Mommsen's argument that Hitler was only a man of improvisation and experiment (p. 19). And in doing this they completely misinterpret the purpose of the Third Reich's domestic policy which in most cases they try to separate from foreign policy. As Bracher and some of the others argue, one of the basic features of the regime was the inter-relation between domestic and foreign policy, but with the former all the time acting as the function of the latter (p. 19)

Like many traditionalists, Bloch emphasises the role of Hitler as the ' integrating ' factor in the Third Reich—and in this, as in the point that the regime *had* to have foreign policy successes (p. 205) he is flying close to the line taken by Broszat. But unlike Broszat he makes it quite clear that for Hitler foreign policy was an absolute priority *per se*, so that both he and Hildebrand are at one in opposing Broszat's view that Hitler's foreign policy must be seen as a means of maintaining the social structure of Germany This completely misconstrues Hitler's concept of the state being only a means to an end, the attainment of his *Endziele* in foreign policy. If, in fact, the state had really been his prime concern, why the fear of being ' institutionalised '? Bloch discusses the factors to which Hitler had to refer inside Germany and within Europe, and makes the important point that Hitler's foreign policy must also be related to the question of how far it accorded with the aims of those who helped him to power and who, until February 4, 1938, were really a carry-over from before January 1933 (pp 206, 209). Bloch therefore sees a permanent parallel between Nazi domestic and foreign policy (p 221), but as to the latter emphasises that one *must* see this as quantitatively and qualitatively different from anything else that went before in German history (p 206). One reservation concerns Bloch's treatment of the Jewish question He correctly states that Hitler saw this as a world problem (p. 205), but he tends to place too much importance on external factors in the development of Nazi Germany's Jewish policies to 1938 (p. 220). One cannot deny the international significance of the Jewish question in the winter of 1938-39, but the *Endlösung* was neither decided upon in January 1942, nor with particular reference to America's entry into the war (p. 221, fn 43) In two other essays Klaus Hildebrand also discusses the question of the internal motivation and ' momentum ' for Nazi foreign policy, and in another discusses the question of Hitler's ' Programme ' and how far it was or was not ' realised ' in the decisive years 1939-42.

The book by William Carr is an excellent, stimulating, and succinct synthesis of much of what appears in the books by the psychohistorians, the Funke volume, and much else which has not been mentioned here. In a nutshell, Carr seeks to explore the ' interrelationship between the personality of Hitler and those social forces which made National Socialism possible ' (p. viii) He does this in five chapters by analysing Hitler as politician (1919-33), as dictator (1933-45), as military commander, by investigating Hitler's ' intellectual ' world, and finally, by discussing whether Hitler was ' a sick man '. What Carr in fact does is to seek to fuse the two main strands of the debate about Hitler, but throughout one can see the hands of the ' revisionists ' at work. Carr says, for example, that ' one must be careful to distinguish between Hitler's role as the executant of German foreign policy in the 1930s and his personal responsibility for the policy itself ', so that ' it is when one begins to speak of " objectives " that doubts arise ' (p 53) And further, Carr warns that in the study of Nazi foreign policy, i.e. German foreign policy after 1933, one must avoid attributing ' far too much importance to the personality of one man ' (p 54) But such is the

excellence of Carr's synthesis of the opposing schools of thought that when, for instance, he sets out some of the arguments which point in the direction of economic pressures pushing Hitler in the direction of war in 1939, he then adds the qualification that ' one must also admit quite frankly that there is far too little positive evidence to permit us to determine with any degree of accuracy the importance of such considerations in Hitler's decision for war ' (pp. 58–59). As with his reference to the views of the revisionists, Carr is inclined to give a fair but critical hearing to the psychohistorians and their work

Some students ought to be warned, however, that the brevity of Carr's book does not indicate an easy or soft option. If anything, his study assumes that the reader has at least a basic awareness and some detailed knowledge of the arguments and problems, as well as the debate, which he tackles with consummate skill, and this is particularly true of the military, economic, and Jewish questions after 1933. In short, a valuable analysis of the subject and a worthy successor to the author's previously excellent study on Nazi policy.[40]

However one assesses the individual contributions to historical knowledge made by the seven books under review, there can be no doubt that together they give a fairly up-to-date and certainly comprehensive picture of the present state of some aspects of Hitler *Forschung*,[41] and their possession can only benefit those who work in the field. Two things are certain: they will certainly provoke debate and, undoubtedly, will be followed by yet more studies on Hitler, the NSDAP, and modern Germany. But then one more thing can be stated with equal certainty: neither these present books, nor any new studies, will really ever get us close to the ' essential ' Hitler.

40 William Carr, *Arms, Autarky and Aggression. A Study in German Foreign Policy 1933 1939* (London Arnold, 1972)

41 The early years of the NSDAP have recently been preoccupying historians cf. Wolfgang Horn *Führerideologie und Parteiorganisation in der NSDAP (1919 1933)* (Düsseldorf, 1972), Albrecht Tyrell, *Vom ' Trommler ' zum ' Führer '* (Munich 1975)

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory Edited by Michael Donelan. *London. Allen and Unwin. 1978. 220 pp. £6·95.*

'DANGER!' cried the late C. A. W. Manning, 'states co-existing overhead.' Why are they there? What is their status and significance relative to the concept of an undifferentiated collectivity of mankind? This remarkable book considers such questions. It does so with redoubtable intelligence, learning and some elegance of style. The 'various hands' at work here share a common inheritance drawn from classical European political thought. Despite the diversity of subject-matter there is thus a unity of purpose and perspective that is reinforced by the editorial skill with which Michael Donelan has handled his gifted team. Conceptual and stylistic unevenness often weakens the impact of symposia. In this respect *The Reason of States* is something of a model of presentation.

Maurice Keens-Soper discusses the practice of the European states-system historically. This provides a valuable ground on which the more abstract theorising of later contributors is erected In one paragraph (p 37) the 'behaviourist school' is put courteously but firmly in its place (and as firmly kept there later on by Philip Windsor). Peter Butler contributes a lucid analysis of Vattel's thought in *The Law of Nations*. He draws the persuasive conclusion that any advantageous transformation of the states-system must be achieved by the states themselves, on the Vatellian basis of mutual respect for states' rights, a due seriousness of political purpose and the functionally valuable continuance of dignified diplomatic practice. Brian Porter's perceptive essay examines with insight and sympathy the limitations and uses of the late Martin Wight's categories of international theory, which are briefly but clearly explained.

Michael Donelan, urbane and charming as always, offers a symposium within the symposium. This is really the core of the book. The great political theorists are discussing the state, states and international relations over drinks at the Inn of the Perpetual Peace. (One likes to picture Saint Augustine clinking glasses with J-J. Rousseau!) These wise persons are chiefly concerned with men living under governments. What are or ought to be the reciprocal rights and duties of men and their rulers? But men also now live in a world-wide collectivity of states. They must therefore be concerned with the reciprocal rights and duties of governments *vis-à-vis* each other. In fact, Michael Donelan's theological tradition aligns him firmly on the side of the conception of Natural Law. This implies the existence of an innate human moral sense, however blunted by original sin, and hence of a moral community of mankind, underlying those arrangements which divide it into separate competitive (and co-operating) political communities called states. Positivists demur. But it can at least be argued that a belief in the reality of such a universal moral community may promote its realisation, assuming this to be a Good Thing. Such an aspiration may prove to some extent self-fulfilling. Thinkers wholly locked in the sense of the predicament of power politics can have little to say about means of transcending it. On the other hand, thinkers of that sort are free to argue that approaching the world as a 'global village' takes too little account of the compelling nature of current realities, those, that is, which suggest the image of a bag of scorpions rather than a symbiosis of

mutually dependent creatures, and may actually reduce the limited orderliness of the international system that prevails, with its constraints of power upon the exercise of power. Whatever the balance of the argument, interdependence within that system grows. With it, the notion of distributive justice as a norm demanding observance by states also grows. It represents, as Professor Hedley Bull allows, a genuinely new development in the conception of a morally satisfying world order.

Moorhead Wright examines the problem of meaning in international theory. He reminds us that reality is apprehended through the filter of language. Three 'realms' are discussed: everyday personal experience; the public domain of interactions, with its concomitants of organisation, convention and institutions that include states; and the ultimate realm of Ends, to which the public domain is in principle subordinate and which it 'ought' to serve. The difficult relationships of the three realms are tellingly explored by special reference to war and its various 'meanings'. This problem of meaning is tackled from a different though related viewpoint by Cornelia Navari. In doing so she offers an impressive analysis of the central thought of Hobbes, and a critique of that realism which, obsessed with a conceived state of nature, tends to make of power a thing in itself, a content that defines the context instead of being defined by it.

James Mayall, in a brilliant contribution, reaffirms the reality of an international society, which by definition cannot be value-free. It can only be at all adequately explained in relation to the history of its development, and to the inescapable element of self-explanation present in all attempts by men to analyse collective human experience. Men make history by writing it. History conditions contemporary phenomena, including those of explanation. Writing with sympathy of modern positivism, and its use in clarifying issues unduly clouded by moral assumptions and justifications, he nevertheless perceives fundamental elements in the global states-system which constitute shared values and implied reciprocities. Whatever the status of a primordial community of mankind may be, such elements provide international society with at least the rudiments of a valid universal morality, however culturally and experientially diverse that society's members may be. James Mayall argues that cultural diversity no longer compromises the reality or workability of a world-wide international society. He concludes that a community of mankind may conceivably be established in men's minds, and thence in their political arrangements, by what appears to be the universal acceptance of the current 'myth of the modern industrialising state'.

Christopher Brewin contributes a useful piece on 'Justice in International Relations'. He prescribes a contract theory of justice, as revised by J. Rawls. He shows how its application would make for the better ordering of the world by means of the regulation of distributive decisions on a basis of rational agreement rather than the margin of power. In conclusion, he offers a devastatingly honest critique of this theory of justice in the light of the history of international society and the current practices of its members. 'If wishes were horses . . .'; but they are not. Barrie Paskins explores the nature of the mutual obligations of the state and its citizens as well as the rights and duties of states in their interstate relations. He concludes that the existence of such a plurality of states clearly modifies the self-enclosed moral system of Hegel, while refuting the 'tormented, criterionless' conceptions of Kierkegaard or Nietzsche that the political world is a moral vacuum filled only by naked power.

'The Justification of the State' is an essay by Philip Windsor of considerable philosophical subtlety. Difficult as it is, it is full of exciting suggestions about the nature of justice. All society Philip Windsor sees as inherently oppressive upon the individual. But the state can be normatively conceived and employed as an instrument for constraining society and so guaranteeing desired rights. The state itself, he firmly points out, also deserves judgment. It is not enough merely to condone tyranny on the

ground that cultures, values and political traditions differ. Nor will it do to assume an innate Western liberal superiority towards non-Western political bosses who crudely and harshly boss their lesser breeds without the Law. 'Mindless relativism and mindless authoritarianism' he condemns equally. What he leaves us with is a highly qualified hope that despite men's inheritance of 'the reptilian brain below the cortex' it is at least possible in principle for them to criticise societies, and to use organs of state to temper the oppressions they suffer. They may also conceivably reach a certain consensus about the nature of justice that may even harmonise interstate relations themselves, and also subject states to that judgment which is precisely desirable because the state is indispensable. The arrow of analysis thus flies from Philip Windsor's bow even beyond the great figure of Hegel back to Plato and Aristotle.

In discussing 'International Relations and the Philosophy of History' Peter Savigear also deals with the matter of judgment. History to him is essentially mental: it is Mind acting in and through events. There are thus real human choices, and their outcome is history; what happens, in effect, is judgment upon the relative goodness wisdom of the choices made. History is, then, collective self-judgment. It is to be understood not by reference to transcendental principles, such as the 'truths' of theology or the criterion of reason, but by what men have chosen to do within a historical process. Meanwhile, asserts Peter Savigear, the history of international relations, as distinct from the history of relations between states with its emphasis on the primacy of the state as 'actor', is only beginning to be written. He admits that 'the state may never be transcended by international relations'. But it is possible that historians addressing themselves to what is seen to happen in international relations may yet achieve a philosophy of international history which develops true judgment. If so they will be in some position to judge validly degrees of good and evil in international relations as against judging merely the discrete politics of participating states. Only to the extent that this is achieved will genuine international political theory have been evolved.

Stephen George concludes the symposium with a concise and sensible discussion of the roles of the 'Scientific' and 'Classical' schools of international political thought. He takes careful account of the pressures upon both to question their presuppositions and modes of analysis in response to profound changes, as he sees them, in the experiences and expectations of the societies, primarily American and British, with which each school has been mainly identified. He relates these intranational changes with developments in international society. They have shown a diminishing preoccupation with the problems of East-West relations (perhaps to be largely reversed in the next few years?) and a growing awareness of the crucial importance to East and West alike of the emergence of a politically articulated and economically momentous divide between North and South. Ultimately derived from a metaphysical value often obscured in debate, the demand for a set of international relationships consciously conducted on behalf of ideas of distributive justice will, in Stephen George's view, prove an irresistible determinant both of future international political action, and of accompanying—and justificatory—international political theory, whether using mainly would-be scientific tools of explanation or those of traditional or empiricist political thought.

Altogether this appears to be a very important book. It is a reassuring and by no means unsuccessful attempt to theorise the stuff of international politics. The suggestion of attainable intelligibility is convincingly conveyed. Relations between political communities, as in themselves a somewhat bewildering series of events in space-time, are subject to an interpretation of notable coherence that offers significance. On its subject this book formidably resists the terrifying possibility that assailed Mrs. Moore in her Marabar cave: 'Everything exists: nothing has value.'

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth ROBERT PURNELL

Bones of Contention: An Enquiry into East-West Relations. By Terence Garvey. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978. 203 pp. £6·50.*

THIS is a concise statement of the main issues involved in the process of detente between the West and the Soviet Union, and is based on a sound historical sense both of Soviet Westpolitik since 1945 and of Russian traditions as reflected in Soviet foreign policy.

Sir Terence, who was British Ambassador in Moscow for two years from the end of 1975, is not a victim of 'euphoria', and sees detente as a progress from considerable to less considerable tension, which may be slowed up or reversed if the Soviet government tries to hasten a 'final victory of Communism' by pushing its luck too hard. Sir Terence argues further that, while the Soviet Union is not immune to social changes, these are not likely to occur soon enough to influence East-West relations in the next crucial years.

Nevertheless his voice is not one of despair. The Soviet Union needs the West, for capital investment and technical innovation, and no more than the West can it afford a serious risk of nuclear war. It is subject to pressures from within, not only from the military lobby, but also from consumers and consumer industries. Deeper analysis would have been welcome here: for example, will the West remain content with the present level of Soviet debt? And is the appetite of Soviet consumers blunted by the widespread functioning of the 'parallel economy'? There are also pressures from outside. The book is already and inevitably somewhat dated in its treatment of the Chinese threat as seen from Moscow, of Soviet difficulties with the non-aligned movement, and of Romanian dissidence within the 'camp'.

Sir Terence's concluding hope is that the process of detente can gradually produce a substantial web of shared interests between the Soviet Union and the West. The Soviet Union has more to gain from interdependence, but Western governments would be foolish to reject the idea because the Russians like it. They must, however, insist on a full price—the cessation of explicitly hostile action in every field of East-West relations. This implies linkage between the various 'bones of contention' listed by the author; but in his view (surely correct) some finesse is needed in the linkage of human rights' issues with the rest. In other words, the human rights' issue can and must be kept alive but not primarily and openly by governments; and it is the last 'bone' over which effective governmental agreements are likely to be reached.

Such a policy is much more easily stated than executed, particularly by members of an alliance who, incidentally, would find it equally difficult to enforce a consequent 'anti-detente' policy. However, the clear route map provided in this book is in itself very valuable, one may hope, to a wide public as well as to experts in international affairs. There are one or two mistakes in dates given—for example, the Korean and Cuban crises.

Corpus Christi College, Cambridge DUNCAN WILSON

The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 1869–1971. By W. David McIntyre. *Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1978. 596 pp. £17·50*

THIS book is volume IX of the ten-volume series 'Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion' edited by B. C. Shafer. At first sight, the choice of the date 1869 seems to have no ready justification. It is Gandhi's date of birth; Smuts was born a year later. The author chose that year, however, to indicate the mid-point of Queen Victoria's reign, and his judgment of the period when the British Empire was beginning to adopt 'that defensive stance which contemporaries termed imperialism' (p. 3). 1971 was the year when Britain decided to enter the European Community.

He defines the central theme of Commonwealth history as the transformation of Empire into Commonwealth, an evolution of relationships (p. 6), and the Commonwealth of 1971 as a voluntary association of states linked by a complex network of organs of communication and institutional relationships (p. 7). He questions whether there was an organic entity of the Empire in 1869 (p. 7). Apart from matters administered locally in accordance with the conventions of limited internal self-government in a few territories, the organic entity of the Empire consisted of the British monarch, the British Cabinet, and the network of Crown and government representatives in territories administered by the Colonial and India Offices. The Empire was an administrative entity in 1869, and officials moving from post to post provided a coherence of convention and experience. Professor McIntyre argues against his own query when he says: 'the unique "spirit" of British imperialism must be sought in the constitutional structure of the Empire and its evolution' (p. 8).

He warns the reader that economic aspects of the Commonwealth will receive comparatively slight attention (p. 8). There is no index reference to one of the most successful co-operative institutions between the wars, the Imperial Economic Committee. Chapter 20 is entitled 'The Mirage of Economic Unity', and he states on page 320 that economic unity proved to be a mirage between the wars. Economic unity may not have been achieved, but there was some degree of economic co-operation not only in the Imperial Economic Committee, but in the Imperial Shipping Committee and other institutions.

The texture of the book at times is thin. The author does not examine the Commonwealth role at the League of Nations in the Italo-Ethiopian crisis of 1935-36. The only footnote reference to the one sentence in the text (p. 204) is to Professor Mansergh's *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs* published in 1952. A book of such range provides much scope for criticism in detail. Does the statement that ' the newfound concentration on local self-government, balanced representation, mixed ministries, multiracialism, and partnership had to be abandoned (with minimum safeguards for minorities) in the onrush of mass independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s ' (p. 451), correctly represent, for example, the constitutional evolution of Kenya? On page 187 the treaty which the Irish registered at the League of Nations, notwithstanding British objections, was the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1922. On page 470 he says, 'Usually the cultural ties of education, language, and the professions were the longest-lasting, but these only applied to a narrow elite'. Is this limitation to an elite correct of education and language? In how many Commonwealth countries today, for example, has education continued to be conducted in English, and among how many people?

The structure of the book results in thorough attention to all areas of the Commonwealth, including the Caribbean and South Pacific. The introduction and conclusion contain stimulating historiographical criticisms. The very full notes in support of the text, the bibliographical notes and index are valuable aids. The headings to the table of attendance at Commonwealth Meetings (p. 447) provoke reflection, and among other useful maps is one of the South Pacific Forum (p. 459).

Professor McIntyre has performed a considerable service to those studying the Commonwealth with this important synthesis both of Commonwealth evolution and historical writing on the subject.

Birkbeck College, London I. M. CUMPSTON

Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross. By David P. Forsythe. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. 298 pp. £12·50.*

TO many people, the title of this book is a contradiction in terms. Humanitarian affairs are thought to be about the basic rights of persons, whereas politics is about the interests of states. In actuality, such a distinction has no meaning. All states and all people have a long-term interest in the development and strengthening of humanitarian law; indeed, it is notable that those who violate humanitarian law do not deny its existence but claim that the other party violated it first. Many of the worst atrocities are explained away as reprisals.

Much of the work of the Red Cross movement is in the twilight zone in which humanitarian considerations and political and military necessity impinge upon each other. There are now 123 societies operating on Red Cross principles, but most of them tend to identify with national policies. Attempts to reconcile differences of attitude and policy are made within the League of Red Cross Societies and at periodic Red Cross conferences, but the cutting edge of impartiality is to be found in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an expression of all that is finest among middle-aged, middle-class, middle-of-the-road Swiss males. The ICRC is always impartial—or impartial on the side of the victim, as it is sometimes put. Those who have encountered the ICRC in the field find it an honourable but sometimes awkward partner, always conscious of its independence and humanitarian duty, and conscious too of its unique standing.

Professor Forsythe has had unique opportunities for studying the Red Cross movement from the inside, including a period with Donald Tansley in the recent reappraisal of the Red Cross. Forsythe provides a careful outline of the structure and principles of Red Cross organisations and the place of the ICRC, its administration, staffing, and finance. He reviews the role of the ICRC in drafting legal instruments as well as its practical work for the protection of sick and wounded combatants, prisoners of war, civilians, political prisoners, and victims of hijackings and kidnappings. While he is careful to cite sources whenever possible, it seems that he has had access to unpublished material. The only error I noticed was quite minor and doubtless due to over-reliance on one particular source

In an interesting postscript, Forsythe suggests that the ICRC should break free of conventional ideas, and he favours ' systematic communication ' with ' nonwhite, non-Western, even radical opinion . . .'. He notes that the ICRC is too weak to be feared, and he believes that this is the source of its strength.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY

Scientists and World Order: The Uses of Technical Knowledge in International Organizations. By Ernst B. Haas, Mary Pat Williams and Don Babai. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1978. 368 pp. £12 25*

THIS is the first of a projected monograph series arising from a programme funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and based at the Institute of International Studies in the University of California. The authors underline at the outset that they have not sought to provide some sort of elegant overview of the interaction between science-technology and the international system, and they also fully acknowledge that despite their close focus on international organisations the bulk of the world's effort in science-technology is not under international control. Their book is concerned with the beliefs of the class of scientists involved with international organisations about the connection between specialised knowledge and collective action, and secondly, with the evolution of programmes in international science and technology. The authors proceed from what they describe as a heuristic and pre-theoretical model, with changing specialised knowledge as the independent variable, a new world order as the dependent one,

international organisations as intervening factors. As they further concede, the new world order implied is consequently confined to that which might derive from the more consensual aspects of technical change. The book begins with a short summary of those opinions which claim a special place for scientific rationality in the solution of the world's problems, ' managed evolution ', as the authors neatly label this ideology. The equation linking knowledge to action is then further considered and a matrix elaborated containing cells labelled ' pragmatic ' and ' skeptic ' as well as the existing and rational world orders. These terms, defined, constitute the theoretical models against which the empirical part of the book is discussed.

The first part of the empirical work on which the study is based consisted of interviews with 146 individuals, 111 qualified scientists and engineers, 22 social scientists and lawyers and 13 diplomats, all active in international scientific organisations. The authors stress that the 146 did not constitute a systematic sample, and indeed they further argue that the group was more indicative because it contained a disproportionate number of ' influentials '. The interview material is next worked into a chapter which discusses the connection between science activities and organisational ideologies, with reference back to the theoretical discussion of world order models.

The third part of the book, and its second empirical component, analyses nine international science-technology programmes with the object of fitting them into one or other of the earlier models. This section is introduced with a treatment of the relationship between decision-making and institutional styles, and the analysis of the nine programmes consists of the perceptions both of the interviewed participants and of the authors. These programmes are grouped into three chapters entitled ' Highly Industrialized Societies ', ' Environmental Management ' and ' Economic Development '. The concluding chapter, headed ' Toward a Pragmatic World Order ', emphasises what was already very apparent, that the authors and their respondents have substantially different perceptions. The respondents, mostly seeing only their own particular trees, tend to be sceptical about the wood, the planned application of science. Having noted that the scientific culture is already co-terminous with political life, the study ends by speculating that biological laws might become social ones. The book is far from being an easy read.

University of Manchester ROGER WILLIAMS

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The Disintegrating West. By Mary Kaldor. *London: Allen Lane. 1978. 219 pp. £5·50.*

THIS is a very ambitious book, on a very provocative theme. It questions the assumption that American and European economic and political interests are fundamentally compatible, arguing that the ' necessary ritual ' of East-West conflict has served to camouflage the much more fundamental conflict of interests within the West. A wide-ranging analysis of the different dimensions of this ' West-West conflict ' leads to a gloomy, if not apocalyptic conclusion, that the choice lies between American dominance of a disordered Europe and a unified European government of an unavoidably militaristic character, hostile to the United States.

The book's fundamental weakness is that the sweep of its argument requires the erudition of a Max Weber and the wealth of detailed supporting material which Max Weber supplied to support his hypotheses. Here we have, crammed into 200 pages, definitions of the state, provocative and unconventional interpretations of the

international monetary, trading and oil systems, passing (and inaccurate) references to such phenomena as Eurocommunism, the Catholic-Marxist dialogue, European relations with Latin America and with the Middle East, the technological and military pressures for co-operation in arms procurement on a European and Atlantic scale, the process of industrial concentration, the nature of the multi-national enterprise, and so on. This reviewer's initial sympathy for such a challenging line of argument was progressively undermined by a feeling of increasing irritation at the wild generalisations which pepper the pages.

The underlying assumptions of this book owe much to Herbert Marcuse, with Stuart Holland and Emma Rothschild as other often-quoted authorities. Mary Kaldor's world view starts from her definition of ' the nature of Western Society ' as based upon ' corporate expansion arising out of a competitive system of private enterprise ' (p. 119). Thus ' the modern nation state is the product of modern capitalism . . . ' in which ' the state reflects the continued domination of corporations in society ' (p. 66). American and European interests are fundamentally incompatible because the internal dynamics of the capitalist world, of which the United States remains the dominant power, do not allow for the satisfaction of European interests. ' Capitalism needs a single world authority in order to guarantee the liberal conditions for international corporate expansion ' (p. 201). Yet even the United States is now faced with internal contradictions flowing from the dilemmas of the late capitalist era. The image presented is thus of a series of interconnected crises, domestic, European, and international, leading the Atlantic world to increasingly destructive conflict, and perhaps war.

' In a sense, this is the book of a political doomster. But it is not entirely without hope ' (p. 12). But the hope offered seems rather thin; if ' the most powerful challenge to Western society comes from socialist and autonomist political groups in Italy, France, and, to a lesser extent, Britain ' (p. 199), this reviewer finds little to alleviate the sense of impending doom.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

Elections Without Choice. Edited by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié. *London. Macmillan for the Committee on Political Sociology IPSA/ISA. 1978 250 pp. £10·00*

Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. By Arend Lijphart. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1978. 248 pp. £10·80.*

BOTH these books are concerned with the possible functions of voting. Both are addressed to readers who may well assume certain general norms—' The classical liberal model of democracy ' (Hermet p. vii) or ' The British Model ' (Lijphart p. 25). The preface to *Elections Without Choice* points out that: ' While only eight of 136 member states of the United Nations have not held a national election in the past decade . . . only about one third . . . can claim to hold competitive free elections conforming to the classical liberal model of democracy '. So the two books discuss phenomena which are very prevalent, not least in many countries of the so-called ' Free World '. For that reason alone, both books would be worthy of serious attention.

As the titles indicate, each book is committed to a major value-judgment. Reportage is subordinated to the study of selected phenomena which contribute to an understanding of the particular problems under analysis. *Elections Without Choice* devotes five of its chapters to single countries, expounding different values or

illustrating different phenomena. Each is by a writer with a profound knowledge of the subject: ' Clientelism, Elections and Systems of Inequality and Domination in Cameroun ' by Jean-François Bayart; ' Semi-Competitive Elections, Clientelism and Political Recruitment in a No-Party State: the Kenyan Experience ' by Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumo; ' The 1975 Tanzanian Elections: The Disturbing Six Per Cent ' by Denis Martin; ' Syria Returns to Democracy: the May 1973 Legislative Election ' by Elizabeth Picard; ' The Impact and Meaning of Non-Competitive, Non-Free and Insignificant Elections in Authoritarian Portugal 1933-74 ' by Philippe C. Schmitter. Two other chapters—' Non Competitive Elections in Europe ' by Juan J. Linz and ' Elections in Communist Party States ' by Alex Pravda—are obviously more general in their approach.

The chapter-headings indicate the theme of the book. There is either an absence of choice or a very limited choice. The introductory chapters are by two of the editors and set out the conceptual framework—' State Controlled Elections: a Framework ' by Guy Hermet and ' Clientelist Control and Authoritarian Contexts ' by Alain Rouquié. The latter makes hard reading. Not all the jargon used seems necessary to convey the meaning. Richard Rose's concluding chapter, ' Is Choice Enough? ', sums up by considering the *functions* of the various mutant forms of elections and argues powerfully that these are very real.

Professor Lijphart's work is based on wide reading and participation in a great number of high-level seminars, rather than personal ' on-the-scene ' research. Its bibliography is so wide-ranging that it far transcends the resources of the libraries of most British universities. Its literateness, and the insights which it gives into the range of methodological approaches available would by themselves give this work considerable value to any reader who wished to follow particular topics further. But perhaps too much has been attempted in too small a space. Secondary sources are sometimes used to provide evidence which may not be reliable enough to permit the inferences drawn from it. On page 186, for instance, a variety of writers is quoted in support of the statement that the 1960 Congolese Constitution was ' virtually a replica of the Belgian Constitution '. Even a cursory glance at both would establish this as an indisputable fact. But until 1957 at least, the Congo was deliberately developed as a French-speaking and Catholic country. The adoption of a copy of the Belgian Constitution had no reference whatsoever to the wellbeing of the indigenous population but was intended to open the Congo and its wealth to Belgians other than Walloons and Social Christians. It is not unreasonable to argue that these changes were themselves a major cause of the collapse of government.

At various points between pages 58 and 103, tables are produced to show ' indices of cleavage ' to a precision of one per cent or one degree of angle. We are not told from what data or by what mathematical processes such hairbreadth accuracy emerges. For the remainder of the book, Professor Lijphart only makes one further reference to this pseudo-mathematical excursion. It is difficult to see why he embarked on it, since it forms no integral part of the main argument of his book, which deals more convincingly with tendencies and trends. The work advocates ' consociational democracy ', and indicates the factors favourable to its establishment. It is something which, given the will, can burgeon in the most unfavourable soil. The final chapter, on ' Consociational Engineering ', discusses how underlying conditions can be made more favourable. How much ' engineering ' can a political system stand before any genuine element of choice is excluded?

Can any such inquiry (or 'exploration', as the sub-title calls it) be conducted without an in-depth examination of the criteria for a viable state? What sort of economic sacrifices will one element make for the sake of the unity of the state? What happens when the economic balance shifts, as it did with the exploitation of oil in Nigeria?

This book outlines one element in a vast and unwieldy debate. Lijphart makes a weighty contribution of his own. But it is part of a debate and not a judicial exercise. It is certainly unwieldy.

University of Dundee PHILIP WHITAKER

International Trade Policy. By F. V. Meyer. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 234 pp. £9·95.*

THIS book provides an excellent analysis of the way international trade diplomacy and structure has developed during this century. Meyer's basic argument is that the gradual switch to negotiations on across-the-board, multilateral tariff reductions has been related to the growth of intra-industry (rather than inter-industry) trade flows.

As befits a book which argues that the *Pax Americana* provided the framework within which much of this century's trade liberalisation has taken place, the single most important chapter deals with United States trade diplomacy. Of almost equal importance is a chapter on the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). He traces the American drive to liberalise tariffs back to the 1934 Trade Agreements Act, but goes back even further to explain the delicate division of roles played by the President and Congress in such tariff-related matters. He explains the gradual falling-away of American enthusiasm for trade liberalisation (particularly marked since 1962) by the fact that America's technological lead has steadily been eroded, thus reducing the economic gains that could be won from any given tariff reduction.

The nice point about Meyer's approach is that he wraps his examination of the way trade diplomacy has evolved within a detailed historical framework. So, as well as giving us an excellent analysis of the development of American tariff policy, he looks at the evolution of the tariff-liberalisation debate within the GATT, where there has been a slow withdrawal from the pure across-the-board approach towards a more particularistic approach to different industrial sectors and groups of countries. He then goes on to look at the way the European Community, Japan and various less-developed countries (LDCs) have reacted to such developments. Despite the fact that this is not a long book, such analysis is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed to make this a useful reference book for anyone professionally interested in the field of trade diplomacy. A well-constructed index adds to the book's value.

At the same time, Meyer argues that the switch of the American position during the 1930s to one favouring multilateral, across-the-board tariff reductions reflects a change in the underlying structure of international trade. As long as this was primarily a matter of inter-industry trade, then tariff policy was seen as a bilateral affair aimed at opening up markets for a country's leading export industries. However, as intra-industry flows became the dominant component of international trade, so it became harder to take such a purely mercantilist approach to trade diplomacy, and attention turned to liberalising trade on a wider front. He does, however, argue that some industries, such as textiles, steel and agriculture, are 'price sensitive, decreasing-returns industries' for which intra-industry trade flows will remain relatively unimportant. So, towards the end of this book, he is leaning reluctantly towards the position that some products are more suitable for freer trade than others.

My impression is that Meyer's structural analysis leads him to be rather more negative about the possibility of liberalising agricultural trade than is warranted. On the other hand, the fact that he has mixed political and economic analyses when considering international trade policy makes this an extremely worthwhile book. For instance, in his discussion of tariff preferences for LDCs, he spends several pages

spelling out the circumstances under which countries with underdeveloped industrial structures are the chief initial gainers from tariff liberalisation. This is, then, a tightly-argued, stimulating book.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems. By Charles E. Lindblom. *New York. Basic Books. 1977. 403 pp. $15.00.*

IN his book Professor Lindblom sets himself an ambitious task: ' It brings two well established fields of study, comparative economics and comparative politics, together within the covers of one book in the expectation that their jutaposition will enrich both.' The author seeks to analyse the relationship between politics and markets at a high level of abstraction on a world scale. That our understanding of international political economy would be greatly advanced by such academic synthesis no one can doubt, for while academic analysis within disciplines digs ever deeper and while more and more empirical studies ignore discipline boundaries, there is little elucidation of the relationship between the two disciplines at the level of basic theory. For the first sixty or so pages Professor Lindblom discusses ' the elements ' at this level of basic theory. exchange theory, authority, efficiency pricing, bureaucracy. We then pass to a brief examination of the several incompetences of market and command systems before moving to a fairly lengthy examination of polyarchy and a more brief look at communism.

The core of the book is the notion of polyarchic controls or ' rule of the many ' (p. 132), a concept which the author prefers to use rather than ' democracy '. On page 133 we read:

> What is distinctive about a contest for authority designed by polyarchal rules is that top authority is assigned in response to a routinized indication of citizen's wishes—that is, an election—an indication, moreover, in which any one citizen's vote is by some formula counted as equal to any other's. It is hard to imagine how the struggle for authority could be made simpler, more peaceful, or more egalitarian.

But all is not as it seems, for ' Business ' has a privileged position and can manipulate volitions.

This discussion draws heavily on American examples. The reader finds himself wondering whether the author's generalisations about markets and politics are true the world over or are applicable merely within the United States and that part of the world economy it dominates. For the reader who is particularly interested in the international system and the role of world market influences thereon Lindblom's analysis says little directly but it does expose the dissonance between the slogan ' one man (or one state), one vote ' and the business privileges which, it is argued, are essential where market systems work.

In Part VI ' Communism Compared ' is nicely but too briefly argued from the ' Two Models ' of chapter 19.

> Model 1 might be called an intellectually guided society. It derives from a buoyant or optimistic view of man's intellectual capacities (p. 248).
> We might therefore call Model 2 that of the preference-guided or volition-guided society (p. 250).

The analysis of economic reform in communist systems is crucial but is not pursued fully enough in chapter 22 to add significantly to our theoretical understanding of politics and markets.

While this book is always stimulating and in places provides some very concise statements of the links between politics and markets, it does seem, however, that the dust-jacket goes too far when it puts the author in a short sentence along with Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Indeed ' Economic Institutions Compared ' by P. J. D. Wiles[1] should be read as a contribution from the economics side into politics so as to balance Professor Lindblom's analysis which comes essentially from politics into some areas of economics.

Bristol Polytechnic F. L. GARDNER

Rich World, Poor World. By Geoffrey Lean. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 352 pp. £7·95. Pb: £4·50.*

THIS is an ambitious book, broader in scope than the title suggests. It considers not only problems of poverty and economic development, and the relations between rich and poor countries, but also (to quote the dust-jacket) ' a whole range of world issues '. In his introduction the author tells us that the book is ' concerned as much with discussing solutions as with explaining crises. It aims to report new thinking and practical answers, as well as the facts behind the human predicament as we approach the new millennium ' (p. 16). Thus both diagnosis and prescription are offered for what are seen as the most critical social and economic problems of mankind.

The main themes, in order of treatment, are as follows: food and hunger (2 chapters); poverty, development and international economic relations (4); population (1); nuclear proliferation (1); energy problems (4); environmental pollution (2); and urban problems (2). The main recommendations are familiar. They include: less emphasis on economic growth, and more on basic needs; ' development strategies ' in poor countries which would incorporate more effective measures of redistribution, greater concern for rural development and small farmers, and the use of appropriate technology; reforms in the international economic system, including commodity stabilisation and more control over transnational companies; a cautious approach to the use of nuclear power (which, however, is not ruled out); energy policies which would give greater weight to conservation measures; and more concern with the environmental effects of actions and policies. The various measures proposed are seen as complementary and well within the bounds of practicability However, the author believes that while their adoption would transform the prospects of the human race, it presupposes a change in individual and hence social values: ' In the end . . . no lasting solutions are possible without a change in human attitudes ' (p. 17). In his concluding chapter, the author sketches out the philosophy of life which he thinks appropriate to the present phase of history, with approving references to (among others) Gandhi, Julius Nyerere, E. F. Schumacher and Barbara Ward.

The argument is clearly and readably set out, and a number of good points are made, especially in the chapters on energy Mr. Lean is well aware that he set himself a formidable task, and gives a frank account of the sources of his material and the limitations of his expertise A lot of work has gone into the preparation of this book, together with an obvious wish to be accurate and fair-minded. However, despite these virtues and its excellent intentions, I believe that the book as a whole contributes little if anything to a better understanding of the range of issues which it considers.

One reason for this is that the treatment of economic aspects is very poor. The general argument of the four specifically economic chapters (3 to 6) is extremely one-sided, accepting virtually without qualification the very debatable propositions that the

1 Oxford Blackwell, 1977

international economic system contains a built-in bias against the poor countries, and that partly because of this the growth of output in these countries has done little or nothing to benefit the poor. Dubious or misleading statements and arguments abound, not only in these chapters but in passing references elsewhere. Examples of the latter are the treatment of speculation (pp. 20 and 29), fertilisers (p. 39), cash crops (p. 41), the effects of population growth (p. 120), capital expenditure on energy provision (pp. 203 and 233), and the effects of inflation on the merits of investment projects (p. 246)

A second reason for concern is that the author's general approach, which unfortunately is widely shared, seems to me to embody a strikingly unhelpful combination of naïve optimism and equally naïve pessimism. The optimism consists in a belief that social and economic problems are in general well understood; that in consequence they lend themselves to ' solutions ', ' strategies ' and ' priorities ', the effects of which are known and controllable; and that these in turn can as a matter of course be successfully carried into effect through plans and programmes undertaken by governments and international agencies. The pessimism resides in the idea that no significant changes for the better are possible unless and until there is a change of heart, leading to the widespread adoption of a new and better sense of values, which would cause individual men and women to induce national governments to adopt the right ' strategies ' In so far as it relies on these notions, Mr. Lean's book has to be classed with the many other publications in this field which give a seriously misleading account of the issues.

University College, London P. D. HENDERSON

Managing International Economic Interdependence: Selected Papers of C. Fred Bergsten, 1975–1976. *Lexington, Mass., Farnborough, Hants.: Heath. 1978. 317 pp. £13·00.*

International Economic Problems. By Leonard Gomes. *London: Macmillan. 1978. £7·95 Pb. £3·50*

The Mystery of Wealth: Political Economy—Its Development and Impact on World Events. By John Hutton. *Cheltenham. Stanley Thorne. 1978. 412 pp. £9·75. Pb· £4·95.*

UNTIL the end of the 1960s, political scientists and students of international relations could take the international economy as a more or less constant parameter. Now, perceptions have changed completely. The immediate impact and recurring reverberations of the breakdown of the dollar standard, the abandonment of fixed exchange rates, the commodity price boom, the oil price increases (or should they be referred to as the energy crisis?), the 1974-75 world-wide economic recession from which we have yet to recover, the emergence of oil producers' wealth, and so on, have combined with the debate on the limits to growth and the continuing rise of the newly industrialised countries, to bring home the vastly increased sensitivity and vulnerability of most national economies to external economic developments. The word ' interdependence ' has come to the forefront, but is probably more useful in drawing attention to our altered perceptions than in describing the present state of affairs, since some countries are more interdependent than others.

The comprehension of these international economic issues and indeed, of the structurally different economic conditions in which we live, is made difficult by the usual lag between fact and theory. For without a cogent theory, without knowing what questions to ask, the massive amount of facts and statistics will not reveal the story

they have to tell. This may not matter when conditions are relatively stable, since they can then be taken for granted and assumed away. The lack of a general theory, an overall view, of significant concepts that can serve to unlock complex issues, is a very serious handicap today, characterised by rapid, abrupt, unforeseen and interrelated changes. Unfortunately, the academic establishment tends to be of rather marginal help here. Engrossed in the paradigms of yesterday, academics are often reluctant to engage in problems of today, except to make polemic points or propound panaceas for individual problems taken in isolation from all the others. The official in governments and international organisations ought to be more interested and better informed; he is, however, wrapped up in day-to-day operations in a narrow sphere and seldom has time to see the wood for the trees.

Fred Bergsten has nad the opportunity both to sit back at the Brookings Institution to reflect on his experience in government from 1963 to 1971, and subsequently to join the Carter administration in January 1977 as Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at the Treasury Department, hopefully to put some of his ideas into practice or test their applicability. *Managing International Economic Interdependence*, a collection of 24 policy-oriented essays, represents an extension and updating of his earlier essays.[1]

The reader trying to understand international economic problems will find a simplifying and unifying concept which makes it easier for the mind to grasp complex and interrelated issues: the concept of the international economic system or order. This order can be divided into three components: international money, trade, and investment. In his first essay, Bergsten identifies five features of the postwar system in the non-communist world which made it a success: (1) the rigid, bipolar international security system tended to submerge internal differences within the capitalist camp; (2) memories of the Second World War, which was perceived to have been directly linked to the breakdown of the international economic order in the 1930s, acted as a powerful spur to Western leaders to create and maintain an open and free international system that would avoid repeating the events of the 1930s; (3) American leadership was accepted both abroad and at home; (4) there was a high degree of consensus on the goals sought by the system, with priority being given to the avoidance of unemployment and its export by individual countries to others; (5) the postwar period was one of unprecedented prosperity and growth until recently. These factors underlay fixed exchange rates, trade liberalisation and various international rules.

In the 1970s, the collapse of the postwar order followed changes in each of the five features. Perceptions of possible East-West hostilities have been greatly reduced. The generation of policy-makers who remember the 1930s from personal experience has largely passed from power. American leadership has weakened, and, as the example of 1971 shows (when the dollar was devalued, its convertibility into gold ended, and temporary import surcharges imposed unilaterally), the United States no longer accepts the costs of leadership unquestioningly. International consensus on economic goals has been replaced by multiplicity of goals as well as different priorities. And finally, the golden age of prosperity has given way to inflation, unemployment and uncertainty.

Bergsten argues that the future international economic order will have to be one of joint management between the countries having greatest economic power. The United States is not in a position to exercise hegemony. Laissez-faire is also out, since countries will need more and more policy instruments to match the growing number and scope of their internal policy objectives, and this search for more instruments must spill over into their external economic policies. Now, for Bergsten an international economic system or order means essentially an effective set of ***international rules and***

1 *Toward a New International Economic Order* Selected Papers of C Fred Bergsten, 1972-1974 (Lexington, Mass., London, Heath, 1975)

institutional arrangements, and the main thrust of most of his essays in this book consists of analyses of the inadequacy of present rules and arrangements, and proposals, at a not-too-detailed level, for new rules and arrangements in the areas of money, trade, multinational corporations, raw materials and so on.

Mr. Bergsten is a thinker in the best liberal tradition. He believes that

> the primary objective of the foreign economic policy of the United States should be the restoration, and subsequent maintenance, of an open and effective international economic system . . . which will contribute positively to global economic progress and, hence, amicable political relations among nations (p. 37).

In advocating reforms to the international economic order, he often gives the impression of believing in (or hoping for) the reasonableness of man and the harmony of interests. Thus, on raw materials he argues that export controls can be justified by economic analysis on grounds of world economic efficiency and equity, but that the criteria would be so stringent that few cases could be justified (pp. 183-84). Do arguments about world economic welfare play much of a role in international confrontations? Bergsten must realise that he stands on thin ice, for, in other essays (nos. 17 and 20), he talks of building security stockpiles on a national basis and in co-ordination with other major consuming countries, and of the need to offer inducements to commodity suppliers, in the form of commodity agreements and liberalised access to markets for the latter's manufactured exports, in return for secure access by the former to the commodities. On both sides, he argues, there is a ' balance of uncertainties ' which could be used to create a harmony of interests (p. 188).

According to John Hutton (see below), the economist can be scientist, prophet or engineer. Bergsten's perspective is that of the systems engineer whose object is the international economic system. While extremely useful in facilitating understanding and in simplifying choice, such an approach tends to overlook the existence of deep seated differences between nation-states which are entities in their own right as well as components of a global system. The global system approach can only react to events such as revolution in Iran, it cannot predict or explain them. Moreover, looking at rules and institutions tends to detract from structural factors which alone can explain change in the longer run. However, as a prominent member of the American foreign-policy establishment, Bergsten offers us some fascinating insights into current American thinking. One concerns the concept of ' bigemony ' (p. 12). In its quest for joint management of the international economic system, the United States finds the stagnation of the process of European unification a major drawback. In view of the urgency of the issues, the United States may not be able to wait for Europe to get together and may have to work directly with the other economic super-power, Germany. If the two can agree, then the United States would ' bring along ' Japan, and Germany would do the same with the rest of the Common Market. Finally, other countries would be brought along or brought in, so that we would have three concentric circles of decision-making.

Leonard Gomes's book clearly illustrates the difficulty of writing a general book on contemporary issues in the international economy. The seven chapters deal with multilateral trade negotiations; the Third World; East-West trade; the Eurodollar market; world monetary arrangements; multinational corporations; and competitiveness in international trade. The reader is treated to a relentless succession of condensed facts, summarised theories, and compressed arguments, without being told why, and may be excused for feeling like one who is being driven in a car at great speed at night and cannot see any landmarks. Mr. Gomes has competently assembled a large amount of facts into a useful reference book, but there is a need to explain to the student the significance of the problems treated and the implications of current

developments. For example, supposing that the student does not believe unquestioningly that more free trade is automatically a good thing, why should he find it interesting to read about the technical details of the multilateral trade negotiations? On East-West trade, the question might be ' so what? ', unless it is pointed out that there is a fear that the massive transfer of advanced technology to communist countries on advantageous terms may weaken the West considerably, economically as well as militarily.

In Bergsten's book, the sense of relevance derives from his point of departure which is, of course, the national interest, broadly defined, of the United States, which is not only the dominant power but is also capable of articulating its objectives in a coherent way. Another way to see the relevance of contemporary events and problems is through the history of ideas, and this is what John Hutton sets out to do in *The Mystery of Wealth*. The contemporary debate about the limits to growth has an antecedent in the classical economists' pessimism about ' diminishing returns '; the OPEC countries resemble the rentiers in Ricardo's world; the EEC can be seen as a hybrid between free trade (in industrial goods) and physiocratic protection for the land; the failure of Germany and Japan to reflate their economies more vigorously for the good of the world economy may have something to do with mercantilist philosophies; and so on. The book covers wider grounds than contemporary international economic issues, with chapters on the history of economic thought; trade, development and growth; domestic problems and policies; the evolving nature of industry; and national economic planning. There is a chronology of events between 1750 and 1977 dealing with world politics, industry and science, British politics, and economic ideas

For the assiduous reader who has tried to understand international economic issues but failed to make sense of them, I cannot resist reproducing a quotation from Hutton's book.

> Graduating student in economics:
> ' Unfortunately, sir, I don't see how it all hangs together.'
> His tutor:
> ' A lot of us feel like that; goodbye and good luck '

Chatham House YAO SU HU

Economic Planning and Social Justice in Developing Countries. By Ozay Mehmet. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 282 pp. £8·95.*

THIS book takes a critical look at the policies which have been pursued in the less-developed countries. The main thesis is that they have increased gross national product per head but have failed to promote real development or the public good. All too often the benefits of increased production have not been shared equitably but have gone to a ruling elite. The concentration of income and wealth has increased. For example, in Brazil between 1967 and 1970 the share of total income going to the richest one per cent of the population increased from 28 to 30 per cent whilst that going to the poorest 50 per cent declined from 15 to 12·5 per cent Moreover, it is not just a simple distinction between rich and poor. The benefits of increased output are shared very unequally between regions, between tribal or ethnic groups, and between town and country

The author is right in insisting that due weight should be given to the creation of employment as well as increasing output. If the highly capital-intensive technology of advanced countries is used in the less-developed it will certainly increase output but it will not create many jobs and therefore the benefit will not be widely dispersed. There

must therefore be insistence on the use of intermediate technology wherever possible in order to create employment.

In addition, stress is laid on the development of agriculture and education. In the case of agriculture, there is need for the creation of small but viable holdings. At present, most of the land is in very large holdings whilst much of the rest is in holdings too small to provide a reasonable subsistence for even one family. Education, it is argued, has often been restricted to the privileged few. Moreover, it has been inappropriate to local needs. There has been undue development of university education for the lucky minority, often at a very high cost to the country. What is required is not education at this level, nor schooling which is intended to lead on to higher education, but a broadly based programme to overcome illiteracy and to impart the simple skills needed by workers in agriculture and industry.

The main arguments appear convincing but some problems need to be studied in greater depth. The need for a broad educational programme related to local needs exists, but it can scarcely be argued that there is *no* need for any more academic education or that nobody in these countries should get a university education. This leaves the difficult question of getting the correct balance between different types of education

To get these ideas accepted will not be easy. There are many vested interests to overcome. There may even be a vested interest among workers in UN agencies to continue the kind of technical assistance now being given, which may fail to give adequate consideration to questions of equity and may involve the employment of expatriate experts at a high cost to the country involved and perhaps the displacement from employment of local graduates.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Nuclear Power and the Energy Crisis: Politics and the Atomic Industry By Duncan Burn. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre, London. 1978. 348 pp. £12 00.*

IN the spring of 1978 there appeared, almost simultaneously, two books analysing the political economy of civil nuclear power. The British book reviewed here, by an industrial economist, Duncan Burn, delineates with devastating thoroughness the debacle of the British civil nuclear effort from its inception to its present shambles; and points obsessively to the American light-water reactor (LWR) industry as, by comparison, a model of how matters should proceed. The American book, *Light Water. How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved,*[1] by Irvin Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian respectively at the Harvard Business School and at a group of leading French universities, delineates in turn the transatlantic chaos of the LWR industry, and in so doing flatly contradicts most of Burn's underlying assumptions.

Burn's thesis, first advanced in his *The Political Economy of Nuclear Energy,*[2] is that the decision-making structure of the British civil nuclear establishment, centred on the Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) and involving ministerial intervention, is fundamentally to blame for the calamitous succession of muddles which mark the history of British nuclear power. He makes, it must be said, an unanswerable case for the futility of the British programme, starting even before the creation of the AEA in 1953-54; and in doing so he takes an almost vindictive delight in savaging the reputations of the leading figures in the British nuclear establishment.

1 New York Basic Books, 1978
2 London, Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967

There is, in his view, ample blame to go around. He dissects mercilessly the over-large, uneconomic and single-minded Magnox programme, then the extraordinary 1965 episode of the Dungeness B contract, and the subsequent snowballing self-delusions as the programme of advanced gas-cooled reactors came apart at the seams. Hardly anyone involved emerges unscathed—although, as he reiterates, many of them are still in key decision-making roles concerning future civil nuclear proposals.

So far so good: and if Burn had written only the second half of his latest book it would undoubtedly deserve deep and serious attention. However, he drastically undermines his case by alluding persistently to what he calls the ' success ' of the LWRs. As Bupp and Derian make clear—and as the present state of the world LWR industry amply demonstrates—Burn's characterisation of the LWR as a ' success ' is self-delusion as deep and persistent as any clouding the mind of an advocate of advanced gas-cooled reactors. The Westinghouse pressurised-water reactor, about whose virtues Burn is rhapsodic, very nearly brought Westinghouse to bankruptcy, with losses estimated by the *Wall Street Journal* at $1000 million in November 1976, even before the company faced 29 lawsuits over defaults on fuel-supply contracts. Similar circumstances affect Kraftwerk Union in West Germany, one of whose partners, AEG-Telefunken, finally bailed out at a cost of over DM 1200 million, as well as the Japanese and other LWR vendors; even the Oyster Creek contract of December 1973, which for Burn marked the advent of the LWRs as competitive, is shown by Bupp and Derian to have been a loss-leader pure and simple, and the first of many for US General Electric, whose losses by 1976 were estimated at some $500 million. Nor does Burn appear to understand the true role and mechanism of nuclear exports, which are now, as they have always been, fundamentally a way for exporting governments to provide indirect subsidies to their own nuclear industries, especially now that domestic markets have collapsed This is an auction we can perhaps be thankful Britain has avoided.

Despite Burn's title his book says virtually nothing about ' the energy crisis ', and what it says is simplistic. It is an incisive if bad tempered book about politics and the British atomic industry, and a credulous, well nigh gullible book about politics and the LWR industry Burn seems determined above all to vindicate his position of 1967, and in so doing exhibits a fixation which he rightly deplores in his British *dramatis personae*. Indeed, on the evidence of this book, even the most tough-minded can become addicted to light water.

WALTER C. PATTERSON

Raw Materials and Foreign Policy. By the International Economic Studies Institute. *Washington: International Economic Studies Institute. 1976. (Distrib. in USA and Canada by Westview Press, Boulder, and in UK by Benn, London.) 416 pp. Pb: $8.00. £6·75*

FROM being the Cinderella of political economy for much of the postwar period, raw material issues have again moved to the forefront of the international political stage. In the words of this book's overall conclusion: ' Whether major or minor, the problems have come at a time when they intersect with many others which have little to do with resources. Precisely because raw materials have become issues in these other contexts, their importance transcends their purely economic value ' (p. 377).

Published in late 1976, and in places already overtaken by subsequent events, this is a comprehensive compendium both of the necessary background information and analysis and of the various interlocking issues. It performs a valuable function in bringing the problems of raw materials to a wider audience than is usual. The title,

however, is rather misleading in that the book concentrates on mineral resources, and lacks any detailed discussion of agricultural raw materials and timber. Even the choice of minerals is somewhat arbitrary, being tailored to American circumstances at a particular period. For example, there is no mention of molybdenum, and coal is barely discussed; presumably because the United States is self-sufficient in both. More oddly, uranium, which is a centre-piece of the non-proliferation debate, is virtually relegated to an afterthought on page 94.

The book is divided into four main sections—a discussion of postwar trends in mineral policies, which highlights the industrial countries' massive dependence on imports, is followed by a useful brief chapter on the uncertainties of mineral statistics and projections, which in turn leads into an analysis of present problems, inevitably slanted towards the United States. The third part discusses the major foreign-policy issues, with chapters first on the main supplying nations and on interrelationships with other consuming areas. This includes useful analyses of the mineral policies of Japan and major European importers. There are chapters on OPEC and petroleum, and on deep-sea resources. The final section covers in turn the major policies, such as stockpiles, commodity agreements, or domestic taxes and subsidies, that are available to cope with the problems previously outlined.

The book is somewhat marred by lax editing, with occasional inconsistencies and much repetition between the chapters. The references to the EEC's Stabex scheme are an example; it is correctly described in Chapter 8 (p. 176) but page 298 wrongly asserts that it is keyed to export prices. It is a moot point whether it is the United States Bureau of Mines' rather than the publishers' fault that the important chart on American mineral import reliance (p. 82) excludes copper. Useful reference material and sound analyses, such as that on the Law of the Sea, are interspersed with more journalistic treatment of, for example, international commodity agreements and multinational companies. The chapter on the latter would have particularly benefited from heavy pruning. Inclusion of an index would have increased the book's value as a reference document.

Throughout, the example of OPEC has influenced the analysis, and to European eyes there is an undue concentration on possible cartelisation. Few would today maintain that this is a major issue in copper, if indeed it ever was. Rather the problems of encouraging future investment, the stability of Central Africa, and the general price stabilisation issue are what should concern policy-makers. The authors regarded cobalt as merely of moderate concern, but two years later its ranking has altered considerably. Attention is today focused on political and economic interruptions to supplies for which broad political solutions are most suitable. This re-emphasises the conclusions quoted at the start of this review.

PHILLIP CROWSON

Growth and Adjustment in National Agricultures: Four Case Studies and an Overview. Edited by J. P. O'Hagan. *London: Macmillan for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1978. 242 pp £12·00.*

THIS book describes the development of agriculture and agricultural policy in Japan, Poland, Sweden and Sudan from the 1950s to the mid-1970s. The studies have been selected from previous work undertaken by the Food and Agriculture Organisation. They are prefaced by an introductory chapter written by the editor who is chief of the Global Perspective Studies Unit.

The origin of these studies makes it certain that their tone is generally uncritical of past policies and sympathetic to current ' official ' proposals. Since the economic

circumstances and political aspirations of the countries vary so considerably, no simple comparisons of performance can be made. Despite this, a fuller appreciation of how agricultural development has occurred and been influenced by policy elsewhere can be helpful for those who face related, if not identical, problems.

Despite its episodic structure, it is possible to identify some main themes in the book. Three merit special attention. First is the fecundity of modern agricultural technology. In all the countries reviewed agricultural production has risen, sometimes despite attempts by governments to restrain it. This greater flow of output has created opportunities for improvement in diet and living standards but it has also required changes in the organisation of agriculture. In the Sudan, for example, more production is welcome both to improve food consumption and reduce imports. In Sweden more output has not been wanted. Greater emphasis has been given to reducing the numbers of people engaged in farming so that the incomes of those who remain may rise. Agricultural improvement here has been the basis for higher consumption of non-farm rather than farm goods. In Poland rising agricultural output has made a vital contribution to industrial growth, releasing people and freeing resources for new industry. Despite adjustment problems, the work of the agricultural scientist seems to make a positive contribution in all sorts of societies.

A second impression is that agriculture must be seen within a total economic and social context. In Japan, for example, the rapid development of part-time farming has been possible because of the creation of many new jobs outside agriculture In turn, part-time farming has enabled Japan to sustain small-scale agricultural units whilst adopting and adapting much of the new technology In the Sudan, in contrast, the absence of non-agricultural industry and wealth has made more difficult the application of methods devised for industrial societies. Imported fertilisers and crop protection chemicals have been insufficiently available to capitalise on the technical productive potential of Sudanese agriculture. Agriculture there requires much adaptation, new capital and new training if it is fully to benefit from the new methods. Resources for doing this will either have to be secured from existing agriculture or borrowed from abroad. Low and erratic prices for exports make the task of agricultural modernisation more difficult even when the prime goal is to feed the home population better.

A third aspect common to each chapter is the vast human adjustment agricultural change demands In Poland precipitate attempts at collectivisation have been reversed and a more gradual approach adopted to the ' socialisation ' of agriculture. The bland language of the technocrat may in fact disguise the radical change in human circumstance that agricultural adjustment implies. Movement from countryside to town, from nomadic to settled existence and from time-honoured methods of farming to new techniques taught by experts, all disrupt human society. Much of the change may be welcomed but in all societies it generates stress. This, however awkward or inarticulate, the policy-maker must not ignore

Although it does not attempt to resolve the many problems it describes, this book will be welcomed as a reasonably objective, well-informed and readable account. Both practising policy-makers and students will benefit from its careful narrative and well-presented tables Many might wish for a more critical text Their needs will have to be met by authors free from the constraints which must affect FAO officials.

University of Aberdeen JOHN S. MARSH

LAW

The British Yearbook of International Law 1974–1975. Forty-Seventh Year of Issue. Edited by R. Y. Jennings and Ian Brownlie. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977 525 pp £30·00.*

HOW sad that successive *Yearbooks* should perforce record the deaths of such eminently distinguished patriarchs of international law as Dr. Jenks and now Lord McNair and Professor Alexandrowicz. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's classical appreciation of Lord McNair's contribution over the years registers the life of one, incredible as it seems, whose career began after leaving Cambridge in 1909. On a personal note, your reviewer is bound to acknowledge his consummate kindness in agreeing to contribute, with the late Professor H. A. Hollond, to the first issue of the *Cambrian Law Review* in 1970, a piece entitled ' Edwardian Reminiscences ', that is of Cambridge at that time; this, at the age of 85. (Why is it that in T. B. Howarth's *Cambridge Between Two Wars* [1] McNair's name, unlike Hollond's, appears so little?) Lord McNair's affection for Caius College was unfailing, and his interest too. At 84 he could still busy himself with ' Why is the Doctor in *The Merry Wives of Windsor* Called Caius? ',[2] an offprint of which he thoughtfully sent to a former colleague of the reviewer's at Aberystwyth, J. E. Trice, a Caius man, whom McNair had recently met. To the end a regular at High Table, the story is told that he would rarely accept a taxi home afterwards, preferring the more complex and spartan regime of public transport.

Of the five longer articles which appear in this issue, special mention should be made of Dr. Goodwin-Gill's admirable monograph ' The Limits of the Power of Expulsion in Public International Law ', which explores the nature, function and purpose of the power of a state to expel aliens. The author examines the justification and manner of expulsion in theory and in the practice of state municipal law as the precondition of the analysis of international standards limiting the power. Treaty obligations, in particular those contained in the European Convention on Human Rights and the Rome Treaty, are seen as sources of specific controls as well as paradigms of those imposed by customary international law. It is not surprising that a Legal Adviser in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (as Dr. Goodwin-Gill is) should conceive of a power rather than, as has traditionally been postulated, a right of expulsion. This conception emphasises that expulsion is a matter of controlled discretion. It is rare for municipal law to make it mandatory even when practice reveals an ' unremarkable consistency ' in the grounds for expulsion (p. 116). And as for the controls, the role of expulsion, to protect the essential interests of receiving states, at the least suggests safeguards against abuse, since the power is limited by the function. Thus it must be exercised in good faith and not for an ulterior motive, for example, to surrender the individual to persecution or to confiscate his property. In this context it is salutary to note the House of Lords' recent approach to the question of whether it is unjust or oppressive to return a fugitive for the purposes of section 8 (3) (b) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1968: *Union of India* v. *Narang* [1977] 2 All E.R. 348; *Kakis* v. *Government of Cyprus* [1978] 1 W.L.R. 779. The individual's own interests, for example, his connections with the state of residence, must be weighed against those of the expelling state which must show reasonable cause for expulsion. Its own municipal law must be observed and the state must have procedures for questioning the unjustified or unlawful exercise of executive discretion. Moreover, the manner of expulsion must accord with generally accepted international standards which require that ' due regard . . . be paid to the dignity of the individual and to his basic rights as a human being ' (pp. 154–55). It was of special interest to

1 London Collins, 1978
2 13 *Medical History*, No 4, 1969

note that Dr. Goodwin-Gill does not appear to conceive that a breach of international requirements occurred in *Dr. Soblen's* case (pp. 91-95). It has always seemed to the reviewer that it is not necessarily improper, and was not in *Soblen's* case, to use deportation proceedings to exclude an alien, even where the exclusion is in response to a request from a foreign state. The only question is whether the Secretary of State considers the alien's presence not conducive to the public good and that condition may exist *because* there has been a request. Indeed, in the contemporary world ' disguised extradition ' may be an answer to the problems posed by the forces of political terrorism when, through the operation of the political exemption clauses of the Extradition Act, the terrorist might otherwise escape the law.

Dr. Akehurst is once again a contributor to the *Yearbook* with an article, ' Custom as a Source of International Law ', and ' The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law ' which appears as a note. The former is a useful survey of current theories about customary law, which Brierly once poignantly described as a matter of a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty. Dr. Akehurst treats fully of all the old questions (What is state practice? How general and consistent must it be and how prolonged? What is *Opinio Juris* and to what extent must it accompany practice?) in an attempt to reach a broader conception of custom than has typically been postulated.

Of the other three main articles, two focus upon Europe. That by Dr. Harris, ' The Application of Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights ', is concerned with the extent to which Article 6 (1) (which provides, *inter alia*, that in ' the determination of a person's civil rights and obligations everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ') extends beyond private litigation in contract and tort situations before ordinary courts to the arena of administrative law following upon the *Ringeisen* Case (1971). In ' The Legal Structure of Association Agreements within the E.E.C. ' Professor Lipstein explains and explores the variety of association agreements contemplated by the Rome Treaty. Dr. Amerasinghe's article, ' Jurisdiction *Ratione Temporis* under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States ', completes the batch of main articles. Of the shorter contributions, special mention should be made of Dr. Marston's ' Some Legal Problems of the Channel Tunnel Scheme, 1874-1883 ', a curio piece perhaps, but a welcome relief from much of the rest which is a little daunting at times.

Two final points: the first to welcome the review of *The Bases of International Order. Essays in Honour of C. A. W Manning*,[3] which is a gracious tribute to that splendid anti-Jacobin; the second to remark the casenote, in the section devoted to decisions of British Courts during 1974-75, of *The Philippine Admiral* [1976] 1 All E R 78 P.C. For some reason the case, which determined that sovereign immunity is not general but limited to transactions *iure imperii* in actions *in rem*, has received little analysis, despite its seminal character The decision is remarkable not least for the quantum of English law purportedly set aside by so little argument.

University College at Buckingham CLIFFORD HALL

[3] London Oxford University Press, 1973

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

The Origins of the Second World War. By Maurice Baumont. Trans. by Simone de Couvreur Ferguson. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1978. 327 pp. £15·80.*

THIS is the English translation of a book published in France ten years ago by the eminent French diplomatic historian Maurice Baumont. Its publishers claim that it ' provides a revealing new perspective on the two decade lull that divided the great wars '. Since, however, we are told firmly on page 3 that ' the origins of the war of 1939 go back essentially to the insatiable appetites of Adolph Hitler ', scholars are unlikely to be startled by the novelty of the arguments presented. They should, nevertheless, be impressed by M. Baumont's obvious familiarity with the principal British, French, German and Italian diplomatic sources of the period, and by his penetrating analyses of the complex choices facing, in particular, British and French statesmen, as crisis followed crisis from the Manchurian invasion of 1931-32 to the Abyssinian affair of 1935, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39.

It seems a great pity, therefore, that the book almost defiantly carries no footnotes and no bibliography, and that its quotations are not always fully attributed. The threads of argument are deliberately fragmented into sections, an arrangement which enables problems to be viewed from many different angles but which breaks up the main strands of investigation, and the chapters are very unequal in length—two and a half pages on ' The Japanese Conflict ' as against thirty-four on ' The Ethiopian Affair '. In addition, M. Baumont has a fondness for sweeping generalisations and for oratorical flourishes which provoke questions rather than answer them. To describe Lord Robert Cecil as ' a typical Conservative ' in 1935 is certainly misleading; to assert that ' in Great Britain, the opposition to any anti-Japanese action [in 1931-32] would have been unanimous ' is to raise a whole host of objections and qualifications. Was it really the case that in 1932 ' it was an almost unanimous British opinion that all nations should disarm to the German level as a first step towards total disarmament '? We can agree that ' the sombre year 1932 was a year of elections for most nations ', but what were the results of these elections, and what were the political complexions of the new governments? M. Baumont sketches very skilfully the range of diplomatic choices open to French policy-makers in 1934, but again one would like more depth of analysis: which parties supported which lines of action?

Nevertheless, with all its faults, this is a penetrating study of the origins of the Second World War which students of the period will find both interesting and useful. Its thesis is not new; in view of its French origins, it is not surprising to find its author uncompromisingly rejecting a Taylorite interpretation, though he does not do so explicitly. Indeed, there is no reference in the book to the recent historiography of the origins of the Second World War, which is a pity. Instead, M. Baumont directs the whole weight of his first-hand knowledge of the period and his painstaking study of the relevant documents to show that ' pushed on by his own impulses, Hitler, like a sleep walker, was following a fanatic's path on which others could have no more influence than on the orbit of a planet ' (p. 104). There is no argument or discussion about this basic premise. Counter strategies and alternative policies could have been pursued by the victors of the First World War to contain Hitler, and M. Baumont takes us through the different possibilities and complex diplomatic problems, while showing us, at the same time, why the European tragedy unfolded in the almost inevitable way it did. His analysis is clear, and his arguments carry conviction, especially if the reader agrees with his basic view of Hitler's programme and expansionist policies.

University of Lancaster RUTH HENIG

War, Economy and Society 1939–1945. By Alan S. Milward. *London: Allen Lane. 1977. 395 pp. £7·00.*

Kriegswirtschaft und Rüstung 1939–1945. Edited by Friedrich Forstmeier and Hans Erich Volkmann. *Düsseldorf: Droste. 1977. 418 pp. Pb: DM 39.00.*

IT is difficult to imagine that there is anyone, inside or outside Britain, who is better qualified than Alan Milward to write a study of the economic world at war. His sweeping study is brilliantly conceived and masterfully executed in a lucid and lively style, marred only by a penchant for the meaningless word ' meaningful ' and an austerity regime with commas. It deserves to command a wide general readership, if a cheaper paper-bound edition is forthcoming, and the range of information and iconoclastic analysis make it prescribed reading for any specialist in the period.

Doubtful, as to whether ' it was yet possible to write an economic history of the Second World War [which] is still the greatest statistical gap in the twentieth century ', Professor Milward has written at greater length about the subjects ' which have been explored in depth ' and has purveyed ' half-truths as quietly and unobtrusively as possible ', in areas where little scholarly work has been done (pp. xi–xii). Conscience now girded, he launches into the fray with such vigour that it is almost impossible not to learn in detail, and/or in general, from each page.

The economy is treated as but one element of a strategic synthesis, functioning within ' a complicated mesh of social, military, political and psychological considerations '. A distinction is drawn between an ' economy's absolute potential for warfare ' and the ' more useful and operative ' concept, whereby such potential ' may be defined as the extent to which economic priorities must be re-ordered so as to attain the desired strategic objective '. Therefore the ' correct strategic synthesis will be that which only makes exactly those demands on the economy which are sufficient to achieve the strategic purpose ' (pp. 19–21). Through a consideration of the strategies, which the major belligerents sought to pursue, the wide range of effective economic strategies is revealed, showing that there are ' no economic priorities peculiar to a " war economy " ', although ' there are certain problems peculiar to war whatever the strategic synthesis in which the economy operates ' (pp 53–4). The remainder of the book is a stimulating consideration of these problems—production, direction of the economy, the economics of occupation, technology, labour, agriculture and food, economic warfare and the reconstruction of the international economy.

Given the enormous amount of data, the obvious errors are few and relatively insignificant. United States tractor utilisation increased in the order of 70 per cent between 1939–46, not the 11 per cent given (p. 277). Foodstuffs were not the only items rationed in the United States (p. 283). In September 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt only agreed in general terms to restraint on the German economy; there was no hint of the detailed figures given (p. 335) The postwar German currency reform is dated 1947 instead of 1948 (p. 336). The threatened negro march on Washington was projected for July not January 1941 (p 340)

There are also some important omissions, which have been researched, such as the Greek economy under German occupation and British economic warfare against the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, although one can sympathise with Milward's witticism that ' never were so many questions left unasked and unanswered by so many ' Soviet volumes on the Second World War, there is *some* material on the Soviet State Defence Committee's role in directing the economy, and in general the reader feels fully informed about the Soviet Union, compared to what he still cannot find out about the Chinese economy at war.

The volume edited by Forstmeier and Volkmann is a more conventional collection of essays, centred around the German economy, along with contributions upon the Austrian, Japanese, British and American economies at war, as well as upon France,

Poland and the Soviet Union under occupation. Given the dearth of socio-economic studies of the Second World War, this volume could usefully be translated into English.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story. By Ronald Lewin. *London. Hutchinson. 1978. 398 pp Index £6 95*

THIS is a half-way book. It is based on two things: Mr. Lewin's accumulated knowledge as a professional military biographer plus the revelation that there was such a thing as Ultra intelligence The book is based only marginally on Ultra material since little of this was available in the Public Record Office when Mr. Lewin laid down his pen.

When in 1974 Group Captain Winterbotham (preceded in 1973 by the late General Bertrand) revealed the Ultra secret, a great many people were vastly surprised and a few--those who had written books in ignorance of the secret—rather worried Since 1977 the authorities, under a variety of pressures including common sense, have been decanting relevant documents into the PRO. So far only two categories of documents are seeing the light. They are voluminous in quantity but severely limited in range. They are, moreover, still incomplete. There is therefore a lot more to come in these categories, and if no other categories follow them to Kew the public picture of Bletchley Park, its operation and product, will remain very lop-sided.

In these circumstances Mr Lewin had a choice He could either get his book out as quickly as possible (and was no doubt urged by his publishers to do this) or he could wait for the documents He chose the first course and therein lie the limitations of the book He has tried to fill the gaps by assiduously consulting a number of people - including old inmates of Bletchley Park—who were on the Ultra list as producers or consumers and he has digested (in both senses of the word) the two outstanding books that have so far appeared (by Patrick Beesly and R. V Jones [1]). But he remains in the uncomfortable position of the man who has got in on the ground floor only to find that the rest of the house is still blocked off and the keys are missing

Mr. Lewin's book is saved by two considerable merits. He already knows a great deal about the war and so can re read the available evidence in the light of his new knowledge of the existence of Ultra He has, for example, some pertinent things to say about the conflict between Churchill and Wavell, leaning more to Churchill's side than has been customary in recent years He also fascinatingly marries the double-cross system with Ultra in a way which was not open to Sir John Masterman who wrote about the former when the latter was still taboo.[2] On the other hand, Mr Lewin's attempt to use Ultra in another round of the Dowding versus Leigh-Mallory contest will, I suspect, appear overstated when all the Ultra material relating to the Battle of Britain becomes available. Mr. Lewin is not alone in making what are to my mind extravagant claims for Ultra at this date; but we had better wait for the evidence The second major merit of this book is that it reads extremely well.

About Bletchley Park itself Mr. Lewin has had to rely on the informants whom he has tracked down. They have told him much on the intelligence side but, so far as appears from his book, little about the actual breaking of the Enigma cyphers and less

1 *Very Special Intelligence The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, 1939 1945* (London Hamish Hamilton, 1977), *Most Secret War British Scientific Intelligence 1939 45* (London Hamish Hamilton, 1978)

2 *The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New Haven, London Yale University Press 1972)

about that neglected art *sine qua nihil*: interception. There is for my taste rather too much naming of names which will mean nothing to the general reader and judging by the adjectives attached to them do not mean much to the author either. But on more substantial matters Mr. Lewin is careful and clear; mistakes about Bletchley Park are few and not important. This was a risky book to write, since the writer who embarks on the (salubrious) task of letting cats out of bags runs the risk of letting out some cats which were never in the bag. Mr. Lewin's professional knowledge has enabled him to escape most of the risks and to produce an interim report which at this stage is well worth having.

PETER CALVOCORESSI

Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War By Roger J. Bell. *Melbourne Melbourne University Press 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Prentice-Hall International, Hemel Hempstead) 278 pp. £11 27 A$19 16*

FROM one point of view Dr. Bell's book provides a supplement to Professor Christopher Thorne's recent monumental work on American policy in the Pacific theatre during the Second World War.[1] Seen from another angle it supplies an interesting comment on postwar studies of Australian relations with the United States, such as those of Dr T. R Reese and Dr. H. G. Gelber.[2]

In this book Dr. Bell traces the history of Australian collaboration with the United States in the Pacific War. He concludes that the influence Australia was able to exert on broad strategy was not in general very considerable. In what is in effect a study of alliance politics, as between a great and a small power, the author shows the difficulty of obtaining anything like parity in such a relationship. A great power is not willing to concede equal rights in determining strategy or directing operations to an ally whose contribution is inevitably much less than its own. Equally, it was impossible for the United States to consult fully with all its allies on every issue, or even keep them always fully informed. Indeed from many points of view, including that of security, the Combined Chiefs were unwilling to divulge more than was absolutely necessary to any ally.

The most that the United States was prepared to do was to provide a mechanism of consultation for Australia and other Pacific allies, through the Pacific War Council, and occasionally through Australian participation in sessions of the Combined Chiefs. The Australians' strategic priorities often differed from those of the United States and Britain, particularly in their natural wish (in a period of maximum danger) for greater priority to be accorded to the Pacific theatre But though Dr Bell concedes that ' the Pacific area *did* receive American air, naval and ground forces in 1942 above the levels initially contemplated by the Anglo-American planners ' (p 79), he judges that this revision of priorities was due to the pressure of events (and he might have added the continuous pressure of General MacArthur and Admiral King) rather than any influence Australia was able to exert. Perhaps Australian influence was slightly greater than other even less powerful allies such as Holland or New Zealand. Nevertheless, ' Australia could not exert a decisive influence on operational policy in the Pacific ' and ' the United States and Britain retained direction of grand strategy ' (p. 106) It is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise

1 *Allies of a Kind The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941 1945* (London Hamish Hamilton, 1978) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1978 p 480

2 *Australia, New Zealand and the United States A Survey of International Relations, 1941-1968* (London Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1969) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1970, p 414 *The Australian American Alliance Costs and Benefits* (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1968)

In two interesting chapters Dr. Bell considers also the nature of the economic relations between the two states during this period, including Lend-Lease, and the unsuccessful attempts of the State Department to induce Australia to abandon its participation in the system of imperial preference. In conclusion he surveys allied planning for peace, particularly in relation to the occupation and eventual peace settlement with Japan, and concludes that Australia was no more able to exert a decisive influence here than in the actual conduct of the war. His final conclusion is an interesting one, namely, that it is an over-simplification to say that ' in December 1941 Australia cut the umbilical cord with Britain and attached itself permanently to the United States ', or that ' the wartime embrace of Australia's new protector was unconditional and enduring ' (p. 226). In Dr. Bell's view, Curtin, Evatt and Chifley continued to value the British connection: and no ' special post-war relationship ' developed with the United States at first. Such a development had to wait for the renewed anxieties aroused on both sides by the Korean War and the fears of communist expansion it generated.

University of Reading KEITH SAINSBURY

War Economy 1942–1945. By S. J. Butlin and C B. Schedvin. *Canberra: Australian War Memorial 1977. 817 pp. (Australia in the War of 1939–1945 Series 4 (Civil) IV.)*

THE authors have concentrated on identifying and describing the structural phases in the Australian war economy between Pearl Harbour and the final Japanese surrender. The first phase, covering 1942–43, was that of total mobilisation. Under threat of imminent invasion the Australians prepared to equip themselves to confront Japanese forces when only limited American back-up was available The criteria in official decision-making at this time were necessarily not those of domestic resources and their limits, but of survival Two departments in particular, Manpower and Munitions, acquired enormous powers, and changing circumstances only led to a limited reduction of their influence.

The second phase in 1943–44 was one of adjustment in which it was realised that Australia was not likely to be invaded and that production plans had to be brought into line with resources. It became obvious, for example, that many of the articles which Munitions aspired to produce in Australia (such as tanks) would be supplied more speedily by the United States under Lend-Lease. Australia's role in the war was now to be a base for General MacArthur's forces and to supply troops and some materials for Allied operations elsewhere in the Pacific. The chief concern of Australia's leaders proved to be not a Japanese incursion but the inflationary pressures engendered by earlier mobilisation and the continued effort to supply war needs, so that at this mid-point in hostilities the panoply of economic controls (investment controls, wage-pegging, price-stabilisation and rationing) came into being. More specifically, the balance between rural and industrial production (which had been unhinged in 1942–43 when agriculturalists had been conscripted into the forces or lured into the war factories by higher wages) was to some extent restored Nevertheless, the Australians resisted Allied efforts to convert the country into a specialised food-producer, since they knew that an offensive capacity was vital if some leverage within international planning was to be retained.

The third phase covered 1944–45 and consisted essentially of relaxing controls, reconstruction and the final transition into a largely civilian economy. The increasing vulnerability of domestic controls to large-scale evasion, the question of industrial promotion in the postwar world and Allied negotiations on future trade and monetary

arrangements are all touched upon, although in an official history the tentative treatment of political factors obviously limits the discussion. The presentation of this broad sequence of events is the strength of the book.

Beneath this sense of phases, however, the chief interest of the work lies in its outlines of bureaucratic conflict. A lot of information is provided on the competition between the Manpower Directorate, the Supply Department, the Department of War Organisation of Industry and the network of agencies established during the war. It is a striking example of how war provides an opportunity for the furtherance of bureaucratic entrepreneurs, although Butlin and Schedvin do not make an argument out of their material. In looking at tax reform we are shown how the federal power expanded at the expense of the states, although it should be said that the volume gives little attention to the states' role and their resistance to federal encroachment. Financial policy is well treated, and there is a clear view of the determination to counter inflation by financing the war out of productivity rather than the building up of future debt; so that we are given some nice touches on the ' Loans for Victory ' campaign.

Labour aspects, apart from manpower planning, are relatively underplayed. There is little treatment of trade unions, although there is a revealing section on the immunity of coalminers to calls for national sacrifice. Otherwise, social changes occasionally break surface rather than having a consistent focus, as with the integration of women into the labour force and the increased bargaining powers of previously weak economic groups such as the rank-and-file of the dairy farms. Australia's involvement in Lend-Lease, and its own policy of Reciprocal Aid, are more adequately dealt with, and the exceptionally heavy demands that the United States made on Australian resources goes a long way towards explaining why the Australians continued to regard the British Commonwealth as a useful countervailing force. Overall, this is a good addition to the official Australian war history, and whilst possessing the conventional limitations of such works, it goes some way towards defining future areas of research

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London ROBERT HOLLAND

WESTERN EUROPE

Memoirs. By Jean Monnet Trans. by Richard Mayne *London: Collins 1978 (First publ Paris: Fayard, 1976.) 544 pp £13·00.*

JEAN MONNET'S long public career began during the First World War, when he helped to co-ordinate the French and British economic war efforts, but it was not until the Second World War that he became convinced of the need for the European integration with which his name is now indissolubly linked. In this connection, he cites in this volume of memoirs a memorandum which he wrote in Algiers on August 5, 1943:

> There will be no peace in Europe if States re-establish themselves on the basis of national sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of prestige policies and economic protectionism . . The countries of Europe are too small to give their peoples the prosperity that is now attainable and therefore necessary. They need wider markets . . . To enjoy the prosperity and social progress that are essential the States of Europe must form a federation or a ' European entity ' which will make them a single economic unit (p. 222).

This watershed in Monnet's thinking is neatly encapsulated in terms of the book's structure by entitling Part One (up to the end of the Second World War) ' The Failure of Force ', and Part Two (since 1945) ' A Time for Unity '

Historians will certainly want to read Part One for the light it throws on Anglo-French relations during the First World War, the origins and early development of the League of Nations, the efforts of the French after Munich to re-equip their air force with American help, the abortive plan for Anglo-French union in June 1940 and the attempt to bring together Generals de Gaulle and Giraud in Algiers in 1943. Monnet played a part, and often a leading part, in all these episodes. Non-specialists, however, will probably be more interested in Part Two, and especially in his accounts of the Schuman Plan, the European Defence Community and the work of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe.

Monnet, of course, was the real author of the Schuman Plan for the pooling of Western Europe's coal and steel industries, and his chapters on the genesis and implementation of the proposal are of considerable value, although the main outlines of the story are already well known. There are a few predictable digs at the attitude of the British government, although it must be said that, on the whole, Monnet is fairer to the latter than some British ' Europeans ' have been. He is quite wrong, however, in claiming that ' Continental Socialists were openly dismayed ' by the Labour Party's *European Unity* pamphlet, which came out at the time of the debate on the Schuman Plan, and which uncompromisingly stated the case against Britain's membership of a federal Europe (p. 315). As it happened, an international Socialist conference was held in London only a few days after the publication of the pamphlet. Delegates from nine ' continental ' countries attended and only the solitary French representative (Guy Mollet) and one member of the Dutch delegation expressed any dismay at all.[1]

One important theme which this book not surprisingly does not explore, but which is worthy of much closer examination than it has received in the past, is the extent to which Monnet was, consciously or unconsciously, an instrument of American foreign policy. Despite the alleged comment of one American policy-maker to the effect that ' Monnet isn't everything ', there is no doubt that his ties with the United States were very close and that the kind of Europe the Americans wanted was Monnet's Europe, even in the case of the ill-fated European Defence Community—another of Monnet's brain-children—where they swung round from an initial position of hostility to one of most ardent advocacy It is not often realised that one reason why Ernest Bevin was so reluctant to merge Britain into a federal Europe was precisely because he feared this could lead to excessive American influence upon British policy General de Gaulle, of course, held the same view even more passionately with respect to France.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

Federal Solutions to European Issues. Edited by Bernard Burrows, Geoffrey Denton and Geoffrey Edwards. *London. Macmillan for the Federal Trust. 1978 225 pp. £8 95. Pb £3·95*

The Council of Ministers of the European Community and the President-in-Office. By Geoffrey Edwards and Helen Wallace. *London. Federal Trust for Education and Research. 1977. 102 pp. Pb £2·00.*

COULD the Federal Trust ever do for federalism what the Institute of Economic Affairs has done for monetarism? It would certainly be quite an achievement, for as the editors of the first of these Federal Trust publications point out, federalism in this country has a bad name It is thought of by many people as being a dogma which implies hostility to the nation state, a desire to see the break-up of the United Kingdom, and a blind commitment to the EEC and all its works.

1 See the ' private and confidential ' memorandum on the conference by E G Farmer in the archives of the Labour Party's International Sub-Committee of the National Executive Committee

Not so, say the editors, and in general Geoffrey Denton is justified in claiming, in his Postscript to the essays, that ' there is in these papers no hostility to the nation state ' (p. 223). It is, admittedly, difficult to see what room there would be for the nation state in Roderick MacFarquhar's Europe of regions, and the very subject of Ernest Wistrich's essay, ' Promoting a European Identity ', must smell a bit fishy to the sceptic. But by and large the book is remarkably successful in presenting a pragmatic argument for federal solutions to some of our most pressing contemporary problems. It is a particularly remarkable achievement considering that there are seventeen contributors, not all of whom are, as Denton assures us, ' convinced federalists ' (p 221).

What emerges is not so much an attack on the nation state as a demonstration that the real dogma which stands in the way of a successful solution to many of our problems is the concept of sovereignty. The idea of a single source of power and authority which owns no superior is a constitutional fiction which demonstrably bears no recognisable relationship to political reality in the modern world. Yet many reputable political figures seem to circumscribe their whole analysis of current problems by a commitment to the maintenance of the sovereignty of parliament, or national sovereignty. The result is that no practical policies can be formulated.

The claim made by this book is that: ' Analysis should start with clarifying the tasks of government and administration in the modern world, the size of unit in which these tasks can most efficiently be done, and the size and type of organisation in which people can have a sense of belonging and participation ' (p. 2). From this starting point the authors of the various essays examine a wide variety of issues which are grouped under three broad headings.

Part A deals with ' Political Needs and Institutions '. It contains an excellent piece by Tom Ellis on why we need a federal constitution in Britain; a stimulating treatment by Ghita Ionescu of the functional aspect of federalism, that is, the dispersion of power to interest groups, or ' The European Social Partners ' as they are described here; there are also very solid essays on Community institutions and Community law, as well as the slightly less pragmatic but equally interesting pieces by MacFarquhar and by Wistrich mentioned above. Part B looks at some specific policy areas, covering monetary unification, the Community budget, industrial policy, company organisation, social policy, and agriculture. Part C extends the focus to ' Europe in the World ', looking at enlargement of the Community, foreign policy, defence, and raw material supplies; it is crowned with a particularly fine contribution from John Pinder on ' A Federal Community in an Ungoverned World Economy ' Taken together, the essays display more good ideas per square inch than can be reasonably expected from such a collection.

The shorter Federal Trust publication is an efficient piece of institutional analysis. The authors examine the view that the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community has achieved a position of considerable institutional importance, and makes an identifiable impact on Community decisions. The conclusions would seem to be that it has assumed considerable importance, but that it is more difficult to identify its impact, which varies with changes in occupancy and in circumstances.

The authors say that the Presidency ' offers one lens through which to focus on the Council of Ministers ' (p. 2). In fact it proves a very useful vantage point for obtaining a view of the whole institutional mess which now exists in place of the more tidy, if somewhat ambiguous, division of functions between the Commission and the Council of Ministers that was written into the Treaty of Rome. The report itself is a model of clarity, and again the approach, both to the analysis and to the suggestions for reform, is admirably pragmatic.

If rational argument carries any weight at all in political decision making, the cause of federalism must be advanced by publications of the quality of these two. If I remain less than sanguine, I at least cannot lay the blame on Federal Trust.

University of Sheffield STEPHEN GEORGE

Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe: A Comparative Approach. Edited by William Wallace and W. E. Paterson. *Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House. 1978. 161 pp. £8·50.*

THIS well organised and useful book is motivated by two concerns. Contributors to it feel, quite rightly, that writing on European foreign policy has concentrated on one, or perhaps two, states, and looked insufficiently at the others. They also wish to assess how far it is possible to apply to Europe the theory developed by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin that foreign policy can be explained in general in terms of ' bureaucratic politics '. This common theoretical concern lends unity to the six papers here. But fortunately their authors are not straitjacketed by the bureaucratic politics theory: where they have something interesting to say, they range widely across the foreign policies they consider.

In a theoretical introduction Christopher Hill sets out some of the problems which the study of West European foreign policies raises. He concludes that ' we shall never have a theory of foreign policy ' (p. 25), but argues the importance of even partial understanding and generalisation. For practical as well as academic reasons, we need insights into the breakdowns, problems of co-ordination and dilemmas which foreign policy makers face.

The best of these papers are the nicely titled ' High Politics in the Low Countries ', by Jan Deboutte and Alfred van Staden, and Ib Faurby's discussion of comparisons between Denmark, Sweden and Norway. These two papers bring together a great deal of unfamiliar material in intelligent discussions. These tend to the conclusion that competition between bureaucracies does indeed have an important influence on the shaping of policy. But domestic pressures and political competition also have a direct bearing, as do the broad values of each society, which differ in important respects for countries which appear structurally similar, as in these cases. Clearly, it is not possible to reduce the explanation of any of these states' foreign policies to bureaucratic politics alone.

The other papers here are also valuable. David Allen makes an important contribution in examining how far the European Communities can be seen as having a ' foreign policy ', given that foreign policy has traditionally been seen as an attribute of the sovereign state. This discussion is well informed and theoretically relevant. Donald Sassoon looks at Italy, where the peculiarities and instabilities of domestic policy emerge as major constraints on an active foreign policy. William Wallace shows how organisational differences are major factors in understanding differences between the responses of Britain, France and West Germany to common problems of interdependence and increasing difficulties of policy management.

As a whole this is rather an expensive book for the number of pages. Much of the discussion could have been fuller. Spain, Portugal and Eire are omitted. But what we do have here constitutes a set of papers of consistent quality.

Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham CHRIS FARRANDS

Organisational Effectiveness in a Multinational Bureaucracy. By Hans J. Michelmann. *Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House. 1978 259 pp. £8·50.*

IN 1973–74 Dr. Michelmann administered two questionnaires to the officials of five directorates in the commission of the EEC, one to 334 of A3 rank as heads of division (pp 244–50) and the other to about 1,200 falling between the ranks of A7 and A4 (pp. 237–43); and he then went on to conduct 195 interviews inside and outside the five directorates concerned. This book presents his data and conclusions. The officials involved were not very responsive, at least not in the lower grades: 310 of the 334 A3 rank returned usable replies, but only 560 of the 604 who replied from the lower ranks were equally acceptable. The staff unions in two directorates took ' a negative stance ' (p. 7) to the project. But the author claims that the replies he has analysed constitute a representative sample.

The project was designed to improve our understanding of organisational effectiveness and to make a contribution to organisation theory. The dependent variable, organisational effectiveness, was set in the context of independent variables, the correlates of effectiveness, organised around sixteen propositions which he derived largely from a book by J. L Price.[1] Dr Michelmann's work is an exercise in demonstrating the value of ' contingency theory '.

He concludes that the most effective directorates by any of the standards he has devised are the two dealing with agriculture and with competition policy. But in claiming that these two show the greatest correlations between effectiveness on the one hand and autonomy and ideology on the other, he is in fact saying something about political will in the EEC as much as commenting on ' contingencies ' These two directorates have more autonomy and a clearer view of their purposes precisely because they are backed by member governments The other directorates he examined—social affairs, transport, and economic affairs—are trying to gain support. Social affairs ' exemplifies the futility of ideology without autonomy ' (p. 229), and the other two are trying to induce member governments to transfer power to Community institutions

The moral of the exercise seems to be that leadership—the director general's own initiative—cannot improve bureaucratic effectiveness if the directorates are not given the necessary standing by member governments ' Organisational engineering ' is only valid ' if the organisations have been given a reasonable chance of success vis à vis their task environment ' (p 232). The directorate of economic affairs ' will continue to be a little ivory tower with little policy relevance ' (p 235). It is not surprising that the response rate to the questionnaire was the lowest in the least effective directorate No wonder the staff unions objected However technically elegant the apparatus of analysis which Dr Michelmann employed, it should really have been tested against the agencies of a national government.

Birkbeck College, London J M. LEE

Europe and Africa: From Association to Partnership By Carol Cosgrove Twitchett. *Farnborough, Hants Saxon House 1978 195 pp. £8·50*

THE Lome Convention is due to expire in 1980. Negotiations are under way at the moment between the EEC countries and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states in an effort to establish a new Convention from that date. This involves an appraisal of the way in which the current Convention has operated in an economic climate that has evolved rapidly ever since its signature in 1975. Carol Cosgrove

1 *Organizational Effectiveness An Inventory of Propositions* (Homewood, Ill Irwin, 1968)

Twitchett's book comes, therefore, at an opportune moment, since it traces the development of the EEC's relations with African states from 1958 to the present—a twenty-year span which has (as the title suggests) seen ' association ' change to ' partnership '.

The author correctly emphasises the predominance of French influence in the whole development of the association idea up to the enlargement of the EEC in 1973. It is clear, and the author makes no bones about it, that without French interests in Africa, the idea of association would never have found its way into the Rome Treaty. Germany and the Netherlands acquiesced only reluctantly in the scheme in order to placate the French; and they were only partly mollified by the promises of wider commercial opportunities which were held out to them. To be part of an extension of European interests in Africa seemed to fly in the face of political developments on the continent. The author carefully documents the extent to which EEC countries (other than France) were able to muscle in on the action in Africa. She concludes that whereas trade was multilateralised (Germany and the Netherlands benefiting), the historic links between France and its erstwhile colonies militated in favour of French firms when it came to the winning of lucrative contracts under the aegis of the European Development Fund (EDF). Under the first EDF, for example, the author tells us that 75 per cent of works contracts, and 60 per cent of supply contracts were taken by French firms, or French subsidiaries in Africa (p. 43); and even under the later Yaoundé regime, the picture remained much the same.

> Although none of the Six had ever anticipated proportional financial returns for their contributions to the EDF, they might legitimately have expected a more equitable share of contracts West Germany in particular and to some extent the Netherlands were clearly the losers Perhaps it was no wonder that they remained cool towards association! (p. 134).

The author relies quite heavily on EEC documentation and interviews with EEC officials. This leads her to adopt a rather starry-eyed view of the EEC's motives and methods in its dealings with the African countries Critics like Galtung, who have accused the EEC of neo-colonialism, are dismissed rather abruptly (p. 123). The author may be right to point out that Yaoundé preferences did not hamper trade with non Yaoundé countries (p. 125), but it is surely a little naive to argue that Yaoundé I was successful because African leaders wanted to renew it' (p 120). This assumes that there is an identity of interests between African leaders and their peoples and that there was some equally feasible alternative to continuing a preferential trade agreement with the EEC.

Looked at in the perspective of twenty years of successive trade agreements, the current Lomé Convention is obviously a great improvement on its predecessors. The geographical scope of the Convention, encompassing many former British possessions, means that the spectre of French hegemony has been banished for ever. Indeed, the author rightly argues that Britain has failed to maximise its advantages from the Lomé Convention (p. 169). Britain has great economic stakes in southern Africa: no country has more to gain from seeing it ' Europeanised '. In assessing Lomé, the author fails to go far enough in advocating reforms. Trade may have doubled between the ACP countries and the EEC in the past four years but the ACP share of EEC imports has remained static at 7 per cent—hardly a figure to boast about The Stabex fund needs to be enlarged; and its reference period needs to be revised so that current and even future years' production is taken into account. Above all, it has to be realised that the advantages accruing to Lomé countries are increasingly relative: and the basic issue now is whether to reduce further this margin of privilege.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON BROWNE

The Mediterranean Challenge: I. By Michael Leigh and Nicholas van Praag. *Brighton: Sussex European Research Centre, University of Sussex. 1978 92 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 2.) Pb: £2·00.*

THIS is an excellent and useful little book, consisting of two essays on aspects of the European Community's relations with its southern neighbours. ' Nine EEC Attitudes to Enlargement ', by Michael Leigh, surveys and summarises the reactions of the nine member governments to the prospect of Greek, Spanish and Portuguese entry. Unavoidably slightly dated on the entry negotiations by the rapid movement of events, this nevertheless provides a straightforward and detailed account of reactions within each of the member states up to the early months of 1978. France and Italy, justifiably, receive the most attention Tracing the different reactions to the prospect of enlargement of French and Italian politics between 1976 and 1978, Mr. Leigh concludes, first, that the preoccupation with agricultural questions has been an excuse for interest-groups to seek the redress of long-held grievances only loosely connected to enlargement; and, second, that the fractured party politics of France made for opposition exploitation of an issue which the coalition politics of Italy was able to keep under control.

' European Political Co-operation and the Southern Periphery ', by Nicholas van Praag, more briefly examines the record of co-ordinated European action in recent years towards the Community's southern neighbours. He devotes particular attention to the Nine's handling of the Cyprus crisis of 1974, to their efforts to influence internal developments in Portugal between 1974 and 1976, and to attempts at joint action with regard to Spain at the time of the Franco regime's executions of ' terrorists ' in 1975, and after his death later that year. His conclusion is that the machinery of Political Co-operation, though extremely active on Southern Europe during this period, was capable of supporting nothing more than the occasional diplomatic demarche or joint statement; over Spain it proved incapable even of co-ordinating the recall and return of the Nine's ambassadors. The European Community, acting through the Commission, was in some ways more effective, and the European Investment Bank provided a useful lever for Community influence. More effective than any of these in the Portuguese situation was the informal influence provided by international party links, and the channelling of funds through these links, together with the powerful influence of the attraction of Community membership, both in Portugal and in post-Franco Spain This is a useful, if sobering, essay on one small aspect of the European Community's external expression. It also contains some fascinating details; did you know that under the Association Agreement of 1973 ' Cyprus obtained free entry of carob beans to the EEC '?

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

Population Decline in Europe: Implications of a Declining or Stationary Population By the Council of Europe *London: Edward Arnold. 1978. 254 pp £14·95*

IT seems a pity that so useful and timely a book should appear under a rather misleading title. In spite of the remarkable fall in fertility in most European countries since the late 1960s, there is no immediate prospect of population decline in Europe (see Table 1.5). The central theme of this important collection of essays is the implications for national societies of a stationary or declining population in the medium-term future That this will happen is not yet certain; it is possible, and it may be moving from the possible to the probable, but a decade of reduced fertility does not

of itself mean a decline in total population The speed of the decline has certainly been remarkable, particularly in Germany and in Britain, and now in the Netherlands.

In September 1976 a number of European demographic experts met in Strasbourg at the invitation of the Council of Europe to discuss the likely consequences of the current decline in fertility The presence of numbers of government officials from member countries was an indicator of the significance of the occasion. The present volume is a reprint of the working papers discussed at the seminar together with a preface and conclusions. The ten original papers deal with the demographic facts and their background of process and change, the problems which the current trends appear to set for economic and social systems, and the kinds of policies which governments might wish to consider in the light of particular situations over the next twenty-five years. Three sets of questions emerge as central to the whole range of contributions to the seminar. First, what are the causes of fertility decline during the last decade; secondly, what is the balance of benefits and costs which follows from this decline; and thirdly, what action can be taken to check or halt the trend if it is seen as unwelcome. The answers are not helpful; there is no certain explanation of the trend, there is no simple form of cost-benefit analysis which applies, and we have very little sure idea of what forms of social policies have a predictable effect on fertility behaviour Some issues are already under public discussion. One is the balance between youthful and aged populations after a period of low fertility There is a not uncommon fear that within a decade or so there will be an increased army of pensioners seeking support which a diminishing reserve of active workers will not be able to provide. Dr. Wander's thorough demographic analysis in Chapter 2 settles that problem; she makes it clear that Europe will have a surplus of labour for the next twenty years. In fact there may well be a problem of how to maintain reasonable ' full employment ' for that period. The social objective of equal work opportunities (and pension rights) for women may prove a delicate exercise in costs and benefits for the rising generation, to say nothing of its demographic implications.

Dr Eversley has written a solid and sharply focused paper on the implications of lowered fertility for social welfare provision against the background of European policies which aim at social security for all at levels approaching those of average wages and improved health and education services. He sets out the argument that falling birth rates and perhaps even a prospective fall in total population, does not necessarily mean a fall in the cost of social provision. His paper complements the review of economic implications by Dr. Maillat This is a central issue. If we are to have prosperity for a generation, then do we need to worry about population trends as yet. But given our present trends do we need to worry about prosperity? There is of course a very wide disparity between the prospects for France, Germany, Turkey and Italy, to mention only the larger countries. The difficulty is perhaps the idea of keeping a secure standard of living with a nil growth rate in population and perhaps even a decline in say fifty years' time, while critical raw materials and power sources are rising in real cost, and technological advances may be forcing our slowly rising labour force into ' structural ' unemployment.

And yet there is a curious sense of *deja vu* Forty years ago some very remarkable forward views of population change were being advanced in the United Kingdom. Births in Britain last year were higher than in 1977 and 1976. Is this a significant change, or are we in one of the minor fluctuations which are probably inevitable as advanced societies move towards a degree of stability of total population which most European demographers now accept as desirable.

Finally, even if there were to be agreement on desired demographic objectives, can government policies make significant differences in current fertility behaviour Declining numbers of births result from choices made by ordinary citizens with an increasing awareness of the options before them, and increasing confidence in

controlling their own fertility. Perhaps a theory of fertility could begin with the proposition that each successive generation gets closer to the number of children actually wanted.

University of Leeds MAURICE KIRK

Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe. Edited by William E. Paterson and Alastair H. Thomas. *London: Croom Helm. 1977 444 pp. £9 95. 1978. Pb· £5·50*

The Foreign Policies of West European Socialist Parties. Edited by Werner J. Feld. *New York· Praeger. 1978 (Distrib in UK by Holt Saunders, Eastbourne.) 149 pp. £11·25*

THE paucity of lively, comprehensive and scholarly studies of major themes in European politics which cut across national frontiers is such that almost any contribution is worth welcoming. However, of the two books reviewed here only the Paterson and Thomas book deserves serious consideration. Social Democracy, both in its historical and contemporary variants, cannot be fully understood solely in political terms. Indeed in their introductory chapter Paterson and Thomas contend that the ' social democratic dilemma ' turns on the difficulty of ' securing not merely a political but also a social and economic consensus around the values of social democracy ' (p. 21), and receive support for this view from several contributors to their volume which covers fifteen Socialist and Social Democratic parties. In spite of this, the major focus of the book is political, in its exploration of the character and fate of these parties in the political systems of Western Europe The ambitious coverage and, by and large, the consistent depth achieved in the fifteen chapters raised expectations in the reviewer that the comparative themes developed in the introductory chapter would be fully exploited. This was not to be, not so much because the themes are ignored, but rather because the more individual chapters sympathetically identify with their subject (to the benefit of country and party specialists), the less sensitive they become to the examples and political models revealed in other countries

Nevertheless the book as a whole makes a most valuable and readable contribution. It combines useful studies of the less well documented parties of Austria, Finland and Norway with interpretative chapters on the more familiar parties. Of the latter, David Hine's chapter on Italy, and the chapter on Britain by Lewis Minkin and Patrick Seyd deserve particular mention. Both succeed in relating the fundamental question of the strategic dilemma of Social Democratic parties in advanced but insecure industrialised societies to the structure of these parties as political organisations and their perceptions of their roles within their respective political systems. The only noticeable gap in the otherwise thought provoking chapter by Minkin and Seyd is the absence of any discussion on the relationship between the electoral system and the current and future status of Social Democracy in Britain.

The second book reviewed here does not compare in any way with the first. In spite of its narrower focus it achieves neither the same comprehensiveness nor depth Individual chapters are of uneven quality and emphasis. Professor Jacques Huntzinger's contribution on the French Socialists should have been one of the most interesting; unfortunately and inexplicably, it is almost unreadable in parts, having suffered from a most appalling translation.

The most regrettable feature of the book is its failure to explore adequately the fundamental question of foreign-policy options for Socialist parties in advanced industrialised societies This subject deserves much more serious and thorough attention than that given in this rather low level and inadequately edited book.

UMIST, University of Manchester CAROLE WEBB

Suez 1956: A Personal Account. By Selwyn Lloyd. *London. Jonathan Cape. 1978. 282 pp. £6 50.*

SELWYN LLOYD has written an absorbing account of the Suez crisis of 1956 One does not have to be a supporter of his conduct at the time, and still less of his attempt to justify it more than twenty years later, to recognise that his book is indispensable to all students of the subject. The one matter for regret is that the author left it for so long before putting pen to paper, for his death, just after the completion of the manuscript, means that he cannot respond to the many questions and criticisms it is bound to provoke. As he explains in the preface, however, it was impracticable for him to start on the book while he was still playing an active part in politics and business or until he had given up the Speakership of the House of Commons We are perhaps fortunate, therefore, to have the book at all.

Not the least of its virtues is the way in which the author, making use not only of his private papers but also of the official records to which he enjoyed access as a former Cabinet minister, employs such contemporary documentation to correct the inaccuracies purveyed in some earlier accounts. He thus gently rebuts one of the more confused passages in the memoirs of Christien Pineau, the French foreign minister at the time, and convincingly demolishes Harold Macmillan's attempt to deny that his advice, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, played a crucial part in the British Cabinet's decision on November 6, 1956 to agree to a ceasefire. He tries, with less success, to cast doubt upon the good faith of his Minister of State, Anthony Nutting, who resigned at the time of Suez 'I was, to say the least of it', he writes, ' somewhat surprised to find him taking this attitude after what he had said in March . . about appeasement not working and that Nasser would break any agreement made with him I also remembered his strong language at the party conference . . ' (p. 204) The reason Nutting resigned, however, was not because he had become pro Nasser, but because he objected to ' collusion ' with Israel, and, as he explains in his memoirs, the speech which he made at the Conservative Party conference was not his own, but Lord Salisbury's, to whose combative prose he was only able to make the minimum of alterations

As well as seeking to correct the memories of his colleagues, Lloyd is also at pains to refute allegations that they were not kept properly informed of what was going on His accounts of Cabinet and other ministerial meetings in October 1956, therefore, include not only a summary of what was said and decided, but also the names of those present, almost as if to emphasise the collective nature of the final decision. Nevertheless, a close reading of the text still leaves open the crucial question of the extent to which the full Cabinet, as opposed to an ' inner circle ' of senior ministers, were aware of the full extent of ' collusion ' between Britain, France and Israel.[1]

They were, however, well aware of, and had indeed accepted, a paper which Lloyd wrote in March 1956, four months before the nationalisation of the Suez Canal, which argued that ' We could not establish a basis for friendly relations with an Egypt controlled by Nasser ' and ' we [therefore] had to realign our policy in the Middle East. Instead of seeking to conciliate or support Nasser, we should do our utmost to counter him and uphold our true friends' (p. 60). In the light of this document, the nationalisation of the Canal was less the cause of the British invasion of Egypt than the pretext for it Eden, indeed, virtually admitted as much to the Cabinet on October 24. ' We would never have a better reason for intervention ', Lloyd reports him as saying, ' than his [Nasser's] seizure of the Canal ' (p. 188) It might be added in this connection that Egypt was not the only Arab country with a leadership unacceptable to Britain; Lloyd's Cabinet paper had also stated: ' We should seek to establish in Syria

1 For a much fuller discussion of the ' collusion ' issue, see Geoffrey Warner's article beginning on p 226 above

a Government more friendly to the West ' (p. 60), and there are some tantalisingly brief glimpses of British connivance at the plans of Nuri as-Said of Iraq to engineer a coup in that country (pp. 56 and 106).

It was recognised that Britain needed American support to implement an effective policy in the Middle East. ' Those who contend that Suez was a watershed in our national history ', writes Lloyd, ' often maintain that Eden's Government still regarded Britain as capable of independent action on a global scale. It needed Suez, they say, to convince us that we were no longer a Great Power. This is very wide of the mark. We knew the facts only too well. During our talks in Washington [in January 1956], Eden put in a paper on our economic situation. The Second World War had turned us from the world's greatest creditor to the world's greatest debtor. We could not undertake any more external commitments ' (p. 42). Why then, one is tempted to ask, did Eden and his colleagues press on with a course of action of which they knew the United States disapproved? Lloyd offers the usual explanation: that they did not anticipate the strength of the American reaction. While this may be so, he himself records that he warned Ben-Gurion on October 26, 1956 that the United Nations could well bring any military operation to a halt within a matter of days. If Lloyd seriously believed this, it was surely the height of folly to launch the invasion.

This brings us, in conclusion, to Lloyd's own position. In general, the book is a sustained defence of British policy, and more particularly, of Anthony Eden. Occasionally, however, Lloyd's personal reservations show through, emphasising in particular his own anxieties about the wisdom of overthrowing Nasser and having to occupy the whole of Egypt or prop up a pro-Western regime with British troops (pp. 187 and 190).[2] Could it be that Lloyd went along with a policy of which, in his heart of hearts, he disapproved, and that this book is merely the final example of the misguided loyalty which he then displayed? Unfortunately, we shall probably never know the answer.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

Harding of Petherton. By Michael Carver *London Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1978. 246 pp £8.50*

NO other nation has done better than Britain at producing senior soldiers who could not only fight and win battles, but also handle the delicate web of politico-military affairs. The perennial need for alliances, and the imperial experience itself, have required and evolved an able series of proconsuls. It is ironical that Field Marshal Lord Carver's Rhodesian appointment should appear to be the last, or nearly the last, in this long succession, for the subject of his biography is a pre-eminent example of the type. The sequence of private sessions with Makarios which John Harding initiated during the Cyprus dispute have a traditional flavour—the shrewd general who, skilled at discerning the *schwerpunkt* in battle, drives ruthlessly at the heart of the political problem as he disregards the fears and velleities of Whitehall. Of course Makarios was too tricky a customer, and the problem too complex, for so direct an approach to reach an instant solution. But it was probably the best ploy at the time, and Lord Carver notes that when Harding retired as Governor in 1957 even ' hard-bitten officials, who on his arrival had resented the severe shock he had administered to a sleepy colonial regime, were deeply moved at his departure '.

2 For further details of Lloyd's reservations and of the French and Israeli belief that he was opposed to the whole venture, see Geoffrey Warner's article *ibid*

Whether in Cyprus, or in the Malaysian command in the bad early days, or at Trieste, or as CIGS, Harding's actions are all of a piece. Two world wars gave him an acute sense of reality: in the second he learned the truth about things in the whirling conflicts of the North African desert and, as Alexander's Chief of Staff, during the slow haul up Italy. It was Harding's acumen that created victory at Cassino. But the interesting point is that this totally professional soldier could then, after 1945, apply his sense of reality with effect in precisely those politico-military areas where so many warriors go astray. Lord Carver does not elaborate on the comparison, but it would be interesting to set down side by side the many fatuities of Montgomery's peace-time intrusions into the political zone and Harding's sensible and perceptive performance. After all that, Plesseys must have been glad to get as their Chairman this grammar-school boy from Somerset—the last large eminence in that line of soldier-statesmen which began with Marlborough.

RONALD LEWIN

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. First Series, Vol. XXI: German Reparation and Allied Military Control 1923. Edited by W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin and M. E. Lambert. *London. HMSO. 1978. 1027 pp. £30·00.*

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. Second Series, Vol. XVI: The Rhineland Crisis and the Ending of Sanctions March 2–July 30, 1936. *London HMSO, 1978. 811 pp. £22·00.*

THESE two volumes painfully illustrate the theme of the transience of mortal things, and especially of British power in the world. In the first, dealing mainly with the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 for the enforcement of German reparations and Anglo-French disagreements over the military control of defeated Germany, Britain sits at the summit of Europe at a time when Europe is the summit of the world. It coldly rebukes France for forcing on Germany a sanction disallowed, in its Law Officers' view, by the Treaty of Versailles; it reproves Belgium for supinely following Poincaré's disastrous course; calls on Mussolini to show some sense and co-operate in clearing up the mess after the Franco-Belgian action; and advises Germany ' to say honestly and sincerely that she intended to mend her ways and to make a real effort to pay to the utmost limit of her capacity, and finally to throw herself upon the mercy of the Allies' (No. 195). In the second, covering the German reoccupation of the Rhineland and the ending of League sanctions against Italy after its conquest of Abyssinia, both in that dreadful year, 1936, the tables are turned. Hitler is now the master of the game, exploiting the quarrel between Britain and Italy over League sanctions to violate Locarno and reoccupy the Rhineland with impunity, laughing at British and French demands that he should refer his argument against the legality of the Franco-Soviet treaty of 1935 to the Permanent Court and take his troops out of the Rhineland again pending talks on a general settlement, and forcing the British government into saying that it would be ' particularly grateful ' if the German dictator raised no objection to Anglo-French staff talks in the interim period before new arrangements to replace Locano were agreed (No. 168).

The Ministers presiding over the Foreign Office in these two periods themselves symbolised the reversal in Britain's fortunes. How curious to think of the consequences had the two been able to change places! In the first, the lordly Lord Curzon talks to Belgian, French and German ambassadors as though they were workmen on his Kedleston estate. His record of interviews with his greatest *bête noire*, the French envoy Count de Saint-Aulaire, reveals the only personal feelings which

surely ever slipped into a Foreign Office paper: ' My Lord, I had a conversation of a rather peculiar character with the French Ambassador this afternoon . . . I replied somewhat sharply . . . ' (No. 266, June 15, 1923). In the second, Anthony Eden worms his way through all the endless, convoluted formulae which stood the slightest chance, on the one hand, of keeping the French reasonably quiet while their European security system fell in ruins with the collapse of Locarno and Britain did nothing, and, on the other, of wheedling Hitler into some arrangements—perhaps a revived Rhine pact or a reformed League, with colonial mandates for Germany to sweeten the package—all intended to ensure that he score up no more cheap victories.

Eden in fact did not really object to Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland: ' it is the manner of their action . . . which we deplore ' (No. 48). Indeed, the 1936 *Documents* show that Eden had previously contemplated suggesting reoccupation to Hitler as a reward if he would behave himself in future; ' by reoccupying the Rhineland he has deprived us of the possibility of making to him a concession ' (*ibid.*). It was Mussolini's attack on Abyssinia which knocked Eden sideways, not Hitler's Rhineland action, though that turned the whole European military situation against Britain and France and rendered them powerless thereafter to check him.

These splendid volumes document the change in Britain's fortunes between the earlier days and the later, but do nothing to explain it, as indeed was not their intention. But they do bring out one significant factor: the overriding British concentration on the *rightfulness* or otherwise of actions in the foreign field, rather than on their military or even political implications. The French, in 1923 and 1936, understood the realities of power: they knew that Germany must be smashed or would be their master. They tried to urge their allies to the same verdict and found Britain could only ask: is it fair?

These documents will be prized for thoroughness, as always, of editorship, though, for the first time, the 1923 volume has rare misprints (another sign of Britain's decline?).

London School of Economics F. S. NORTHEDGE

The National Movement in Scotland. By Jack Brand. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978. 330 pp. £9·95.*

NATIONALISM is a world-wide phenomenon, yet its particular forms are often very difficult to relate to one another. Thus general theories of nationalism tend to be of limited use in explaining the nationalism of any one country

Dr. Brand has attempted to incorporate general theory in his very full account of Scottish nationalism, which replaces H. J. Hanham's *Scottish Nationalism*[1] as the principal source for students of the subject. His theorising derives from two sources: the analysis by Ernest Gellner and others of nationalist movements as ' characteristic of modernisation ', and Neil Smelser's seven stages in the development of social movements, or ' Value Added Approach '. Brand applies these theories and approaches to the history of nationalism in Scotland, and in particular to the rise of the Scottish National Party (SNP).

It is very good to have a new theoretical contribution to the subject, and at first sight it seems to be helpful. For example, it is possible to fit the various historical stages of nationalist history under the headings of Smelser's stages, such as ' structural conduciveness ', ' strain ', ' generalised belief ', and so on. These certainly seem to work, at least up to the point when things begin to go wrong for the SNP; that is, after

1 London. Faber, 1969

the book was written in 1977. For by 1978 the SNP was in decline, and the Labour Party in Scotland appeared triumphant. What stage of development was that?

Then there is ' modernisation '. Gellner associated national movements at certain points in time and in certain places as representing ' modernisation '. But would he have included the SNP in that? It seems unlikely, and it may be stretching political science a bit far to call the SNP, but not the other parties, modernising in its aims. Here, we get close to partisanship, and Dr. Brand is an SNP supporter.

In fact, the use of theory in this book is rather limited. What stands out is the author's enthusiasm for the history of the Scottish national movement, which, by the 1960s, in effect tapers down to the SNP. For although there are undoubtedly Scottish nationalists of a kind outside the SNP (in other parties and organisations), it is the SNP which now counts politically as ' nationalism '. This is ' SNP-history ', not Scottish history, for Scotland is only part-nationalist in any sense It is also political science, and will provide a reference-point for analyses of Scottish nationalism in the next ' stage of development '.

University of Glasgow JAMES G KELLAS

The French Stake in Algeria, 1945–1962. By Tony Smith. *Ithaca, London. Cornell University Press 1978 199 pp £10·50.*

PROFESSOR SMITH looks at the familiar proposition that the unworkable political system of the Fourth Republic in France made a realistic policy of decolonisation impossible, and finds it unsatisfactory as an explanation of France's failures in Algeria. Instead he ' reverses the chain of causation to maintain that it was rather an unrealistic policy, growing from what will be called the " colonial consensus " which upset and finally destroyed the Fourth Republic by dictating actions that again and again met with defeat ' (p 23)

The colonial consensus arose out of the humiliations of the Second World War It was necessary for France's self-esteem in the postwar world to insist that it was not alone, but had a vast empire behind it. General de Gaulle is to be blamed for the vehement direction of this policy, in spite of his ultimate change of view in regard to Algeria. As he said in Algiers in October 1947, ' Loyal Frenchmen . . . know that in letting our cause be threatened on this shore of the Mediterranean, it is the entire national edifice which risks dislocation ' (p 49). Because of this close identification of French and imperial interests it was impossible to accept the need for withdrawal even after fighting had begun. In fact the worse the situation became in Algeria the more France's guilt drove it on to feel that it must protect both its sovereignty and its obligation to Algeria.

Professor Smith discusses the historical roots of this commitment, and in his perceptive fourth chapter he analyses the complete failure of France to give educational and economic opportunities to Moslem Algerians. He points out how successive French governments of all political views accepted the consensus in spite of a series of colonial conferences from Brazzaville onwards which pointed out the inconsistencies of the policy. Visitors to Algeria, like President Auriol in 1948, persistently saw signs of affection and loyalty in the country. Prime Minister Guy Mollet could feel, even after the war of independence was well under way, that the chief worry of those in Algeria was that France would abandon them to supposed economic decline. The politicians could feel that they had public opinion behind them as a public opinion poll in 1957 showed (p. 152).

It is not clear what ' colonial consensus ' meant in relation to colonial populations. Did it really mean the French settlers alone, or, as is implied, the whole population, French and Moslem? Were the postwar French governments consistent in their interpretation of this consensus? Professor Smith has perhaps not pushed his inquiry as far as it could go, but the book shows clearly how rewarding a new standpoint can be in re-assessing familiar material.

University of Aberdeen ANN WILLIAMS

People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975. By Willy Brandt. Trans. by J. Maxwell Brownjohn. *London: Collins. 1978. 524 pp. £8 95.*

THE first volume of Dr. Brandt's memoirs, *Begegnungen und Einsichten*, was issued in 1976. This English version (a good one) is not a straight translation of the original; a number of aspects of the German political scene have been omitted, and additional stress laid on matters of special concern to the British and American publics. The span of the work remains, however, the same—from the building of the Wall in 1961, when he was still Mayor of Berlin, to his resignation from the Federal Chancellorship in 1974: an eventful and formative period alike for Germany, for Europe and for East-West relations

As such, it can hardly fail to engage a wider than professional interest, even if the numerous accounts of journeys, prècis of conferences and conversations, and the inclusion of a fair amount of already familiar material may lessen its appeal to the general reader; as also could a certain blandness of tone resulting perhaps from a combination of Brandt's habitual discretion, his tolerance (including magnanimity towards political opponents) and a generally *bien pensant*, even at times conventional, outlook—not to speak of the constraints of the tightrope which his country's situation has obliged him to walk.

A British reader may be struck, if not perhaps wholly surprised, by the paucity of reference to this country, as also by Brandt's reticence towards his fellow-Socialists here, despite his statement that ' the network of contacts and friendships that linked me with the island became stronger and more close knit as the years went by ' Although a known and persistent champion of British entry into the European Community, he allows himself the comment, ' Of course it may be asked why the British themselves took so long to join The likelihood is that their economic crisis would have been mitigated by an earlier link with the Community By the time they secured admission, their problems were accumulating fast. On the other hand, and with all due respect, I found that the British are not easy partners. The loss of their role as a world power came hard to them ' Not that his disappointments have been confined to Britain ' Scandinavia's European links were of special concern to me, and not only because my years there had left an enduring mark. They also preoccupied me because of my belief that these countries have much to contribute to European co-operation . . . Nevertheless, opposing tendencies soon made themselves felt . . The Norwegians were haunted by a pietistic teetotaller's nightmare that the Common Market might oblige them to become wine-drinkers, and that their girls would be carried off by swarthy southerners '

Of British politicians, Heath appears chiefly to evoke his regard, and not just because of the coincidence of their premierships Before that, his British opposite number as foreign minister was George Brown, of whom he quotes ' the perplexing and disillusioning plea, " Willy, you must get us in so that we can take the lead " ': and a little later adds an unfamiliar detail: ' It was typical of his endearing and somewhat eccentric personality that he liked to deliver late-night harangues about

religious matters . . . Shadow-boxing, as it were, he did battle on behalf of Catholicism, which he considered the only road to salvation. ' On another Labour leader, Gaitskell, he observes that ' despite his insularity, which was of imperial dimensions, he possessed uncommon intellectual and political gifts ' (pp. 160-165).

Over and above its intrinsic value for the historian, the book presents the persona of a sympathetic figure; a man of courage as well as charm; a doer and a pragmatist (rather perhaps than a deep or original thinker); and—whatever the eventual verdict on his policies and achievements, which is not within the scope of a short review—a statesman of fundamentally civilised instincts and intentions. One looks forward to the promised second volume dealing with his earlier years.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

The Distorted Image: German Jewish Perceptions of Germans and Germany, 1918-1935. By Sidney M. Bolkosky *New York, Oxford, Amsterdam· Elsevier 1975. 247 pp. $10.95.*

WHILE this study deals with domestic political developments in Germany, its subject matter should be of interest to students of international affairs since those political developments ultimately confronted Europe and the world with a human and moral problem of such magnitude that neither contemporary society or politicians, nor later historians for that matter, could deal with it adequately. The sub-title gives the clue to the book's content: how the German Jews saw political developments in Germany after 1918 and, more importantly, how they saw their own place and role in German society in the years following the traumatic defeat of 1918. The author has, in the main, based his study largely on the journal of the largest German Jewish organisation, the *Centralverein für deutsche Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens,* the *C.V Zeitung*

Although not an over-exciting book to read, it is well worth examination by those who wish to know more about the attitudes and thinking (within the time scale chosen by the author) of the community destined to become the first victims of Hitler's racial theories once he had the authority and power of the state behind him. Indeed, the author has done a great service to students of twentieth-century Germany because relatively little is still known about how the Jews in Germany--and indeed in many other countries both before and during the war—perceived the rise to power of Hitler and the Nazi Party.

In the main, Bolkosky finds that the German Jews failed to perceive the true evil of Hitler and Nazism, as the epitome of the *völkisch* and anti Semitic movement, for a combination of two reasons: nearly all continuously professed deep allegiance to ' Germany ', whatever the regime, simply because it was their homeland; and, secondly, despite the extremes of these rightist movements, placed their faith for a secure life in Germany in the well-springs and traditions of German *Kultur*, which, as they saw it, sprang from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. Part of the Jewish reaction to anti Semitism was therefore ' obsessive assertions of German identity—national and cultural ' (p. 67), but this in fact highlighted the essential dilemma of the German Jew: ' it assumed that the Enlightenment values of scientific, rational understanding were equally respected and acknowledged by all Germans ' (p. 107). Not all Germans did, of course, and this misconception assumed its most serious proportions with regard to the continued existence of the Weimar Republic, that ' liberal-bourgeois-democratic-Jewish-bolshevik ' creature so detested by all the right-wing parties of post-1918 Germany. By defending the Republic which guaranteed their civil rights, the Jews additionally made themselves the target of all

anti-democratic and anti-republican forces. In the final analysis, however, Bolkosky believes that the German Jews were unable, or unwilling, to see, or rather grasp, what was happening around them: ' this stubborn clinging to identification with Germans . . . was so firmly and deeply rooted in German Jews that most refused to relinquish their identification with German archetypes even after the National Socialist victory of 1933, indeed until 1935 or even 1938 ' (p. 163). Ultimately, this identification proved fatal because ' it blocked out any critical view of reality ' (p 189).

JOHN P. FOX

Nazi Ideology Before 1933: A Documentation Introd and trans by Barbara Miller Lane and Leila J. Rupp. *Manchester. Manchester University Press. 1978 180 pp. Index. £6·95.*

THIS modest but useful little book represents an attempt to redirect attention to ideology as a central feature of Nazism. Ideology has been even-handedly neglected by Marxists, who regard Nazism as a manifestation of capitalist imperialism, and by Anglo-Saxon pragmatists, who see in Hitler a power-crazed opportunist with a talent for propaganda. Neither group can satisfactorily explain how in seven short years (1925–32) Nazism became a mass movement, defeating the traditional Right, as well as the Social Democrats and Communists in free elections This book has the merit of assembling documents, hitherto available only in German, as well as reviewing the secondary literature; it would be even more valuable if it included a bibliography.

What one misses in the introduction by Professor Lane is her definition of ideology, which is merely related to ' large scale political and cultural change ' (p xxv). This is hardly adequate, especially in connection with a movement aiming to put the clock back. Nor does she examine the question whether what we mean today by ideology is the same as what Hitler, who did not use the word, meant by *Weltanschauung* The latter was an all embracing attitude to life, into which could be slotted particular policies relating to agriculture, race relations, and so on Because the co-authors do not recognise this, they concentrate unduly on short-term programmes, mainly concerning the economy. It is useful to have these documents, if only to remind us how radical were some of the proposals of Feder, the Strassers and the young Goebbels; but Rosenberg, who, like Hitler and Himmler, was not much interested in economics, gets short shrift. There are no excerpts from his two main books *Der Mythus des 20 Jahrhunderts* and *Der Zukunftsweg deutscher Aussenpolitik*. Nor is there any mention of the excerpts published in 1970 by Professor R Pois and drawn chiefly from *Der Mythus* [1]

The picture is therefore sketchier than it would have been if the co authors had trawled more widely and also extended their survey beyond 1933. The Nazis, once in power, developed aspects of their ideology, for example, in their euthanasia, and anti religious campaigns, which had no voter appeal and had been masked in earlier years. One should, however, be grateful that a start has been made with these documents, and hope that a further volume will follow.

University of Reading R. CECIL

1 *Alfred Rosenberg Selected Writings* Ed R Pois London Cape 1970

Documenten betreffende de buitenlandse politiek van Nederland, 1919–1945. Periode A: 1919-1930. Deel 1: 1 juli 1919-1 juli 1920; Deel 2: 1 juli 1920-31 augustus 1921. Edited by J. Woltring. Periode C: 1940–1945. Deel 1: 10 mei–31 oktober 1940; Deel 2: 1 november 1940-31 mei 1941. Edited by A F. Manning and A. E. Kersten. *Den Haag: Nijhoff 1976 and 1977. (Rijks Geshiedkundige Publication Grote Serie)*

THE volumes under review are the first four to appear in a new project commissioned by the *Rijkscommissie voor de Vaderlandse Geschiedenis*. The aim is to produce a comprehensive selection of documents illustrating the evolution of Dutch foreign policy between 1919 and 1945. The volumes will be grouped into four sub-series: the first (A) covering the period 1919-30; the second (B), 1930-40; the third (C), 1940-45; and the fourth (D), containing materials relevant to the central theme from archives outside the Netherlands. The first four volumes published cover the earliest phases of periods A and C. Work has begun on period B, but so many important papers from the 1930s were destroyed or lost in May 1940 that the task of reassembling, let alone editing, the archives is bound to be a difficult and lengthy one.

For periods A and C, by contrast, the official archives are almost embarrassingly rich and the sheer wealth of materials available has clearly encouraged the editors to plan on a grand scale. Whereas their Belgian counterparts needed only five volumes to illustrate Belgian foreign policy throughout the whole of the interwar period, the Dutch editors have produced four enormous volumes, each six hundred or more pages long, covering little more than three years altogether. Such, however, is the breadth of their interests and the wide variety of sources which (quite rightly) they consider appropriate for inclusion, that it would be churlish to criticise them for publishing too much. They have in fact made a decisive break with the format usually followed in official publications of diplomatic documents In the first place, although the bulk of the collection comes from the Dutch Foreign Office, they have also made ample use of material from departmental archives and, where appropriate, from the private papers and diaries of cabinet ministers or senior officials. Secondly, they have broken loose from any tendency to equate ' foreign policy ' with ' high policy '. The documents published in these volumes cover not only such problems as the Dutch attitude towards the League of Nations or the Versailles Peace Treaty, but also the detailed negotiations with or about such important private or semi private institutions as the major Dutch multinationals or KLM. The end product is extremely impressive, and it is to be hoped that as several other European governments prepare to publish fresh series of documents on their external policies since 1945, those concerned will take heed of the standards set by their Dutch colleagues.

The first four volumes deal with two phases in each of which ministers and officials were obliged, because of circumstances almost totally beyond their control, to carry out a far-reaching reappraisal of the foundations of Dutch foreign policy. In the volumes covering 1919-21, the Dutch are seen coming to terms with a world dominated by an alliance to which they had not belonged and by some of whose members, notably the French and the Belgians, they were profoundly distrusted A recurrent theme is the extremely bad relationship between the Netherlands and Belgium in the aftermath of the First World War; another, the constant hope, which in the end was fulfilled, that Anglo-American rivalry, or Anglo-French discord about the treatment of Germany, would allow the neutral Dutch some room for manoeuvre. There is also invaluable material on the early history of the League of Nations and on the diplomacy and politics of the small states who later formed the Oslo Group. In the years dealt with in these volumes, moves in the direction of co-operation between these countries were severely handicapped by Dutch-Belgian antipathies and Dutch (and to a certain extent Swedish) discontent with Norwegian claims to sovereignty

over Spitzbergen. Finally, and by no means least, mention ought to be made of the abundant documentation covering Dutch interests in the Far East.

Alliance problems also loom large in the other pair of volumes, dealing with the twelve months following the German invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940, but in this case the Dutch ministers and officials were obliged to adjust to the demands, inconveniences and opportunities of an alliance which, even though it did not yet dominate Europe, let alone the world, was increasingly the filter through which they as members had to see both the world and Europe. The first of the war-time volumes throws fresh light on the internal debate within the government-in-exile about how far the decision to side with the British and French in May 1940 was irreversible. But once, with the departure of de Geer, the possibility of compromise with the New Order ceased to hold any interest for the principal figures in the Dutch administration, the focus switches to the problems of participating in an alliance in which, for the period covered by these volumes at least, the British were the undisputed leaders. The Dutch role in alliance politics during this early phase, whether in connection with military co-operation, the gold negotiations or longer-term planning for the relief of liberated Europe, stood in marked contrast to that played by the Belgians. Exasperated British officials sometimes attributed the idiosyncrasies of Dutch behaviour to the obstinacy which was allegedly a hallmark of the national character, but a more objective explanation of their independence is to be found in their possession of a significant Empire which gave them considerable bargaining power, not only in London, but still more perhaps in Washington. The numerous documents dealing with the Far East which also, it need hardly be said, contain much of interest to those concerned with the special problems of the Far East itself in the crucial period 1940–41, form an indispensable counterpoint to the papers dealing more specifically with Europe.

One final note: although a knowledge of Dutch is essential for a detailed study of these documents, the editors have also provided extensive summaries in English of every document in the collection. These summaries are printed separately at the beginning of each volume and are also available in offprint form. It is yet another sign of the care and thoroughness with which this project has been planned.

European University Institute, Florence PETER LUDLOW

Die Parteien in der Schweiz: Geschichte, neue Forschungsergebnisse, aktuelle Probleme. 2nd rev. edn. By Erich Gruner. *Bern: Francke. 1977. 351 pp. (Helvetia Politica, Series B Vol. IV.) Pb: Sw.frs 34.00.*

Die Schweiz in der Sicht des Auslandes: Ein Forschungsbericht über die politikwissenschaftliche Literatur des Auslandes zum politischen System der Schweiz. By François Da Pozzo. *Bern: Francke 1977. 256 pp. (Helvetia Politica, Series B Vol. XI.) Pb: Sw.frs. 36.00.*

Aufstellung und Auswahl der Kandidaten bei den Nationalratswahlen in der Schweiz: am Beispiel der Wahlen von 1971. By Erich Gruner, Martin Daetwyler and Oscar Zosso. *Bern: Forschungszentrum für schweizerische Politik. 1975. 502 pp. Mimeographed. (Available from Eidg. Drucksachen-und Materialzentrale, 3000 Bern.)*

THE first two of these books belong to a series which has now produced seventeen volumes. These demand the attention of all who are interested in the central parliament and administration of Switzerland, and the attendant pressure groups and parties. The Institute which fathers them, the *Forschungszentrum für Geschichte und Soziologie der schweizerischen Politik*, at the University of Berne, should also be known. Its central instrument is an incomparable press cutting library.

The first edition (1969) of Erich Gruner's study of Swiss political parties was a landmark, and a brilliant success. Hitherto, there had only been available a vast, scattered, and in various ways unsatisfactory literature dealing with this and that party or canton. The titles of the more usable of these are collected in the bibliography here. As regards the existing, fully proportionalised, Swiss political structure, Gruner's book-length study of the whole field of political party, central and local, contemporary and historical, was a new creation that had had no predecessor.

In performing such a task, rough edges are always left. Tiny mistakes dog all writings on Switzerland, even those by Swiss. The misplacement of a single letter in a German word in the first edition had attributed ' a strict system of censorship ' to Britain up till 1918. This is now corrected to ' a strict property qualification for voting '. Details like this are corrected in this second edition, which is otherwise in the main a photographic reproduction as far as about page 180; thereafter it becomes more and more a new work.

In one way, this is a disappointment. For example, the generalisation that ' Swiss political parties are the children of the referendum rather than of parliamentary government ', an insight which has become accepted and transforms the perspective of political history, needs now to have more compelling evidence adduced than the ambiguous example of a referendum in St. Gallen in 1834. This generalisation is connected with another claim, that mass political parties appear in Switzerland (i.e. in the cantons) earlier than elsewhere in Europe or the United States. Only on a rather exclusive definition can this be argued. If the example of St Gallen is taken, then Gruner tells us later that the early organisation had to be rebuilt completely in 1847, 1857 and 1875, and that the present organisation only dates from 1896. This is uncommonly late, rather than early. One would have liked a rethinking and rephrasing of the earlier edition.

Furthermore, throughout the second edition we become aware that although the first edition is brought up to date, this has not been done consistently. Most statistical tables now go up to 1975 or so, but some only go up to 1967. Much more misleading, the word ' today ' sometimes refers to 1969 or a little before, sometimes to 1976 or so. (For example, on page 232, where it causes serious confusion, and page 30, where it merely annoys.) A few valuable pages of the first edition have been dropped. The first edition, however, contained 278 pages, this has 351

Of the new material the most welcome is the continuation of the narrative to the present day, and the (editorially defective) discussion of the party press, which has changed its nature in the last dozen years. The other additions include a discussion of new American methods (no doubt with an eye on the use of the book for teaching in Swiss colleges and universities); a discussion of new sources of information (especially opinion polls); and a section on the recent Swiss proposal to anchor political parties in the Federal Constitution and perhaps to finance them.

Very serious readers will need both editions. The generality of good libraries in this country must have one or the other, preferably the second one, on their open shelves; what this has lost in unity of style it has gained in contemporaneity. Professor Gruner is a scholar of stupendous achievement, and this is one of the most wide-ranging of his works.

The second book, *Switzerland seen from Abroad*, is by a former student of Gruner's, François Da Pozzo. He has written a delightful and important book, which held me fascinated throughout. His subject matter is more limited than the main title implies. It concerns only the ' scientific ' foreign literature on Swiss central government written since the 1890s. It is, by implication, addressed partly to Swiss professional students of government, who traditionally pay little attention to anything (apart from flattery) written by those not of their own nationality and language, and partly to foreign students of Swiss government, who necessarily make their first

approach through their own language and literature. These need to be told, for example, how sound Bryce is. Finally, it should be read by those who are writing, or have written, about Switzerland; the impact of a new self-consciousness is a devastating experience none of them should escape

This comes down in practice to a concentration on ' the classical ' (and dead) authors A. L. Lowell (*Government and Parties*), James Bryce (*Modern Democracies*), C. R. Brooks (both *Government and Politics* and *Civic Training*), and André Siegfried (*Démocratie-Témoin*, of course), and on other ' more modern and relatively weighty works '. These turn out to be C. J. Hughes (*Parliament*), Jean Meynaud (a copious writer, both on Vaud and on topics concerning the whole of Switzerland), Klaus Schumann (*Das Regierungssystem der Schweiz*, an excellent book, too little known here), and others (notably Gerhard Lehmbruch, Leslie Lipson, Kenneth McRae, and P. H. Coeytaux). The bibliography forms an excellent checklist for the foreign student, even if it is not as complete as it ideally could have been

Da Pozzo takes successive aspects of government (elections, Parliament, the Federal Council, pressure groups and parties, federalism, language-groups), giving first of all the normal modern Swiss political scientist's approach, and then quoting and evaluating a selection of authors relevant to the topic. Here the author's criticism is very friendly, but pertinent, and firm. For example, when Bryce in *Modern Democracies* (p. 486, p. 500) reveals that he considers Switzerland in 1919 to be overwhelmingly agricultural and pastoral, a country with no important industry or finance, and therefore having unimportant pressure groups and sedate politics, Da Pozzo remarks (p. 100) that this is ' only conditionally historically suggestive as a causative factor '. A serious library should include this book also, preferably on the open shelf adjacent to the classic and modern works mentioned.

The third book is one I should have reviewed earlier Its contents are adequately described by its title: a study of the candidates for election in the Swiss Lower House This is an important book on a neglected subject which has wide implications, like so much of Gruner's work It merits extended notice in journals more specifically concerned with parliaments.

University of Leicester C. J HUGHES

Modern Switzerland. Edited by J Murray Luck *Palo Alto, Calif SPOSS 1978 515 pp $22 00 (USA), $23.00 (elsewhere).*

Cities with Little Crime: The Case of Switzerland. By Marshall B Clinard. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978 208 pp. £8·50. Pb £3 95*

THE first of these books disclaims, but suggests, official inspiration. Apart from an introduction by the editor, who is an Emeritus Professor of Stanford University and a former science attaché at the American embassy in Berne, it is entirely the work of Swiss, many of them now or formerly in the public service. It is an unattractive production, both from the literary and visual aspects, adorned with murky photographs. It seems to be designed for the popular American market. The Editor could usefully have checked the articles for repetition. There have in the last few years been several books about Switzerland in general, and much of what is written here has recently been said by other writers in English elsewhere. Nevertheless, there are probably no English readers who could not learn something from many of these articles.

This poverty of innovation and relative lack of quality is disappointing, because the twenty-seven authors are the accredited leading experts in established positions in the country. They have about twenty pages each: this is evidently a difficult length, if one is an expert writing for a naïve audience on one's own subject, for an official sponsor. There are, nevertheless, some outstandingly good contributions, mostly by academic writers, within the field that interests this journal. These are: J. F. Aubert on the federal constitution, Erich Gruner on the political system, Luzius Wildhaber on the judicial system, Jürg Hauser on demography, and H R. Kurz on defence Other good articles are on energy, agriculture, and the economy. Several others, which cannot be listed here, are quite usable. Bonjour's article on neutrality is a return to his former anodyne apologetics. There is no article on the immigrant-worker population.

While *Modern Switzerland* makes a justifiable parade of the machinery of industrial peace—the absence of strikes, which is the foundation of Swiss working-class prosperity—*Cities with little Crime* draws attention to a feature no less honourable. This is the low incidence of urban working class crime in Switzerland, ' white collar crime ', and tax violations, on the other hand, are reckoned to be ' extensive '. The book, by an American Professor of Sociology, concentrates on trying to establish the facts: it finds that there was ' more crime in Switzerland than originally anticipated ', but that the situation was nevertheless impressively different from trends elsewhere, and in particular, crime was very significantly less than in Sweden Th. discussion of reasons for this anomaly is brief, but suggestive.

University of Leicester C. J HUGHES

Italy at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1976. Edited by Howard E Penniman. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977. 386 pp. (AEI Studies 169) Pb· $5.75.

THIS book is one of a series of studies of elections in selected democratic countries The ten contributors, most of them professors in American universities and some of them of Italian origin, are all specialists in present-day Italian politics Their subject is the last general election in Italy, held on June 20, 1976, which brought a dramatic advance of 7 2 per cent in the Communists' vote and narrowed to 4·4 per cent the gap between them and the ruling Christian Democrat Party The Christian Democrats, for their part, despite rebuffs in the divorce referendum of 1974 and the regional elections of 1975, a serious economic situation and corruption charges, managed to regain the ground lost in 1975 and so to maintain the share of the total vote— 38 8 per cent — which they had secured in the previous general election in 1972 The contributors examine in detail how these results came about

As the title of the first article, by Joseph LaPalombara, suggests, it is becoming increasingly a case of ' Hobson's Choice ' For the Christian Democrats maintained their position largely at the expense of the smaller parties which had been their partners in past coalitions since 1948. At the same time the Communists made serious inroads into the vote of the other left-wing party, the Socialist Party, whose share in the total vote dropped back to only 9·6 per cent. Gianfranco Pasquino points out that in 1946 the Socialist Party occupied one half of the leftist area and was still stronger than the Communists, and he asks whether this decline is irreversible. Among the factors taken into account are regional considerations (the Communists made big gains in the depressed South), methods of selecting parliamentary candidates (the Communists sought some innocuous seeming Independents to enhance their respectability, while the Christian Democrats had only moderate success in their search for new faces), factionalism within the parties (strong among the Christian

Democrats and Socialists, kept in check among the Communists), and the effects of the mass media on the election campaign. Foreign policy was not much of an issue in the election, although the contributors agree about the counter-productive effects of American attempts to influence the outcome.

Extensive and detailed tables add to the value of this dispassionate and well-informed symposium, in which speculations about the future, kept to a minimum, have not been seriously invalidated by the disastrous happenings of 1978.

MURIEL GRINDROD

The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece. By Nancy Crawshaw. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 447pp. £12·50.*

NANCY CRAWSHAW, who spent many years in Cyprus and Greece as a correspondent for the *Guardian*, provides a lengthy narrative of the *Enosis* campaign of the 1950s, as fought in the towns, villages and mountains of Cyprus by EOKA guerrilla bands and terrorists, and on the diplomatic front by the Greek government against a fairly stable alliance of British conservatism, determined to halt or delay the Imperial retreat, and the Turkish government, keen to exploit the many openings which Britain provided for an assertion of its claims to a decisive say in the island's future. Other aspects of the Cyprus problem during those years are also considered: the UN debates, the Nato implications, and attempts to influence American, Arab and ' anti-colonial ' opinion. Two introductory chapters survey the background before Makarios's plebiscite of January 1950, which is rightly taken as a starting-point; a 32-page postscript deals briefly with the breakdown of the 1960 constitution and the Turkish invasion of 1974.

A sentence in the preface suggests that this book is intended mainly for British readers with first hand memories of Cyprus, and this may explain several rather surprising features. An unregulated profusion of episodic detail makes it far too long and diffuse; despite some useful summaries and attempts to highlight what are seen as turning-points, there is insufficient concentration upon what was, or later became, important—or even on what, over twenty years later, is still interesting. As a result, significant developments, such as the effects of the Suez war on Britain's whole Middle Eastern position, or Makarios's move away from rigid ' self-determination ' towards accepting independence as a possible way out, in September 1958, tend to be submerged by the restless sea of incident.

The standpoint is, on the whole, one of not uncritical support for the efforts of the British, both in London and Cyprus, to cope with a problem that often seemed insoluble. The question of how far British policies, and the abrasive tactlessness and point-scoring resorted to by so many ministers in the Eden—Selwyn Lloyd—Lennox-Boyd era may have contributed to this intractability deserves more attention than it gets; in particular, the summing-up on Harding's governorship (' the main object of his mission, the restoration of law and order, had been achieved ' etc., p. 262) seems surprisingly bland.

The book is very well produced, a few slips in datings and misspellings of Turkish names apart; but much of it now has a curiously dated flavour, as though it had been written some twenty years ago.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

The Social Democratic Image of Society: A Study of the Achievements and Origins of Scandinavian Social Democracy in Comparative Perspective. By Francis G. Castles. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978. 162 pp. £5·95.*

SCANDINAVIAN Social Democratic parties have achieved a degree of success that is without parallel elsewhere in becoming the natural governing parties in their countries over the past half century. This book sets out, first, to analyse the reasons for that success and makes a thorough job of it in a refreshingly concise manner. In so doing, it will be of interest not only to specialists in the Scandinavian field but also more widely to students of comparative government. The survey is conducted in broad comparative perspective and the author does not fall into the trap of treating the parties of Denmark, Norway and Sweden as an undifferentiated unity. He could perhaps have gone further in distinguishing between them: it would, for example, have been illuminating had he followed up his comment that the Norwegian Labour Party is ' a more ardent protagonist of state regulation than the other democratic socialist parties of Scandinavia ' (p. 26), and it is arguable whether the handicaps under which the Danish Social Democrats operate are not so severe as to prevent them from being considered dominant in the same sense as the others Nevertheless, the general thesis has much going for it.

The next section of the analysis investigates what use the Social Democrats have made of their power, and in particular, whether their rule has demonstrably been of benefit to the working class Here the author gives a trenchant critique of the view that the political regime has little or no effect on social security levels or income redistribution It is at this point, well over half way through the book, that we come to the concept embodied in the main title, that of ' the Social Democratic image of society ' The thrust of the argument at this point is in part that it is inaccurate to view the Social Democrats as parties essentially de radicalised by their reformist policies. They are stated to be first and foremost class parties, and their recent increase in radicalism is held to flow naturally from their character Yet the author recognises that difficulties in maintaining consensus are likely to arise as a result of these new developments, and it can certainly be argued that the ' image ' is *changing*

The final section of the book is concerned to show, from an analysis of the origins of Social Democratic ascendancy, that the Scandinavian experience is—literally—inimitable. Again there is much of value in the analysis, but the author would be the first to admit that there is much that is controversial, in particular the blanket characterisation of parties of the Right. The point of his attack is sharper in the Thatcher era than in the Butler era, but the implications are still much too sweeping. Having said that, the general level of argument in the book is stimulating and there is certainly no shortage of ideas

University of Hull N. C. M. ELDER

Politics in High Latitudes: The Svalbard Archipelago By Willy Østreng Trans. by R. I. Christophersen. *London: C Hurst. 1978 134 pp £8·00.*

SVALBARD holds a central place in the closely related set of problems which have increasingly come to dominate and disturb Norwegian-Soviet relations since the 1960s. Yet though the new-found strategic importance of these Arctic islands—formerly known collectively as Spitsbergen—is also of considerable significance in the wider East-West context, a comprehensive study of the background to and implications of the archipelago's present status has been lacking. Mr. Østreng's useful little book, originally published in Norwegian three years ago and fully up-dated for the

English version, seeks to fill this gap. So well has he succeeded that this is likely to become a standard source for those interested in developments in Svalbard as seen from Norway—which has formal sovereignty over this remote territory straddling the 72nd parallel on Nato's northern flank.

Oddly, in view of its importance for Svalbard's rapid rise to strategic significance, the author makes little mention of the growth in the Soviet Northern Fleet, which uses the sea passage between the archipelago and the Norwegian mainland to reach the Atlantic. But otherwise the book gives a clear presentation of the peculiar regime imposed on these islands by the 1920 Treaty which awarded them to Norway—rightly characterised as ' unique ' (p. 28). Having defined a ' Svalbard model ' implicit in the Treaty terms—with elements such as internationalisation of the right of access and economic exploitation (which allows the Russians to mine coal on nominally Norwegian territory), equal treatment for subjects of Treaty signatories, demilitarisation, local use of taxes—Mr. Østreng goes on to show how Norway's lack of interest in enforcing its authority in the islands up to the early 1960s has allowed the Russians virtual autonomy there.

The difficulties involved in trying to impose Norwegian jurisdiction, now that oil exploration and fisheries developments have enhanced the economic value of the islands, are fully described; so are events in the low-key but escalating confrontation with Russia. Much good material on policy alternatives is included, though there are those who would certainly question the optimistic conclusion—which reflects the official Norwegian position—that both East and West ought to see their respective interests best served by conceding Norway's right to overall control.

R E GOODERHAM

EASTERN EUROPE

Demokratisierung in der DDR? Ökonomische Notwendigkeiten, Herrschaftsstrukturen, Rolle der Gewerkschaften 1961-1977. By Wolfgang Biermann. *Cologne. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik. 1978. 170 pp. Pb. DM 18.00.*

MUCH has been written in the German Federal Republic on economic reforms carried out in the German Democratic Republic in the 1960s and early 1970s. The debate has centred mainly around the question of whether any system of centralised economic planning and management is compatible with the dynamic development of a highly industrialised society. However, there have been fewer attempts to relate the developments in economic policy in this period to an analysis of the power structure of the GDR and to the almost continuous debate within that country on the present and future shape of socialist society, and from this analysis to draw conclusions about trends of economic and political development.

Wolfgang Biermann's scholarly and detailed book is divided into three main sections. In the first part, he painstakingly examines the theoretical literature to be found in the GDR on how socialist society should function and develop. His intention is to reveal the differences of opinion under the blanket uniformity of socialist jargon. He considers the work of a progressive and of a traditional theoretician. He then evaluates how their views on the existence and operation of objective laws under socialism lead to crucially different interpretations of the nature of democratic centralism and socialist democracy—hence of the role of the party and the state under socialism.

In the second and third sections of the book, Biermann develops some of the controversies of the first section and overlaps them with an examination of GDR policy from 1961 onwards. He aims to show the influences at work in the formation of economic policy and their inter-relations with social and political forces (the power and role of the trade union movement, decentralisation and the role of the party and so on). For example, with regard to the working of the Neue Ökonomische System der Planung und Leitung der Volkswirtschaft (NÖSPL), Biermann shows how the policy recognised objective differences in the material interests of the individual, the collective and society, but only in so far as they could be used as economic levers in the interests of the economy as a whole. This meant that workers did not have the right to enforce their own material interests themselves, nor could their trade unions for them, against the position of the omniscient and solely legitimate central leadership. He goes on to demonstrate how the actual workings of the NOSPL, which were based on a system of the scientific and technical progress of ' structure determining ' sectors of industry and on economic incentives (the profit motive), led to the subordination of social progress to economic considerations The resulting economic and social disproportionalities and social conflicts took the form of a real contradiction of interests between economic specialists and the SED leadership on the one hand and between the interests of the work force and those of factory managers and economic specialists on the other. These conflicts, Biermann argues, could not be solved by tinkering with the NÖSPL (or its modified version the Ökonomische System des Sozialismus) based as it was on a harmony of interests. Yet by the late 1960s the conflicts were a threat to economic growth. Honecker's new economic policy of total social planning was adopted as a solution and a new, more distinct role given to the trade union movement in the system of economic planning and hence in the improvement of workers' working and living conditions.

Biermann concludes that ' even a strictly centralised organised society with social ownership of the means of production like the GDR is compelled in the interest of its total rationality to put up with, in fact even to encourage criticism and the limited staging of conflicts of interests ' (p. 113) This conclusion is well supported by evidence in his book. However, it could be argued that given the book's incomplete analysis of wider aspects of the GDR's political and social system—and Biermann makes no pretensions of completeness—the author places too much emphasis on this tendency towards democratisation of the representation of interests in the material sphere.

For the future, Biermann sees the GDR leadership facing two possible alternatives in overcoming the present hindrances to total social planning and economic growth The first is that the leadership will allow the process of democratisation to continue in the interests of the development of the economy, but that this will bring into question existing bureaucratic structures and generate new conflicts. The second alternative is that the leadership will stick to bureaucratic centralism which will prevent economic growth and engender new social discontent and conflicts. Presumably the title of the book refers to the idea inherent in this tactical dilemma—that the present process of democratisation of economic decision-making may one day develop a dynamic of its own and transcend the social system of the GDR But by posing this dilemma purely in economic terms the author does perhaps have rather a narrow conception of the possible political options open to the leadership in the future.

Understandably, West Germany has an almost obsessional interest in the social system of the GDR and this is often reflected in its academic literature. Thus the most serious criticism of the book from the point of view of the non-West German reader is that it is difficult to assess objectively the significance of the debates and developments described in the book because apart from a few references to the Soviet Union and to

Romania, the author fails to include other East European democratic experiments of the period (for example, Czechoslovakia before 1968, Hungary after 1968, Yugoslavia) within his framework. Undoubtedly a wider analysis could be made, based on Biermann's method of approach.

An additional point is that the book is too condensed. The fact that one fifth of its length is devoted to some 680 footnotes placed at the back of the book makes it hard work for the reader. The criteria used for the inclusion of material in the footnotes is not always clear; important qualifications of statements and ideas contained within the text are often relegated to the smaller print at the back.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, Biermann has provided his readers with an interesting study by making all too often neglected theoretical controversies relevant to the actual development of economic policy and to the social and political structure of the GDR. Whilst the reader may not necessarily agree with the author's political stance, the wealth of detail and references contained within this short book will make it worthwhile for anyone who is either interested in the economic reforms which have taken place or who is curious about how issues and developments have to some extent been debated within the GDR.

CAROL APPLEYARD

Yugoslavia After Tito. By Andrew Borowiec *New York Praeger 1977 (Distrib by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne) 122 pp £10·25*

THE future that awaits Yugoslavia once its political creator has left the stage concerns all who care for that diverse homeland of the Southern Slavs and those who monitor shifts in the balance of strength between East and West Titoism has come to represent many things—workers' self-management, an innovative foreign policy of non alignment, a market economy combined with Marxism—and such a daring amalgam of policies must be surely based to survive their founder's death. In this slim volume Andrew Borowiec examines the factors that constitute Tito's Yugoslavia and speculates on the probability of the edifice enduring without the charisma of the partisan leader. On his reckoning, Titoism as we know it is unlikely to survive, and the future for Yugoslavia itself is uncertain.

Borowiec acknowledges that Tito has achieved much for his country, but the problems that faced him as he strove to forge a united nation were immense and Borowiec does not consider that the foundations he has laid are strong enough to guarantee survival. One test of a regime's stability is the ruling group's ability to perpetuate itself without violent succession struggles and consequent changes in policy. Borowiec does not believe that Tito has recruited into the leadership enough young men of calibre, sufficiently identified with Yugoslavia, on whose shoulders the burden of power might be placed. Only the old partisans could claim to stand for the country as a whole, and death and repeated purges have depleted their ranks Too often men of the new generation are too strongly identified with their own republics to stand as credible national leaders.

It is the need to bring together the various national groups that will be one of the greatest problems facing Tito's successors; indeed, a final solution has eluded the Old Man himself, and he has displayed no clear idea how to foster the necessary brotherhood and unity The frequent writing and rewriting of the constitution have reflected the desperate attempt to produce a viable governmental framework accommodating the aspirations and dispelling the fears of its constituent peoples.

It is against this background that Borowiec presents a succinct yet comprehensive review of the main issues in Yugoslav politics. He assesses the success of Tito's policies as well as directing his readers' attention to their likely fate once the leader is

dead. Borowiec clearly does not anticipate that much will remain, and gives as his only reason for any optimism at all the fact that Yugoslavia has already survived countless crises.

Borowiec's comments on Tito's record may seem ungenerous and his expectations for the future unduly gloomy; certainly he is sparing in his praise. But in passing judgment on Tito himself he is not entirely negative. The task Tito assumed was impossibly difficult, and he recognises him as a man of stature. What Tito needed, says Borowiec, ' was a different country, devoid of Yugoslavia's internal and external pressures, nationalist feuds, and the omnipresent concern with how to avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union ' (p. 9).

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Socialist Albania since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments By Peter R Prifti. *Cambridge, Mass, London: MIT Press 1978 311 pp (Studies in Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution 23) £14 00*

THIS is a collection of self-contained essays dealing with some selected aspects of Albania's domestic and external policies since the Second World War, preceded by a brief historical introduction and an account of the communist seizure of power. Such treatment might perhaps be appropriate for countries whose postwar history has been amply explored But Albania is not one of them Because of the shortage of serious studies on the country, what is badly needed in its case is a survey of postwar events coupled with close analysis and interpretation.

As several of Mr Prifti's essays have appeared in American periodicals, the book bears the marks of prior separate publication Hence it lacks that sense of sequence and unity normally provided by straight narrative One by product of this is the omission of a number of important developments which have shaped the outlook and policies of Enver Hoxha's regime during the past thirty years or so The book, for instance, does not describe the political and military structures which the Italian and then the German occupation armies had set up in Albania during the last war: the communist and non-communist resistance units are thus made to appear as though they had operated in a political vacuum. Other topics also ignored altogether are the part played by several British officers attached to the Albanian resistance movement; the presence of British and American official missions in the country during the early postwar years and their failure to establish diplomatic relations with the communist regime; the Corfu Channel disaster of 1946, when two British warships struck mines, suffering heavy casualties; the joint British-American attempt (betrayed by the Soviet agent Kim Philby) to subvert the Albanian regime in 1949-53

But with all these serious omissions, the book does contain a good deal of well documented information about other postwar developments This is particularly true of the sections dealing with economic policy and foreign trade, the emancipation of women, the Chinese-inspired cultural revolution of 1966-69, the banning of religious practices, the running battle between the Communist Party and the intelligentsia, the military establishment. Although Mr Prifti sheds a good deal of light on these matters and is highly critical of Enver Hoxha's Stalinist policies and methods of rule, he sometimes sticks so close to Albanian official sources that he does not give himself enough room to subject their claims to rigorous scrutiny or explain the true motives behind the overblown rhetoric of the Albanian leaders. By accepting somewhat uncritically, for example, the official version of the wartime resistance movement's relations with the people (pp 16-17), the communist partisans are depicted as spotless angels and their non-communist counterparts as unmitigated demons. When

discussing the anti-religious campaign of 1967, Mr. Prifti quotes with approval Hoxha's statement that the Albanians have never been very attached to religion (p. 157). Apart from being patently unhistorical, such a sweeping generalisation, made in this particular context, comes dangerously close to saying that no great harm has been done by the most brutal religious persecution of postwar Europe.

The book also devotes a chapter to the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. This is a useful contribution to the understanding of a group of people whose influence is likely to grow not only within the Yugoslav federation but on Yugoslav-Albanian relations as well

ANTON LOGORECI

MIDDLE EAST

The Zionist Revolution: A New Perspective By Harold Fisch. *London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1978. 197pp £8 50*

THE author, a professor at the religious university Bar Ilan, Tel Aviv, and a co-founder of the ' Land of Israel Movement ' (1967), holds that the Jewish national movement has been rooted from the beginning in paradox. On the one hand, it aimed at overcoming the abnormality of the Jewish situation through the creation of a Jewish state. This had been the gist of Theodor Herzl's brochure *Der Judenstaat* (1896) and remained the dominating idea until the establishment of the State of Israel. It was essentially a secular national ideology—liberal or socialist—comparable to any other national movement of that era, and it seemed to justify the assumption that through the state, Israel would ultimately become ' like all other nations '

On the other hand, there was from the start (and this has become increasingly strong) an awareness that Israel's ideological identification with the Western Liberal tradition was a fallacy; that Zionism—far from obliterating all differences—is re affirming the special character and uniqueness of the Jewish people; that the roots of Zionism are spiritual, and that ' Israel reborn ' will not be a nation like others, but again ' a people that dwells alone ' (Numbers 23·9) Professor Fisch fully identifies himself with this vision and proclaims that ' the return to Zion ' can only be understood in the language of ' the Jewish myth ' (p 7), *i e* in religious terms. He sees the central force of the movement in the Covenant of Mount Sinai which consecrates Israel's religious destiny and creates the triad of relationships: God, land, and people (p 20).

It is difficult to assess, for the benefit of the outside world, a view which is based on myth and revelation But even from within, and on its own terms, the book leaves important questions unanswered. It fails to address itself to those Jewish thinkers who are no less orthodox and profound than Professor Fisch, but who hold different views from his, in particular in pointing out that the Divine promise of the land to the Jewish people did not prevent their repeated expulsion from it. In addition, Professor Fisch does not ask whether the religious *right* to the land implies a religious *obligation* towards the non-Jewish population Indeed, the basic chapter of the book—The Covenant—contains only one reference to the non Jewish population in the two words ' hostile strangers ' (p 21). Throughout, the author tries to elevate the political conflict into the sacred sphere, but he gives no indication how the sacred history of Israel is to be related to the allegedly profane history of the other nations. The future of the State of Israel, however, may well depend on this issue.

WALTER ZANDER

Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question 1917–1925. By Neil Caplan. *London. Cass. 1978. 268 pp. £11·00.*

The Wiener Library Bulletin. 1978 Vol. XXXI. New series nos. 45/46. (Special issue on the Palestine Problem.)

DR. CAPLAN'S tightly-packed study, well-written if rather apt to reiterate the same unsurprising arguments, starkly illustrates the fundamental ambiguities contained in the Balfour Declaration. As the Jewish settlers rather understandably saw it, Britain, speaking for world opinion and for history, had given them a charter that proclaimed the paramountcy of their interests in Palestine; the ' National Home ' meant a ' Jewish Commonwealth ', to be created by the building up of their numbers into a decisive majority. Until that could be done it was the duty of the British to assist in every way; to have no truck with ideas of self-determination, to repress native hostility ruthlessly and make the Palestine Arabs acquiesce in the fate determined for them by showing them that there was no chance whatever of averting it. The characteristic attitude of the British was that they were there to hold the ring; the Jews should make use of the great opportunity they had been given to persuade the Arabs, by tactful behaviour and moderate language, that the National Home would really benefit them. Not until July 1922 was the Declaration given any really authoritative gloss, and the Churchill White Paper and preamble to the Mandate in some ways compounded the uncertainties.

At times the reader may find it hard not to be reminded of the more or less contemporary struggle over paramountcy in Kenya. Certainly much of the intra-*Yishuv* discussion was strongly flavoured by the conventional white-settler rhetoric of the time: the Arab understands and respects force and firmness; apparent opposition is really the work of a few venal *effendis* or outside agents; colonial officials are lamentably weak-kneed; economic benefits will in time blunt the force of nationalist aspirations, and so on. This is not the whole story. Some believed that positive ' Arab work ' in the shape of financial aid to peasants, technological advice, help in organising trade unions, or the sponsoring of a politically moderate ' Muslim National Association ', was essential, and tried hard to promote it. H. M. Kalvaryski deserves to be remembered as the most persistent advocate of this line. Occasional lone voices recommended a bi-national approach; in 1923 Yosef Castel, a Palestine-born journalist, suggested that Balfour should be asked to re-issue his Declaration in a form guaranteeing Arab national rights as well as Jewish. But very few prominent Jews, it seems clear, believed in the efficacy of such efforts. As early as June 1919 Ben Gurion had told the Provisional Council of the Jews of Palestine: ' there is no solution to this question. No solution! There is a gulf, and nothing can fill this gulf . . . We, as a nation, want this country to be *ours*; the Arabs, as a nation, want this country to be *theirs* ' (p. 42).

The eight articles in the Wiener Library Bulletin's special number include one by Dr Caplan, ' Britain, Zionism and the Arabs 1917–1925 ' that draws on material not used in his book. The other items, all of high quality, include contributions by two Israeli scholars whose recent books have been widely and favourably reviewed, ' Palestinian and Pan-Arab Nationalism 1918–1939 ' by Yehoshua Porath, and ' Why Britain Left: the end of the Mandate ' by Michael J. Cohen. It makes a useful symposium, but surely the puzzling, not to say provocative, map on the cover needs explanation?

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

The Economic Case for Palestine. By Elias H. Tuma and Haim Darin-Drabkin. *New York: St. Martin's Press. 1978. 126 pp. $15.95*

AN Arab and an Israeli have joined forces to prepare this brief analysis of the economic prospects for Palestine after independence. The authors assume that any future state of Palestine will comprise the West Bank, occupied territories and the Gaza Strip, but will probably exclude East Jerusalem, which would become part of a unified Jerusalem with status as an international city or as an autonomous open city. The cold precision of the authors in delimiting the possible future boundaries of an independent Palestine sets the tone of impartiality which pervades the entire book and cuts the discussion loose from the emotional and political anchors that normally constrain sensible deliberations concerning a future Palestinian state.

The new Palestine is foreseen as a country of 2·1 million persons by 1980, when the Gross National Product would stand at some $1,689 million, and the authors suggest that, relative to other states in the region, the new state may be expected to meet their criteria of economic viability. Much of the economic dynamic would, in the early years, derive from a forecast boom in construction as returnees are housed and as stability encourages improvements in existing housing stock. Agriculture would be expected to be the main employer, though such a situation could only be made possible by provision of much augmented water supplies through more intensive use of surface and sub-surface water bodies in the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea coastal area. The calculations made in this study on availability of land and water assume that the new Palestinian farmers would show skills in irrigation and cultivation at least equivalent to those currently prevalent in Israel but rarely found in the Arab states: such an assumption might be severely tested should a Palestinian state materialise.

The authors, with far greater honesty than may be found in most other reviews of the prospects for an independent Palestine, look closely at the economic benefits and costs of the integration of the new state with adjacent countries, and notably with Jordan and Israel. They conclude that any form of integration of a new Palestine state with either Jordan or Israel would be to its economic detriment. It is suggested that Palestine could afford to co-operate economically with its neighbours only at the level of project integration, which they see as harmless and beneficial. The case that is presented is brief but profoundly sensible within an economic context The only important area that is ignored is the probable benefit to a new state from remittances from Palestinians abroad; it seems a mistake to assume that the Palestinian diaspora will act differently from its Israeli and Jordanian equivalents and fail to provide a fluctuating but useful flow of foreign exchange income.

Many will dismiss this study as unrealistic since it so determinedly turns its face against the political aspects which appear to dominate speculation on the form of any new Palestinian state Yet the burden of argument in this volume is highly persuasive and gives a timely warning that political identity has little meaning without economic independence and short term national economic viability

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

Peace in the Middle East: Superpowers and Security Guarantees By David Astor and Valerie Yorke *London Transworld Publishers (Corgi Books). 1978. 174 pp Pb £1 95.*

THIS book will be of interest to a rather wider audience than the title might suggest. Its proposals for a system of security guarantees to underwrite a comprehensive peace settlement are important not only for those involved with the future of the Middle East, but also for anybody concerned with the evolution of international peacekeeping

and the development of relations between the super-powers. As the subtitle indicates, David Astor and Valerie Yorke believe that a viable system of guarantees requires the long-term involvement of both super-powers. They thus reject the view which has sometimes appeared to dominate American thinking, that the Soviet Union can be excluded from a peace settlement. On the contrary, they call for a broad degree of super-power co-operation extending to the establishment of an eventual Permanent Standing Arms Control Committee to oversee and control the supply of arms to the Middle East. At the same time, however, the authors are opposed to the deployment of American or Soviet combat forces as part of the settlement, arguing that any super-power presence should be confined to civilian personnel operating surveillance systems to give both Israel and its Arab neighbours warning against surprise attack.

This leaves the tasks of providing military contingents for peacekeeping forces to European and Third-World countries. In Sinai and on the Golan Heights where there are clear geographical features dividing the two parties but no overlapping populations, these could continue to operate under United Nations auspices. The West Bank, however, presents a much more complex problem. The authors believe that a Palestinian entity—their term—would have to be demilitarised, although light arms would be allowed for internal security purposes. Given the need therefore to provide security for both Israel and the Palestinian entity, they propose the establishment of a new international guarantor force, whose job would be to prevent the entry of illegal arms as well as both terrorist and reprisal raids. To be effective, such a force, described as a Border Guard, must be assured of a long-term mandate—fifteen years in the first instance—and must also be empowered to use force where necessary. As neither of these requirements is likely to be fulfilled under the auspices of the United Nations, the authors argue that the Border Guard should come under the jurisdiction of an international control commission to be created under a Middle East peace treaty. This would be a broadly-based organisation, co-chaired by the two super-powers, with the commander of the Border Guard coming from a non-aligned country

Although progress towards devising security arrangements for Sinai has been made since the book went to press, the Camp David accords and the controversy which has surrounded the 'Framework of Peace in the Middle East' suggest that implementation of many of these proposals is still some years off. This may be as well The system of guarantees outlined will require a degree of regional trust and confidence which is still conspicuously absent, and the super-powers will have to make important decisions about the contentious question of their future relations outside Europe. Is Washington, for example, willing to accept parity with the Soviet Union as a Middle East power? Would the kind of co-operation the authors envisage in this region provide a precedent for relations in, say, Africa, or might the Arab-Israeli conflict become insulated from developments elsewhere in the Third World, just as the SALT negotiations have been? While the authors cogently argue that such co-operation would be both desirable and feasible, their analysis, particularly in the sections on arms control, underlines just how difficult some of these ideas are going to be to put into practice. That having been said, it seems unlikely, as the authors clearly recognise, that a long-term solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be devised without innovatory methods of international peacekeeping. The great strength of this book lies in the way it combines an overall framework for such an Arab-Israeli security system with a grasp of military and political detail. Chapters 5 and 6 should be read with particular attention, preferably with access to a large-scale topographical map of the Golan Heights and the West Bank.

PETER MANGOLD

Iran: The Illusion of Power. By Robert Graham. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 228 pp. £7·95.*

IT is pure chance whether books whose subject matter erupts upon publication into an international crisis are actually any good. It is, then, nice to note that Robert Graham's book is a welcome introduction to the Iran of 1978—a year in which the Shah's hold on his throne seemed more precarious than in any year since 1953. It is by no means a definitive study, but it is a wide-ranging, sensitively-observed analysis of the forces at work within Iran, as seen through the eyes of a *Financial Times* correspondent who was based in Tehran from 1975 to 1977. It is also a brave book, in that most recent Western commentators on Iran (apparently including the intelligence community) have chosen not to probe too deeply into the soft under-belly of the Shah's regime—the corruption close to the throne and the widespread alienation of much of the populace. In the best journalistic tradition, the writer has not been intimidated by the knowledge that his book would make him powerful enemies in Iran. For showing such independence of spirit, he deserves the extra sales that the continuing Iranian crisis will undoubtedly have brought him.

The book falls into three parts. In the first, Graham traces the political and economic background to modern Iran. His analysis is not particularly original and rests quite heavily on the standard academic authorities. He tells the history of the Pahlavi dynasty, describes the rise of the oil industry and the relatively weak manufacturing sector and points to the rapid growth of the cities at the expense of the rural sector. The middle section deals with the major planning decisions taken in the hectic years since the oil-price explosion of late 1973 He is particularly good on the background to the hasty decision in mid 1974 virtually to double the scale of the fifth five-year plan. He then goes on to chronicle how the emerging bottlenecks taught the Shah and his planners that developmental problems cannot be overcome purely by throwing money at them

Graham concludes his book with an analysis of the system of power under the Shah. He points out how this revolved round the ruler himself, and in an interesting chapter he discusses how the royal family managed its considerable wealth through devices such as the Pahlavi Foundation. He then goes on to look at the relative influence of different institutions and individuals at the next level down. The prime minister's office, the Rastakhiz Party, the Judiciary, the Imperial Court, SAVAK and the military all get well covered. The same is true of topics such as Iranian nationalism, the role of religion and the plight of the universities.

This is in general a fair book, which does not waste too much time on indignant rhetoric, but looks closely at the reasons behind the Shah's failings, such as his over-emphasis on the military sector and his total inability to decentralise political decision-making Perhaps Graham emphasises rather too much the economic waste of the mid-1970s (I doubt if the record of most OPEC members is much better for these years). And he might have given more space to considering how the international community comes to terms either with a post-Shah era in which leadership will pass to a generation which knows what it rejects, but has been starved of the political experience which will permit it to reach a peaceful consensus about where the nation should go next

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State. By J. E. Peterson. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble 1978. 286 pp. £9·95.*

THE surge of change and development which has swept over the Sultanate of Oman since the coup of 1970 brought an era of stagnation to a dramatic close, has had its counterpart in a spate of recent books on the country. Mr. Peterson's work is one of the more scholarly of these, the author taking as his subject the tangled story of Omani politics in the twentieth century, although covering, where necessary, events and personalities of the nineteenth century and before.

The book is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with the perennial themes of Omani political history: the dynasty, the administration, the politics of the tribes, and the impact of the outside world—which for most of the period largely meant Britain or British India. In the second part the author explores the various challenges which have threatened the Sultanate under the Al Bu Sa'id dynasty: the Imamate movement of the interior and tribal separatism, the Arab nationalist-backed rebellion in the Jebel Akhdar in the 1950s, and the much more serious revolt in Dhofar in the 1960s and 1970s—highly ideological and fed from South Yemen.

It was his ultimate inability to provide an answer to these challenges as much as the frustration produced by his ultra-conservatism and parsimony in an oil-booming economy that eventually led to the downfall of Sa'id bin Taimur, hitherto the most considerable figure amongst the Sultans of the present century.

The author has admirably disentangled the complex dynastic and tribal politics which characterised the old regime and throws much light on the various personalities, both Omani and British, that were involved in the country's internal and external relations. He is weakest, and slightest, on the current regime of Sultan Qaboos, and his book needs to be supplemented by John Townsend's *Oman The Making of a Modern State*[1] for the reader to get a full, critical picture of the political and economic state of the country in the 1970s.

Nevertheless this is an important work, conveying a wealth of information both in the text, the notes (which should never have been put at the ends of chapters), and the excellent appendices of genealogies, office holders and budgetary data. The reader may find the Library of Congress system of Arabic transliteration unfamiliar and pedantic (rather as though the alphabet had had an affair with the Morse Code) and it is curious that in so well-researched a volume the jacket photograph should have been described as showing Muscat and Fort Jelali, whereas it is in fact of the fort and town of Muttrah.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth BRIAN PORTER

AFRICA

Politics in Africa. By Dennis Austin. *Manchester Manchester University Press. 1978 202 pp. £7 50 Pb £2 50.*

TO present the politics of post-colonial Africa in six lectures to an audience of laymen is a formidable task. Dennis Austin brings to it the sure knowledge that can pick an example from any part of the continent to illustrate a point; a critical detachment from the clichés that name scapegoats for every unsatisfactory state of affairs; and, as a bonus, a taste for throwaway quotations that is a joy to the reader who is on his wavelength

1 London Croom Helm, 1977 Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1978, p 521

Having been in the business long enough to remember the hopes of the first postwar years, hopes shared with African nationalists by their sympathisers in the metropolitan countries, Austin does not dismiss these, as younger writers tend to do, as myths created to put a face on surrender to the inevitable. They were no more so than today's myth of salvation from the rejection of dependency. Nevertheless, his first chapter is entitled ' The Fallacies of Hope ' It begins with the failure of the ' Westminster model '. Then there was a belief that ballot-box support for a nationalist party equalled a sense of nationality that would override local and ethnic differences; and the even more mistaken belief in the possibility of a continent-wide African union. Blanket explanations of these disappointments, he notes, with special reference to systems analysis and dependency theory, break down as soon as one considers the diversity of the actual states to which they are applied.

Regions have their characteristic features, however, and he treats in turn of western, eastern, central and southern Africa. The last presents today's most agonising problem, one quite different from that of the territories which dealt directly, by negotiation or war, with European rulers. Only here does Austin allow himself the word ' wicked '. He does not share the widespread certainty that such a monstrous regime must fall to revolution. Following Max Gluckman he perceives a state of ' cohesion without consensus ' which might last indefinitely. He also notes that, in the Homelands policy as in relations with the former High Commission Territories, South African governments see ' the advantages of control without responsibility '. Unlike Ali Mazrui, he does not foresee that minor concessions will ' slip into an avalanche ', let alone a revolution of rising expectations. But, he concludes, ' if there *were* a total collapse, the international world . . . would have to try to put what was left together again in ways no one can possibly foresee '. He wisely concludes that we do not know nearly enough to predict the future.

LUCY MAIR

Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana. By Tony Killick. *London Heinemann Educational 1978. 392 pp (Studies in the Economics of Africa. Edited by I Livingstone and H W Ord) £3 90.*

AS its title implies, this book is not merely an analysis of economic policies in Ghana since independence, though, as such, it is the most comprehensive and convincing account to date. Mr. Killick's work goes farther because it is at the same time an attempt to show how the prevalent ideas of development economics of the late 1950s and early 1960s were reflected in the Nkrumahist policies of the period and how these policies came to grief partly because the government did not (and still does not and will not) have the political and administrative capacity to implement them. This is, perhaps, too bald a summary of a long, well documented and fully-qualified argument, which is mainly, though not wholly, focused on the Nkrumah period.

Mr. Killick begins with a chapter which excellently distils the ideas of the development profession two decades ago—its anti-market, interventionist tendency and its rejection of international trade through the espousal of planning and import substitution and economic nationalism. Nkrumah may or may not have been directly influenced by these writers, but the thrust of policy was in tune with their ideas and gained their approval. Killick clearly, though perhaps reluctantly, thinks that these ideas were misguided largely because they ignored the urgency of exporting to finance the necessary imports for a heavy investment programme and because of the neglect of peasant agriculture Nor were the microeconomic implications of the grand design fully understood. For example, had the price and import control policies worked, the

income distribution would have worsened, precisely the opposite effect to what was intended. In fact, the whole story of implementation makes riveting but sorry reading. The problem was not so much that of corruption but maladministration, ill-judged decision-making, lack of co-ordination and above all the absence of will. Killick shows that this morbidity carries through to Nkrumah's successors; even the reaction to interventionism attributed to Busia's ministry was more in words than deeds.

For any one interested in Ghana's political economy, this long-awaited book is, of course, essential. It will also absorb those who are interested in the relationship between economic ideas and policy-making. It is clearly written and though rigorous, impressively untechnical. There does, however, appear to be an inconsistency between his argument and his conclusions. Killick emphasises that the distinction between an economic strategy and its implementation is a false one. He also argues that ' the state was an inefficient agent of modernisation, with limited capacity to raise the standard of its own performance, that political processes resulted in a low quality of economic decision making and may continue to do so . . . it follows that the State has tried to do too much and ought to attempt less ' (p. 350). If that is true, it would seem that the attempt to discover, as Mr Killick does, a correct strategy, however pragmatic, for the long-term development of Ghana's economy is misplaced.

University of Bath E HORESH

ASIA

Energy and Economic Development in India. By R K. Pachauri. *New York Praeger 1977 (Distrib in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 185 pp. £12 50.*

THE recent decision of OPEC to increase oil prices by 14·5 per cent must have awakened memories in New Delhi of the nightmare of 1973 and 1974 India, already one of the world's poorest countries and largely deficient in domestic sources of oil (producing then, as now, only about one third of its needs) was suddenly faced with a quadrupled bill for a commodity which was not only an essential energy source but also the raw material for the domestic fertiliser industry in which so much capital had been invested and on which the continued success of the green revolution was heavily dependent Within the space of a few months the proportion of India's import bill accounted for by petrol, oil and lubricants rose from about 11 per cent to just under 25 per cent and it seemed that, as if to rub salt into the wound, nature had conspired with OPEC to produce two consecutive monsoon failures in 1972 and 1973. The resulting requirement to buy large amounts of grain on the world market in the oil crisis years of 1973 and 1974 (partly alleviated by a Russian loan of two million tonnes) further depleted India's already slender reserves of foreign exchange. Small wonder that energy, in India perhaps even more than in the West, very rapidly assumed major importance in government policy making (and in scientific and academic research).

The publication of Dr Pachauri's book is a timely reminder both of the effect which the 1973 oil price increases had on non-oil developing countries (particularly non-Islamic ones) and of the heavy cost in energy of economic development in all less-developed countries, but especially in India with its major investment in energy-hungry industries and its ambitious plans for rural electrification. The latter is an indispensable requirement for the continued increase in electrically pumped ground-water irrigation on which much of India's further agricultural expansion depends now that canal irrigation is so widely developed in the plains.

Dr. Pachauri's approach is admirably systematic, with sections, each capable of standing on its own, on energy demands, resources and the technological alternatives,

from humdrum coal to more esoteric means such as biogas and solar energy. The author makes a plea for an urgent start on effective conservation and sensible use of forest resources. He also includes a summary of the development of the Indian economy from 1947 to 1977, which is worth the price of the book on its own as a lucid vade-mecum for all students of recent Indian history, and a pungent critique of the present-day electric power industry in India. He is well—possibly uniquely—qualified to cover so wide a range since his academic disciplines are both economics and engineering, and his present position as Senior Professor at India's Administrative Staff College gives him a privileged bird's-eye view of the Indian public sector scene.

Dr. Pachauri concludes with a call for energy self-reliance (a familiar aspiration in all branches of the Indian economy) for which he makes out a convincing political rather than economic case. If the book has a fault, it lies in its concentration on the energy cost of economic development to the virtual exclusion of energy's role in development. Nevertheless, it is highly recommended as essential reading in all development agencies and a useful addition to the libraries of Western ministries of energy.

Chatham House RICHARD THOMAS

Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India. By Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1978. 351 pp. £18.20*

ACCORDING to the authors of this book:

> People have two contrasting views of India since Independence. One is that very little has changed and that India is still very much a traditional, illiterate, village society with citizens perfunctorily and ritualistically participating in elections and campaigns but with very little real change occurring in political sophistication and meaningful political behaviour. The other is that India is an Asian democracy in which political ' modernization ' has occurred at a rapid pace in the face of great social and economic crises with citizens becoming genuinely involved with new democratic institutions and processes—parties, elections, legislatures—and developing a sophisticated knowledge of, and belief in, such institutions, while retaining many practices and orientations of traditional society. As our presentation has indicated, we are very much inclined to the latter interpretation (p. 272).

This reviewer, although agreeing that there has been an increase in political consciousness, among rural as well as urban voters, is sceptical that it has moved so swiftly and so far, except possibly in parts of northern India following the Emergency and Mrs. Gandhi's sterilisation policy.

The authors' findings derive from studies of political behaviour, by national surveys, done in ten languages in most Indian states, with the elections of 1967 and 1971 as primary observation points. The samples were chosen by random probability selection procedures, from up-to-date electoral rolls. The size of the samples was 2,000 to 3,000 citizens and 1,000 leaders. The interviewers were ' young Indian students ' (see dedication).

For these interviewers ' special training and precautions were necessary to minimise the bias in the relationship of the interviewer and respondent due to differences in social status and ensure that objective interviews occurred ' (p. 14). One does not doubt the objectivity of the interviewers, only the possibility of real

communication between people who differ as widely in class and caste status as most of these interviewers and respondents. One would like to know more about how the authors minimised the bias which they so readily admit.

Three aspects of political development are compared for the general elections of 1967 and 1971: the political involvement of citizens, identification with political parties, and cultural orientations towards the political system Integration, legitimacy and social progress are seen as resulting from political pluralism, competitive party politics and a genuinely open society The authors declare Indian democracy before the Emergency to be ' fundamentally sound ' (p 294).

The book includes a welcome postscript describing how at the general elections in March 1977, nearly 200 million Indians voted for freedom, and by returning the Janata Party to power, terminated the Emergency and restored a free press, an independent judiciary and civil liberties. But the differences in electoral response between the north and south of India are not adequately discussed, particularly how Mrs Gandhi retained such strong bases of support in Andhra Pradesh and Karnatika

Mrs. Gandhi has launched her campaign to regain India, from a parliamentary constituency in Karnatika From her progress it seems that memories are short and political consciousness in the Indian rural masses not as developed as the authors of this book think

School of Oriental and African Studies, London HUGH GRAY

Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle 1917 47 Edited by D A. Low. *London Heinemann 1978 513 pp £11·50.*

IN this book, Professor D A Low has collected more than a dozen individual studies of various aspects of the Indian struggle in the three decades before independence They are of very uneven quality and some can not unfairly be described as tedious.

Professor Low has written a somewhat pedestrian Introduction which goes over well trodden ground, without throwing much new light on the subject or stimulating new thought. He analyses the three phases of the struggle—1917-23, 1927-34 and 1939-47—and argues that each of them was sparked off by some action which was regarded as an affront to India Agitation then led to concessions which were motivated by the desire to damp the trouble down This is an over simplification, which ignores the continuity, combined with gradualness, of British policy in moving towards self-government. This failure to understand British motives is excusable, but it is less easy to feel charitable towards Low's reference to what he calls megalomania in Linlithgow or towards his entirely unsupported statement that British Managing Agents had gone far to crush out the economic life of the landlords in Eastern India. This reviewer cannot agree with either of these statements.

The best of the chapters which follow the Introduction is that in which Judith Brown analyses the nature and limits of Mahatma Gandhi's authority. He was, indeed, a father figure, but father could not always get his own way—and his policy, therefore, often had to shift

Johannes H Voigt's chapter on events during the war is disappointing. It does not bring out the two main features of the period—the bazaar-bargaining attitude of the Congress and the dilemma confronting the British government in view of the antagonism between the Congress and the Muslim League. Voigt does, however, emphasise the conflict between the attitudes of Gandhi and Nehru Gandhi would have compromised on the demand for immediate independence, but would not commit India to participation in the war, while Nehru cared little about non-violence, but would not abate a jot of the demand for independence. Other chapters deal with the

way in which the All-India Congress made use of, but was also conditioned by, local issues. None of these chapters is outstanding, but perhaps the best is the one dealing with Bombay.

Altogether, although this book contains a good deal of factual information, it is unlikely that the student of Indian affairs will gain much enlightenment from it.

P. J. GRIFFITHS

Thailand: Origins of Military Rule. By David Elliott. *London: Zed Press. 1978. 190 pp. £5·95.*

Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation. By Josef Silverstein. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1978 224 pp £11·50 Pb: £3·50.*

TAKEN together, these books reveal a malaise that afflicts studies of developing nations. At first glance, they appear similar. They deal with military rule and modern politics in adjacent, predominantly Buddhist, countries. But the similarity ceases with the titles. David Elliott's book is an assertively Marxist analysis of modern Thai history. Josef Silverstein's is a structural functionalist treatment of Burma's experience since independence. Neither is a first-rate representative of its type, but both have some value within the logic of their respective genres. The malaise lies in the fact that while each has much to offer the other, neither shows the slightest interest in the other's concerns or methods.

The four sections in Elliott's study are devoted to the Thai rice economy, ' early underdevelopment ' up to the military coup of 1932, the period between 1932 and 1947 and American imperialism, and what are called ' class struggles ' since 1947. His discussion of the inter-relationships between ecology, agriculture and economic and political change is fascinating. So is his handling of the socio-economic bases of national regimes in Thailand. (Silverstein could profit from a fuller consideration of these things.)

But there are serious problems as well. The reader can only get at this material by wading through a tangle of Marxist jargon which is deployed with a heavy hand Elliott provides a 23-page appendix to explain his terminology to the uninitiated, but the text still reads like a cryptographic puzzle. More serious is his tendency to oversimplify. The term ' class ' is used to analyse Thai society over 700 years with very little substantiation. It is used frequently (fully seven times on page 33) to the exclusion of details of kinship patterns, the distribution of wealth and land, and so on. When he elaborates on the varied social groups and cleavages subsumed under the term ' class '—in both ancient (for example p. 48) and recent (for example, p. 135) times—that term seems capable of describing anything and hence nothing. Western ' imperialism ' is clearly an important element in Thailand's modern history. Yet his implied view that it is a univocal, coherent force requires but does not receive substantiation. It could as easily be seen as a muddled, unfocused set of forces, often at odds with one another

Silverstein's study of Burma is pitched at the level of national politics. It deals mainly with the small, rather Westernised, national political elite and with politics of a rather formal kind—institutions, administrative structures, ideologies, parties, centre-state relations, and so on. But there is a vagueness and an artificiality about this discussion which mars the entire enterprise. The author never disaggregates the national elite and never adequately explains its links (or lack of links) to the land, to the mass, to rural power centres, to Burmese social structure of which we hear far too little. Discussions of the economy, which are supposed to form a major portion of the

book, are too oriented to urban areas and to matters of high policy. They read like a précis of a statistical abstract.

Much of the book is a scrupulous and detailed summary of official policies, speeches and versions of events. This is valuable, but we need also to see behind it, to know how and to what extent policies were implemented, how genuine the so-called mass organisations were, the connections between pressure groups and the actions of the national elite. The vital problem of land policy is a sad example. Statistics on land nationalisation are provided without any contextual material to show how much land was originally controlled by whom, the incidence of landlessness and so on (pp. 74-77). The peasants organisations' ' interference ' with land-reform committees is mentioned but never described, so we know not whether it was radical or reactionary. Later we hear that the landlord was the peasant's enemy without details on patterns of landholding, and that after land reforms the peasant ' now was free ', without any data to substantiate or explain this (p. 157). It is possible that much of this problem lies not with the author but with the closed nature of the Burmese state. Information is clearly hard to come by. But if this is true, Silverstein should offer more than a vague reference to the problem (p. xi). His institutions, high policy, elites, political culture and political identity are important topics (Elliott would do well to take note of them.) But they need to be anchored in a concrete, substantive socio economic context if their full significance is to emerge.

We in the West know precious little of Asia and the ranks of those who can interpret it to us are very thin. It thus behoves Asia specialists to listen to one another, to speak *to* and not *past* one another, to attack but also to share one another's ideas. Elliott and Silverstein offer us two parochialisms—one Marxist, the other liberal. It won't do.

University of Leicester JAMES MANOR

The Army and Politics in Indonesia. By Harold Crouch *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1978 377 pp. £13·00*

Political Power and Communication in Indonesia. Edited by Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye *Berkeley, London University of California Press 1978 424 pp £13 00.*

THE army in Indonesia has exercised political power on a virtually exclusive basis since March 1966 when President Sukarno was obliged to transfer executive authority to Lieutenant-General Suharto. That act of transfer did not mark the sudden involvement of the army into politics. Indeed a central theme of Dr. Crouch's excellent and lucid volume is that political involvement had been its experience from its advent in 1945 as little more than an alliance of local fighting units. The Indonesian army as a corporate entity came to regard itself as both the midwife and guardian of the state with a right to play a central role in its policy-making and administration. Such a role was not conceded by civilian politicians from independence but over time circumstances enabled increasing military participation in public life. Thus, when the civilian politicians were eventually displaced, the representatives of the ' New Order ' were not a new innovative elite but a strengthened segment of the old one.

The focus of this rewarding study is the army not the armed forces. The primary object of the author is to explain its role in Indonesian politics rather than to examine its internal structure. Nevertheless, in attending expertly to one object, he throws considerable light on the other. The book concentrates on the experience of the army from October 1965 when an abortive coup made possible a major transformation of

the political system. To this end, a detailed account is provided of the place of the army within the competitive framework of Guided Democracy The execution of the abortive coup is examined judiciously and in an agnostic manner; the conclusion reached is that the Indonesian Communist Party was privy to the planning of the undertaking with dissident army officers. The core of the book provides a record of the central events in Indonesian politics over the past decade. The political challenge by Suharto to Sukarno, the decimation of the Communists, the army's employment of students to provide justifiable circumstances for the transfer of power, the consolidation of Suharto's position within the armed forces and the emasculation of the political parties are all described and analysed with skill and detachment. In addition, Dr. Crouch examines the economic interests of the army and the extent to which a practice of ' unconventional financing ' was institutionalised and expanded as its senior officers became beneficiaries of the development of the modern sector of the economy.

The concluding part of the book is taken up with an analysis of events in January 1974 when the visit to Jakarta of the Japanese Prime Minister precipitated violent popular protest which barely concealed a conflict between field and political officers The so called ' January disaster ' is represented as a challenge by proxy on the part of professionally-minded officers concerned lest financial excesses and corruption undermine the legitimacy of military domination of government and the corporate spirit of the army. In the event, they lost out politically An interesting sequel, to which the author does not give attention, was the poor quality of military performance displayed in the occupation of East Timor in December 1975 The stress on military professionalism on the part of the recently appointed head of the armed forces reflects an awareness that the performance as well as the cohesion of the army and other services has been a casualty of their deep involvement in politics.

The armed forces are one of a number of institutions discussed in a splendid set of essays on Indonesia put together under the joint editorship of Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye They are organised into three sections: a survey of the culture of politics, a consideration of major social and political institutions and an analysis of aspects of communication The overall quality of the volume is such that it is invidious to mention only some of the contributors Its organising theme, discussed at the outset by Karl Jackson, is that of the bureaucratic polity Thus, Indonesia is considered in terms of a political system in which power and participation in national decisions are limited almost entirely to the employees of the state Professor Jackson proceeds to make out a convincing case that since 1957, when parliamentary democracy was replaced by martial law, the basic form of government in Indonesia has not changed fundamentally

Although the general form of government may not have changed fundamentally, the major social and political institutions have experienced significant change, at least in terms of role. The essay on the armed forces by Ulf Sundhaussen covers similar ground to that considered by Crouch but is of a more sympathetic cast Differences of interpretation arise not over the importance of the military, but over their degree of cohesion and in this respect over the causes of the disturbances of January 1974 There are sober and systematic studies of the bureaucracy and of the economy by Donald Emmerson and Bruce Glassburner respectively There are also fine analytical accounts of the political parties and of Islam by William Liddle and Allan Samson. In discussing the frustrated political ambitions of organised Islam in Indonesia, Professor Samson is somewhat optimistic about its propensity to accommodation to the present political order.

Among the essays specifically on communications, that by Nono Anwar Makarim is truly outstanding for its ability to convey the political-cultural context in which the Indonesian press operates Of special interest also is the chapter on Cartoons and

Monuments by Benedict Anderson in which, through a discussion of so-called symbolic speech, he provides a moral critique of the lapse from values proclaimed by Indonesia's revolutionary generation and ruling class. In conclusion, Karl Jackson stresses how the flamboyant Sukarno and the ideologically austere Suharto have both presided over a structure of politics limited to a few key institutions largely immune to popular pressures and autonomous political interests.

London School of Economics MICHAEL LEIFER

Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China, 1949–1954: A Case Study By Dorothy J Solinger *Berkeley, London University of California Press for the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California* 1977 2[illegible]1 pp. £13.15

THIS is a study of the first five years of communist rule in a huge, fragmented and backward part of China where the new regime started out under many disadvantages in its endeavours to bring internal integration to a region that existed only on the map and to involve it much more closely in the life of the whole country It is also intended as a contribution to the discussions among political scientists about the problems of creating integrated modern states, especially in the developing world

The topic is both important and fascinating The main sources used are the Chungking newspaper *Hsin hua jih pao*, translations (such as the *Survey of the China Mainland Press*), and studies of the South west. They yield much information on how the regional military government perceived and dealt with problems before handing over its functions to the strengthened central authorities, the provinces, and to the Communist Party machine from late 1952 onwards Perhaps more might have been done to compare the South west with other regions, to see how closely policy developments followed the Centre, or to find out what was said during the ' cultural revolution ' about the way officials acted during those years; but within its research limits the book presents much information

The general problems of integration are set out in a series of sixteen propositions that to one who is not a political scientist smack rather of the obvious, such as ' When a direct strategy is applied with great pressure and coercion, the probable political reactions are alienation, passive noncompliance, or rebellion ' Conversely, the reader will be surprised to note, ' where no controls are placed on the populace, this populace tends to attempt to attain additional local power '.

The book will be read by students of South-west China in the early years of the People's Republic for the evidence it presents with clarity, though one might wish for a clearer distinction between official claim and actual achievement It is a worthy effort; but readers will have to decide for themselves if they can accept the author's statement that ' this book has implications for regional government in China over time; and for problems of regionalism and integration in other nations in the modern world '

University of Leeds W J F. JENNER

The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective. Edited by Francis H. Heller. *Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press for the Harry S Truman Library Institute for National and International Affairs. 1977. 251 pp. $13.00.*

THIS somewhat uneven book is the record of a conference held in May 1975 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. After a brief introduction by the editor, it begins with a panel discussion between eight participants in the United States government's decision-making process in 1950, including John Muccio, the American ambassador to South Korea, General J. Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army, John Snyder, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Averell Harriman, a Special Assistant to President Truman. In general, this discussion is disappointing, either adding little to what we already know from published accounts, or being totally misleading, as for example when General Collins stated: ' So far as I know, we never gave any consideration to the use of the atomic bomb in Korea ' (p. 23) [1] Perhaps the most interesting passages concern Mr. Snyder's account of his journey back to Washington with the President from Kansas City on June 25, 1950, and Mr. Harriman's recollections (based upon his contemporary notes) of the celebrated Wake Island conference between the President and General MacArthur in October. Both, incidentally, show Truman as less abrasively decisive than he subsequently sought to portray himself.

The bulk of the book, however, is made up of four papers by academics on various aspects of the war: by Lawrence Kaplan on its impact upon Nato and, more particularly, the question of German rearmament; by John Edward Wiltz on the repercussions inside the United States; by Robert Simmons on communist policy [2]; and by Richard Leopold on the historiography of the war. All these are well worth reading, particularly the second and the last, although the continuing process of declassification of United States government documents has rendered some of the comments by Professor Leopold and his discussants a little out of date. It should be noted that all the papers, with the exception of that by Professor Simmons, which was not actually read at the conference, are accompanied by prepared comments and an oral discussion on them by other conference participants. The volume concludes with two brief appreciations of President Truman by Averell Harriman and Clark Clifford, both of whom, of course, served on his staff.

In sum, this is a book which specialists must read and all good libraries should have The general reader seeking elucidation of one of the major crises of the cold war may, however, find it a little confusing.

University of Leicester GEOFFREY WARNER

China and Japan: Search for Balance Since World War I. Edited by Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy. *Santa Barbara, Calif Oxford: ABC Clio. 1978 468 pp £12 38.*

AS this review is being written, the United States government has announced its decision to enter into diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and seems to have brought nearer completion the reintegration of that country within the

1 This, of course, is contradicted by President Truman's famous remarks at his press conference on Nov 30, 1950, which sent Mr Attlee hurrying across the Atlantic for consultations See also the memorandum of Nov 8, 1950, by John K Emmerson of the State Department, printed in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950*, Vol VII, Korea (Washington US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp 1098 1100, as well as General Collins's own comments at a top-level meeting on December 1, cited on pp 1279 and 1280 of the same volume

2 In essence a summary of his book, *The Strained Alliance Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York Free Press, London Collier Macmillan, 1975)

world community. In doing so, the Americans reacted to the signing of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978 which crowned the set of treaties concluded between the two countries in the previous six years. We have thus seen the fulfilment of a process about which the authors of these studies (which do not go beyond 1975) were only guessing. This remark is not made in criticism of the book, for it is often a salutary exercise to see how the outcome differs from what intelligent estimates predicted.

This interesting volume consists of studies by over twenty authors. It includes three sets of historical studies which seem to fall within the category of Japan's interventions into China, 1914-33; Japan's involvement and war with China, 1934-45; and Sino-Japanese negotiations from the Treaty of Taipei of April 1952 to the ' Tanaka treaty ' of September 1972. In addition to these central chapters, there are commentaries, ' overviews ' and skilful editorial introductions which bind the more specialised material together. It will be clear from this that the editors do not seek to offer a continuous or consecutive narrative so much as a series of in depth studies based on the latest research and using Chinese and Japanese language sources as well as historical materials from elsewhere. They are, moreover, involved in a ' search for balance ' between the two countries (as their sub-title suggests), that is, they are not content to look at the mainstream of history but insist on the need for studying the anti-mainstream in both countries which is fumbling after right attitudes and better relations. Thus, the book provides an account of the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-45, an interpretative essay on war guilt and several essays on individuals and groups who tried to improve relations between their countries at the time. These last studies are important; but the endeavours they describe did not gain widespread support and do not seem to be worthy of such a grandiose description as a ' peace movement '.

Two points emerge from this very worthwhile publication. First, it represents the fruition of one aspect of American scholarship in this field, the decision to concentrate on east Asian studies, rather than on studies of individual countries in the area. As one of the authors writes, ' over the past century, the politics of East Asia have been influenced more profoundly by the Sino-Japanese relationship than by any other single factor ' (p. 5). Secondly, out of the twenty four authors, nine or so are Chinese, four Japanese and three Korean. These scholars were American trained but have an international perspective which is distinctive. This gives the book a certain uniqueness in addition to its undoubted contemporary relevance

London School of Economics IAN NISH

NORTH AMERICA

The New American Political System. By Samuel H Beer *et al.* Edited by Anthony King. *Washington American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1978. 417pp Pb $6 75*

THIS is an extremely valuable book. It is organised like a conventional text book, with chapters by familiar names on all the main familiar topics in American government—Greenstein on the Presidency; Heclo on the bureaucracy; Patterson on Congress; Shapiro on the Court; Ranney on party organisation; Epstein on federalism. Brody deals with declining turnout and Kirkpatrick with other aspects of voting behaviour; interest groups have no chapter to themselves, but are frequently referred to elsewhere. Beer contributed the introduction, on the climate of political opinion, and the editor sums up.

The purpose is much more ambitious and the achievement much more substantial than the framework suggests, and not only because the ten essays maintain an average standard of analysis or information (or both) all too rarely found in collective works. For, while the authors naturally vary in the extent to which they find it necessary to introduce background material, they all focus on the ways in which the operation of the system has changed in the last fifteen years or so, and provide separate contributions to a common theme: that of dispersion, disintegration and atomisation of power. As King writes in his conclusion, the key to American politics was always supposed to be the assembling of organised blocs of power into dominant coalitions: today the blocs are so fragile and the alignments so unstable that to operate in the old ways amounts to building coalitions from sand. The decline of traditional loyalties in the electorate, the promotion of participatory devices in the parties (which reinforce the short-term enthusiasts for a particular issue or candidate at the expense of lasting organisation), the proliferation of small islands of power in a Congress which has learnt to distrust, and tries to thwart, the executive branch—all have added to the constraints limiting the President's freedom of action The old New Deal confidence that Washington could solve the nation's problems is sadly shaken (so that the states are enjoying some revival of influence); and it has not been replaced by another dominant cleavage around which political conflict is organised, or by a new dominant consensus on the broad direction of policy. Scepticism about once-accepted remedies, multiple lines of division over cross-cutting issues, the demand for participation and recognition by dissatisfied minorities, have generated a more complex, more diffuse and often more bitter set of struggles—while the old integrating mechanisms no longer work effectively.

The authors are well aware of, and do their best to avoid, the dangers of over-statement; but their perspective is inevitably somewhat skewed, since quite properly they tend to take past arrangements for granted without much discussion of their weaknesses The book's real starting point is the Kennedy-Johnson administration, and nostalgia for the confident, majoritarian liberalism of the Great Society can often be detected in the background Yet that brief burst of reform was quite exceptional, fulfilling drives frustrated over twenty years of nominal Democratic majorities by the obstructive influence in Congress of the party's Southern conservative wing Had the voters really so wished, no doubt enough power could have been mobilised to overcome the obstacles—as it was by Roosevelt and Johnson when they enjoyed the real progressive backing to which American party organisations have sometimes responded but for which they have never substituted Immobilism is no novelty in American government, even if it takes a rather different form in the 1970s; and the one drawback of this excellent volume about the recent past is that it may inadvertently encourage illusions about earlier days.

Nuffield College, Oxford P M. WILLIAMS

America since 1920. By Daniel Snowman *London Heinemann 1978 246 pp. £6 50 Pb £2 75.*

TO attempt to cover sixty years of American history in little more than two hundred pages is a dauntingly difficult task for any author. Only too often, the result is a densely packed work of reference, with every important law, policy and personality recorded, fixed in time but not explained In the present work, which is a revised edition of a book published ten years ago, with an additional chapter on the 1970s, Daniel Snowman has been well aware of the danger. He has written what is,

essentially, an interpretative essay; and he has concentrated on social developments, with political and economic matters relegated to supporting roles.

The main theme of his interpretation is that social diversity creates social tension, and that there has been, in the United States of America, a continuing struggle between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies: the former being frequently disruptive in nature, and the latter stabilising. If the centrifugal forces become too powerful, then society runs the risk of disintegration; if centripetal forces dominate, the result is conformity and dullness. This is an interesting, if not sufficient, explanation of American social dynamics, provided that it is not required to bear too much weight. Snowman occasionally falls into that trap: to describe the abstract impressionist paintings and the beat poetry of the 1950s as centrifugal forces may be clever, but it is not particularly helpful. In the period from 1930 to the early 1950s, he argues, the differences within American society were overborne by a series of common dangers, as the Depression, the Second World War, and the cold war threatened the nation's prosperity and security As a result, and perhaps oddly in a work of social history, we are given a conventional account of the New Deal (and none the worse for that), followed by a solid chapter on American foreign policy The 1920s and the 1960s are the ' centrifugal ' decades; and Snowman discusses the Jazz Age, Prohibition and the Ku Klux Klan as phenomena of the earlier period, and the black revolt, the youth revolt, and the psycho-social consequences of the Kennedy assassination as significant manifestations of the later one.

This is convincing enough, within limits, although it tends to produce a somewhat over-simplified view. The criticism, put crudely, is that the material of the discussion is more social, and less sociological, than might be wished The important social changes—in social stratification, the role of labour, technology, ethnicity, race and demography—are all discussed, but not always as extensively explored as they deserve. This is, however, no more than a reservation; and it should be said that Snowman's acute perceptions, keen eye for the bizarre and lively style have combined to produce an introduction to his subject valuable to student and general reader alike

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State By Daniel Yergin. *London: Deutsch 1978. 526 pp £7 95.*

DANIEL YERGIN observes that much recent writing about its origins ' has been a continuation of the Cold War by other means ' (pp. 6-7). It would be at least as apposite to suggest that an American civil war has been prosecuted by pen, as mightily as it has in British historiography of ' Appeasement ' The respective ethnic dimensions of such apparent interest, passion and guilt are probably determined by unhistorical beliefs that alternative national policies could have produced alternative international outcomes Yergin's related approach is to analyse the struggle for primacy between two competing and antithetical perspectives of Soviet-American relations which took place amongst the foreign policy decision-making elite of the United States in the period 1933-50. These perspectives are labelled the ' Yalta axioms ' and the ' Riga axioms ', the latter trailing in its retinue the ' National Security State '. Yergin's broad axiomatic labelling and its mutually exclusive nature is not only less than adequate to encompass the complex range of American policies, it is also hardly novel. His indisputable stylistic elegance, acute observation and wit fail to hide the fact that his sophisticated labels present as lamb some rather old mutton—Rooseveltian realism/naïveté/duplicity, Russian national interest or Bolshevik world revolution, and the military-industrial complex.

The ' Riga axioms ' testifying to the impossibility of accommodation with revolutionary Soviet Messianism fare best. Yergin's extremely interesting exposition of the causes, nature and consequences of the ' Groupthink ' of the Russian Section of the State Department (whose pre-1933 listening-post was the Estonian capital) is perhaps the most wholly original section of the book. The ' Yalta axioms ' are as elusive as their chief ideologue, Roosevelt, who benefits from all the doubts regarding a possible Soviet-American accommodation on a trade-off, spheres of influence basis. Yergin scarcely mentions Roosevelt's monopolistic policy on the atomic bomb.

Yergin's use of sources guarantees the supreme readability of his study and makes an important supplementary contribution to our knowledge, but also points up the work's limitations. He has culled a great amount of original material from the letters, diaries and papers of a large number of American ' top people ' and a few British counterparts. This he has presented most ably to give the perceptions of United States foreign policy-makers at their aphoristic and articulate peak, although there are occasions when such material appears to be more important for what it adds to style rather than to content.

Given this *salon* approach, there is little new detail on the day-to-day minutiae and drudgery of the great range of diplomatic events of the period. Moreover, although this approach permits Yergin a few sniping shots at the negative aspects of the economic revisionist perspective, it would require more concentrated fire-power to ensure that the beast had been mortally wounded. Finally, while there are a few *bons mots* on United States domestic politics, the integration of this frame of reference into the diplomatic picture is not, in general, a strength of the study. But at the end of the day, Mr. Yergin has produced an important, and certainly the most readable, book upon the origins of the cold war.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War. By Stanley Hoffmann. *New York, Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill. 1978. 331 pp. £9·40*

IN concluding his analysis of global complexity, perhaps appropriately titled ' The Nightmare of World Order ', Stanley Hoffmann writes that ' a prerequisite to success is an awareness of the new conditions of international affairs, a knowledge that world order tomorrow will not resemble, and may well require the opposite from world order in the past. Are citizens and leaders really prepared for such imperatives? Are they willing to stop listening to familiar clichés, fixed ideologies, and self-righteous harangues? Will the need forge a way? ' (p. 193).

In this book Professor Hoffman clearly does contribute to the awareness which he so urgently calls for. The work unravels the dilemmas, contradictions and paradoxes which will have to be faced by all states, large and small, but specifically those to be confronted by the United States. The work is synthesising in the sense that the complexities of late twentieth-century international politics, while by no means new to academic common rooms, are masterfully interwoven into a coherent theme of basic choices for American foreign policy-makers. Will the traditional game of foreign policy—the rules of strategists (in the American context, the combination of Clausewitz and Containment), the preserve of soldiers and diplomats assuming zero-sum calculations—be adequate to cope with the emerging global system? In other words, will it be beneficial or even possible for the United States or other powers to continue to pursue primacy or dominance in international politics? Alternatively, will the United States, given all the permutations and paradoxes of its power, be more effective if it seeks to concentrate upon what the author has defined as the choice of

' world order '? The latter choice would indeed demand an artful balance, a balance described by Hoffmann as ' tomorrow's dialectic . . . allowing for a fragmentation of the strategic-diplomatic contest under the nuclear stalemate, and an emergent community in which competition will, of course, persist, but where mankind ought, perhaps, slowly to learn to substitute games against (or with) nature for the games between what Erik Erikson has called " pseudo-species " ' (p. 188).

The ' choices ' for the United States which Hoffmann outlines are presented in particularly satisfactory ways from two points of view. The first is his successful attempt to relate a wide range of international relations theory to his normative conclusion. The second is his wide global reach—the scope and the span of the events, economic as well as political, which he integrates into the development of alternatives that he posits for his audience of leaders and citizens

The weakness of Hoffmann's prescriptive theme emerges from the portion of the prerequisite which suggests that citizens and leaders should be aware that ' the world order tomorrow will not resemble and may well require the opposite from the world order of the past ' The warning may indeed be worthwhile and relevant, but as long as the paradoxes of power or the conflict between domestic and international order persist, Hoffmann's advice is gratuitous at best. He seeks to outline the perspectives and processes which the United States should adopt to meet the challenges of adjusting to world order. There is yet another cry for revamping the ' foreign policy machine ', more calls for liaison committees between the Executive and the Congress, more intra departmental committees to co-ordinate policies, wiser leadership, more responsive and responsible media (pp 233ff). But no matter how great the desire of certain members of the foreign-policy establishment to sensitise the American foreign policy system to the emerging new realities, the fact of the matter is that the concessions Hoffmann suggests the United States should make, for example, in negotiations with Third-World countries (p. 277), still have to be weighed in terms of those concessions' impact upon domestic votes

Perhaps Professor Hoffmann's questions about whether or not citizens and leaders are really prepared for the new imperative, whether they would be willing to stop listening to familiar clichés and self-righteous harangues, can be answered, less in terms of ideological fixations, and more in terms of the sacrifices which preparation for tomorrow's world order will demand of those citizens and leaders All the paradoxes and dilemmas which the new world order implies, and which Hoffmann so very ably spells out, may ultimately not be resolvable and might leave the author's wise prescription in the category of right but improbable solutions.

University of Southern California RANDOLPH C KENT

Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy. By Stephen D Krasner *Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press 1978 402 pp. £13 30 Pb £3 95*

IF this were a monograph entirely about how different American administrations have responded to the problems of American corporate overseas raw materials investments, it would only have been a summary of data already available elsewhere However, the author has used his case studies for two other purposes: as a basis for theorising pursued in part to explain why American academic theories which deal with foreign policy seem to be of limited relevance to policy-makers, and in part to touch upon the issue of security of raw material supplies

In dealing with the former, the author presents his approach in confusing and contradictory theoretical chapters In order to stake out his position, he challenges

what he describes as the two reigning academic interpretations of the relationship between foreign policy-making and society: the Lockean or Liberal and the Marxist. He shows that the Marxist view of the state as the executive committee of corporations is simplistic and wrong, and quite correctly rejects the logic of liberal, pluralistic theory by demonstrating that in foreign relations governments often have broader responsibilities that are not always reduceable to, or deduceable from, the sum of competitive group interests. But neither of these observations is novel, nor would John Locke, the authors of the *Federalist Papers* or numerous scholars who specialise in international relations disagree with him. This dimension explains why the State Department and the Executive are consistently accused in the United States of being elitist institutions beyond the effective and legitimate reach of Congress.

Since Krasner overlooks this strand in American political theory and practice, he goes on to argue that democratic pluralism has penetrated so far into the American Executive, that the ' state ' is weak when it comes to making policy, particularly foreign policy. His views on the weak state are odd, to say the least, since one could also argue that pluralism is a particular strength of the American constitution. In fact Krasner contradicts himself on this point when he writes that ' Despite its internal fragmentation, the external power of the United States allowed it to create a stable international economic environment ' (p. 352). He might have avoided confusion about his intent, if he had indicated that his main concern was foreign economic and not national security policy. Certainly, liberal economics does hide a great deal about power and policy formulation But if this point could have served as a solid organising principle for the book, it is lost behind a pretentious effort to develop a theory of the state and case studies which do not allow us to see how the American state has been weak in Krasner's sense when it comes to raw materials policy

What is so puzzling is why we need so much theory to reach such obvious and over studied conclusions; or stated differently, why such obvious conclusions need to be validated by, and lost within, such extensive resort to theorising. This is a reflection in part of the theoretical miasma through which many academics feel obliged to wade to reach their conclusions, and in part of insufficient contact with policy formulation as a corrective to theorising. As an example, the author's development of a theory of ' statism ' adds nothing by substituting ' state ' for the more usual ' government ' or ' administration ' in the American context He could have made his point just as easily by developing the observation that government and society are not identical in their functions and interests. He is too often led astray by his theories.

What about the case studies? What do they tell us about raw materials policy? The author asserts that American policy-makers have consistently placed general foreign policy aims above security of supply and security of supply above more competitive markets (p. 148). While his cases do illustrate the author's theory that American foreign policy cannot be understood in terms of specific corporate interests, his examples, save for petroleum, are ill chosen for understanding past priorities in minerals policy or future needs. They are not part of a broad analysis of American raw materials policy and this limits their usefulness apart from proving the theoretical points raised in the opening chapters In addition, it is questionable to use petroleum, nonferrous minerals and agricultural products to illustrate how conflicts among the above-mentioned goals are resolved Guatemalan bananas and sugar from Cuba and the Dominican Republic do not qualify as strategic resources, nor do they raise the issue of security of supply. The Zambian case, which involves copper, is certainly not about a mineral in scarce supply. Moreover, the author seriously undermines the importance of his examples for understanding American resource policy, as well as a crucial part of his theory of the state, when he writes that ' despite the domestic weakness of the American state, raw materials have rarely been an impediment to economic growth ' (p 347).

Finally, while he does indicate that American mineral supplies may be adversely affected by international realignments that have affected the operation of multinational corporations, a different analysis would be required to evaluate just how serious this is for the security of supply of minerals for American industry and just how flexible American foreign policy can be in adjusting successfully to this new environment.

S. J. WARNECKE

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Brazil: a Political Analysis. By Peter Flynn. *London: Benn; Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. 564 pp. £15.50.*

Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power. By Ronald M. Schneider. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1977. 236 pp. $16.50.*

THE first of these books is presented by the publishers as a volume in their ' Nations of the Modern World ' series. It also appears to be classified as history. But if a hopeful reader, having paid the high price, expects to have bought a book providing him or her with anything like a portrait or history of its subject he or she will be disappointed. In fact, Mr. Flynn states clearly in his introduction that ' This is not a history of Brazil.' Another type of hopeful reader might pay his or her 1,550 pence for what is promised in the sub-title, a political analysis. This, despite the somewhat misleading setting in which it has been placed by the publishers, is what the book really purports to be. ' It is ', writes Mr. Flynn, ' an attempt at political analysis, presented chronologically.'

Mr. Flynn is clearly well equipped to make such an attempt. He has spent a number of years in the academic study of Latin America. He has obviously read widely for the writing of this book, including sources in Portuguese—which, curiously, are often not regarded as essential reading by those who seek to pronounce on things Brazilian. Against this background, Mr. Flynn was right to conclude that there is a need for an informed and balanced analysis of the Brazilian political (and economic) scene, if only as a corrective to the often unbalanced commentaries with which we have become too familiar. Yet, despite the hard work he has obviously put into his book, the need for such an analysis remains, for Mr. Flynn has presented us with a picture of the Brazilian political jungle in which the analysis he intended to provide has become entangled in and submerged by a mass of information through which he bravely tries to hack his way.

There are, this reviewer suggests, two basic failings which undermine the value of this book. The first is the absence of anything more than a passing mention of the colonial period. True, Mr. Flynn devotes some early pages to the Empire, but that rested on political, economic and social foundations which had evolved in the three colonial centuries. It is a curious blind spot among so many writers on Brazil in the Anglo-Saxon world that they seemingly fail to appreciate the persistence of the formative influences of the colonial period into the Brazil of our own day. Thus, the early neglect of Brazil by the Portuguese Crown opened the way to various forms of private enterprise as often as not outside the law, and these and the patterns of settlement and the later cyclical development of the colonial economy were to create problems with which all governments of independent Brazil, imperial, civil and military, have struggled to deal, each of them hampered by the lack of sufficient human and material resources to make their writ run in the remoter corners of the country as was the Portuguese Crown before them. Nothing purporting to be an analysis of the politics of modern Brazil can ignore these antecedents any more than similar antecedents can be ignored in the case of the United States.

The second basic failing in this book is the absence of any clear assessment of the events in each of the periods into which the history of modern Brazil is divisible. Mr. Flynn has arranged his book approximately in accordance with these periods—the Empire, the First Republic, the first Vargas administration, the Vargas experiment in corporative government, the postwar nominally democratic years from 1945 to 1964 and the military regime from 1964 until today. But none of these sections concludes with any summing up, nor are there any leads, in terms of causes and effects, from one section to the next. A partial exception to this judgment is provided by pages 308–11, on the Goulart years, but these really belong to the end of the preceding chapter. In particular, there is no clear identification of the differing characteristics and policies of each of the military administrations since 1964. There is also a failure to identify or to describe leading personalities in a story dependent on personalities. The scholarly President Washington Luiz de Souza appears with no introduction on page 47. None of the succeeding civilian presidents, including Getulio Vargas but excepting João Goulart, is described as a human being any more than are the succeeding military presidents, each of whom has been much more than a man of straw manoeuvred into the presidency as might be assumed from these pages. In some cases (pp. 482, 497, 501 and 506) military promotions, appointments or dismissals are regarded as important by the author, but their significance and those concerned in them remain unexplained. In other cases (pp. 178, 402 and 451) generals flit through the jungle treetops but are named only to disappear without further reference. We are never told what, if anything, happened to the authors of the colonels' manifesto (pp. 510–11). Altogether, the reader is taken at what one feels to be an increasingly breathless pace through an increasingly tangled scene in which opaqueness rather than analysis becomes the main feature.

It must be said, however, that Mr. Flynn leaves an impression of the policies of Presidents Vargas and Goulart considerably more favourable than the left-wing detractors of the one and the right-wing detractors of the other would have had us accept in their own day. He also leaves two other impressions. One is of the extent of American connivance in the undermining of President Goulart and his replacement by the military, and of the influence of multinational corporations. The other impression resolves itself into the question, given the record of the First Republic and of the years 1945 to 1964, of whether, and if so how, democracy can hope to solve the amalgam of political, economic and social problems, large and small, which we know as Brazil. It remains a very open question.

Professor Schneider has already established his credentials for writing about Brazil.[1] In his new book he sets out, on the assumption that Brazil is moving towards the status of a world power, to consider the likely shape and direction of Brazil's future foreign policy. To this end he presents us with chapters on Brazil as an actor on the international stage and on the external and internal environments in which the country's foreign policy is formulated and developed. He concludes with a chapter on the likely future character of that policy and its prospects.

Unfortunately, however, the author's considerations and speculations on Brazil's foreign policy do not contain very much that would not be obvious to any informed observer of the Brazilian scene. For example, his recipe for Brazil's future relationships with its neighbours is hardly a novel one: 'Brazil's policymakers will continue to monitor Latin American responses and reactions to their initiatives very closely, and shifts in relationships between other South American countries will influence Brazilian decision making, as will internal political changes in those countries' (p. 197). More generally, it is not something peculiar to Brazil that its foreign policy 'is

1 *The Political System of Brazil: emergence of a 'modernising' authoritarian regime 1964–1970* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971).

highly conditioned by economic considerations ' (p. 15) or that, consistent with the evolution in the scope and conduct of foreign relations in the modern world, other ministries than that of foreign affairs should be concerned in making and carrying out foreign policy.

To this reviewer the value of Professor Schneider's book lies less in what he has to say about Brazil's foreign policy than in two other impressions he leaves on the reader. First, given the economic considerations underlying Brazil's foreign policy, it may be startling to those accustomed to regard that country as a paradise for private enterprise to learn of the predominant position of the state in the economy. Of this the figures cited by the author leave no doubt. For instance, in 1972 ' more than half the total employment provided by the country's twenty-five largest firms came from the seven public enterprises included in this category '. Even more striking was the fact that ' of the top twenty-five firms in terms of assets, seventeen were governmental, accounting for 82 per cent of these firms' total assets. For the hundred largest firms the proportion of assets held by public enterprise was 68 per cent ' (p. 18). Again, ' The Brazilian government is currently responsible for half of Brazil's foreign trade and plays a major role in capital formation ' (p. 28, note 28) Second, in considering the sources of influence on the making of Brazil's foreign policy, the Presidency, the armed forces, the foreign ministry, the economic ministries, the business community, Congress, the press and academics, the church and labour, Professor Schneider has succeeded where Mr. Flynn has failed—in providing a clear delineation of the Brazilian power structure and its leaders, and of the interplay of forces and interests within that structure

N. P MACDONALD

Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil By Shelton H. Davis. *Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1977 205 pp £7·95 Pb. £3·75.*

Assault on the Amazon. By Richard Bourne. *London Gollancz. 1978 320 pp. £8·50.*

A PROMINENT feature of the contemporary Brazilian scene is the opening up of Amazonia. It has attracted international attention, either for ecological reasons, or economic reasons, or for its effect on the Brazilian Indians, or for a combination of all three.

The process really began in December 1966, when President Castelo Branco announced ' Operation Amazon ', a five-year programme in which nearly $2,000 million would be spent on the development of transport, power and natural resources, the bulk of the funds coming from external sources. In the ' Plan for National Integration ', announced in 1970 by President Garrastazú Médici, fiscal incentives were diverted from business projects to road-building and settlement. The chief feature of the plan was the building of the Trans Amazon highway and the related opening up of new areas for agricultural settlement, in particular, to provide land for the landless population of the Brazilian north-east In September 1974, there was another shift in official policy, with the announcement by President Ernesto Geisel of the Polamazônia Plan. This sought to rationalise the penetration of the Amazon basin by designating fifteen ' poles of development ' in the region

Such, in its bare essentials, is the background to the many-faceted problems addressed by Professor Davis and Mr. Bourne in their books. With Professor Davis, an anthropologist, one gets the impression that he decided beforehand the case he intended to make and then selected and used his materials accordingly. On reading his preface it is difficult to come to any other conclusion. That is not all. Professor Davis is

writing from the cloisters. Apart from a brief stay in Rio de Janeiro some nine years ago he does not appear to have returned to Brazil, much less to have visited Amazonia at any time. In fact, he writes of ' corresponding with persons who have been to the Amazon and could verify certain facts ' (p. xvi). It appears that he derived a large part, if not all, of his material from documentation and information centres in the United States, and from fellow anthropologists whose primary interest has been the study of the North American rather than the Brazilian Indian.

Be all that as it may, Professor Davis, as the title of his book implies, is chiefly concerned with the impact on the Indians of Brazil of the opening up of Amazonia. His first chapter is entitled ' Brazilian Indian policy; an historical overview '. But he begins only at the start of the twentieth century and seemingly fails to realise that all that has happened since has happened before. With respect to the present day Professor Davis relates to his central theme, ' that the massive amount of disease, death and human suffering unleashed upon Brazilian Indians in the past few years is a direct result of the economic development policies of the military government of Brazil ', some discussion of those policies and of the activities of international financial institutions and of domestic and foreign private capital. But, perhaps because he is writing at long range, he sees these matters only in black or white, with the emphasis rather heavily on the black. In his view, an unholy alliance of the Brazilian military government, international lending institutions and multinational corporations is waging ' a silent war . . . against aboriginal peoples, innocent peasants and the rain forest ecosystem in the Amazon Basin of South America ' (p. 167).

As regards the Indians, Professor Davis fairly gives some prominence to the Figueiredo Report of 1968, prepared and published at the instance of General Albuquerque Lima, then Minister of the Interior, which trounced the attitudes and behaviour of the old Indian Protection Service and led to its replacement by a new official body, the National Indian Foundation But Professor Davis does not really believe, it seems, that this and other changes in official attitudes towards the Indians have been for the better. Rather, he sees the Foundation and the Statute of the Indian of 1973, for which it was responsible, as providing the institutional foundations for a new type of Indian policy subservient to the larger development objectives of the Brazilian military regime (p. 160). And he sees that regime as ' attempting to institutionalise a type of Indian policy similar to that practised in the United States ' (p. 107).

Mr Bourne, who produced an excellent biography of President Vargas in 1974,[1] gives us quite a different picture of the process of developing Brazilian Amazonia and its results. For one thing he went to Amazonia to see things for himself. He travelled extensively in the area and talked to what must have been hundreds of people, from high officials to lowly road-workers and settlers. He has also read widely, official literature and critical assessments alike, and in both English and Portuguese If he started out with any preconceived ideas he has clearly allowed his travels and observations, his conversations and his reading to compose a picture on which he makes his own measured judgments.

For those who may wonder what the objectives of successive Brazilian military governments in Amazonia might be, Mr. Bourne cites some of them on page 73 of his book—roads to provide an infrastructure for settlement; propaganda to awaken the rest of Brazil (and foreign investors) to the possibilities of the area; a colonisation programme; fiscal incentives to encourage industry and farming, and an aerial survey to pinpoint possible sources of minerals, which are already known to include bauxite, china clay, copper, iron ore, tin and uranium. He then considers in turn the road-

1 *Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883-1954 Sphinx of the Pampas* (London, Knight, 1974) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct 1975, p 631

building programme, organised settlement, the exploitation of minerals, ranching and the activities of multinational corporations, the Indians and the effects of development on the environment. Under each of these heads he carefully considers the validity of the objectives, the frequent failures to achieve them and the human and material abuses inherent in any frontier society. Not all the new roads yet serve a useful purpose; not all the settlement schemes have proved successful; not all private entrepreneurs, domestic and foreign, have behaved with sufficient social responsibility, although Mr. Bourne does not find their activities and influence as pervasive as Professor Davis would have them. Mr. Bourne also finds that, despite official federal policies, treatment of the Indians and of the environment has not always been sensible or satisfactory.

But, and here he differs again from Professor Davis, Mr Bourne also has something to say about successes He clearly feels that while not all efforts to protect the Indians have been successful, and despite (possibly inevitable) deficiencies, the National Indian Foundation and the Statute of the Indian are evidence that the Brazilian authorities are trying, and with some success, to deal humanely with the problems posed to the economic development of the Amazon basin by its aboriginal inhabitants Certainly he has nothing to say of ' the silent war ' or of the ' massive amount of disease, death and human suffering ' Professor Davis believes, at long range, to have been inflicted on the Amazonian Indians

On the environment, Mr Bourne points out that Brazil had actively promoted binational treaties with its neighbours for the conservation of Amazonia While not uncritical of some of the environmental effects of the penetration of Brazilian Amazonia, he writes that it should be stressed that ' around 90 per cent of Amazonia still remains virtually untouched and that, with the possible exception of the river flooding in 1975 and 1976, few adverse environmental effects of the human impacts so far can be confidently adduced ' (p. 206) For good measure, he comments that ' the rainforest is far from destroyed as yet ' (p. 279)

Mr. Bourne concludes what this reviewer found to be a book at once absorbing and encouraging by writing ' I have tried to be dispassionate in chronicling the different aspects of the contemporary assault in Amazonia; to explain why it is happening, who is involved, and how its style and direction have changed In drawing attention to greed and violent conflict one should not forget that the whole movement also contains many examples of patient labour, selflessness and idealism ' (p 295). It must be said that Mr. Bourne has amply succeeded in what he set out to do and that his book should henceforth be required reading for anyone proposing to pronounce on the present and future of Amazonia It is only unfortunate that here and there the text is marred by careless proof reading, and that on p. 214 the state of Rio Grande do Norte is named when reference is actually being made to the state of Espirito Santo.

N P MACDONALD

The Unsuspected Revolution: The Birth and Rise of Castroism. By Mario Llerena. *Ithaca, London Cornell University Press 1978 324 pp. £8·75.*

ANY book about Cuba which is as highly praised by Hugh Thomas as this one is in his foreword, commands attention and respect in advance This account of the origin and development of Castroism, supported as it is by the author's long standing acquaintance, and often friendships, with many of its leaders, as well as letters and documents during the two years when he was, in effect, the ambassador in the United States of the 26 of July Movement and, later, Chairman of the Movement's Committee in Exile, sheds much light on the subject; it also makes manifest the patent integrity of Mario Llerena. But it does not make clear whether it was Castro's

intention, when the *Granma* reached Cuba in 1956 and throughout the Sierra Maestra campaign, ultimately to make Cuba the first communist state of the Western Hemisphere. That that was the aim of some of Castro's supporters is almost certainly true; that there was duplicity, deceit and confusion is undoubted fact; that Castro was, and probably remains, an opportunist cannot be denied; but that he was a convinced and dedicated Marxist remains unproven. It is a pity that Dr. Llerena makes no reference to the opposition to Castro of the old guard Cuban communists in 1959 and 1960, or, for example, to the role and fate of Aníbal Escalante. Nor is there any reference to the reaction of the American government to the revolutionary government or to its effect on Castro.

Dr. Llerena, already disillusioned by August 1958, reveals himself to have been often shrewdly sceptical but, at times, naïve and almost gullible. Even his judgments today must occasionally be questioned. It is too easy, for example, to describe the Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 as ' pro-Communist ' (p. 207). It may well be true, but by no means certain, that the average standard of living in Cuba today is lower than it was; but as Dr Llerena says himself: ' some aspects of the organisation of Cuban society and the distribution of wealth certainly could have stood improvement ' (p 52) And in that respect, in terms, for example, of education and health services, the peasants and the poor are undoubtedly better off, even though the price in lost freedom and subservience to the Soviet Union has been too high. Dr. Llerena may be right in doubting whether Castroism will outlast Castro (pp. 251–52). But after twenty years in which a whole generation has been brought up to reject bourgeois values, good and bad, it must be doubted whether they will ever again be accepted in Cuba.

Professor Thomas is unquestionably right when he says that this book is ' compulsively readable ' and that future historians will turn to it ' as a first-class source . . .' (p 12). The three appendices are invaluable and the index useful and competent.

J. A. CAMACHO

A Critique of Arms Vol. I. By Régis Debray. Trans. by Rosemary Sheed. *Harmondsworth Penguin. 1977. (First publ Paris, 1974.) 315 pp. Pb: £2 95*

The Revolution on Trial: A Critique of Arms Vol. 2 By Régis Debray. Trans. by Rosemary Sheed. 1978. *(First publ. Paris, 1974) 364 pp. Pb. £3·95.*

RÉGIS DEBRAY'S first venture into describing revolutionary warfare in Latin America, *Revolution in the Revolution?*[1] was, at least, tersely argued and elegantly, if misleadingly, written. Volume 1 of *A Critique of Arms* reads rather like a long and rambling effort at half-hearted justification of his original theories.

One of the interesting parts of this book reproduces a letter from Althusser to Debray. Criticising Debray's original ideas, Althusser writes that ' your analysis of the concept of the guerrilla force is an *abstract* analysis, in as much as you analyse the concept of the guerrilla force (and its effects) *independently* of the *historical conditions* in which the guerrilla force exists ' (p. 263, his italics). While Debray admits the force of the argument, this first volume does little to take it into account. So, once again, the reader is regaled with such obvious insights as that ' the rigour of the revolutionary struggle requires iron discipline, pigheaded determination, and never-failing loyalty '. So, presumably, does the counter revolutionary struggle.

1 New York, London Monthly Review Press, 1967 Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct 1968, p 836

Although there is a long discussion of various Marxist texts on the need to link the guerrilla struggle with the popular struggle, Debray's discussion remains at the abstract level. The only country analysed in any detail (apart from a last chapter on Chile) is Cuba, and Cuba, we are told, changed the conditions for revolutionary struggle in the rest of Latin America. The chapter on Chile has, as most sections of this book, some interesting insights, but mostly old arguments are rehearsed and declared invalid; as Althusser points out, Debray is better at destroying the weaknesses of his opponents than at formulating his own specific propositions.

It is a pity that Debray does not, in this first volume, allow himself more scope for historical and class analysis. When he does come down from abstract heights his remarks are usually interesting but only partially satisfying—they are little more than points of departure for more sustained analysis. This analysis is surely necessary because unless Debray can establish that the guerrilla tradition is of central importance, then one is left wondering quite what all the fuss is about. However, this point, as so many others, is simply assumed by the author to be self-evident (he writes, in a typical throwaway aside, that ' when Che vanished from the scene, it became clear that everyone on the continent was in some sense a Guevarist ' (p 18). In *what* sense?)

The second volume, *The Revolution on Trial*, has many of the same faults as the first, even though one might expect more precise analysis since it is devoted to three case studies, Venezuela, Uruguay and Guatemala Throughout these case studies certain themes recur; the most important seems to be that the success or failure of guerrilla movements depends on the adoption of the correct revolutionary line. Guerrilla failures are analysed largely in terms of their own internal shortcomings. Any group opposed to revolutionary nationalism is denounced, though it is not at all clear why the forces of reaction remain so strong, apart from the failures of the guerrillas and the strength of American inspired counter insurgency techniques That may be true, say, for Guatemala, but seriously over simplifies Venezuela and Uruguay. Venezuelan parties cannot simply be written off as oligarchical offshoots and political conflict is not simply elite bickering Debray offers very little serious political analysis and his sociological analysis is mechanical

Yet there are aspects of his approach that command attention, especially when he is dealing with a guerrilla movement of undoubted extensive popularity like the Tupamaros in such a corrupt and dependent country as Uruguay had become. Because of his identification with such movements we have a clear idea of how the urban guerrillas viewed their task and what options they felt were open to them. It is also possible to follow in detail the development of the formidable counter-insurgency apparatus that came to dominate the state.

Debray's analysis of the urban and petty-bourgeois intellectuals who constituted the Tupamaros is far and away the most convincing. His analysis of rural movements is much more superficial. Uruguay is the most ' European ' of the countries he examines For all his self-declared intention to analyse the peculiarities of Latin American revolutionary movements, it is ironical that he should succeed most in the least typical of the countries he studies.

St. Antony's College, Oxford ALAN ANGELL

The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948-66. By John Samuel Fitch. *Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978. 243 pp. (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science 95th Series (1977) 1.) £10·50.*

THIS book combines two subjects: first, the role of the armed forces in the politics of Latin America, and second, the history of Ecuador during a stormy period of nearly twenty years. Both subjects are important and merit study and analysis; but when combined the result is of less value than would seem probable. The political life of Ecuador is very different from that of the larger and more important countries of Latin America. Viewed as a history, the book pays only scant attention to the external and economic forces which have mainly determined the development of Ecuador. Viewed as an analysis of the role of the military it is not wholly convincing and certainly unrepresentative of the remainder of Latin America. It is fair to say that the book is the result of an immense amount of research, including 'in depth' interviews with eighty key military men and nineteen political leaders, all of whom participated in one or more of the five revolts which overthrew the government during the period. But the validity of the statements made by these men in regard to their motives must be open to question; it is human to proclaim worthy motives and to conceal those that are ignoble. The author tells us that the CIA was active in Ecuador and employed a variety of 'dirty tricks' (p. 56); but apparently the activities of the agency played no part in the motivation of any of those interviewed. There are some forty tables, graphs and structural diagrams which do not do much to illumine the text, itself often verbose and opaque.

Roughly half way through the book Mr. Fitch finds it necessary to explain what he is trying to do: 'In the preceding chapters evidence has been presented that shows a clear relationship between military officers' perceptions of the state of the larger political system in terms of certain specified decision criteria, and their willingness to support or oppose the overthrow of the government in a military coup d'etat' (p. 99). Many may think he has based too much theory on too little substance. The notes are voluminous (pp. 187-220), the bibliography is impressive (pp. 221-226) but the index is barely adequate.

J. A CAMACHO

The British Caribbean: From the Decline of Colonialism to the End of Federation. By Elizabeth Wallace. *Toronto, Buffalo. University of Toronto Press 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Books Canada, London.) 274 pp. $17.50.*

Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960–70: Internal Security in a Developing Country. By Terry Lacey. *Manchester. Manchester University Press. 1977 184 pp. £8·50.*

MORE completely than anywhere else in the old Empire, the Commonwealth Caribbean territories were created by Britain. Their common history of slavery, exploitation, deep class-colour cleavages and mass poverty makes a prima facie case for generalisation. But this can only go so far; the striking imbalances between them in size, wealth, population and constitutional advancement coupled with acute particularist sensibilities born out of their history of mutual isolationism, makes detailed studies of each essential.

Of course, general historical surveys are extremely useful if only for reference. Elizabeth Wallace has attempted this, but despite the sub-title, her work is very heavily

biased towards a detailed account of the rise and fall of the West Indies Federation (1958-62). It is descriptive in manner and written without any pretence at theoretical political analysis or reference to any models of political behaviour. In doing so, it provides welcome information on detailed aspects of postwar Jamaican and Trinidadian politics, but inevitably covers much of the basic data gone over by others; after all, apart from the EEC, the West Indies Federation has perhaps received more coverage than any other attempt at regional organisation. From that point of view, her analyses of events not directly related to the experiment are more useful: for instance, her correct assertion that the split between Manley and Bustamante in Jamaica in 1942 set the future mould of Caribbean politics, namely, firmly rooted two party systems incorporating deep and essentially non policy differences, a quasi-fusion of unions and parties and a tradition of non-radical, insular charismatic leadership Furthermore, it was these factors which underlay the failure of the Federation rather than any action (or lack of it) by Britain except in its attempt to divorce political and economic considerations. Unfortunately, she does not expand on that crucial point, for no consideration is seriously given to the well-worn colonial dilemma of wishing to develop territories economically without granting ' premature ' political freedom

Redress is at hand with Terry Lacey's masterful study of political violence in Jamaica. A reworked PhD thesis, it records the sad state of public order and its widely observed relationship, perceived at the popular level, to the deeply entrenched two party system where armed gangs of hooligans have been openly used by rival politicians in the highest offices, particularly in the appalling slums of West Kingston, arguably among the worst in the Western Hemisphere This is done partially by statistical analysis whereby conclusions are drawn on the nature and incidence of violence in terms of its origins in Jamaica's social and political structure, and its economy, where exploitation by socially irresponsible entrepreneurs and foreign corporations is clearly apparent The facts speak for themselves: a ' lumpenproletariat ' of 150,000 (or 25 per cent of Kingston's population) with a greatly increased use of guns and drugs over the decade under observation The coincidental sharp growth in the Rastafarian cult amongst this class is also traced From being a minor mystical cult it began to express social and political consciousness in the attempt to build ' Africa ' in Jamaica; on the other hand, the bourgeoisie was noted for its ever-growing siege mentality and its ' subsequent retreat into a " laager " which was both physical and mental ' (p 78), a development that only served to further exacerbate the cleavages in Jamaican society. He also clearly differentiates between political and criminal violence and points out that once the 1967 election was over, the former partially turned into the latter since the by now armed ' lumpenproletariat ' were politically and socially aware, ' perhaps awakened a little to the implications of their own strength ' (pp. 93-94). The so called Rodney riots of 1968 were illustrative of this development, since as Lacey cogently argues, they were ' about looting, not shooting ' (p 99) Nor is the arena of the judiciary and police ignored: neither were willing to act against gangsters with known political connections. With such a heritage of internal security, it is not surprising that as the remarkable incidents of early 1978 showed—when the rapprochement between rival gang leaders was conducted outside the party political arena—the former patron-client relationship is gravely weakened. Is a new political force emerging?

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

A Guide to the Official Publications of the European Communities. By John Jeffries. *London: Mansell. 1978. 178 pp. £10·00.*

THE author, who is a librarian at the University of Kent, has already had considerable experience in dealing with the publications of the Communities. This guide should be of great value both to anyone organising a documentation centre and to research workers seeking particular pieces of information. The publications are described in relation to the institutional framework of the Communities except for those of the Commission which are in subject order. The appendices list sales offices and documentation centres all over the world. There is also a useful section spelling out abbreviations and acronyms.

It seems that the guide was mainly completed in 1975 and therefore is not as up-to-date as one would wish.

Chatham House D. H.

The Middle East and North Africa 1978–79. 25th edn. *London: Europa. 1978. 951 pp. £18·00.*

IT is perhaps not surprising that the three main topics treated in Part 1 of the latest edition of this reference book are the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil and the arms trade. They are competently surveyed by Michael Adams, Michael Field and Hanns Maull, respectively. Part 2 is as usual on regional organisations, Part 3 contains an up-to-date country by country survey and Part 4 includes a who's who and lists of journals and research institutes which deal with the area.

Chatham House D. H.

Africa South of the Sahara 1978–79. *London: Europa 1978. 1,256 pp £20·00.*

AS a convenient and reliable guide to the present state of the nearly fifty countries which make up Africa south of the Sahara, this directory is highly to be recommended. In addition there are ten background articles written by specialists, a section dealing with regional organisations and a who's who.

Chatham House D. H

NEW PERIODICAL

ABMEES: A Bibliography for Middle Eastern Economic Studies. Vol. I. Nos. 1 and 2, January 1979. Director: Professor H. Bowen-Jones. Editor: Dr. R I. Lawless. *Published by Oxford Microform Publications, Telford Road, Bicester, Oxon., for the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies at the University of Durham, in three annual issues per volume. Annual subscription £25·00/$60.00.*

THIS periodical is a bibliography of documents received by the Centre, structured by region, country and subject. Key documents, reproduced in full on microfiches, are also available to subscribers; the microfiche file can be obtained either as a complete ' Core ' collection or by ' Sectoral ' subject package, and all are fully referenced in *ABMEES* and indexed annually. Full details and samples are available from the publishers.

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Correction. On page 664 of the October 1978 issue of *International Affairs* the review of *The Marshall Plan Summer* by Thomas A. Bailey incorrectly criticised the book for saying that the Potsdam Protocol 'categorically stated' that 'It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria'. In fact these are the precise words used in the Protocol.

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THE DOLLAR AS A RESERVE CURRENCY *

Jeremy Morse **

THE dollar has passed through three main phases since the Second World War. The United States emerged from the War as the major world power, with the dominant economy and also, though not so obviously the dominant currency. Alastair Cooke recalled in a recent ' Letter from America ' a speech made by Ramsay MacDonald to a conference in London in 1934, which contained a plea to all the Europeans to give up trying to maintain their own currencies as independent units and to link them instead either to sterling or to the dollar. Within ten years they were no longer alternatives. During the War Britain built up debts in the form of sterling balances—which are still with us, and in about the same amount, because we have been unable to pay them off; but the United States by contrast, and unusually after a major war, emerged with its economy actually enhanced. It had increased the efficiency and the pre-eminence of its industry—so much so that only now, after about thirty years of peaceful competition, is the significance of its relatively low rate of productivity growth (a fundamental criterion) becoming apparent. Also at the end of the Second World War the United States had about 60 per cent of the world's reserves, with a very strong liquid position: its reserves greatly exceeded by any measure its liabilities.

However, in the late 1940s only 6 per cent of the world's reserves were held in dollars, while the percentage in sterling was much larger. In fact, the first phase, which began then, was seen as one of dollar shortage. (As this article will repeatedly show, statistics do not always clearly demonstrate the underlying facts, or the psychology, of the time.) The supremacy of the dollar was also veiled by the expression ' gold exchange system ', which was adopted to describe the Bretton Woods system. In fact the United States played the major part in designing that system, and but for the authority of Keynes probably no other country would have had a sizable voice in it. The United States expected that, because its economy would be strong, other countries would more often than not be wanting to devalue; so it chose a fixed-rate system which would limit devaluations against the dollar, and it had a very high quota in the new International Monetary Fund (IMF)—at one point over 30 per cent.

In the event, the system that the United States devised did not work very

* This is a transcript of a speech given at the Headquarters of the British Petroleum Company Ltd on Oct 31, 1978, under the auspices of the RIIA

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effectively at the start. IMF credits were little used, and would not have been sufficient to make the system work. Instead, America herself had to contribute generous transfers in the form of Marshall Aid, to assume the role of policing the world, and to sustain very substantial capital outflows. In statistical terms, as early as 1950 the official settlements balance of the United States was in equilibrium, i.e. capital outflows were matching the very large current account surplus; and throughout the 1950s it had an average official settlements balance of about minus one billion dollars, or a little more, each year. The figures thus suggest that there was no dollar shortage. In reality, however, there was—but it was suppressed because other countries were using import barriers and exchange controls which the United States was not, and they had not accepted convertibility which it had. America very comfortably financed this deficit of one billion dollars a year, half by selling gold, reducing its very large stock, which had been as high as 24 billion dollars-worth; and half by allowing a gentle rise in the dollar balances.

The turning-point between the first and second phases was the end of the 1950s, when the gold reserves of the United States still exceeded its liquid deficit, and when the proportion of world reserves held in dollars had risen from 6 per cent (in 1948) to about 19 per cent (in 1960). In 1958-59, however, the current account slipped into deficit for the first time and the Eisenhower administration promptly introduced a programme which included some deflation. Also at that time it was decided to set up the gold pool, whereby other countries, through their central banks, helped America to keep down the market price of gold. It was about then too that the dollar deficit, as opposed to a dollar shortage, began to be spoken of as a problem, while Japan and European countries felt strong enough to assume the obligation of convertibility.

America's prompt response, putting its current account in order and keeping inflation fairly low, led to some golden years in the early 1960s. Then came Vietnam—the most comprehensive disaster to hit any major nation since 1945, affecting it on all fronts, military, social, and economic; and with it came the inflation that resulted from the basic refusal to recognise that the country was at war and that its policies should be financed on that basis. However, for the 1960s as a whole the average annual deficit on official settlements, again made up of a current account surplus offset by capital and other outflows, was still only a little over one billion dollars—though in 1968-69 there was a massive repatriation of Eurodollars which helped to improve the average figures for the decade as a whole. This one billion dollar deficit differed fundamentally, however, from that of the 1950s; then all the restraints had been in the rest of the world; now the United States was trying to impose capital restraints to limit its official settlements deficit. These restrictions applied by the United States disguised the marked deterioration in the underlying position, and greatly promoted the development of the Euromarkets.

Not long after the turning-point of 1958-59 the first revaluations of other currencies occurred (the D-mark and the Dutch guilder in 1961). Nevertheless, the system was biased towards devaluation, as fixed-rate systems usually are, and because of this bias the dollar, as the centre of the system, tended to be over-valued. It might be said that in this second phase the dollar was still at the centre of a par-value system; but that, though the centrality of this role was more obvious, the dollar's underlying position in relation to other currencies was weakening—largely as a result of the initial generosity of the United States, and partly because deeper trends were surfacing. The gold-exchange standard was clearly becoming the dollar standard; America's liquid position had worsened; and the share of dollars in world reserves had risen by 1969 to 26 per cent (and probably about 36 per cent if Eurodollars are included). I can remember that at the end of this phase official advice to the British government about the monetary system was to the effect that ' we are on the dollar standard and the dollar is weak '. Periods of weakness, however, alternated with periods of strength.

Naturally, in these circumstances, American opinion was swinging strongly away from fixed rates and towards floating rates. It began to favour a system which would allow the United States to devalue if need be, as opposed to a system which would prevent or limit devaluations of other currencies against the dollar. This shift of opinion originated in academic circles, where there was strong support for floating rates; but it spread quite quickly, and by about 1968 the tide of opinion amongst those involved in government in America was moving towards ' floating '.

The turning-point between the second and third phases was the period 1970-72. During those three traumatic years, the United States still earned an overall current-account surplus, but the official settlements deficit, including capital and other outflows, rose to 52 billion dollars for the three years taken together, as compared with the very steady average annual deficit of one billion through the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, the course of events during those two decades had in some ways exemplified how a reserve currency system should be run. In such a system the reserve-currency country has to issue enough reserves to match the steady growth in world trade, which implies incurring a deficit. If the deficit is too large, then the amount of the reserve currency (dollars or pounds or whatever) in the world is too great and there is a reaction against it. Such a system therefore requires a small and rather steady overall deficit. General de Gaulle was fundamentally right when he questioned the reserve- currency system, since for reasons of self-interest the reserve-currency country, is likely after a time, to want to run larger deficits and to pay for them with its own currency. But it is notable for how long the United States did manage to maintain this fine balance—which has now been lost.

In 1973 came the collapse of the fixed-rate system and the end of official convertibility. This term has since vanished from the IMF Articles. There was always confusion between *official* convertibility, meaning that countries that

had pounds or dollars could go to the reserve centre and exchange them for something else—gold or another currency—and *market* convertibility, meaning that anybody who held dollars, even during this difficult period, could go and exchange them, at a price, in the market. The abandonment of official convertibility in 1971 was crucial, as was appreciated at the time. The first major effort of the Committee of Twenty, which came close to success in the summer of 1973, before the oil price rises were announced, was to try to rescue the par-value system, on the basis of a bargain that the United States would restore official convertibility—provided that in future the pressure for balance-of-payments adjustment would bear as much on surplus countries as on deficit countries, so that there would no longer be an in-built tendency for the central currency of the system to be overvalued by an excess of devaluations over revaluations. All that came to naught, however, and the present flexible-rate system, in which the dollar is inconvertible while remaining the principal currency, is substantially different from that which prevailed before 1971.

Under President Ford the immediate reaction of the United States to the dollar's weakness—as before under Eisenhower—was to put its house in order. Inflation was effectively curbed, and the dollar had two years comfortably ensconced in the middle of the new flexible-rate system. Under the Carter administration, however, inflation has begun to rise a little, up to the OECD average, and the external deficit has been very high: in 1977 there was a current-account deficit of 15 billion dollars and an overall official-settlements deficit of 35 billion.

But, as has already been observed, statistics can be misleading—and this is particularly true now. From the statistics it looks as though the dollar standard is more firmly entrenched in this third phase than it was in the second phase of its postwar history, or even in the first phase. Dollars held in the United States now account for 40 per cent of the world's reserves (about 126 billion dollars in 1977 figures). Besides these there are Eurodollars totalling almost 60 billion, so it could be said that 62 per cent of world reserves, including all the offshore holdings, are held in dollars. For percipient observers, however, the psychological watershed was crossed in August 1971. Even before that, during the 1968 discussions about arrangements for running down the reserve role of sterling, Guido Carli, the then Governor of the Bank of Italy, suggested that similar provisions should be considered for the dollar. It was decided, however, to proceed first with the more urgent problem of sterling, recognising that to devise arrangements for the dollar would take much longer.

Nowadays the idea of moving away from the dollar as the sole pillar of the system is broadly accepted, and it is easy to forget what a great psychological change has occurred. In 1970-71 many people, including respectable economists, believed that the dollar could not devalue within the system; not just that it would be inexpedient to devalue because it would upset things—which had also been thought about the pound—but that it actually could not be

done within the system. During this third phase—that of inconvertibility, floating exchange rates, and wide currency movements—the world has in fact in many ways begun to look on the dollar much more as it looks upon other currencies.

The last period of serious weakness of the dollar at the beginning of the 1970s arose because of problems with the capital account—not the current account, which was showing only a small deficit. The present dollar crisis, however, involves a big current-account deficit, like the sterling crises of 1968–70 and 1975–76; and the market is treating it along similar lines. That is to say that confidence is not likely to be restored until the current account is clearly on the mend. Nor is the United States generally expected to regain that fine balance of distributing just one billion dollars a year to the rest of the world. In any case, too many dollars have already been put out into the world: on the basis of the IMF figures the excess of liabilities over claims is now in twelve figures of dollars. The psychological environment reminds me of that which surrounded sterling in the 1960s. Most official holders of dollars would like the American economy to be strong, thus restoring some stability, removing the need to diversify and allowing them to sleep at nights; but they doubt whether this will in fact be done.

Although the situation is akin to that of sterling in the mid-1960s, there is no question of the dollar being run down as a reserve currency in the next ten years in the way that sterling was. There are three reasons for this: first, the sums involved are very much larger; second, and even more important, whereas the dollar was an obvious alternative to sterling, there is no comparable alternative to the dollar; and third, dollars are held by all the major countries, and though some sterling area countries had sizable holdings of sterling, the major countries of the world did not. The significance of this last point shows up in the present pattern of reserve diversification: smaller countries, particularly oil-exporting or Latin American countries, are reducing the proportion of dollars in their reserves by selling some if they are running a deficit, and by taking fewer if they are running a surplus. But the effects of this can quite easily be offset in one day by Germany deciding to take in a billion in order to hold its exchange rate steady. A recent assessment by Morgan Guaranty makes the point that this pattern is unlikely to change very quickly—the German authorities are not yet seeking to hold yen, nor the Japanese to hold D-marks. Clearly the problem is of a totally different order from the sterling problem.

Nevertheless, diversification has begun and will continue for many years to come, depending on the strength of the dollar in the meantime. Almost all countries would feel more comfortable if the proportion of dollars in their total reserves were reduced to a lower level. In the case of sterling the desired level was generally as low as 10–20 per cent, and the run-down took seven or eight years to achieve; in the case of the dollar the percentage may be higher, but it will take longer to achieve. During periods when the dollar is strong only a few

far-sighted countries will be shifting out of dollars; when the dollar is weak, the pressure will be intensified.

The question arises, what will be held instead of the dollar? And what will be the repercussions of this shift? First, the reserve-currency role of the D-mark and the yen will reluctantly be allowed to grow. Official D-mark balances are worth a little more than seven billion dollars, and Euro-D-mark balances held by countries might double that figure: official yen balances are somewhat less. Perhaps D-mark and yen balances together represent about the same proportion of world reserves that the dollar represented in 1945. Second, more Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) will be issued. During 1978 both the United States and Germany abandoned their previous objections to a further issue of SDRs, almost entirely as a result of the weakness of the dollar. (The case for issuing more reserves was not based on the volume of reserves in the world—but in a world where there is a variety of reserve assets, with at present too many dollars, some surplus countries would rather acquire SDRs than dollars. And it could also be useful for the United States, though they would not want to advertise the point, to be able occasionally to finance their deficit with something other than dollars). Lastly, there is a possible European currency, and perhaps some others that have yet to be thought of. On the question of how we may move gradually away from the dollar system, one mechanism that might be helpful is a substitution account. This is a good idea that ought to be developed. Also it must not be forgotten that, once the world is no longer adding to dollar reserves, inflation will, in the course of time, whittle down the proportion of dollars in world reserves, as has happened with the franc and pound sterling. Even these lesser reserve currencies have never wholly vanished, but they have become an ever smaller and less troublesome part of the whole reserve scene. The dollar's residual role is likely to be larger.

It is impossible to discern precisely which reserve assets will replace or share the role of the dollar, or in what proportions; but from the way that attempts to tackle the problem are developing it is evident that a multiplicity of solutions will emerge. There will not be one grand solution, and as the process goes forward the pattern may change. On paper the SDR is the most logical replacement, because if most of the world's reserves could be put into an asset which moved in the middle of currencies there would tend to be less diversification and less disturbance. It will be a long time, however, before the SDR is fully accepted as an actuality by central banks, let alone the possibility of its being held and used more widely in the market. That will come only slowly.

It is against a broad background of the kind I have described that the European Monetary System (EMS) needs to be judged. For five or six years the Western world has been stuck in a mixture of inflation and unemployment, which has been bad for confidence, and hence for investment and growth. There has also been severe exchange instability, which is likely to recur periodically as the world moves away from the dollar as the sole pillar of the

system. In the face of these problems, the EMS has been presented as having two basic aims relevant to their solution—though since the Bremen meeting in July 1978 they have sometimes almost disappeared from sight.

The first aim is to establish a zone of stability in Europe and so reduce within Europe the divisive effects of exchange flows. Some argue that this would also help to calm exchange fluctuations in the rest of the world. This point is more debatable. The case for it has been well put by Luc Wauters of the Kredietbank, on the lines that if there is a general diminution of expectations that, for example, the D-mark is going to move in one direction and the Italian lira in another, there will be less incentive for exchange flows in the world as a whole, and particularly for flows in and out of the dollar. Against this it is sometimes argued that these flows will go on just as strongly, but that if Europe could, like a hedgehog, roll itself into a ball with its prickles bristling, all these flows would pass over its back, leaving Japan to feel their full force. This prospect worries some Japanese observers of the EMS, but in my view it is unlikely to materialise. The European system will succeed only insofar as exchange-rate flows are reduced in the world as a whole, as well as within Europe.

The second basic aim of the EMS is a co-operative effort further to reduce inflation, so improving the chances of escaping from stagflation and of returning to soundly based and sustainable growth in moderate cycles such as was enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s.

Although both these aims meet with general approval, many people question whether the mechanisms proposed are adequate to attain such high aims and whether they are timely. In the negotiation of the EMS so far too much weight has been given to questions relating to exchange rates and intervention; the choices among different types of snake, and the argument between the grid and the basket, are technically important but they have received a disproportionate amount of attention. The blame for this lies partly with Germany and France whose haste to begin operating the EMS by the start of 1979 has resulted in the fundamental and long-term aspects of the scheme being obscured, particularly in its presentation to the public.

These fundamental aspects were sketched out in the Werner Plan but have been developed more clearly in the EMS, which can be seen as a form of Bretton Woods system for Europe. They comprise the development of the ECU (European Currency Unit), and the establishment of a European Fund to provide medium-term credit; and most important, a renewed effort to bring the European economies together by coordinating policies, particularly on inflation but also on the whole complex of inflation, unemployment, and growth. This last is the most important and fundamental element, because unless the economies converge no system of par values can be made to work—certainly not in the modern world.

In all these respects, what is proposed in the EMS is an advance on the effort that was made under the Werner Plan, of which all that eventually remained

was the ' snake '. The EMS may be regarded as the second (but probably not the final) effort towards achieving a convergence which will eventually lead to economic integration in Europe. In the negotiations Britain, among others, rightly insisted that some advance on Werner was essential, and that if a new system was to be established it must be durable enough, and gain enough ground on previous efforts, to provide a basis for a further advance later. The timing of the initiative was not ideal, and there was obvious scope for hesitation and for criticism. It would have been preferable if the quite marked convergence that had occurred could have been even greater: inflation rates were only ten percentage points apart in Europe in 1978, compared with twenty in 1975, but the gap was still large. It would also have been helpful if the dollar storm had died down, because it is commonly accepted now that when dollars are flowing around the world in very great amounts the European currencies tend to be driven apart. But on the other hand a start needed to be made, even if its timing was not particularly propitious.

What is now important is that Britain should join the scheme. Our position today is quite different from that of the 1960s and early 1970s when the exchange rate was chronically weak, and from that of 1974-75 when the inflation rate was allowed to get wildly out of hand. Our inflation is now back to the OECD average, and North Sea oil provides an opportunity to maintain a stable exchange rate. Britain should be in the scheme, trying to make it work, both for the general good of the scheme and in the national interest. The EMS would be enhanced by British membership for several reasons: sterling would be an important stabilising element in the currency mix; if a D-mark zone in Europe is to be avoided, sterling as well as the French franc and the lira needs to be in the EMS; and Britain could make a useful contribution both in technical matters and in promoting the longer-term aspects. From Britain's own point of view, membership would reinforce the aim of bringing down inflation, and it would assist endeavours to achieve improvements in other areas of the Community such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Community budget. Britain could also be sharing in an effort to build a better world base. To sum it all up in a French phrase—' les absents ont toujours tort '.

So to recapitulate, the reserve role of the dollar is beginning to decline; at this stage its trade and intervention roles are virtually unimpaired; and as the currency of the major economy in the world the dollar is still pre-eminent and firmly based. Anthony Tuke described the matter perfectly following a session with Secretary Blumenthal at last year's meeting of the International Monetary Conference (IMC) in Mexico, which had ended on a rather gloomy note. He turned to the Secretary and said, ' I'd like you to know, Mr Secretary, that for most of us bankers the dollar is still the sun in the sky.' There is an afternoon ring about ' *still* the sun in the sky ' which expresses the position exactly. For the dollar it is neither morning nor evening, but afternoon.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT

James Barber *

ECONOMIC sanctions are economic measures directed to political objectives. They are normally supplemented by other measures, such as the severance or restriction of diplomatic and cultural ties; but unless otherwise stated the use of the term ' sanctions ' in this paper refers only to economic sanctions. Sanctions are sometimes employed in addition to force, but here we are primarily considering situations short of war. Not that the distinction is always easy to draw—many Arab states have, for example, imposed sanctions against Israel, but they see these sanctions as the economic dimension of a wider war effort.

Indeed, the relationship between sanctions and the use of force is fraught with ambiguity. Whilst some advocates of sanctions see them as an alternative to force, there is a contrary view that sanctions can only be effective when force is available and ready to be used if required. This ambiguity has naturally led sometimes to confusion: for example, when the League of Nations was preparing in 1935 to impose sanctions against Italy some members were opposed to blocking the Suez Canal or cutting communications with Italy because the League was ' a great instrument of peace '. In contrast others believed that ' collective security '—the prevailing doctrine of the day—could only be ensured if force were available. This ambiguity, or double thinking, was exemplified in the case of Stanley Baldwin, the British Prime Minister of the time. According to Winston Churchill, Baldwin felt ' that Sanctions meant war; secondly he was resolved there must be no war; and thirdly, he decided upon Sanctions '.[1]

Some of those who oppose the use of force argue from the importance of moral factors in international relations, emphasising collective action to sustain prevailing international norms. Woodrow Wilson expounded this idea in Paris in December 1918 when he spoke of ' the organized moral force of man ' working throughout the world so that ' whenever and wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them, and men everywhere will ask, " what are the purposes that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world?" Just a little

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1 *The Second World War.* Vol 1: *The Gathering Storm* (London: Cassell, 1948), p 137.

exposure will settle most questions '.[2] Other supporters of sanctions are more pragmatic. They recognise that sanctions provide only a limited instrument but they emphasise the need to take account of means as well as ends; and they argue that in many situations force may be an unacceptable method. Particularly influential has been the assumption of a simple and direct relationship between economic activity and political behaviour, whereby the authority of a political regime is believed to depend ultimately upon its economic strength.

One way of looking at sanctions is to note the number of states involved. The initiative in imposing international sanctions normally rests on one or two particular governments; but to make the sanctions effective they usually attempt to recruit other states and to involve international agencies. Thus sanctions may be employed by a single government—the United States against China; or by a group of states—for example, the Eastern bloc against Yugoslavia; or by the international community as a whole working through an international organisation—the League of Nations against Italy. The range of sanctions and the intensity with which they are imposed also varies considerably. Apart from the question of the number of states imposing the sanctions there is also the question whether the sanctions are employed selectively, concentrating on a particular aspect of the economy such as oil supplies, or whether they are applied on a much wider basis. Another issue is that of the authority which backs the sanctions. This may be only a recommendation by an international agency to its member states—and inside a state by a government to business organisations—or alternatively there may be an attempt to make the sanctions mandatory, even to the extent of imposing them by law. Rhodesia is the only case in which an effort has been made to maximise sanctions on each of these three scales—universal, comprehensive and mandatory. It took thirty months to reach that position, and even then the application of sanctions did not gain universal support.

The objectives of sanctions

In each case in which sanctions have been applied there appear at first sight to be clear objectives relating to changes in the behaviour of the government against whom they are directed. It is these objectives which are emphasised by those imposing the sanctions. But in reality the issues are much less clear cut, as for instance in three leading cases—League of Nations sanctions against Italy, United States sanctions against Cuba, and British sanctions against Rhodesia.

In the Italian case, one of the chief themes of speeches at the League of Nations was the need to protect the small state of Abyssinia against the aggression of a larger one. This was the ostensible issue. Yet when he was writing about the affair in his memoirs Viscount Templeford—who as Sir

2 *War and Peace Presidential Messages, Addresses and Other Papers 1917-1923* Edited by Roy Stannard Baker and William E Dodd (London Harper, 1927)

Samuel Hoare had been British Foreign Secretary at the time—paid little attention to it. The dispute between Italy and Abyssinia, he wrote, ' seemed likely to involve Europe and the world in a very serious crisis '. It was important to settle the dispute, among other reasons, because of Britain's obligations to the League; in order to safeguard British interests on the Upper Nile; to retain Britain's traditional friendship with Italy—which was important in guaranteeing the Mediterranean route for British communications with the Middle and Far East; to avoid a rupture with France, and to make it unnecessary for France to keep an army on the Italian border; to ensure that Mussolini was not thrown into Hitler's arms; and because there was an increasing threat of war in the Far East arising from Japanese aggression. With all these factors in play, when Hoare discussed the proposed sanctions with Laval, the French Foreign Minister, they agreed on a double approach: ' On the one hand, a most patient and cautious negotiation that would keep him (Mussolini) on the Allied side; on the other, the creation of a united front at Geneva (the League of Nations) as a necessary deterrent against German aggression.'[3]

In the case of American sanctions against Cuba there was a similar diversity of considerations. George Ball, the then Under-Secretary of State, has set forth four main reasons for the American action: to reduce the will and ability of the Cuban regime to export subversion and violence, to make plain to the Cuban people—and to sections within the regime—that a policy of revolution could not serve their interests, to demonstrate to the whole American continent that Communism had no future in the Western hemisphere, and to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining an outpost in the West.[4] But there were also a number of other reasons, including such domestic considerations as the hopes of candidates for Congress that an anti-Castro stand would gain them support in the election. Indeed these factors entered into the presidential election campaign. Two weeks before polling day, in an attempt to help Nixon, President Eisenhower announced a ban on exports to Cuba, while Kennedy promised ' to do something about Fidel Castro '—a promise that may have contributed to the Bay of Pigs fiasco.[5]

In the case of British sanctions against Rhodesia, when Harold Wilson announced the imposition of sanctions he told the House of Commons that ' our purpose is to restore a situation in Rhodesia in which there can be untrammeled loyalty and allegiance to the Crown and in which there can be, within whatever rules this House lays down, a free Government of Rhodesia acting in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a whole '.[6] However, Wilson also spoke of his fears—the fear that the Commonwealth could

3. *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954), p. 152.

4. See Margaret Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1971), p. 41.

5. See Anna P. Schreiber, ' Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy ', *World Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1973, p. 405.

6. *Hansard*, Nov. 11, 1965, Vol. 720, No. 3, Col. 359.

disintegrate if the problem were not settled, and the fear that if Britain did not seize the initiative others would, who might embark on ' dangerous courses of action which we should all reject '. There was, he said, a struggle for the soul of Africa; and in such a struggle he did not want to see a ' Red army in blue berets ' entering Rhodesia. Two days after that Commons debate Richard Crossman reflected on the situation in his diary. According to Crossman, Wilson saw Rhodesia as a great test of his statesmanship—but at the same time the Prime Minister did not forget the party-political situation at home. He was determined, wrote Crossman, ' not to leave his flank open to Heath, and make sure that we (the Labour Government) can't be blamed for UDI '. There was, however, according to Crossman, a split inside the Cabinet about the potential effectiveness of sanctions in achieving their ends. Some ministers were sceptical but others, like Barbara Castle, acted as Wilson's conscience, urging the imposition of sanctions against the White regime.[7]

Primary, secondary and tertiary objectives

The study of particular cases of sanctions makes clear that the objectives for which sanctions are imposed are far from simple or straightforward. They can broadly be grouped into three categories. There are ' primary objectives ' which are concerned with the actions and behaviour of the state or regime against whom the sanctions are directed—the ' target state '. There are ' secondary objectives ' relating to the status, behaviour and expectations of the government(s) imposing the sanctions—the ' imposing state '. And there are ' tertiary objectives ', concerned with broader international considerations, relating either to the structure and operation of the international system as a whole or to those parts of it which are regarded as important by the imposing states.

Examples of all three categories can be found in the cases given above. It was a primary objective of sanctions to stop Italy attacking Abyssinia, and to return Rhodesia to legality; it was a secondary objective for American politicians to seek to gain domestic support by taking action against Cuba, and for the Labour government to counter attacks by the Conservatives over Rhodesia; and it was a tertiary objective for Britain to seek to demonstrate the utility of the League of Nations in the Abyssinian crisis, and for the Americans to seek in Cuba to stop the spread of communism to the Western Hemisphere.

The diversity of objectives in the application of sanctions tends to be made plain if they become long drawn-out after the customary hopes for short, sharp action are disappointed. At first the primary objectives usually emerge most strongly, but even this is not always clear-cut. When the Soviet Union—supported by the other states of the Eastern bloc—imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia in 1948, the primary aim of achieving changes within Yugoslavia were clearly accompanied by the secondary and tertiary objectives of ensuring

7. *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister* Vol I. *Minister of Housing 1964-66* (London: Hamish Hamilton/Cape, 1975), pp 377-78

that the Eastern bloc held firm and that the Soviet Union continued to enjoy the advantages it gained from its 'hegemony.' For the Russians, the importance of Tito's independence was not only what it implied within Yugoslavia, but also the fact that it challenged Stalin's expectations of a disciplined subordination to the Soviet Union: to have ignored Tito's actions could have jeopardised the whole structure by encouraging others to display a similar independence. Yugoslavia's attempt to base its economic development upon a concept of national interest, including ambitious plans for industrialisation, also challenged the Russians' preferred economic strategy by which the Soviet Union would supply the products of heavy industry while Yugoslavia concentrated on developing its rich mineral resources. The Yugoslavian economic 'deviation' extended to a refusal by it to establish a range of joint co-operative ventures similar to those operating in other Peoples' Democracies to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Summarising the situation, Stephen Clissold has pointed out that 'The immediate causes of the . . . rift might seem trivial, but the Kremlin saw in them the culmination of insubordination and the expression of an arrogant and intractable frame of mind stretching back to the conduct of the wartime partisan struggle and now constituting an obstacle to the Russians' designs for complete domination on their own terms of Eastern Europe.'[8]

An instance of the way in which different, and sometimes competing, sets of objectives can be entertained within the same government is supplied by the case of British sanctions against Italy. As has been seen, one of the considerations in the mind of the British government was the desire to demonstrate Britain's commitment to the League of Nations. Another was to respond to the strong public reaction against Italian aggression. During the 1935 election campaign—which resulted in the return of the National government with a handsome majority—the government took its stand on support for the League and against aggression. Before the outcome of the election was known, action against Italy had been agreed at the League—and four days after the election limited sanctions were imposed. But they did not include an oil embargo, which was widely believed to be the most effective sanction. To Hoare's private comment that failure to introduce the oil embargo would be letting down the League, and that public opinion would not stand it, Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary—replied that 'the Government had won the election decisively. They no longer had to angle for votes from the left wing and could do what they liked . . . all the official world, outside the Foreign Office (and many within it) are against sanctions, and especially oil sanctions'. On the position at the League, Hankey argued that Britain could not be expected to act alone. Four of the Great Powers—the United States, Germany, Japan and Italy—were for one reason or another

8. *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 1939–1973: A Documentary Survey* (London: Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1975), p. 50.

outside or opposed to the action, and of the three that had demonstrated support—Russia, France and Britain—only Britain had the capacity to act.[9]

This difference of approach between Hankey and Hoare did not exhaust the full range of views within Britain or even within the government. Harold Macmillan noted others in connection with a speech by Hoare in Geneva, favouring a firm stand by the League. This speech, which was made before the election, won widespread support, for a variety of reasons—Baldwin, the Prime Minister, hoped it would encourage rearmament by consent; Churchill saw it as strengthening the League as an instrument to secure a European coalition against Hitler; Lord Robert Cecil and his League zealots believed it was a return to the pure doctrine of the Covenant; devotees of the Empire, like Dawson—the editor of *The Times*—were encouraged by a firm stand to protect British interests in Africa; and the general public was heartened by it as an apparently strong response to the increasingly dangerous climate in international relations.[10]

To this diversity of views in Britain—which strikingly exhibits the mixture of primary with secondary and tertiary objectives—should be added the further range of views held in France, Britain's chief ally in the League. The French were even more reluctant than the British to alienate Italy. French governments of the 1930s were crippled by indecision, and they were haunted by the spectre of a revived, militant Germany. To many Frenchmen, and to none less than Laval, Italy was an important European ally who should not be offended. During the sanctions crisis Laval kept in regular contact with the Italian government, assuring it that any action France might take would only be nominal. The French reluctantly accepted that they had to keep reasonably near to their major ally, Britain, and that they could not be seen to be undermining the League. For their part the British government argued that they could go no further than the French. It was a case of two horses fretting in a single harness, jostling each other but wanting to give the impression that they were pulling hard and in unison.

When economic sanctions are applied over a lengthy period the relative weight of these different categories of objectives may shift. This is clearly illustrated in British sanctions against Rhodesia. British objectives were, as we have seen, thoroughly mixed from the beginning, but at first there was a clear commitment to such primary aims as returning Rhodesia to legality and making unimpeded progress to majority rule. Yet George Thompson, Secretary of State for the Commonwealth at the time, has admitted that hopes of achieving these primary objectives had largely been abandoned by early 1968. Giving evidence to the Bingham Commission investigating the breaking of oil sanctions, Lord Thompson said that the British government came to realise

> that we couldn't bring the Rhodesian Government to an end by sanctions,

9. See, Stephen W Roskill, *Hankey Man of Secrets* (London, Collins, 1974), p 187
10. *Winds of Change 1914 1939* Memoirs, Vol I (London Macmillan, 1966), pp 436-38.

> unless we were prepared to apply them to South Africa. We were under no circumstances prepared to do that, and therefore the more we went into the repeated problems of the allegations about oil from British companies reaching Rhodesia the more we came to the conclusion . . . that the best we could make of a bad job . . . was to be in a position to say at least that there was no oil from British companies reaching Rhodesia.

Later Lord Thompson, who acknowledged that sufficient oil had continued to reach Rhodesia because of a ' swap arrangement ' made by the British companies, stated that had the British government acquiesced in British companies supplying the oil direct ' then it would have done us immense harm at the United Nations and elsewhere '.[11] It is clear from Lord Thompson's evidence that in Rhodesia secondary objectives were becoming predominant as hopes of achieving the primary objectives inside Rhodesia dwindled.

The limitations of sanctions in achieving primary objectives

The primary objectives of sanctions are, as we have seen, those that tend to be given the most emphasis in the imposing state; and they have also received the most attention in studies of sanctions. These primary objectives are themselves diverse. They may include attempts to induce internal political change within the target state—as the United States sought successfully to do in the Dominican Republic, and Britain failed to do in Rhodesia. They may be directed to forcing an erring member of a regional alliance back into the fold, as the Russians tried to achieve with Yugoslavia. They may be designed to deter the target state from some action beyond its borders—which is what the League of Nations attempted against Italy, and the United States sought to do against Japan in the 1930s. They may seek to weaken or punish the target state, as in the case of the Arab boycott of Israel, or they may be intended to force a target state to accept broadly agreed international norms, as in the argument over sanctions against South Africa.

Even after categorising and identifying as precisely as possible the purposes for which sanctions have been applied it is difficult to evaluate their effectiveness—for their application cannot be isolated from other factors. Circumstances and objectives change over time, and there is always a diversity of objectives against which success or failure may be measured. Yet, even taking these difficulties into account, there is a striking consensus in the literature that economic sanctions alone have been ineffective in the fulfilment of their primary objectives. Johan Galtung has commented that, although sanctions had been ineffective in the case he was studying (Rhodesia) this should not ' be taken to imply that there are no conditions under which economic sanctions will work '[12] And other authors have identified important

11 *Report on the Supply of Petroleum Products to Rhodesia* (Bingham Report), FCO (London. HMSO, 1978).

12. ' On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia ', *World Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 3, April 1967, pp. 378–416.

and damaging side-effects of sanctions such as the denial of international legitimacy and the encouragement of revolutionary groups—effects which may not always have been intended when the sanctions were imposed but which have had an adverse impact upon the target state. These qualifications deserve attention. But the point made by most authors is that it is a mistake to expect economic sanctions alone to achieve the desired primary objectives. Sanctions should rather be implemented as part of a broader strategy: otherwise they become the ' victims of over-expectation '.[13] Such a broader strategy might include diplomatic efforts—the isolation of the target state, denying the legitimacy either of a regime or of its particular actions so that its will to resist is eroded and other states are deterred from renewing contact or supporting it. This was, for instance, the policy of the ' Stimson doctrine '—so called after the American Secretary of State—adopted by the United States against Japan in the 1930s. An important aspect of this was the American determination simply to refuse to recognise any of Japan's territorial conquests in China.

The constant pressure of having sanctions imposed upon it, together with the isolation and challenge to its values, especially when this is sustained over a period, may undermine the self-confidence of the target state and encourage its opponents. Seen in this light economic sanctions may thus be regarded as a contributing factor, if not the main element, in pressuring a target state into changing its behaviour or in creating conditions which may make other pressures more effective. In his study of Rhodesian sanctions Harry Strack concluded that ' In terms of political achievements, sanctions must be regarded as a marginal instrument of influence best employed in conjunction with other means of influence such as armed force—especially if political results are desired in the short run.' But he believed that when majority rule is achieved in Rhodesia, even if it comes mainly through guerrilla war, ' the United Nations will still be able to claim success for its sanctions program as having been a contributing factor '.[14]

Such qualifications may doubtless enable us to avoid the risk of creating excessive expectations; but if sanctions are in practice, to be brought to bear, governments obviously have to be able to rally sufficient enthusiasm and commitment to win support for them, sometimes among people who will themselves suffer. The more muted the rallying cries—the more sanctions are presented as an instrument of limited effort—the more difficult it may be to motivate people to participate in them. Nevertheless, the difficulties must be faced, and in general there seems to be a wide measure of agreement among scholars that economic sanctions alone have seldom if ever achieved their primary aims. In a general survey of sanctions Margaret Doxey concluded that ' in none of the cases analysed in this study have economic sanctions succeeded in producing the desired political result '. Rather, she argued, international

13 C Lloyd Brown John, *Multilateral Sanctions in International Law A Comparative Analysis* (New York. Praeger, 1975), p 3

14 *Sanctions The Case of Rhodesia* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1978), p 253.

ostracism reduced the chances of a settlement by limiting the channels of communication and by making understanding more difficult to achieve.[15] Turning to particular cases, Anna Schreiber concluded that American sanctions against Cuba had the reverse effect of that intended, for they helped to bolster Castro's position and opened up opportunities for Russian involvement.[16] In the case of the Dominican Republic, although Schreiber accepted that sanctions helped to topple the Trujillo family regime, it has been replaced by governments which are no more acceptable to the Americans. Even authors who have noted some measure of success for sanctions have reached similar conclusions about the attainment of primary objectives in the cases they investigated. For example, of three authors who studied the Rhodesian case, Galtung wrote that ' the effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative ';[17] Leonard Kapungu, that ' in no way can the Rhodesian rebellion be said to have weakened by economic sanctions; in fact economic sanctions have welded together the Rhodesian conservative element in support of the survival of the regime ';[18] and Harry Strack, that ' scholars who have studied the use of sanctions to secure various policy objectives in the international system have generally concluded that they are ineffective and may be counter-productive. Study of the Rhodesian case confirms their conclusions '.[19]

Nonetheless, failure to achieve their primary aims should not be taken to imply that the sanctions have had little economic effect upon the target state. In some instances that effect has been substantial. In the case of Yugoslavia, trade and the implementation of the Five Year Plan was heavily dependent upon the Eastern bloc—in 1948, 51 per cent of Yugoslavia's exports went to the Communist states and 46 per cent of imports came from them. Stalin's economic blockade strangled this commerce and forced the Yugoslav government to abandon its Five Year Plan, bringing the country close to bankruptcy. American sanctions against Cuba also had a considerable impact. The United States government followed up its ban on the import of Cuban sugar with a ban on almost all exports—and while the Soviet Union quickly filled part of the gap and even some Western states continued to trade with Cuba, the country's dependence on American markets had been so great that the Cuban economy was severely damaged. Equally in Rhodesia—although there was help from South Africa and although international sanctions have never been watertight—some important sectors of the economy, such as the tobacco industry, suffered acutely, and Rhodesia has had a chronic problem of foreign exchange exacerbated by the heavy expenditure of the guerrilla war.

The threat of sanctions to the economic interests of the target states cannot therefore be taken lightly—indeed it was the threat rather than the

15. Doxey, *op cit*, p. 140
16. Schreiber, *op cit.*, p. 404
17. Galtung, *op cit.*, p. 409
18. *The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia* (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1973), p. 128
19. Strack, *op cit.*, p. 238.

implementation of sanctions that settled a boundary dispute between Albania and Yugoslavia which arose after the First World War. Until November 1921 Yugoslavia had refused the Paris Peace Conference decision to retain the 1913 boundaries. Then Britain demanded that the League Council be called to consider sanctions and almost immediately Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw to the old line.[20] In that case the threat was enough: but when sanctions actually are imposed the situation changes. The issue then becomes one of how the imposing states can achieve political results by economic pressures; and for the target state one of how it can resist the proposed political changes even if it suffers economically.

Why has it been so difficult to achieve the primary objectives of sanctions? There is no simple answer. The single most important reason appears to be the failure of the imposing states to anticipate fully the response to sanctions within the target state. Galtung writes of a ' naïve theory ' according to which a roughly proportional relationship was assumed between economic deprivation and political disintegration[21]; while Hugh Thomas noted that in the Rhodesian case British civil servants at the Department of Economic Affairs advised that when the national income declined to a point that could roughly be assessed, White Rhodesians would accept that ' the game was no longer worthwhile '.[22] These assumptions of political collapse following hard upon economic disaster have proved to be unfounded. Indeed economic sanctions have generally had the opposite effect of creating a sense of community and solidarity in the target state. We have already noted Leonard Kapungu's comment on Rhodesia. Similarly, in Italy in the 1930s Christopher Hibbert has described how the people rallied round the Duce.

> Old ladies sent him their jewellery to help him pay for his war, and young men said they would gladly die in it by suicidal air-raids on the British Fleet. Many former liberals supported the war, and the Church did not oppose it. Several former anti-facists living in voluntary exile returned to support their country in her hour of need.[23]

In postwar Yugoslavia and Albania, both subject to sanctions by Communist states, the effect was to foster national unity in resisting outside pressures. In Cuba, Schreiber noted that although the economic impact was severe it gave the government an excuse for its failings and it helped to build Castro into a national hero, standing up to the ' North American giant ' and the ' imperialist blockade '.

Within the target state, therefore, sanctions tend to create a psychological climate which is similar to a war-time spirit of resistance. And this may be of critical significance in a situation in which ' economic sanctions are a battle of

20 Mervin Frost, ' Collective Sanctions in International Relations An historical overview of the theory and practice (Seminar Paper— Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg)

21 Galtung, *op cit* , p. 386

22 Quoted in Doxey, *op cit* , p 130.

23 Christopher Hibbert, *Benito Mussolini* Rev edn (Harmondsworth Penguin, 1965), p 92

confidence between the (target) states and the international community '.[24] Reluctance to accept change may become even stronger, and the population may be ready to accept a high degree of economic punishment. The alternatives which are offered to them—whether it is abandoning Italian imperial aspirations, or dissolving the Castro government in Cuba, or accepting Black rule in Rhodesia, or replacing the Jewish state of Israel with a secular Palestine, may appear so unattractive that the privations of sanctions are well worth bearing.

Naturally, target states also try to take the edge off the economic impact of sanctions by stockpiling, by finding alternative markets and suppliers, by diversifying the domestic economy, by buying illegally even if this is more expensive, and by diverting the economic impact away from the politically dominant social groups. In some cases the application of sanctions has even stimulated sectors of an economy. In Rhodesia there was a substantial expansion in manufacturing industries after UDI: in the ten years after 1965 the volume of the manufacturing production rose 88 per cent above its 1965 level, while in the period between 1963 and 1970 the range of output expanded from 602 products to 3,837.[25] Defeating sanctions becomes a major national activity, with businessmen who had made the loudest protests against the risk of sanctions being imposed leading the drive to undermine and circumvent them.

The contrast with the situation in the imposing states can be sharp. The objectives for which sanctions are imposed are diverse and often appear to be confused; and there is, of course, a price to be paid—and a price that is not always evenly distributed. Some imposing states will suffer much more than others, and within any particular country some sectors of the economy will be affected while others may escape unscathed. Feelings of resentment spring up among those who have to pay the highest price, providing a strong motive for evading or modifying the sanctions. While sanctions are decided by government, compliance is required at all levels—individuals, groups, firms, financial organisations—and the greatest compliance is demanded of those who have to pay the highest price. Moreover, these same people often have the greatest doubts about the effectiveness and the political justification of sanctions. Thus in contrast to the situation in the target state there may be great difficulty in the imposing states in creating, and even more in sustaining, the psychological climate for a national effort involving sacrifices. What may be required to achieve such a commitment is an emotional response similar to that of war time—but in the circumstances which surround the imposition of sanctions that is normally difficult to achieve.

The problem of maintaining a commitment to sanctions increases when it is seen that they are being breached by others. In each case when sanctions have been applied there have been governments and commercial enterprises

24 Kapungu, *op cit.*, p. 52.
25 Strack, *op cit*, p. 90

them. In broad terms these objectives have positive and negative aspects, and they are directed both to home and international audiences. Positively, they are intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of the imposing government—for instance that of the United States in controlling events in Central and South America, and that of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The purpose of sanctions here is to demonstrate a willingness and capacity to act. Negatively, the purpose may simply be to anticipate or deflect criticism. In some instances this may involve warding off threats of action by other states such as Britain faced from the Black Commonwealth over Rhodesia. Or it may involve avoiding domestic criticism on the score of ineptitude or indifference. It is generally important for governments to be seen to be concerned and busy—as Lloyd George said of sanctions against Italy: ' They came too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in the nick of time to save the Government '.[35]

Once commitments have been made to a policy, whether by individual political leaders, or by governments or international organisations, reputations and pride are at stake. At public meetings, in statements to their parliaments, at international conferences, and on radio and television political leaders give undertakings which become very difficult to renounce; and when sanctions are protracted over a long time an increasing number of organisations and people become committed to them. This has been an important feature of the Rhodesian case. At first it was predominantly a British effort, but to make the sanctions more effective the British had to recruit more support. Other states and international organisations became involved, so that their reputations and commitment were at stake. And so, in turn, it became increasingly difficult for the British to contemplate a unilateral settlement with the Rhodesian regime.

Secondary objectives often contain a substantial symbolic element. While this has sometimes been a subject of derision, symbols are important in political relationships. They include for instance attempts to express a sense of morality. For Finland, sanctions against Rhodesia were ' an impressive demonstration on behalf of the equality and rights of man ', while the Austrians saw them as ' the indispensable complement of the heavy moral pressure that the international community exercises through international public opinion '.[36]

Although most studies have concentrated on primary objectives of sanctions, several authors have turned to their secondary purposes to explain why governments have persisted in introducing or applying them. Harry Strack notes seven secondary objectives for Rhodesian sanctions.[37] Anna Schreiber concludes that ' it is mainly its symbolic functions that makes economic coercion a tempting policy for governments '.[38] Margaret Doxey writes that Anglo-French sanctions against Italy could be ' accurately

35 Quoted by Macmillan, *op cit.*, p 430
36 Strack, *op cit.*, p 36
37 Strack, *op cit.*, pp 26–27
38 Schreiber, *op cit.*, p. 413.

described as a face-saving exercise '.[39] But Johan Galtung is more sympathetic to governments when he writes that:

> There is the value of at least doing something, of having the illusion of being instrumental, of being busy in time of crisis. When military action is impossible for one reason or another, and when doing nothing is seen as tantamount to complicity, then something has to be done to express morality, something that at least serves as a clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of. If the sanctions do not serve instrumental purposes they can have *expressive* functions.[40]

Judgments on the success or failure of sanctions in achieving their secondary aims are difficult to reach. Few of the studies have attempted to make such judgments, and in any case the nature of these objectives is so elusive, referring as they do to issues of status, symbols, and reputation. Obviously there is a relationship between primary and secondary objectives—for if its primary purpose could be achieved the status of the imposing state is likely to be enhanced, and the symbols it is seeking to condemn take on greater meaning. But although, on the whole, primary objectives have not been achieved it does not follow that secondary objectives have also failed to be realised.

Some loss of prestige may have been suffered by the imposing state—whether it is the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to discipline Cuba and Yugoslavia respectively, or the inadequacy of the Anglo-French action against Italy, or more recently the British failure against Rhodesia which brought such fierce attacks in the Commonwealth and the United Nations. However, to set against this is the fact that the imposing governments have generally achieved some more limited objectives. As Galtung rightly commented sanctions have given them the opportunity to display their attitudes and concern and to be active. Furthermore they provide a way of symbolising a general stance in international relations. These are positive demonstrations, but they have also the negative advantages of avoiding criticism and attacks at home and abroad. Added to this the act of imposing sanctions gives the government a breathing space. Time can be important in politics—circumstances change, the sharp edge of the initial criticism may be blunted and other issues arise to steal attention. In the case of Rhodesia, although the British government was under persistent criticism from the Black states that criticism was modified by the British action, and at home the Labour government succeeded in holding its own supporters together reasonably well, whereas the Conservatives were often in disarray. Also public-opinion surveys show that for a year at least there was a general confidence in the government's ability to handle the situation. To the question put by Gallup: ' Do you approve of the government's handling of the Rhodesian situation in Rhodesia?'

39 Doxey, *op cit*, p 93
40. Galtung, *op cit*, p 411

a majority approved during the first year of sanctions (the strongest support being recorded in February 1966 when 55 per cent approved, 29 per cent disapproved, and 16 per cent didn't know), but towards the end of the life of that Labour administration the support had slipped away (in June 1969 only 27 per cent approved, whereas 49 per cent disapproved and 24 per cent didn't know)—but by then Rhodesia was not such a central issue in British politics.

Tertiary objectives

Tertiary objectives are those concerned with the structure and behaviour of the international system generally, or those parts of it which affect the imposing states. This may include efforts by the imposing states to ensure a certain pattern of behaviour in international affairs, such as the League of Nations attempted by ' outlawing ' aggression as a means of settling disputes. It was, of course, extremely difficult to define ' aggression ', but that was the aspiration—and the action taken against Japan and Italy, was in part designed to achieve that. At the time the more enthusiastic League supporters saw the action as a means of backing up international law, but in the view of a Chatham House group which looked at the issue in the late 1930s that was a misperception of the nature of international law: it could not be analogous to criminal law within the state because there was no way in which a state could be perceived or treated as a criminal. The group reported that the League was simply out to prevent aggression and that the Covenant ' lays down no penalties for the violation of international law or the breaking of the peace. It merely describes the methods which State Members are bound to follow in rendering assistance to the victims of aggression and upholding the Covenant of the League '.[41] That view of international law would now be challenged by many governments as too restrictive. They would argue that states can be treated as criminals against the international community when they offend against certain norms. Sanctions, therefore, become a means of upholding international norms by deterring those who might be tempted to break them and, if necessary, punishing those who do. This would be the view of the Black states for those who break the norm of racial equality, and an attempt has been made by the Arab states to gain legitimacy and extend their action against Israel by branding the Israelis as ' racialists '.

Other tertiary objectives include support for a particular international structure. The form of this structure will depend on the way international relations are perceived. It may, for instance, be an attempt to defend a balance of power, or to ensure the coherence of a regional grouping, or to counter the extension of ideological or religious doctrines. The actions of the Americans in Central and South America or the Russians in Eastern Europe could be interpreted in each or all three of these ways. Structural considerations may also extend to a concern for the organisation of interstate relations—either the diplomatic structure between states or the establishment and support of

41 *International Sanctions, op cit*, p 13

international organisations. Support for the League against Italy, and the United Nations against Rhodesia are examples of the latter. In both cases the broader issue of how international relations are handled is superimposed on the particular problem.

Tertiary objectives are usually directed to defending or furthering existing structures or organisations, whether it be an alliance or an international body. In these instances it is those who deviate from, or set up a challenge to, the existing order who are subjected to the sanctions. But when international structures and norms are changing, the sanctions may also be used to ensure that the new dispensation is accepted. The sanctions imposed on Rhodesia can be interpreted as the implementation of the new international norm of racial equality.

In the case of tertiary objectives there are even greater problems of evaluation than there were for secondary. The range of factors to be taken into account in examining changes and developments in the international system is so great that it is impossible to isolate the particular part played by sanctions, and the degree and direction of change is open to wide interpretation. Furthermore tertiary objectives include a deterrent element (i.e. to demonstrate to others than the target state that action will be taken against similar behaviour). This was an element in the action taken by the United States against Cuba, by the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, and in the League's decision to act against Japan and Italy as aggressors—but what the effect of this was on other states can only be a matter of speculation. Of course judgments are made. In the case of the League it has been argued that it was the failure to act with sufficient vigour and determination—the failure to provide an adequate deterrent—that encouraged Hitler to follow aggressive policies. In the view of the German historian, Klaus Hildebrand, Hitler's decision to supply arms to Italy during the period of sanctions was ' a test case for him to see how Great Britain, as the decisive power in the League of Nations, would behave were the Reich to oppose decisions made in Geneva. Great Britain's reaction, or rather lack of it, must have strengthened Hitler in the belief that London would eventually also be prepared to come to an agreement (with him) '.[42]

Conclusion

Economic sanctions are employed in an attempt to achieve political ends by economic means. They are imposed for a variety of reasons, revealing a mixture of aims on the part of those governments seeking to impose them—ranging from international and domestic considerations, to differences of view within various sections of the governments. This diversity increases when the aims of other governments and international organisations are taken into account. The objectives pursued can broadly be divided into three categories:

42 Klaus Hildebrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (London: Batsford, 1973)

primary, which are concerned with the behaviour of the target state; secondary, which refer to the position and reputation of the imposing state; and tertiary, which are concerned with the structure and behaviour of the international system. During the period in which sanctions are applied the emphasis of the imposing state may change—with primary aims, perhaps, providing the chief motivation initially (though this is not always the case), whilst later on secondary and/or tertiary objectives may predominate.

Although there are some difficulties of evaluation, there is a strong consensus that sanctions have not been successful in achieving their primary objectives (although they may help to weaken the target state's ability to resist other forms of pressure). The reasons for the failure are many—including problems of agreement and implementation among the imposing states, but also a failure to appreciate the reactions inside the target state and too much reliance on a naîve theory of economic pressure leading to political disintegration. The importance of secondary and tertiary objectives has often been undervalued. Yet, even when their importance is recognised evaluation of their success is very difficult, because some of the aims are so elusive (for example,the reputation of an imposing state), and the complexity of others (for example, the structure of the international system). Despite such difficulties sanctions have offered a policy option in trying to achieve a range of objectives, and frequently they have been seen as a more acceptable method of pursuing those objectives than direct recourse to force.

SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA—OPTIONS FOR THE WEST

James Barber and Michael Spicer *

IN recent years South Africa has been subjected to a range of international sanctions. These sanctions have had great diversity, both in the areas of application—military, economic, communications, cultural and sporting; and in those who have imposed them—the United Nations, individual states, regional and specialist international organisations, trade unions, pressure groups, and individual citizens. Such diversity obviously indicates the existence of differences of objectives and interests. But there are common features: first the belief that substantial change is required in the racial structure of society within the Republic; second that such change is a proper subject for concern of the international community; third, that sanctions can contribute towards that change.

In examining the options for the West in this situation there is an initial problem of identifying what is meant by ' the West '. There are considerable differences in the degree and range of contact between South Africa and individual Western states, and also in the attitudes adopted by the individual states towards the Republic. Those Western states with the closest contacts with South Africa—notably the United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany and France—tend to be the most cautious in their approach; and this group also happens to contain the three Western permanent representatives on the Security Council. However, even within that group there are differences of interest and sometimes of policy. Britain in particular has much longer and greater ties with South Africa than the other Western powers and therefore could either exert the greatest influence—or alternatively suffer the greatest damage from—any action taken against South Africa. At the other end of the scale some Western states, such as the Scandinavian countries, have few direct links—and perhaps as a result of this they tend to adopt a more radical stance. In this paper, unless stated otherwise, ' the West ' refers to the group with the greatest contacts, and therefore the greatest responsibilities.

Furthermore, it is one thing to consider the actions and attitudes of Western *governments*; the fact is that the implementation of sanctions involves many

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layers of society, from individuals to international organisations. George Shepherd, an American scholar, has questioned a government-centred approach. In a study in which he states that ' the South African conflict is a racial revolution with a class base, which has grown into an international war ',[1] he challenges the assumption that sanctions can only be effective if they are comprehensive and imposed by governments. He argues that non-governmental organisations (NGOs)—churches, trade unions, corporations, and pressure groups—' constitute a form of coercion on societies and states which have greater impact than official policy '.[2] However, he does see one of the main activities of the NGOs as pressure on governments and it is governments which are examined in this article.

The struggle against racialism now permeates many levels of international relations. For some states, notably those of Black Africa, and for some organisations, such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), the campaign against apartheid in South Africa has top priority. The Western states also oppose apartheid and want to see change to a fairer, more equal society in the Republic; but for them this objective does not have the same priority. They perceive their relations with South Africa as one aspect of a wider complex of international relationships. Within this framework they are concerned with the overall stability of the international system and with the methods that are used to achieve change as well as the ends which are sought. The West has become increasingly reluctant to use force in settling international disputes and therefore has to place greater reliance on other policy instruments. Another factor is the recognition in the West of the increasing interdependence of international relations. In the case of South Africa this can produce contradictory pressures—on the one hand the recognition of South Africa's importance to the Western economy, especially in the provision of vital minerals, and on the other the fear that differences of approach to racial issues in Southern Africa will distance the West from the developing world, thereby producing economic problems as well as opening up opportunities for the spread of communist influences.

At international organisations and through the activities of pressure groups at home, the Western states are under constant pressure to extend and intensify sanctions against South Africa. In such a situation, although an existing sanction may have been imposed with a specific objective in mind (for example cutting sporting links to influence South Africa into accepting multi-racial teams) each particular sanction becomes part of a broader picture. The most committed opponents of apartheid see the sanctions policy as one piece, and they do not believe apartheid can be changed incrementally or by evolution. Therefore, if for example, a Western state wanted to lift a sports boycott because it thought that sufficient progress had been made in that

1 *Anti-Apartheid Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 4

2 *Ibid.*, p. 140

particular field, it would meet resistance from committed opponents, including the Black states. They would interpret such action as support for apartheid, and perhaps consider subjecting the Western state itself to a sports boycott.

The main pressures on the Western countries are directed to inducing them to increase economic sanctions and eventually to impose comprehensive, mandatory sanctions (for it is the West which is seen to have the capacity to influence the situation). However, the question arises whether in the light of previous experience there is any point in considering economic sanctions if the main aims are to bring about changes within the Republic. One answer would be to say immediately that there is not; that the evidence demonstrates clearly that sanctions do not achieve their primary aims (i.e. aims concerned with developments within the target state). The opposing view to this rests on two main lines of argument: that past experience is largely irrelevant because in no case have sanctions been applied thoroughly and efficiently; and that each case is unique, South Africa being vulnerable in ways that others were not. There is a third viewpoint, which would emphasise that in no previous case have sanctions just been concerned with primary objectives. There have always been secondary objectives—i.e. those concerned with the reputation and position of the imposing states—and wider tertiary objectives concerned with the international system generally. And in South Africa's case some governments may give similar or even greater weight to these secondary and tertiary objectives than they do to the primary purposes of sanctions.

There is, in fact, a clear difference in the interpretation of past experiences with international sanctions—one side saying that we know from the past that sanctions do not achieve their primary objectives, while the other argues that past experience should be used to ensure that they are made successful in future. This latter argument might have gained the support of Woodrow Wilson, for when he spoke of sanctions in 1919 he had in mind much fiercer measures than have ever been employed: ' Suppose ', he said, ' somebody does not abide by these engagements (the League of Nations Covenant) then what happens? An absolute isolation, a boycott! The boycott is automatic . . . No goods can be shipped in or out, no telegraphic messages can be exchanged, except through the elusive wireless perhaps; there should be no communication of any kind between the people of the other nations and that nation.' [3] Certainly nothing like that has been attempted or achieved.

This conflict of interpretation is characteristic of the divided opinions that surround South Africa. For every argument that favours sanctions another can be found to counter it. One reason for this is that the different sides usually debate from different assumptions, premises, and priorities—covering such fundamental issues as order against revolution, individual right against community rights, and the benefits of economic prosperity as compared with

3 Quoted in RIIA Group paper, *International Sanctions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: RIIA, 1938), p 2

those of political change. There are also deep divisions over the methods to be used in stimulating change—whether, for instance, the White rulers can be persuaded or pressured into change, or whether change can only come through revolution. There is also great uncertainty about the objectives in terms of the nature of a future South African society. Finally, there are conflicting views about the impact that economic sanctions against the Republic would have on Western economies. The advocates of sanctions argue that the adverse effects would be small—that South Africa could easily be replaced both as a market for goods, and as a source of raw materials. The alternative view is that the impact upon Western economies would be very substantial, creating considerable unemployment in certain sectors of industry (especially in the United Kingdom) and, even more dangerous, by denying the West of critical minerals. The alternative source for some of these minerals is the Soviet Union and so, according to this argument, the Russians would have a virtual monopoly in their supply, thereby constituting not only a danger to the Western economies but to their whole security structure. According to this view the West is as dependent on South Africa in certain vital commodities as South Africa is on the West.

Nor is the debate without its ironies. Harry Oppenheimer, a leading capitalist, preaches a creed which is almost Marxian in its emphasis upon economic development as the determining factor in social and political behaviour; while the African National Congress (ANC), which is not without its Marxist links, adopts a primacy-of-politics approach in its belief that ' capitalist ' governments, like those of the United States and Britain (which it sees as the main supporters of the White racist regime) can be pressured or persuaded into applying economic sanctions in order to bring down the South African White regime.

The view that South Africa is uniquely vulnerable to economic sanctions rests on a number of related arguments. In past cases of sanctions one or two countries have led the campaign with more or less support from their allies, and apathy or opposition from the rest; but if and when they are applied, sanctions against South Africa will have virtually unanimous support, because South Africa's racist policies have made it a pariah state condemned by the whole international community. It is also argued that even though there could be substantial rewards in sanctions-breaking there is no easy route through which this could be arranged on a large scale—as there was for Rhodesia when South Africa itself provided the loophole. South Africa can be blockaded effectively. Also, the complexity and advanced nature of the South African economy, which is more developed than any economy previously subjected to sanctions, make it dependent on international co-operation and interaction—and, therefore, more vulnerable. William Gutteridge wrote in 1964: ' the self-sufficient largely agricultural economy of South Africa fifty years ago could have survived in isolation for a long period. The industrialised state of today, in which a substantial proportion of the African population is involved, could not

long withstand the shock of shortages.' [4] This overall view of the Republic's dependence on the outside world is reinforced by the particular case of oil. South Africa has no oil, and although it has been stockpiling and developing its capacity to produce oil from coal it is still very dependent on imports. If their access to this one commodity could be blocked over a period the South Africans would be forced to accept terms imposed upon them.

While the emphasis in this argument is on South Africa's vulnerability to sanctions, some of the strongest opponents of the White regime see sanctions as only one of the instruments to be employed. For the ANC, for example, the main assault would come from a revolutionary struggle waged inside and on South Africa's borders. Sanctions would play their part in this struggle by weakening the ability of the White regime to resist, and by legitimising and encouraging the opponents of apartheid inside and outside the country.

In contrast there are a number of arguments which seek to demonstrate that South Africa is not a unique case, and that sanctions will be as ineffective in achieving their primary aims against it as they have in other cases. Although many states might decide, or be pressured, into imposing sanctions there would be agreement neither on objectives, nor upon the question if and when sanctions might be lifted. Such potential confusion and misunderstanding could itself become a source of international tension and hostility. Further, the Western states are the only ones which can make sanctions bite against South Africa, but they have the least sense of conviction in the matter, and it is they also which would have to suffer the heaviest cost in imposing them. Since there would be a real danger of undermining the international Western economy if sanctions against South Africa were made effective (especially in denying the West of vital minerals) the Western states would simply fall back upon symbolic gestures. Moreover, the size and strength of the South African economy does not make it vulnerable to sanctions—quite the reverse. The South Africans could buy their way out of some problems, and fall back on their own resources to solve others. Meanwhile, inside the country the impact would fall on the poorest, weakest section of the population—the Blacks.

More fundamentally, it is argued that the belief that sanctions could succeed in changing South Africa simply repeats the naïve assumption that there is a direct relationship between economic deprivation and political change. The political will of the White South African is tougher, if anything, than that of other groups against which sanctions have previously been directed; and it is a steel which would be tempered by adversity. White South Africans would see themselves fighting for their very survival, and in this struggle they would be prepared to endure severe economic hardship. At the same time the geographical position of South Africa and the size and sophistication of the economy mean that sanctions directed against it would affect the whole sub-

4 'The Strategic Implications of Sanctions Against South Africa' in R Segal, ed., *Sanctions Against South Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964), p 115

continent. There is no way in which the Black states of Central and Southern Africa would be protected from the impact. Political instability might be fostered there, rather than in South Africa itself; with the result that once this became apparent sanctions would be withdrawn or cease to be applied effectively.

Options for Western policy

The alternatives which present themselves in an abstract analysis of policy are always much sharper and clearer than the actual choices which present themselves to a government, and they frequently do not take account of the many other concerns which a government will have on hand when it is dealing with any particular issue. However, the advantage of setting out the options analytically is that it clarifies the choices that may have to be made and points up the broad directions which policy may take. In the case of South African sanctions five broad lines of approach for the West suggest themselves: (a) intensified economic development; (b) communication; (c) disengagement; (d) graduated pressure; and (e) comprehensive sanctions.

Intensified economic development. This course represents the polar opposite of sanctions, although its intentions may be the same; it envisages change through expansion rather than deprivation, resting on the belief that rapid economic development is the surest way to break down apartheid. With development, so the argument goes, come demands for greater skills and greater social mobility, affecting Blacks as well as Whites. Greater individual opportunities for advancement and the acquisition of wealth would emerge among Blacks, creating social and political aspirations which the government could not ignore. Since the Western states would play a leading part in sponsoring rapid development South Africa would become increasingly dependent on them, so that the West's ability to exercise influence would be much greater. A further advantage for the West would be that the expansion of the South African economy would strengthen the Western economy generally and therefore increase the international influence of the West. Moreover, unless there is continued economic development in the Republic many Black South Africans will suffer increasing hardships—sanctions or no sanctions—because of the rapid increase in the population.

The best known version of the intensified economic development approach is that presented by Harry F. Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation. Oppenheimer argues that those who advocate economic and financial sanctions aim in practice if not in intent at change by violence.[5] He believes that it is naïve to assume that economic isolation will lead to a change of heart among the governing party. The policy of apartheid implies not only a political but an economic separation of the races. This can be broken by economic expansion. Apartheid rests on the notion that the flow of

5 'Why the World Should Continue to Invest in South Africa', supplement to *Optima*, No 1, 1978

the Blacks to the cities can be stopped and ultimately reversed, an idea that overlooks the effect this has on the economy. Apartheid only works because a lack of investment keeps down the number of jobs available in the advanced sector and because it increases under- or unemployment in the primitive subsistence sector—*i.e.* the Homelands. Accordingly, in the face of the advanced sector's inability to revert to labour-intensive production methods, a lack of investment limits the advanced sector of the economy to a level where the majority of skilled work can only be handled by the Whites. The South African government is then able to use the multiplicity of laws available to it to prevent unemployment building up in urban areas. Stagnation is the only economic situation compatible with apartheid, and in fact stagnation reinforces apartheid by perpetuating the dual nature of the economy through the enlargement of the primitive subsistence sector. But, the argument continues, if South Africa can finance a growth rate in excess of 5 per cent the Black urban population will inevitably grow and the economic failure of apartheid will follow hard upon the political failure already apparent. (Apartheid rests on the belief that it is not possible for people of different race and culture to share power within a united country without domination by one race; yet not only can South Africa not be divided on an equitable basis, but the White government has no intention of doing so and the majority of Black Homeland leaders in any case refuse to give up what they regard as their South African heritage.)

Communication. This approach is based on the view that comprehensive sanctions would be inimical to the interests both of the West and of the people of South Africa as a whole. It is not, however, an argument for doing nothing. The West should use contact and communication as a means of influencing change in the Republic. Despite the regular protests of the South African government that it is being misunderstood and betrayed by the West, the Whites are sensitive to Western power and opinion. This should be used as a means of promoting evolutionary and incremental change, to undermine racialism and to produce a fairer distribution of wealth and power. To achieve this selective sanctions could be employed, but these would be 'positive' as well as 'negative', and they would be most effective in those matters where Whites were already considering reform. Positive sanctions offer actual or promised rewards, whereas negative sanctions are concerned with actual or threatened punishment. Most advocates of sanctions concentrate on the negative side but in the communication approach the positive aspects would also be emphasised—the carrot would be as obvious as the stick. In the opinion of David Baldwin, an American scholar, the type of international sanctions which may be proposed reflects a general view of human nature: whether men are more open to threats than promises.[6] Baldwin himself believes that positive sanctions are more likely to achieve the desired results because people are more open to influence from those who are friendly.

6. See 'The Power of Positive Sanctions', *World Politics*, Vol 24, No 1

In terms of political change this approach implies that the West should neither lay down a precise blueprint, nor join the chorus calling for ' one man, one vote ' as the panacea for all South Africa's problems. The Western states might, however, give quiet encouragement to the exploration of constitutional arrangements for sharing and distributing power. But although incremental change should be fostered and encouraged, there is no room for optimism about the question whether the South Africa problem is amenable to other than painful solutions. Even by incremental and evolutionary methods it would be foolish to underestimate the scale of the undertaking in terms of social reform and economic cost. Changing the structure of labour, reforming the educational system, revising land-holding rights, are all huge schemes requiring vast state expenditures, which would bring rising wages and falling competitiveness—while the size of the Black population rises sharply. There is also the major problem of social attitudes to reform; the Whites will be inclined to give too little too late and the Blacks to demand too much too soon. Despite such problems, the argument continues, the West should seek to influence but certainly not dictate the direction, pace and perception of change. And this would be impossible with a policy based predominantly on negative sanctions.

A leading advocate of a communication approach has been George Ball, an American Under-Secretary of State under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. His main thesis is that there can only be trouble if the West prescribes a solution which is totally unacceptable to White South Africans and employs methods which are consistently hostile to them.[7] Such an approach would promote a civil war into which the great powers will inevitably be drawn. If the example of race relations in the United States teaches Americans anything it should be that it is an error to expect South Africa, with a far more complex society, to transform itself peacefully into a multiracial state in a short time. In any case, it is accepted that the Whites belong in South Africa and this means that South Africa is a special case where the prevailing African model of one-man-one- vote majority rule needs modification.

According to Ball, the use of sanctions to achieve Western purposes in South Africa is dangerous for many reasons. An arms boycott and political and social excommunication would not persuade the Whites to accept majority rule. Sanctions would hurt those whom it is meant to help—the Blacks—and would sour internal and international relationships, preventing constructive negotiation. There is in any case no evidence that the majority of the Blacks are in favour of sanctions: in fact it is very difficult to generalise about what Blacks want. Unfocused economic sanctions would deepen the siege mentality of Whites and drive liberals to support the government. Moreover, sanctions have, in the past, always failed to bring about benign change. The orthodox American liberal view which holds that Russia should be exposed to Western ideas through trade, but that South Africa should not, is an example of

7 ' Asking for Trouble in South Africa ', *Atlantic Monthly*, Oct 1977, pp 43-51

dishonest thinking: some of those who advocate sanctions are interested less in reforming Pretoria than gaining approbation at home and experiencing a glow of *schadenfreude* at White discomfiture. Further, if the West encourages polarisation through sanctions, and sanctions do not then deliver majority rule, the West will find itself wanting to pull back from the brink while the Russians jeer, and provide the arms it cannot. Meanwhile, South Africa is not high on the list of American priorities, and the United States should, therefore, not let the pressures of domestic policy get it too deeply involved. America should above all else avoid contributing to disaster by falling into the excessive zeal of the late convert, or letting its own internal politics force it into taking sides. Rather it should adopt a moderating role, discouraging foreign intervention by stressing that the problem is one for South Africans to solve, encouraging an evolutionary path to change and abstaining from insisting on precise political goals. The United States should contain pressures for violent change by letting the Blacks know that they will not receive aid in an armed struggle.

Disengagement. Disengagement is an increasingly discussed option, but it is not always clear what precisely is intended. Uncertainty surrounds the degree of disengagement and how it might be implemented; for example, would it be achieved by formal government regulations, or more by advice and pressure on individual firms and organisations to reduce their contacts? Complete disengagement does not seem possible and ' keeping at a distance ' might be a better description. The policy would not be confined to economic links but would spread to cover diplomatic, cultural, and sporting ties: in other words, there would be a general downgrading of Western involvement in South Africa's affairs.

The disengagement approach rests on the assumption that so much uncertainty surrounds the future of South Africa that it is wise for the West to keep its options as open as possible and not be too involved. Intensive Western interference would be beneficial for neither the people of South Africa nor the Western states. The issues within South Africa must eventually be settled by the South Africans themselves; by elevating the situation into a major international dispute a settlement becomes more difficult to achieve. Many more people and organisations, each with its own interest and pride, become involved—so that the range of issues and conflicts is extended. Too deep an involvement could create great strains within the West, for there are differences of interest and perception between the Western states towards South Africa. Moreover the pluralistic nature of Western political systems and the degree of commitment felt by some pressure groups on racial issues, including South Africa, could result in substantial internal problems. On the economic side, while recognising that essential ties must be retained—for example, those relating to strategic minerals—and that some Western states, notably the United Kingdom, could not afford to break all their links, a

sustained effort should be made to develop alternative sources of supply and trading relationships.

The emphasis in the disengagement approach is more on secondary than on primary objectives in sanctions. Developments in South Africa are unpredictable, the prospects for international action against the Republic are uncertain, but meanwhile the West must protect its interests—which could be adversely affected by too close an involvement. This assumption of general international uncertainty and even ineffectiveness has been extended to include the United Nations. The disengagement approach assumes that there is little that the organisation could or would do about the problem. Although the resolutions and rhetoric of the General Assembly continue unabated they pertain more to ritual than to substance. Resolutions in the Security Council for sanctions will always be met by Western vetoes. Any measure taken by the United Nations will therefore be either cosmetic or ineffective, because there is no will in the West to intervene in a way that would undermine its economic interests. Nevertheless there is a real danger for the West that while any steps that might be taken against South Africa will be ineffective, the Black states will generally become so alienated from the West that a wide range of international relationships will be adversely affected. The Western stance should therefore be aimed at as much disengagement as possible from South Africa, with a clear condemnation of apartheid. South Africa should be treated like other states whose policies are deprecated. There should be no military ties, and all other links should be limited. If individual companies decide to pull out of South Africa because of the uncertainties, no attempt should be made to stop them. New investment should not be encouraged.

The communication approach rests upon the assumption of uncertainty in the climate affecting South Africa; Henry Kissinger, when he was Secretary of State, advocated a form of disengagement which was based upon a more challenging perception of the structure of international relations. Kissinger's argument is that development is impossible without international stability and order. To achieve that a form of detente had to be established between the five centres of power—the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, Japan and China. That was the top priority. The Third World—and that would include Southern Africa—is in itself of secondary importance. It does, however, constitute a danger—for it might become the stage for a contest between the major powers to control or at least to establish spheres of influence across large areas of the globe. Although Kissinger believes that the underdeveloped world faces decades of political and economic instability, he wants the major powers to avoid becoming enmeshed in their turmoil, or even lured in by Third-World states seeking support against rivals. If the major powers could disengage from these situations the cause of international peace would be greatly served. The great powers should, therefore, avoid involvement in the racial, ethnic, economic and political conflicts that persist in the Third World. If possible they should try to mediate, but otherwise they

should remain as aloof as possible, leaving the Third-World peoples and states involved to sort out their own problems.

Pressure for reform. This approach assumes that it is impossible for the West to distance itself from South Africa—whether it may want to or not—and that attempts to achieve reform by contact and communication alone have been shown to be inadequate. The problems of the Republic are high on the international agenda, and will remain there, because the Black states with their voting strength in the United Nations organisations and the support they will get from the Communist and Asian states will ensure that they remain there. To ignore the situation in Southern Africa or to fail to exert pressures for reform will not serve Western interests or values—which include concern for individual rights and racial equality. The interests to be served by active pressure against South Africa are many. Some of these can be fairly accurately identified, such as a continued growth in trade with Black Africa, while others—although less amenable to quantification—are no less important: for example, retaining influence and trust in the Third World and countering Communist influence. A positive approach to reform by pressure will foster international co-operation and racial harmony at home.

Although the White South Africans are tough-minded they can be pressured into reform, provided the West itself is prepared to be firm and to employ a wide range of sanctions. A degree of instability and violence already exists in South African society. Pressures for reform might stimulate further limited internal violence, but reforms can be achieved without a breakdown of the society. The alternative to reform by pressure is revolutionary change, and that would be worse both for the West and for the people of South Africa. Black rule is coming to South Africa, although the particular constitutional arrangements are as yet unknown. It is wise to accept this and work actively for reform as quickly as possible and with as little bloodshed as possible.

Arguing on these lines, Clyde Ferguson and William R. Cotter, in an article of January 1978 support America's backing of the United Nations arms embargo of 1977.[8] They advocate that the embargo be followed by a graduated list of measures short of mandatory economic sanctions, with the aim of persuading South Africa to move immediately to transform its policies and to open a dialogue with its Blacks—rather than waiting until it is too late for a peaceful settlement. Ferguson and Cotter divide their list of 41 courses of action under five headings. Under the first, *diplomatic options*, they include moves that range from presidential condemnation of bannings, detentions and other police actions in South Africa, and changes in embassy representation, to the final and severe step of accepting the argument that apartheid constitutes a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Under the second, *military options*, the authors refer mainly to moves aimed at tightening the implementation of the United Nations mandatory arms embargo and to the ending of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. The third heading,

8 See 'South Africa—What Is To Be Done?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 56, No 2, Jan. 1978, pp. 253-78.

options with respect to refugees and the non-military support of Liberation Movements and African states is self-explanatory, but it includes the significant suggestion of steps to increase support to the ' Front Line ' African states most affected by their proximity to South Africa, and making contingency plans for helping those countries such as Botswana and Lesotho which are most vulnerable to the threat of South African retaliation to external pressures. Under the heading *mild economic options* the authors include a ban on all new investment in South Africa, the expansion and more rigorous implementation of the employment codes, the ending of all American credits to South Africa, the encouragement of diversification of business away from the Republic and the discouragement of American tourism to South Africa. *Tough economic options* moves on to the prohibition of all financing and transfer of technology to the South African government and its parastatal corporations, the reduction or termination of South African Airways landing rights in the United States, the use of American influence to depress the gold price, and American support for a total oil boycott. The authors set these actions within a time-scale of two years. But other advocates of a strategy of pressure would regard this as quite unrealistic, for they would argue that the pressures should not be set in a rigid timetable and would certainly require substantially longer than two years to take effect.

A less speculative and more limited approach which lies within this general framework, but has some of the spirit of the communications approach, has been adopted by Merle Lipton. She envisages reform by increments in selected sectors of South African economy and society, which would lead to greater bargaining and political power for Blacks.[9] She writes that ' instead of withdrawing foreign investment (with its immense practical difficulties and unforseen consequences), Western governments should use it to apply pressure to . . . important group(s) of employers to bring about changes, such as equal employment practices and the recognition of black trade unions '.[10] According to Mrs. Lipton, constructive engagement does not totally exclude the use of sanctions, which might take the form of a flexible and multiple strategy for selective boycotts if South Africa fails to meet certain specified criteria. But the main focus of the policy in her eyes is not broad political change in the short run, but the limited and concrete gains which a pragmatic incrementalist approach make possible.

Comprehensive sanctions. The arguments for comprehensive, mandatory sanctions (i.e. an all-out economic war against the White government) are based on the assumptions that the days of White domination are numbered in South Africa, whether the West likes it or not. Change can only come through revolution, because the South African government is not prepared to accept the peaceful incremental changes which some Western states advocate. Backed

9. See ' The Debate About South Africa Neo Marxists and Neo Liberals ', *African Affairs*, Vol 78, No 310, pp 57-80

10 *Ibid*, p 58 Merle Lipton here refers to an earlier article of hers, ' British Investment in South Africa. Is Constructive Engagement Possible? ', *South African Labour Bulletin*, Oct 1976

by neighbouring Black governments and trained by Communist states, the revolutionary forces are already active and will steadily increase the intensity of the conflict, as was done in Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia. The externally based revolutionary forces will gain increasing aid from Blacks within South Africa, so that even the notorious South African security police will not be able to break the forces of change. The Whites will find themselves increasingly engulfed in a sea of Black revolution. The West therefore faces a clear choice. Finding a middle way in such a conflict is impossible; it is a case of ' who is not with me is against me '. There may appear to be some short-term Western interests which are served by protecting existing investments and contact with South Africa but this is a false evaluation. In the medium and long term, Western interests will be best served by supporting the revolutionary forces; when they come to power—and their victory is assured—they will turn to those who have supported them through the struggle. Even in the short term there are clear advantages for the West in backing the revolutionary struggle. Such a step would greatly help the West's relations with the Third World generally and Black Africa in particular, and it would help to counter the steady spread of Communist influence, as the Eastern states are now seen as the main supporters of Black liberation. The test of Western support for Black aspirations is not whether economic aid is given to some Black states, but whether the West is prepared to back the cause of African freedom by joining in the overthrow of the White racist regimes of Southern Africa. The way in which the West can best contribute to that cause is by imposing comprehensive, mandatory sanctions which will weaken the White South Africans' ability and will to resist, and symbolise Western support for the cause of the oppressed.

The AAM is a prominent advocate of comprehensive sanctions, and Abdul S. Minty, the honorary secretary of the British AAM has articulated the arguments for this policy.[11] In his view all links with South Africa bolster apartheid and therefore constitute direct collaboration with that system. This applies especially to investment in South Africa. Faced with increased pressure to withdraw their investment, those companies which previously asserted that they could not do without high South African profits, now argue that investment can help to break down apartheid but that their efforts to use their investments to this end necessarily have to take place within the framework of South African society and South African law. The AAM considers this argument to be a transparent manoeuvre to legitimise investment already in South Africa and to facilitate the free flow of further capital there.

Mr. Minty then poses the question: can improvement in Black wages and conditions justify all the side-effects of investment? These side-effects include the increased flow of white immigrants many of whom adopt racist views, serve in the Defence Force and transmit their views to relatives in Britain and other Western states; taxes paid from these investments which contribute to the

11 *The Case For Economic Disengagement* (New York UN Centre Against Apartheid, Nov 1976)

machinery of coercion and domination—the police, military and bureaucracy—and transfers of technology used to bolster the arms industry. The answer is clear—the whole process is a vicious circle; new investment generates further trade, and this in turn reinforces apartheid. In the growing conflict in South Africa, no radical change will come from the White community which is prepared to defend with total violence the apartheid system that gives its members their power and privilege. It is the intransigence of the Whites that has forced the armed struggle on the Blacks. A boycott strategy is necessary in addition to the armed struggle because all Western connexions with South Africa tend to support the side of White power, making the struggle more difficult and violent than it need be. The peaceful change strategy so widely advocated in the West was only articulated at a time when the armed struggle was developing in new forms in Southern Africa. It is in effect an anti-liberation strategy, for in defending their interests in Southern Africa the Western countries find that the stability and security they seek inevitably entail support for the Pretoria regime. With its nuclear programme, South Africa presents the greatest single threat to world peace. The West has the ability to influence events in South Africa and therefore has a special responsibility to ensure that the conflict does not erupt into a wider inter-racial war. The West ought therefore to sever all links with South Africa.

Another variant of the argument for comprehensive economic sanctions is provided by Martin Legassick and David Hemson in a paper commissioned by the AAM,[12] calling for sanctions combined with international working- class mobilisation. Using a neo-Marxist interpretation of South African history, they set out to argue the fundamental falsity of the view that the imperatives of economic growth can and must undermine apartheid. They assert that from the beginnings of capitalist development the masses in South Africa were involved in various forms of struggle against racism and capitalism. In the period since the Second World War the ' capitalists ' responded to the liberation movement's struggle for the elimination of racism through the political power of universal suffrage by putting forward the industrialisation thesis, to the effect that economic growth automatically leads to the abolition of racism—thus rendering mass movements and the mass struggle superfluous. The South African state as the representative of capital pursued this argument in action, forcing the liberation movement to regroup underground and abroad as a movement for the revolutionary overthrow of apartheid. However, despite the actions of the South African government and the arguments of the capitalists and the capitalist mass media that more investment rather than the revolutionary struggle was the way to destroy apartheid, the international campaign of solidarity went from strength to strength, and in the 1970s it combined with the re-emergence of successful forms of mass struggle in Southern Africa itself.

12 *Foreign Investment and the Reproduction of Racial Capitalism in South Africa* (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement, Sept 1976)

Meanwhile far from ending racism, they argue that rapid economic growth in the 1960s actually resulted in a decline of Black wages; and faced with exposure, foreign capital revised its argument. Since it seemed that economic growth would not automatically produce answers, the alternative was ' capitalism with a human face '. Officially, the TUC and Labour government in Britain responded to the exposure of apartheid conditions with a policy of various forms of disengagement and a programme for improving workers' conditions. But in practice they reneged on their commitment—allowing capitalism to continue its practices in the absence of a forceful reformist programme.

It follows that supporting the disengagement of British capital, the prevention of loans and new investment and any form of assistance for the perpetuation of racial capitalism in South Africa is not enough. Old investment will remain in South Africa in concerns which should be the property of the international working class. Programmes to transform South Africa into a normal capitalist state must be combatted by direct forms of solidarity with the struggle of South African workers. More particularly, the ILO/TUCSA (Trade Union Council of South Africa) paternalistic reformist approach, which advocates an evolutionary model of trade union growth within the framework of present South African patterns of trade union organisation, falls into the same trap as all reform within the framework of apartheid and must therefore be replaced with a more radical approach—' Sanctions against capital: solidarity with labour. This is the policy we advocate at the present juncture in the struggle against capitalism.' [13]

Towards a conclusion

It seems clear that the policies which will be followed by the Western governments towards South Africa will not only be shaped by developments inside the Republic but by the domestic and international settings in which the Western states operate. Even if the Western governments wanted to downgrade the South African sanctions issue, it is likely that they would only have a limited success. The concern over racial issues within their own societies and the international pressures from the Black states will persist.

There is some belief that economic contacts do offer a potential lever for change, as demonstrated by the introduction of codes of conduct, and the view expressed by Mr. Edward Rowlands (Minister of State in the Labour government) that we have ' tried to use our power and persuasion and pressure, through those very economic contacts and through the code of conduct with the other members of the EEC '.[14] However, pressure through existing contacts is one thing, but changing the South African social and political structure by large scale expansion of these contacts is another. There can be no great confidence that the outcome would be as predicted by men like

13 *Ibid*., p 16

14 *Hansard*, Dec 8, 1978, Col 1831

Oppenheimer, for previous expansion has certainly not always resulted in social and/or political reform. But the decisive factor so far as the Western governments are concerned is likely to be the potential international reaction. If the West supported increased economic investment and involvement in South Africa it would be branded by the Black states as supporting racialism and oppression. The costs for the West, in terms of international relations generally, would be too high to contemplate. Where there is some uncertainty, however, is in the behaviour of large multinational companies. This paper is concerned with the response of Western governments, whereas many of the critical decisions on investment and economic activity generally are not taken by governments. The amount of influence that Western governments have over such companies is open to question, and some of them may be tempted to follow the Oppenheimer approach. Yet, as international actors, they too are subjected to a range of pressures which limit their actions, and they also would be exposed to the ire of the Black states if they openly set out to follow the rapid development approach.

The comprehensive sanctions policy is equally unlikely to be adopted. There is little confidence that it would produce the desired results, and there are strong doubts about the ability of the international community to make sanctions really effective and watertight (all previous experience supports this scepticism). But even if sanctions were uniquely effective, the outcome might be disastrous for the West. The economies—not just of South Africa but of many of the surrounding states which are dependent on the Republic—might be wrecked. The political and social consequences of such a situation are quite unpredictable. The vulnerability of neighbouring Black states to sanctions against South Africa must be a serious constraint on the West. There is a danger that even partly effective sanctions against South Africa would have their main impact in the neighbouring states. Obviously the White government would make its first priority the defence of its position in the Republic, seeking to divert as much of the impact of the sanctions as possible onto the Black population inside the country and onto the neighbouring Black states.

Other doubts embodied in Western attitude towards comprehensive sanctions relate to the assumptions of such bodies as the ANC and the AAM that racial conflict is inevitable, that the liberation forces are the major or sole vehicles of transformation from apartheid, and that ' one man, one vote ' is the only acceptable alternative to the present apartheid structure. However difficult it may be to achieve, the inclination of the Western states will be to seek as much compromise and consensus as can be achieved, to move by incremental steps and if possible to avoid major disturbances of the international political and economic systems.

All this raises questions about the broad objectives which are to be sought inside South Africa and the methods to be employed in achieving those objectives. While there is general agreement both within the Western states

and internationally that change towards a more just society in South Africa is essential, the terms of the desired dispensation and the ways of achieving it are not agreed. For example, is there a general acceptance, as George Ball implies that there ought to be, that South Africa is fundamentally a pluralist society whose nature should be reflected in any future constitutional and social structure? Or alternatively is South Africa to be seen as a unitary state with majority rule as the objective? There is no agreement. Equally, in terms of methods there is a clear gulf between those who believe that violent revolution is inevitable—and that it has indeed already started—and the view that although there is a considerable degree of violence already in South Africa, change should be brought about as peacefully as possible for the suffering involved for people of all races in a major civil war would be too terrible to contemplate. Because of such divergences of view there is no agreed common base upon which to evaluate developments taking place within South Africa itself. For instance, for those who favour incremental change, the Wiehahn Report on labour relations, and the South African government's response to it, may be seen as an important step in the right direction. For those who believe that only a root-and-branch change can produce the desired outcome such a report is only tinkering with the system—a cosmetic action to disguise the oppression that permeates South Africa's racist society.

With such considerations and constraints surrounding them, while continuing to search actively for reform in South Africa, the Western states will probably do so within the frameworks of the three central lines of policy we have defined—communication, disengagement and pressure for reform. These options are, of course, not always in harmony with each other, so it is likely that Western policy will shift between them over time, and never be as clear cut as set out in this paper. The shifts of policy and the different emphases will depend upon such variables as the values and beliefs of the particular Western governments; the pressures to which they are subjected by organised parties and groups; the state of their own economies and of the international economy generally; and the international political and strategic situation, including the whole range of international problems, dilemmas and issues which seize the attention of governments. A further, and most important factor, will be the development of the situation on the ground in Southern Africa—either forcing the pace towards a more radical approach on the part of the Western powers, or enabling them to allow the problem to simmer without boiling.

EUROPE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Christopher Tugendhat *

THE future shape and direction of the European Community will be profoundly influenced by the decisions and events of 1979. Direct elections to the European Parliament will introduce a new and—it is to be hoped—dynamic factor into the Community institutions. Decisions will be taken concerning the enlargement of the Community to include Greece, Portugal and Spain. Major decisions concerning the Common Agricultural Policy are being forced upon the Community by the increasingly obvious inadequacies of the present system. The attempt to set up a new Community-based stable currency system through the European Monetary System will come under trial. And related to both of these last two questions is the future shape of the Community Budget, and the sensitive issue of the level of contributions to it by particular Member States.

Major consequences for the Community will flow from the positions adopted and the decisions reached on these matters. Less spectacular, but no less important, is the field of industrial policy—another major area of Community activity where we are poised between a retreat into narrowly-understood self-interest or the establishment of a new approach to both the advantages and the disciplines of a genuinely common market. What is to be the role of the Community in the industrial policies of Member States?

Although the European Community is more than a purely economic organisation, and its objectives, motivations and benefits go much wider, the fact is that industry is the foundation on which everything else depends. If European products cannot compete successfully in the world, and if European companies, large and small, cannot provide jobs and profits, nothing else is possible.

The loss of industrial adaptability

At present European industry is not prospering. Not just in Britain but across Europe unemployment is high and new investment far too low. Some of our Member States are doing less badly than others, but the problem is a general one. There are, of course, many reasons for today's difficulties. The world as a whole is in recession. The enormous rise in oil prices some years ago had effects with which we are still grappling, and which must make us particularly worried about what is now happening in the Middle East. Above all a group of newly industrialised countries has emerged who all too often

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seem able to produce more cheaply and in larger quantities than we ourselves. The figures for world production of steel illustrate this development. The Community share of world steel production has gone down from 23 per cent to 18 per cent in the last 10 years—a drop oı over a fifth in our production. Asian countries, including Japan, have on the other hand increased their share of world production from 17 per cent to some 22 per cent—a roughly equivalent proportionate increase in production. In the Community's steel industry we now have over-capacity and considerable surplus labour.

There is in particular one element in the present situation which should cause us concern. In one field after another Western countries in general and those of the European Community in particular seem to be losing their ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Adaptability in the face of change and challenge was formerly among the West's most striking characteristics. When the United Kingdom and the United States were unable during the Second World War to get supplies of rubber from the Far East they developed synthetic substitutes. When the Germans were cut off from oil they developed petrol from coal in order to keep the Luftwaffe flying. In the decades after the war new industries have burgeoned in Europe—plastics, synthetic fibres, electronics, aluminium and a host of others. They have provided far more new jobs, and contributed far more to the massive rise in living standards that has occurred over the same period, than have the Victorian industries once known as the ' commanding heights of the economy '.

But now in the 1970s the West is certainly finding it much more difficult to adapt. This is noticeable everywhere, but particularly so in Western Europe and in Britain. The European response to the energy crisis has been ludicrously inadequate; and as events in Iran are bringing home to us, we may yet pay a heavy price for this. All too often the Western reaction to the challenge of the newly industrialised countries is a demand that their goods should be kept out, even though as consumers we clearly find them very attractive. When an industry is in deep trouble the call goes out for subsidies, job protection, for a cartel, even when there is no market for its goods.

What are the causes for this attitude? Two in particular stand out. There is a growing assumption that standards of living to which we have become accustomed are best guaranteed by securing a minimum of change. Few people actually come forward with the proposition that people should go on doing what they have always done, in the same place they have been doing it—but this attitude seems to be implicit in a lot of what is being advocated. The discussion of employment and industrial policy now seems to be dominated by such phrases as the ' protection of employment ', ' job maintenance ' and so on. As William Diebold has pointed out in *International Affairs* : ' One of the awful things about job security in times of recession is that to the extent it is provided it reduces security for those who have no jobs, which just now means the young.' [1]

1 Oct 1978, p 588

Of course it is easier to advocate change and adaptability than to undergo it. There must be understanding for those who are required to endure a period of unemployment, to learn new skills, and perhaps to move their homes. These things are not easy. The resources of the state and of the Community should be mobilised to help. At the Community level the Social Fund has a role to play in providing funds for retraining; and the British government should lend its support to increasing the size and scope of the Regional Fund so that it can be of more assistance to declining industrial regions. But the object of these interventions should be to facilitate change, not to hold it back.

A second reason for our present stagnation in the face of the challenge to adapt lies in the responsiveness of politicians to constituency and regional pressures. These can be very strong when management and unions are asking for protection or support, whether in the form of subsidies or cartel arrangements, and when large numbers of jobs are at stake. Such pressures are also brought to bear on the European Commission—sometimes supported by national governments. Again there is a need for understanding of the position of those who feel the future of their companies and jobs to be at stake. But the end of the road down which they point us can all too easily become the production of goods that nobody wants—goods which then have to be dumped on world markets at a loss. This is no way in which to create new opportunities for the future.

The advantages of Community rules

This is where the Community comes in. The pressures which individual governments face may be too strong to resist. Moreover it is doubly hard for a government to hold the line against those who wish to keep foreign goods out—regardless of consumer preference—and to maintain or even expand the production of goods that cannot be sold at a profit, *if it believes the others may secure a temporary advantage by doing exactly that*. It was this sort of beggar-my-neighbour rivalry that did so much harm in the 1930s.

The Treaty and subsequent Community legislation and jurisprudence provides, however, a framework of rules and disciplines which can assist governments in resisting these pressures. It can also help to create the conditions in which companies can reap the largest possible benefits from being adaptable and efficient. The Community has thus both a carrot and a stick at its disposal—though I must emphasise that the Commission alone cannot guarantee the ultimate objective of a free and prosperous single market inside the Community unless the Member States recognise their ultimate interest in observing the rules to which they have agreed.

A series of examples suffice to illustrate the point. Take the case of employment subsidy schemes. Most governments tend to resort to them from time to time, and they have a limited role to play in tiding a particular area over the decline of one large employer and the emergence of others. But experience

shows that the subsidisation of the jobs in one place leads to their loss elsewhere—either in the same country or other Community countries—as the unsubsidised producers lose out to their subsidised rivals.

The Community has a policy governing employment subsidy schemes. This is designed to ensure that the schemes are both temporary and linked to plans for restructuring the industries concerned and retraining the employees affected. When the Commission seeks to apply the relevant articles of the Treaty it sometimes makes itself unpopular. But the rules are in the interest of all— which is why they were agreed in the first place. They help to prevent unfair competition and the export of unemployment from one place to another, and they help to ensure that industries adapt to change instead of becoming a permanent drain on the taxpayer.

Apart from employment subsidies the Community also has rules governing other kinds of aids—for example those for investment. Here it wants to make sure that the net effect is not to enable a producer to price his goods at a level which he would be unable to attain operating under normal market conditions—thus competing unfairly with other manufacturers in the Community. This is not to say that the Community allows no investment aids. On the contrary it supports governments in stimulating investment in depressed regions, if necessary with aids; and it actively supports aid which is directed at the reconstruction or redevelopment of a number of industries. Thus the British Steel Corporation has been both allowed to receive government assistance for modernisation and has also received Community aid for this purpose.

This raises a wider question. Until recently neither the Community nor national governments needed, or tried, to take a view on the correct overall capacity of a given industry or sector of the economy. Market forces and commercial judgment in relation to them could be trusted to take care of the matter. In the present world economic climate and in the state of structural crisis in which certain of our traditional industries find themselves—and the problem is mostly in this sector—it is no longer possible to rely on purely business judgment. The problems are now so big, as well as being socio-economic in character, that judgment can no longer be purely commercial. Indeed if the judgments were made simply on market principles we would, for example, no longer have a shipbuilding industry in Great Britain—or possibly anywhere in Europe. Some might argue that indeed we should not have a shipbuilding industry—I do not agree—but if there is to be one in the future, then the public authorities must bend their minds to the recreation of a shipbuilding industry which has both the right sort of capacity and the right size of capacity: and we all know that will have to be smaller than it is now. Retrenchment and reconstruction are financially costly and cause social upheaval. In making the effort any industry or government naturally wants to be assured that its efforts will not be falsified—and the political credit that it will be obliged to expend will not be wasted—by the failure of competitors to

take similar measures; or worse, by their cynically exploiting the apparent gap left in the market by expanding existing capacity and selling below cost.

How does the Community try to prevent this happening? Textiles provide a good example. The industry has been in difficulty in all Community countries for a long time, with consequent pressure on governments to intervene, to provide subsidies, to ensure protection from external competition, etc. We know that this is not a problem which can be tackled successfully by each Member State separately. In the Community, therefore, we have approached the problem in two ways: we have limited the use of state aids to the kind and for the purposes outlined above, in order to ensure an orderly adjustment to changed market needs. And we have also taken a variety of external measures discussed below. In the case of other kinds of industry—for instance, steel or shipbuilding, where the industrial structure is concentrated in a relatively small number of productive units—with these, too, it is worth trying to agree on an industry-wide plan for the future which takes into account likely future market requirements and attempts to adapt the structure and capacity of the industry accordingly.

It is sometimes difficult to persuade people in Britain—government and industry alike—that this country has more to gain from this kind of collective effort than from a purely national approach. But put the proposition the other way round. Britain is no longer one of the richer members of the Community and in any beggar-my-neighbour race to keep uncompetitive industries afloat through government assistance it is likely to lose. If it chose to use government money for the purpose of subsidies the Federal German government and, for that matter the French, have considerably greater financial resources to dispose of than the British. Moreover, the Germans have recently made it very clear in the context of steel, but it could easily be applied elsewhere, that they would refuse to continue to co-operate in the common policies on steel currently being pursued in the Community—policies which depend not on the law but on goodwill, and from which Britain derives major benefit—if certain Member States refused in return to curb excessive levels of subsidy and to adapt the form these take. This is not a warning Britain can afford to ignore.

' Harmonisation '

So much for the stick. What about the carrot? It is the task of the Commission to ensure that the Common Market really is common, in the sense that goods can circulate freely without let or hindrance. This means that the most inventive and effective companies and those who work the hardest secure the rewards to which they are entitled, while consumers are given access to the widest choice from which they will be able to select the goods that most appeal to them in terms of quality and price.

It is to bring down non-tariff barriers to trade that the Commission has brought forward proposals for approximating national laws concerning the production and marketing of products, more commonly known as

' harmonisation '. ' Harmonisation ' has not had a good press in Britain. But it is, nevertheless, an important element in supporting the efforts of European industry. The enormous variety of national rules and regulations which products have to comply with before they can be sold constitute a major barrier to trade between Community members. They reduce both the opportunities for export by companies with attractive products, and the choice of goods available to consumers.

These barriers may relate to safety considerations such as the specifications of lights, tyres, exhaust systems etc., which are laid down by governments for motor vehicles; or they may be concerned with health—for instance the rules on additives, labelling and measurement of food products. Or they may be general environmental regulations which industries are required to observe. The Community's objective is to simplify these rules where possible and to seek to ensure that they do not deprive the producer of the fairest market or our citizens of the opportunity to buy cheaper or more attractive products. The result should be a wider variety of products and not, as is sometimes imagined, the development of drab, standardised Euro-products lacking the national characteristics people often value. Of particular importance to Britain is the fact that the automotive harmonisation package is in its last stages of completion: it will be up to British car manufacturers to take advantage of it, in the same way as British manufacturers of agricultural machinery have taken advantage of the standardisation of production requirements in that field.

Simply put, the task of the Commission, working on behalf of the Member States who constitute our Community, is to help to create an environment in which industry can flourish. This economic and social environment must be one in which risks can be taken and rewards earned—for this is the best way to provide opportunities and jobs on a continuing basis for the greatest possible number of people.

We must beware of the approach characterised in Britain by the phrase ' picking winners ', which suggests that the man in Whitehall or Brussels knows best. There is, of course, a place for research co-operation in high technology ventures, and increasingly there should be joint investment in exceptionally expensive projects. The Joint European Torus (JET) now underway at Culham is a good example, and there are others. Should Europe be getting together on the silicone chip for instance? There is also a place for governments to build up or maintain particular industries for security reasons, or in order not to be over-dependent on certain crucial imports, or to provide an indigenous training ground for vital skills.

Apart from the financial efforts of the Member States themselves, the pursuit of these policies can be assisted by such Community financial instruments as the European Investment Bank. The Community framework can also be used to ensure that needless duplication does not occur in different Member States, and that their initiatives are complementary rather than wastefully competitive. The fact that the Commission is not subject to electoral

pressures and can take a broad Community view can give its advice and ideas a particular value.

But the burden of proof should always be on those who wish to proceed along the road of intervention on the part of public authorities. Each step must be justified, and the objectives of the government's or Commission's intervention carefully spelled out so that the taxpayer knows what he is being let in for, and so that he can measure the merits of the project against other priorities. This is of course difficult to do, and mistakes will occur, but the attempt must be made.

This line of policy is not easy, either for national governments or for the Commission. The political pressures in favour of ad hoc interventionism to help a particular national or industrial interest will always be very great. The establishment of a framework within which risks may be taken and rewards won does not sound very glamorous. But it is more likely than any other policy to create the conditions in which European industry can recover its adaptability in the face of change and its ability to respond to new challenges.

How does the Community's internal policy relate to the competitive position of European industry in relation to the challenges from outside? Europe does not have the raw materials to pursue a policy of industrial autarky. It must trade; to trade it must compete; and to compete, the price and quality must be right. The wall of protection that has been thrown round the Community in textiles and steel is—sadly—the most popular Community policy in Britain. But it is essentially a policy contrived to buy time, to allow for reconstruction and modernisation. Britain's European competitors know that the Community cannot indefinitely derogate from the real underlying trends of trade, though such devices as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement for textiles, or the temporary voluntary restraint arrangements in steel which the Community has concluded with a number of outside countries. The day of reckoning will come, and we must modernise the older sectors of the industrial base and move ' up-market ' to meet the challenges which face us.

The European Community: rebirth or retreat? No ready-made answer is at hand. But what is clear is that we have reached a turning-point in European industrial development. The Community will be what Member States and individual citizens want it to be. It has at its disposal instruments of policy which can ensure that at least we do not retreat and that we move forward, however slowly. But the forward movement depends upon us not frustrating the attainment on a European-wide basis of renewed industrial competitiveness.

THE PALESTINE POLICY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT 1945-1946*

Ritchie Ovendale **

THE Palestine policy inherited by the British Labour government in 1945 could be said to be ambiguous: Winston Churchill as Prime Minister during the Second World War spoke to Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, about plans for partition in Palestine; Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, made statements about Arab unity.[1] The ambivalence of British policy can be partially explained by the attitude of the United States. Hitler's pogrom against the Jews after the Munich crisis in 1938 produced, rather than an anti-German reaction in the United States, a ' strong anti-British atmosphere '. The United States would do little itself about taking refugees, but expected Britain to do everything. Neville Chamberlain, as he was at that time trying to secure United States co-operation, was forced to take strong action on the Jewish refugee question. Consequently in May 1939 Britain tried to soften the impact in the United States of the White Paper on Palestine limiting Jewish immigration into the mandate by publishing it at the same time as a programme to settle the refugees in British Guiana. This did help to quieten United States opinion for a while,[2] but the Zionists in the United States changed this. In May 1942 Chaim Weizmann's programme of ' gradualism ' and patient negotiation gave way to the activist ideas of Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion planned to stimulate the United States into supporting a revolutionary change of its Palestine policy, in which Britain would have to acquiesce.[3] Britain tried to involve the United States in the problem: on January 20, 1943, the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, approached the United States with a request for common Anglo-American action to alleviate the distress of the persecuted in Europe. Little came of this other than the formation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).[4] President F. D. Roosevelt was warned in January 1945 that Palestine policy had to become an ' international responsibility ' and that the British could not be ' asked to carry it alone '.[5] On February 14

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1. See Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel* (London Collins, 1965), pp. 301-303

2 Ritchie Ovendale, *Appeasement and the English Speaking World* (Cardiff. University of Wales Press, 1975), pp 194-95, 250-52

3 Sykes, *op. cit*, pp 281-85

4 *Ibid*, pp 288-89

5. US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter cited as *FRUS*), 1945, Vol 8, pp. 680-82, Landis to Roosevelt, Jan. 17, 1945

Roosevelt assured the King of Saudi Arabia that ' he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people '.[6]

With the election of the Labour government in July 1945 British policy towards Palestine was controlled mainly by three people: Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister; Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary; and George Glenvil Hall, the Colonial Secretary. To the public Bevin appeared to be the dominant influence. Bevin lacked tact and the soft approach, he was subject to rages, and the Jews he knew from his trade union days had been the Jews of the diaspora and not Zionists. He failed to appreciate that emotional Zionists were not amenable to negotiation.[7] Behind him Bevin had a Foreign Office and permanent British Middle Eastern officials with pro-Arab attitudes, stemming from the days of Lawrence of Arabia.

The new Labour government, however, could not decide Palestine policy in isolation. It had to be considered in relation to the views of the United States as well as Britain's strategic interests and responsibilities in the Middle East. As there was no clear policy towards India, and as the Middle East was seen as one of the principal routes linking the empire together, it was still an area of vital British concern.

In September 1945 the British military and police presence in Palestine was considerably under-strength. The establishment of the district forces was 3,506 while the actual strength was only 2,480 men. The police mobile force was similarly undermanned: the strength was at 1,017 with an establishment of 1,940. The deficiency was put at 1,949 but there were also potential vacancies estimated at 640.[8] The situation, according to the officer administering the government of Palestine, J. V. W. Shaw, was explosive. In his analysis, there were, on the one hand, the young Jewish extremists, products of ' a vicious education system ' and knowing neither toleration nor compromise. These extremists considered it morally justifiable to use violence against any individual or institution impeding the fulfilment of their demands. Shaw, turning to history, and perhaps misunderstanding it, considered that the prototypes of the Stern Gang and the National Military Organisation were the Zealots and Assassins whose creed in Roman times even condemned to death Jews married to gentiles. Shaw argued that ' these Zealots of today ', from Poland, Russia and the Balkans, still had to learn toleration and recognition of the rights of others. The Jewish Agency, though it deplored terrorism, through its flaunting of law and order and other activities, merely contributed to an atmosphere in which the terrorist flourished: ' the Jewish leaders appear to be deliberately pushing extremism to a point where an explosion can no longer be avoided and do not scruple to use the plight of the Jews in Europe as a main political excuse '. On the other hand there were the Arabs, described

6 *Ibid*., pp. 2-3, 711, 90F/2 1445, Memorandum of Conversation between Al Saud and Roosevelt, Feb. 14, 1945

7 Francis Williams, *Ernest Bevin Portrait of a Great Englishman* (London: Hutchinson, 1952), p. 259

8 *Cab* 129, 2, f 47, Memorandum by Hall on Forces in Palestine, Sept 10, 1945

by Shaw as being, on the whole, backward and less politically active. The pressure of Zionism had been the main contributory factor to a sense of Arab nationalism. They would fight stubbornly especially when roused by threats against their land, customs and religion. The Arab's fear of dispossession of his land was intense. Shaw warned that ' the mass of the Palestinian Arabs are still capable of resisting, savagely and tenaciously, what they may consider as an attempt to reduce them to a minority status in a land which they regard as theirs.' Jewish speeches, publicity and terrorism were fast persuading the Arabs that they would have to maintain their present position by force.[9]

The Labour government was faced with having to decide on a short-term policy to cope with the immediate predicament before any long-term solution could be implemented. The reason was that the quota of 75,000 Jewish immigrants allowed into Palestine under the provisions of the White Paper of May 1939 was almost exhausted. The Jewish Agency, when offered the remaining 3,000 certificates at the expedited rate of 1,500 a month demanded 100,000. On September 11, 1945 the British Cabinet discussed the recommendation of the Palestine Committee that the policy outlined in the White Paper should be adhered to between the exhaustion of the quota of immigration certificates and the promulgation of a long-term policy. It was argued that the Arabs should be urged to accept continued immigration at the existing rate. The United States was to be informed of the intention to formulate a new long-term policy, and it was suggested that the Chiefs of Staff take immediate steps to reinforce the Middle East garrison to cover further limited immigration. There was a warning that any continued flow should be suspended until after the pilgrimage to Mecca in November, in case of Arab explosions before the necessary military preparations had been taken. But the Cabinet felt that while full justice should be done to the Arab claims ' it was possible to exaggerate their importance '. Britain was in the position that whatever action it took it would be criticised. It was important to carry the United States along with any policy, and opinion in that country was highly critical of what was being done in Palestine. This was criticism without responsibility as the United States was not prepared to accept any liability for handling the situation. There was the further difficulty that the need to garrison Palestine might result in serious delays in demobilisation and in the deaths of British soldiers. Reactions to this in Britain and among the troops ' might be very unhappy '.[10] The Cabinet accepted the general recommendations of the Palestine Committee.[11]

British policy in Palestine was regarded as part of British policy in the Middle East as a whole. Bevin was behind this thinking: on August 30 he proposed to the Cabinet a conference of British representatives to discuss general policy in that area. The Foreign Secretary argued that the time had

9. *Ibid.*, ff. 47-49, CP 45, p. 165, Shaw to Hall, Aug 24, 1945 (extracts)
10. *Cab. 128*, 3, ff 3-6, Cab 30, CP(45) 7, Confidential Annex, Top Secret, Sept 11, 1945
11 *Ibid.*, 1, f. 51, Cab 30, CP(45) 7, Secret, Sept. 11, 1945.

come to consider whether Britain should continue to assert its political predominance in the Middle East and its overriding responsibility for the area's defence, or whether on defence and man-power grounds, Britain should ask for the assistance of other powers. There was also a need for an economic and social policy covering the Middle East.[12] There was to be no overt action which might suggest that the conference was considering the Jewish-Arab problem in Palestine.[13] The conference met between September 5 and 17 under Bevin's chairmanship. It was attended by the ambassadors from Baghdad, Cairo and Teheran; the ministers at Beirut and Jeddah; the high commissioners for Palestine and Trans-Jordan; representatives of the British Middle East Office; and the Director-General of the Middle East Supply Centre. In general terms the conference decided that a British influence which rested on military or political props could not be enduring. Britain should broaden the base on which its influence rested and develop an economic and social policy that would make for the prosperity and contentment of the area as a whole. But the Middle East was to remain largely a British sphere of influence: Britain ' should not make any concession that would assist American commercial penetration into a region which for generations has been an established British market '.[14]

The Palestine Committee, however, took a more precise view of Britain's strategic position in the Middle East. It saw the attitude of the Arabs as being of the first importance, as the Middle East was a region of ' vital consequence ' for Britain and the empire. It formed the nodal point in the communication system, by land, sea and air, linking Britain with India, Australia and the Far East. It was the empire's main reservoir of oil. It also contained the Suez Canal and the principal naval bases in the eastern Mediterranean and at Alexandria. Despite the importance of the region Cyprus was the only territory under full British sovereignty: Palestine, as a mandated territory was subject to international agreement; all the other Middle Eastern countries were independent except Trans-Jordan which was likely to achieve that status in the near future. Britain, therefore, depended on co-operation from these independent states. British prestige at that time was ' immensely high ' and relations with the various rulers ' friendly and cordial '. But this could be transformed overnight if Britain took any action which the Arabs might construe as injurious to their interests: Arab sentiment was sensitive about the future of Palestine. The situation was made more difficult by the formation of the Arab League which increased the will and the power of individual states to resist the implementation of policies to which they objected. If Britain were to enforce a policy which the Arabs did not like, especially if it was open to a charge of breach of faith, this would seriously undermine her position and would lead not only to widespread disturbances in the Arab countries but also

12. *Ibid*., f 34, Cab 26, CP(45) 2, Secret, Aug 30, 1945
13 *Ibid*., *loc cit*
14 *Cab 129*, f 91, CP(45) 174, Memorandum on Middle East Policy by Bevin, Secret, Sept 17, 1945

to the withdrawal of the co-operation on which Britain's imperial interests so largely depended.[15]

The reports of these committees were largely accepted by the Cabinet. At the Cabinet meeting of October 4, Bevin pressed his view that it was essential to broaden the basis of British influence in the Middle East ' by developing an economic and social policy which would make for prosperity and contentment in the area as a whole '. Economic development and social reform could make for an easier solution of military and political problems which included a threatening situation in Palestine, an agitation in Egypt for the withdrawal of British forces, and difficulties with France in the Levant. The Cabinet paid particular attention to Britain's strategic position. The Chiefs of Staff were considering the feasibility of basing forces needed for the protection of the Middle East on British territory rather than in Egypt. It was hoped that there would be some joint agreement on Egyptian defence leaving Britain with responsibility for the Suez Canal. Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, agreed with the proposed policy for Egypt. The Mombasa area was being considered, but while it was suitable as a base it had difficulties of road and rail communications and port facilities. Hall asked for a fresh consideration of the strategic importance of Cyprus. The Cabinet approved the recommendations for the new policy in the Middle East.[16]

By October the Palestine issue was complicated for the British by pointed pressure from the United States. The President, Harry S Truman, was personally supposed to have been influenced by a legalistic interpretation of the Balfour Declaration, issued by British government in 1917 promising a homeland for the Jews—in the hope of influencing United States opinion over entry into the war. Furthermore, Truman recorded that ' the fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was a matter of deep personal concern ' to him.[17] Dean Acheson has written, however, that this concern for ' the mystical emotion of the Jews to return to Palestine and end the Diaspora ' obscured the ' totality of American interests ', and indeed those of the West, in the Near and Middle East.[18] There was another side to Truman's idealism, that of election politics. As he told Arab ambassadors to the United States after the November Congressional elections in 1945: ' I'm sorry gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.' [19]

The State Department was consistent. E. R. Stettinius, the Secretary of State, advised Truman in April 1945 that the Palestine question should be handled with a view to the long-range interests of the United States.[20] The

15. *Ibid*, f. 20, CP(45) 156, Great Britain's Position in the Middle East, Secret, Sept 8, 1945.

16 *Cab. 128*, 1, f. 81, Cab. 28(45) 6, Secret, 4 10.1945.

17 Harry S Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol 2· *Years of Trial and Hope* (London· Hodder and Stoughton, 1956), p 140

18. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), p 169.

19 Quoted by Richard P Stevens, *American Zionism and U.S Foreign Policy 1942-1947* (Beirut, 1970), p 138.

20 *FRUS. 1945* (8), pp 704-705, 867N 01/4 1345, Stettinius to Truman, April 18, 1945

State Department reiterated its warning on August 24: the active support of the United States for a Jewish state in Palestine would be contrary to established policy of respecting the wishes of a large majority of the local inhabitants as to their form of government. It would have a ' strongly adverse effect ' on United States interests throughout the Near and Middle East.[21] As early as August 31 Truman was specifically advised by the State Department that the United States should refrain from supporting a policy of large-scale immigration into Palestine during the interim period between the expiry of the certificates allowed under the White Paper, and any new long-term policy.[22]

But Truman did not agree. In June 1945 he had sent Earl G. Harrison, the dean of the University of Pennsylvania law school, to investigate the condition of displaced persons in Europe. Harrison recommended that 100,000 additional certificates be issued to displaced Jews wanting to go to Palestine.[23] Truman wrote to Attlee on August 31, 1945—though the message does not appear to have been conveyed to the Prime Minister personally until September 10 by James Byrnes, the new Secretary of State—that ' the main solution appears to lie in the quick evacuation of as many as possible of the non-repatriable Jews, who wish it, to Palestine ' and that ' such action should not be long delayed '.[24] Attlee was alarmed. Byrnes told Bevin in Paris that Truman was about to make a statement on the Palestine question probably endorsing Harrison's report. The Secretary of State was warned by Bevin that such action ' could not fail to do grievous harm to relations between our two countries '. On September 14 Attlee endorsed Bevin's warning.[25] He elaborated the British position in a telegram to Truman two days later: if the Jewish refugees were placed in a special racial category there would be a violent reaction by other groups who had been in concentration camps. Attlee reminded Truman that the British had to consider the Arabs as well. There were pointed references to Roosevelt's pledges to the Arabs—they would have to be consulted: ' It would be very unwise to break these solemn pledges and so set aflame the whole Middle East.' As Attlee commented, it was Britain's responsibility to preserve order in that area. In effect Truman was telling Britain what to do without assuming any responsibility himself. From the British point of view neither the United States nor the Jews had any regard for the likely explosion in the Middle East if 100,000 certificates were granted. The Palestine problem also had to be considered in relation to India with its 90 million Moslems.[26]

The State Department's assessment of the situation was similar to that of the British government.[27] On September 26 it recommended that it was

21 *Ibid.*, pp 727-30, 867N 01/8 2445, Memorandum by Henderson to Byrnes, Aug 24, 1945

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 734-35, 867N.01/8 3145, Memorandum by Henderson to Byrnes, Annex by Merriam, Aug 31, 1945

23 See, ' Report of Earl G Harrison ', *Department of State Bulletin*, p 456, Sept 30, 1945

24 *Ibid*, pp 737-39, 867N 01/8-3145, Truman to Attlee, Aug 31, 1945.

25 *Ibid*, p 739, 867N.01/9 1955, Attlee to Truman, Sept 14, 1945.

26 *Ibid*, pp 740-41, 867N 01/9-1745. Telegram, Attlee to Truman, Sept 16, 1945

27 *Ibid*, p 741, 867N 01/9-1745 Telegram, Truman to Attlee, Sept. 17, 1945.

essential for the United States to have a more unified and positive policy on Palestine. Such a policy would recognise Britain's responsibility as the mandatory power and would publicly accept a British decision that it would be impossible to allow any large number of refugees into Palestine. Action would rather be taken to secure the admission of these refugees into other countries, including the United States, though there was no mention of amending that country's immigration quotas. The United States should also publicly put forward the view that there should be no decision affecting the basic situation of Palestine without full consultation of both Jews and Arabs.[28] Loy W. Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, was more forceful when, on October 1, he warned that United States pressure for mass immigration of Jews into Palestine would undo the confidence with which the United States was regarded in that area. He hinted that, if the United States pressed this, it might assume some responsibility for such an undertaking.[29] The official State Department view was even stronger: it pointed particularly to Roosevelt's assurance to Ibn Saud of April 5, 1945. If these promises were not kept there would be a blow to United States prestige not only in the Middle East but elsewhere. There was also ' a very serious threat to vital American interests ' in the Middle East.[30] The United States War Department estimated that if Palestine were opened to Jewish immigration 400,000 men would be needed to maintain order—of which the United States would perhaps have to contribute over 300,000. If the British military estimates were similar, Henderson conceded that British opposition to immigration was ' understandable '.[31]

Against this background of mounting United States pressure the British Cabinet on October 11 discussed the possibility of inviting the United States to join the British in examining the question of Jewish immigration into other countries outside Europe, including the United States. Bevin insisted that Palestine had to be seen as part of overall British policy in the Middle East. But agitation in the United States on the immigration issue was poisoning relations with that country. He could not accept that Jews could not live in Europe: the Harrison report was not based on a proper investigation. Bevin suggested that there should be a careful enquiry associating both Britain and the United States. The United States should also make some contribution to receiving Jews from Europe. It was further suggested in Cabinet that the proposed committee should visit Palestine at an early stage to hear representations from both Jews and Arabs lest it be too swayed by the hardships of the Jews in Europe. Bevin's proposal for a joint Anglo-American commission was accepted by the Cabinet,[32] and, after some hectoring,[33] by the United States. The British Cabinet realised that this did not imply that Truman accepted the

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 745-48, 867N.01/9-2645, Memorandum by Merriam to Henderson, Sept. 26, 1945.
29. *Ibid.*, pp 751-53, 867N.01/10-145, Henderson to Acheson, Oct 1, 1945
30. *Ibid.*, pp 753-55, 867N.01/10-245, Memorandum by Acheson to Truman, Oct 2, 1945
31. *Ibid.*, p 762, 867N 01/10-945, Memorandum by Henderson to Byrnes, Oct. 9, 1945
32. *Cab 128*, 1, f 91 Cab. 40(45) 1, Secret, Oct 11, 1945
33. See, *FRUS, 1945* (8), pp. 771-83

British view on short-term immigration; indeed he still favoured the Harrison report.[34]

Bevin said that he would accept the recommendations of the commission of enquiry provided that its report was unanimous. In doing this he apparently thought he had the assurance of Richard Crossman, one of the British members, that there would be no unanimity unless the British interests were taken into account. Crossman, married to a Jewess, possibly had other loyalties. The twelve members of the commission held preliminary discussions while crossing the Atlantic on the *Queen Elizabeth*. It was soon apparent that what the British members wanted was Anglo-American unity and the formation of a bloc against Russia. Sir John Singleton, British co-chairman of the commission said:

> We must endeavour to capture, in peace, the wartime partnership of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. This, I think, is perhaps the most important part of our joint mission: to demonstrate that Great Britain and the United States can together solve the problems before them.[35]

The commission heard evidence in Europe that refugees were not prepared to settle anywhere else other than Palestine—Zionist propaganda had had a telling effect. At that time Britain was taking about 18,000 refugees a year, the United States because of the prewar immigration quotas only a handful. Immigration was a tricky question in the United States. Certain communities would not allow Jews to settle in their suburbs or join their country clubs, and Congressmen, sensitive to their constituents' feelings, were reluctant to exacerbate the situation. It was not until late in the decade that the cinema industry began to examine the question on the screen in an attempt to influence opinion. In the Middle East the Anglo-American commission heard the opinion of the Arabs that the Zionists had no other claims whatsoever to Palestine. The Arabs argued that there was no reason why they, the one race with no anti-Semitic tradition, should have to bear the sins of Christian Europe.[36] In the end the commission rejected partition and recommended in a unanimous report, binationalism.[37]

During the time that the Anglo-American commission was sitting the British government operated a provisional monthly quota of 1,500 immigration certificates for Palestine. Arab states were told informally of this.[38]

A committee of British officials drawn from the Colonial, Foreign and India

34. Cab. 128, 2, f. 21, Cab 52 (45) 7, Secret, Nov. 13, 1945, *FRUS, 1945 (8)*, pp 785–86, 867N.01/10-1945, Byrnes to Halifax, Oct. 24, 1945

35. Quoted by Joseph B. Schechtman, *The United States and the Jewish State Movement* (New York Herzl; London: Yoseloff, 1966), p. 148

36. See Richard Crossman, *Palestine Mission: A Personal Record* (London. Hamish Hamilton, 1947); also Bartley C Crum, *Behind the Silken Screen* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947).

37 See *Cab 129*, 9, ff 158-95, CP (46) 175, Text of Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry on Palestine, Top Secret, April 26, 1946.

38 *Cab. 128*, 5, f 34, Cab. 1 (46) 3, Secret, Jan. 1, 1946; *FRUS, 1946* (7), 867N.01/2-646, Memorandum by Byrnes to Truman, undated

Offices, as well as the Treasury, was gloomy about the possible disastrous consequences of an acceptance of the recommendations of the Anglo-American commission. It thought that the reactions of the Palestinian Arabs would ' undoubtedly be grave ' as they were denied their main objectives, and questioned the commission's prediction that Arab hostilities would be allayed by the proposed declaration that there should in no circumstances be a Jewish state in Palestine. There would be repercussions in India: the Moslems there would sympathise with the Arabs and their attitude on Pakistan would harden. The political assessment was that adoption of the report would have ' disastrous effects ' on Britain's position in the Middle East and unfortunate repercussions in India. Zionist clamour in the United States would not be silenced, as British administration of Palestine policy would continue to be misrepresented and to provide a weapon for anti-British propaganda. From the military angle it was argued that there would be a general Arab rising in Palestine supported materially and financially by the Arab states, together with riots and demonstrations in the Arab countries of the Middle East. Reinforcements for Palestine would be essential. Indian troops and local forces in the Middle East could not be used against the Arabs and indeed might be provoked to a state of mutiny. According to the Chiefs of Staff the military situation in Palestine could only be handled with considerable reinforcements, and there were no sources from which these could be drawn. In addition the financial burden would be enormous: housing and development schemes alone would cost about £100 million—whilst a further recurrent expenditure of £5-10 million would be necessary to improve the economic and educational standard of the Arabs. It was intolerable that the British taxpayer should have to foot the bill. The British government, therefore, should decline to carry out the policy recommended by the commission of enquiry. Britain could invite the United States to share responsibility, giving not only political support but also military and financial assistance. As an alternative the report should go to the Security Council of the United Nations on British or joint Anglo-American initiative.[39]

Initially, Bevin was more optimistic. He told the Cabinet on April 29 that skilful handling of the recommendations of the commission of enquiry might, in consultation with the United States, achieve a reasonable settlement. Bevin was opposed to referring the matter to the United Nations: that could affect other aspects of British foreign policy. The essence of British policy should be to retain the interest and participation of the United States as that country's assistance was essential to implement many of the recommendations. In this Bevin was supported by Hall, and the Cabinet as a whole agreed that military and financial assistance, as well as political support, would be needed from the United States. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, pointed out that while existing British troops might be able to handle any trouble resulting from the publication of the report, substantial

39 *Cab. 129*, 9, ff. 127-52, CP(46) 173, Report of Committee of Officials on Palestine, April 27, 1946

reinforcements would be needed if it were announced that the report was to be implemented, and the planned rate of demobilisation could not be maintained. At that time Zionist terrorists in Tel Aviv had killed six British soldiers and the Cabinet emphasised that if the report were to be adopted the first steps should be taken to disarm the illegal organisations in Palestine. Otherwise British troops might ' take the law into their own hands '. Emphasis should be given to the report's first recommendation that the whole world shared the responsibility for resettling refugees, and the United States should be pressured into changing its existing immigration laws and accepting its share of displaced persons. The resettlement of European Jews should be dealt with as part of a general refugee problem and the future of the Palestine mandate should be referred in due course to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Indeed some ministers favoured referring the whole problem to the Security Council: if this were not done the suspicions of Russia could be aroused. Bevin, however, opposed the suggestion: if the issue were to go to the United Nations at all it should not be to the Security Council. The Foreign Secretary maintained that the matter should be handled rather between Britain and the United States. He was going to tell Byrnes at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris that the United States could not continue to offer advice without being ready to take some share of the responsibility. Bevin proposed a body of experts jointly appointed by the Foreign Office and the State Department to consider the financial and administrative implications of the report, the military implications being considered by the combined Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Cabinet agreed that in the first instance Bevin should ascertain from the United States the extent of its possible active military and financial assistance.[40]

Bevin and the Cabinet did not take as gloomy a view of the consequences of the recommendations of the Anglo-American commission of enquiry as did the specialist committee of officials who had discussed the matter two days previously. From the Cabinet minutes it appears that the wider military and political implications were not considered as being so catastrophic. Bevin's views certainly seem to have carried more weight than any other minister's, and hence the quashing of the suggestion that the matter be referred to the United Nations. This can be seen in the context of Bevin's overall foreign policy which gave primacy to the Anglo-American alliance. Palestine, though an explosive issue, was perhaps not the dominant one. Bevin, by the end of April 1946, had succeeded in educating the American administration to what he saw as the realities of the Russian threat. The United States had taken its first stand against Russian expansion on the Iranian issue in March 1946.[41] That same month it considered sending a powerful fleet into the Turkish straits to stop Russian moves there.[42] Bevin, too, had to consider the attitude of the

40 *Cab. 128*, 5, f 174, Cab 38 (46) 1, Secret, April 29, 1946.

41 *Ibid*, 5, f. 98, Cab 20 (46) 5, Secret, March 4, 1946, f 111, Cab 23 (46) 4, Secret, March 11, 1946, f. 121, Cab 25 (46) 3, Secret, March 18, 1946, f. 130, Cab 27 (46) 1, Secret, March 25, 1946

42 Francis Williams, *A Prime Minister Remembers The War and Post-War Memoirs of the Right Hon Earl Attlee* (London Heinemann, 1962), p. 163

Dominions, at that time meeting in London: J. C. Smuts, the South African Prime Minister, was a known Zionist.

On April 18, 1946 Bevin had asked the United States that the report of the Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry should not be published until he had had time to consult the American government. Truman agreed to this, but noted that it might just 'give the British a chance to pull their usual stunt'.[43] Bevin discussed the matter further on April 27 in Paris with the Director of the Office of European Affairs, Mr. Matthews, and urged delay in publication. The Foreign Secretary was prepared to permit the immigration of 100,000 Jews but said that they could not all go to Palestine immediately. He urged the United States to join Britain in forcing the Jewish Agency to cease its aggressive tactics. The immigrants into Palestine were chosen by the Agency for their military qualities, and armed with weapons largely paid for by American Jews. Bevin spoke of the possibility of a complete British withdrawal from Palestine: four divisions could not be maintained there indefinitely. There was the possibility of Russian penetration in the area which would weaken the whole situation in the Middle East. Only the assumption of some responsibility by the United States could improve the situation: he hoped that American troops would be sent to Palestine. Reference was also made to objectionable paragraphs in the report and to the aggressive attitude of the Jews 'poisoning relations between our two peoples'.[44]

Truman, influenced by the American Zionist Council's fears that the report denied 'Jewish historic rights and aspirations', on April 30, without first consulting the British, endorsed the recommendation that 100,000 certificates be issued to immigrants for Palestine and two other aspects favourable to Zionism. Those clauses conciliatory to the Arab case were dismissed as long range considerations. The British public was outraged by Truman's statement: seven British soldiers had just been murdered by Zionist terrorists and the British government felt that Truman showed scant appreciation of the needs of British security—Palestine would hardly be a secure base in a state of rebellion.[45] This forced the British Cabinet to define its position publicly.

Attlee, before addressing the House of Commons, secured the support of the Dominion Prime Ministers and the Cabinet for a statement which stressed the practical difficulties of absorbing a large number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine in a short time, that this could not be done until the illegal organisations had been disbanded and disarmed, and which raised directly the question of active United States collaboration. At that time the local commanders in Palestine were emphasising the need to arrest the leaders of the illegal Jewish organisations as a first step.[46]

43. *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 584-85, 867N 01/4-1946, Memorandum by Byrnes to Truman, Marginal Notation by Truman, April 19, 1946

44 *Ibid.*, pp 587-88, 740 00119 Council/4-2747, Memorandum of Conversation by Matthews, April 27, 1946

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 588-89, 867N.01/4-3046: Telegram, Acheson to Byrnes, April 30, 1946.

46 *Cab 128*, 5, Unnumbered, Cab. 39 (46) 1, Secret, 1 5 1946; *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 589-90, 867N 01/5-146 Telegram, Harriman to Byrnes, May 1, 1946.

Truman suffered from conflicting sources of advice. Hilldring, the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, wanted the United States to needle the British into implementing the recommendation for entry of 100,000 Jews immediately and without reference to future action on any other aspects of the report. The United States could accept primary responsibility of the movement of these refugees to Palestine. Hilldring was worried about Jewish demonstrations, particularly in Germany and Austria.[47] Merriam, of the Near Eastern division, rejected this and pointed to the alarming Arab reaction and the dangers to American interests in the Middle East.[48] On May 8 Truman asked Attlee for concurrent action in initiating consultation with Jews and Arabs.[49] The British Cabinet thought that this showed some admission of responsibility on the part of the United States.[50] Bevin explained to Byrnes in Paris that considerable numbers of American troops would be needed in Palestine if the report were to be implemented, together with financial assistance.[51] At this stage the British introduced an additional argument: the renegotiation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty which affected British strategic interests.[52] Byrnes, after discussing this matter with Bevin, recommended delay, and suggested that Truman, if he were prepared to offer military assistance, should consult Eisenhower about the likely size of the commitment.[53] The British, at this stage, put forward Bevin's earlier plan for a committee of British and United States experts to consider the recommendations of the report before the proposed consultations with the Jews and Arabs.[54]

Throughout these discussions it was Bevin who controlled British policy: Attlee was always anxious to defer to the advice of his Foreign Secretary. Bevin even seems to have managed to have influenced Byrnes in Paris—but that was not the same as winning over Truman to the British point of view. Bevin optimistically reported to the Cabinet on May 20 that there was evidence that the United States was ready to assume some practical share in the responsibility for Palestine: ' they now seemed to be willing to remove this question from the realm of propaganda and to study its practical implications on a business-like footing '. He felt that the mention of the seriousness of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations had had a salutary effect on the attitude of the United States government towards co-operation in the Middle East.[55]

Britain and the United States agreed to invite the Jews and Arabs to submit within one month their views on all recommendations in the report. This

47 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 591-92, 867N.01/346, Memorandum by Hilldring to Acheson, May 3, 1946
48 *Ibid.*, pp 597-99, 867N 01/5 346, Memorandum by Merriam to Acheson, May 8, 1946
49. *Ibid*, pp 596-97, 867N 01/5-646 Telegram, Truman to Attlee, May 8, 1946.
50 *Cab 128*, 5, f. 198, Cab 44 (46) 10, Secret, May 9, 1946
51 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 601-603, 740 00119 Council/5-946 Telegram, Byrnes to Truman, May 9, 1946.
52 See *Cab 128*, 5, f. 188, Cab 42(44) 1, Secret, May 6, 1946.
53. *FRUS, 1946* (7), p. 603, n 36
54 *Cab 128*, 5, f. 201, Secret, May 13, 1946, *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 603-604, 867N.01/5-1046: Telegram, Attlee to Truman, May 9, 1946, p 606, 867N 01/5-136: Telegram, Attlee to Truman, Undated
55 *Cab 128*, 5, f 216, Cab 50 (46) 1, Secret, May 26, 1946

action would be taken independently but simultaneously. Thereafter there would be a joint study of the implications of the report carried out by experts nominated by the two governments. Truman was already selecting his experts.[56]

The British submitted their points for discussion[57] Truman had his way in securing fairly immediate talks about the ' physical ' problems arising out of the transfer of 100,000 to Palestine.[58] Henry F. Grady, alternate for the Secretary of State on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems, was appointed to head the American experts.[59] On June 21 the United States Chiefs of Staff urged that no United States armed forces should be involved in carrying out the recommendations of the Anglo-American commission, and that no action should be taken in Palestine which were beyond the capabilities of British troops. They warned that only limited forces could be spared. These might pacify the situation in Palestine, but the ' political shock ' attending the reappearance of United States armed forces in the Middle East would risk serious disturbances throughout the area to the extent of invalidating current estimates of the required strengths of the army and navy. The Chiefs of Staff thought that the Middle East could then ' well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war '. Russia could replace Britain and the United States in influence and power throughout the Middle East:

> As to the importance of a stable Middle East, friendly to the Western Powers, it is obvious that this area is the buffer between Russia and the British Mediterranean life line. If the peoples of the Middle East turn to Russia, this would have the same impact in many respects as would military conquest on this area by the Soviets. Under these conditions, even if Turkey *maintains her internal and political integrity, it is highly* questionable that she could continue her stand on the Dardanelles and maintain her position as other than a satellite Russian state. Also, for very serious consideration from a military point of view is control of the oil of the Middle East. This is probably the one large undeveloped reserve in a world which may come to the limits of its oil resources within this generation without having developed any substitute. A great part of our military strength, as well as our standard of living is based on oil.

As the United States had a vital security interest in the Middle East the Chiefs of Staff were against any move which might orient the peoples of the area away from the Western powers.[60]

Towards the end of June the British position hardened. There was an organised series of attacks by Zionist terrorists in Palestine during which five

56 *Ibid.*, *loc cit.*; See *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 606-609
57 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 612-15, 867N 01/5-2746 Telegram, Attlee to Truman, Undated.
58 *Ibid.*, pp 617-18, 867N 01/6-546 Telegram, Truman to Attlee, 6 May 1946
59 *Ibid.*, p 631, n 78
60 *Ibid.*, pp 631-3, 867N.01/7-246, Memorandum by McFarland, June 21, 1946.

British officers were kidnapped. The High Commissioner in Palestine urged that the conversations on the admission of the 100,000 be suspended until the officers were released and that he be given authority to implement locally, at his discretion, action against the illegal Jewish organisations and the Jewish Agency. The Cabinet when it discussed the matter on June 20 thought that it would be a mistake to break the conversations with the United States over the 100,000. Bevin, by letter, urged strong action and the importance of securing the support of the United States for this. The Cabinet decided to take a strong stand because of the likelihood of Arab violence. It decided to suppress the illegal organisations and to do this to raid the offices of the Jewish Agency: this was seen as necessary as there was evidence of connections between the agency and the Haganah. Secrecy was essential and for this reason it was decided to inform the United States government only shortly before the raids.[61]: This Attlee did.[62] On June 29 military and police forces occupied buildings in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, including the Jewish Agency, arrested about 2,000 people and seized large quantities of documents which revealed the close connection between the agency and Haganah.[63] Truman, however, after seeing Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, publicly regretted these developments.[64] Byrnes tried to put further pressure on the British by suggesting that a reassuring statement on Palestine would help the discussions in Congress on the United States loan to Britain.[65] Some members of the British Cabinet merely thought that it would be advisable to use the term ' Zionist ' rather than ' Jew ' in future statements on Palestine as there were many Jews in Britain and the United States who were not in sympathy with Zionist policy.[66]

The worsening situation in Palestine convinced the British government that a way would have to be found around the recommendations of the Anglo-American commission. The Cabinet discussion of July 11 revealed this evolving policy. The favourable prospects in Congress for the American loan obviated the need for any public statement on Palestine. Instead, the Cabinet turned to considering a new long-term policy for the area. Hall presented the Cabinet with a paper arguing that the recommendations of the Anglo-American committee were unworkable: British representatives in the Middle East unanimously advised that adoption of this policy would have a disastrous effect on Britain's policy in the region and unfortunate repercussions in India, whilst the Arab peoples would be made more easily accessible to Russian propaganda and influence. According to the Chiefs of Staff the implementation of the report together with the suppression of the illegal armies in Palestine would necessitate reinforcement by two infantry divisions, one on the spot and one at short call, an armoured brigade and three infantry battalions, together

61 *Cab 128*, 5, f. 251, Cab. 60 (46) 3, Secret, June 20, 1946
62 *FRUS, 1946* (7), 867N 01/6-2946 Telegram, Attlee to Truman, undated.
63. *Cab 128*, 6, f 3, Cab 63 (46) 4, Secret, July 1, 1946
64 *FRUS, 1946* (7), 867N.01/7-346, Press Release by White House, July 2, 1946
65. *Cab 128*, 6, f 14, Cab 66 (46) 5, Secret, July 8, 1946
66 *Ibid., loc cit*

with some additions to the naval and air forces. The necessary army reinforcements could not be found in Britain ' save at the expense of withdrawing from other commitments from which, in fact, withdrawal is not possible '. Then there was the estimated cost, capital and indirect, of £150 million as well as recurrent expenditure of £13-20 million.[67]

Hall advocated a new long-term policy with provincial autonomy as a convenient stepping-stone to either federation or partition, the choice being left till after the explosive atmosphere had cleared.[68] He explained to the Cabinet the recommendation of the Anglo-American commission that the future constitution of Palestine should be such that no one race could dominate the other—but it contained no practical suggestions for achieving this. This would mean the continuance of the existing mandate; trusteeship could not be secured without the prospect of self-government and independence. Hall suggested instead two semi-autonomous provinces, one Jewish and one Arab, under a central trustee government. The way would be left open for partition into two independent states, or towards partnership in a federal constitution. Attlee had sent Sir Norman Brook to Paris to learn Bevin's views on this idea. The Foreign Secretary was anxious not to have to oppose the recommendation of the 100,000. He proposed to suggest to Byrnes that there should be a conference in London, preferably early in September before the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, at which British and United States officials could discuss with representatives of the Arabs and Jews all the issues raised by the Anglo-American commission. But Bevin intended to tell Byrnes that Arab opposition to the 100,000 would be lessened if the United States announced that it was prepared to admit a substantial number of Jewish refugees, even though that meant enlarging the existing quota. Bevin, however, doubted whether Hall's scheme would provide a long-term solution for Palestine. Instead the Foreign Secretary suggested consideration of a scheme in which the major part of the Arab province would be assimilated into the adjacent states of Trans-Jordan and the Lebanon, with the Jewish province as an independent Jewish state with perhaps somewhat larger territory than that suggested. Hall's intermediate solution would not be inconsistent with this aim. Bevin ceded that provision might have to be made for Jerusalem with a special council controlling the Holy Places: it might become an international area under the United Nations. The full political support of the United States was important, though Bevin did not contemplate ' continuing American participation in the administration of Palestine '.[69]

In Cabinet there was general agreement that the report of the Anglo-American commission offered no solution to the constitutional problems in Palestine. The view was expressed that if Bevin's proposal for partition were accepted it should be put forward at once: the Jews could then be left to settle the number of immigrants for the Jewish state and to bear the cost; British

67. *Cab 129*, 11, f 27, CP(46) 258, Secret, July 8, 1946
68. *Ibid.*, ff 38-50, CP(46) 259, Secret, July 8, 1946.
69 *Cab 128*, 6, ff. 19-21, Cab 64(46)4, Secret, July 11, 1946

strategic needs could be secured through treaty arrangements with the Arab states. On the other hand there would be strong opposition to this idea: long and difficult negotiations would be needed to settle the frontiers of the new sovereign states. Hall's scheme obviated this. Lord Tedder, the Chief of the Air Staff, reminded the Cabinet that whatever constitutional solution were found, Britain's strategic needs in the Middle East, particularly with regard to communications and oil supplies, depended on the good will of the Arabs. In the end the Cabinet favoured Hall's intermediate scheme, rather than the one put forward by Bevin, and decided that as it would be unwise to throw out the Anglo-American report immediately in the forthcoming discussions with the United States, an ' appropriate moment ' for bringing forward this alternative plan would have to be found. The issue of immigration to the United States should be emphasised: this would be assisted by the proposed announcement on behalf of UNRRA that 120,000 Jews should be admitted to the United States. The Cabinet did include Bevin's idea for a council representing interested religions to control the Holy Places in Jerusalem.[70]

British and United States officials met in London in July to discuss the recommendations of the Anglo-American commission of enquiry. The tactics agreed upon by the Cabinet worked: Grady was brought around to what was virtually the scheme outlined by Hall to the Cabinet. This released the British from their embarrassment over the earlier report. In their discussions the British delegates were sensitive to the comments from the Chiefs of Staff that no solution to the Palestine problem should be proposed which would alienate the Arab states. Hence the British delegates proposed modifying the provincial boundaries to make the scheme more acceptable to the Arabs. The United States delegation, however, wished to expand the Jewish province. In Cabinet Lord Tedder, the Chief of Staff, insisted that any future government of Palestine should give Britain power to control and co-ordinate the defence of that country as well as maintaining forces and military facilities as, when and where Britain required them. The Chiefs of Staff would prefer to see a particular airfield in Arab territory, but Tedder claimed that his rationale for concessions to the Arabs was not based on this military consideration, but rather to make the plan more acceptable to them. The Cabinet favoured a compromise ceding that particular territory to the Arabs while making concessions to the Jews in another area.[71]

Grady explained the scheme to Byrnes on July 19 as being one of provincial autonomy in which Palestine would be divided into two partially self-governing Arab and Jewish provinces with an overall central government. The mandatory power would maintain direct jurisdiction over Jerusalem and the Negev. Grady saw this plan as being almost a verbatim copy of one submitted anonymously by Sir Douglas Harris of the Colonial Office to the Anglo-American commission that January.[72] Byrnes, concerned about the

70 *Ibid*, *loc cit*

71 *Ibid.*, f 37, Cab 71 (46), Secret, July 22, 1946

72 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 646-47, 867N 01/7-1946 Telegram, Harriman to Byrnes, July 19, 1946

immediate transfer of 100,000 immigrants to Palestine had hesitations and seemingly preferred the Anglo-American commission's scheme,[73] but Grady warned that there was no practical alternatives to his recommendations. It was unlikely that the British would be willing to renegotiate and they had been ' most reasonable and completely co-operative '.[74]

The British position was probably made more resolute by the blowing up on July 22 of the King David hotel in Jerusalem,[75] a wing of which was used as British army headquarters: ninety-one were killed. Menachem Begin of the Irgun has claimed that warning was given to the British of this, but evidence has not been produced.[76] The officer administering the government in Palestine advised that only two alternatives were now open to the British: either to institute widespread searches for arms with a view to breaking up the Jewish resistance movements—which would create conditions tantamount to a state of war; or alternatively the British government could announce a final solution to the political problems and impose it themselves. The British officials in Palestine preferred the latter course. Attlee suggested to the Cabinet on July 23 that it was important to reach an early agreement with the United States on a long-term political solution, announce it as a joint policy and get world opinion behind it.[77]

When the agreed Anglo-American plan went to the Cabinet on July 25 it was generally approved. Bevin had hesitations over placing it before the United Nations and thought that a central advisory council should be responsible for the Holy Places in Palestine. Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, pointed out that the British financial commitment was limited to meeting the deficit on recurrent expenditure in the Arab province and thought the plan satisfactory.[78]

On July 25, however, the United States press published an account of the Morrison-Grady plan based on leaks. The Zionist lobby went to work. Truman was being advised by Byrne's who—after meeting Attlee and Bevin in Paris on July 28—recommended to the President public acceptance of the Morrison-Grady plan as a basis for a solution.[79] But the Zionist lobby was so effective that Truman, after a Cabinet meeting and consultation with members of both houses of Congress, concluded that he could not make such a statement.[80] Britain did its best to ease Truman's position. The Cabinet was under considerable pressure from the High Commissioner in Palestine to stop the illegal immigration. He argued that a large proportion of these immigrants were recruited into the illegal underground organisations, and suggested that

73 *Ibid.*, pp 648-49, 867N 01/7-1946· Telegram, Byrnes to Harriman, July 22, 1946

74 *Ibid.*, p. 652. See pp 652-67 for plan.

75 *Ibid.*, p. 651, 867N 01/7-2346. Telegram, Byrnes to Harriman, July 23, 1946

76. *The Observer*, Nov 13, 1977

77. *Cab 128*, 6, f 41, Cab 72(46), Secret, July 23, 1946.

78 *Ibid.*, f 44, Cab. 73(46) 2, Secret, July 25, 1946.

79 *Ibid.*, f 53, Cab 74 (46), Secret, July 29, 1946; *FRUS*, 1946 (7), pp 671-73, 867N.01/7-2946: Telegram, Byrnes to Truman, July 29, 1946

80. *FRUS*, *1946* (7), pp. 671-73, 867N.01/7-2946: Telegram, Byrnes to Truman, July 29, 1946; see Stevens, *op.cit.*, pp 151-54

the illegal immigrant ships should be forced to return to their port of departure, except for those from Balkan countries or ports under Russian control, which should be diverted to Tripoli or Cyprus. The Chiefs of Staff strongly supported this view. Continued illegal immigration would mean serious trouble with the Arabs, and the British forces could not cope with trouble from both Arabs and Zionists. More troops for Palestine would mean slowing down the army-release scheme. The naval and military authorities were prepared to undertake stopping illegal immigration.[81] Sir John Shaw, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Palestine, argued that both Arabs and Jews would uncompromisingly reject the plan of provincial autonomy. The Arabs were more likely to be hostile to the plan than the Jews, especially to the provision for the 100,000 immigrants.[82] The Cabinet was reluctant to endorse these military recommendations fully for, as late as August 7, it was felt that Truman might accept the Morrison-Grady plan. It agreed only in principle that the illegal immigrants should be removed to Cyprus or other suitable areas.[83] The situation was so serious, however, that by August 14 1,200 illegal immigrants were trans-shipped from Haifa to Cyprus.[84]

Indeed the whole situation in Palestine was deteriorating so rapidly that Britain decided to go ahead on its own in an attempt to implement the Morrison-Grady plan: reaction to the King David hotel incident probably influenced this decision. After that explosion, in the fury of the moment, the British army commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Evelyn Barker, spoke of ' punishing the Jews in a way the race dislikes—by striking at their pockets '. Zionist propaganda took over. The murdered were forgotten.[85] Attlee informed Truman that his government had decided to go ahead and make arrangements for the proposed conference with the Jews and the Arabs at the end of August. The British saw the plan as the one most likely to lead to a settlement in Palestine. Under it Attlee thought it would be possible to introduce a substantial number of refugees from Europe into Palestine without disturbing the peace of the whole of the Middle East and imposing on Britain a military commitment which it could not discharge.[86] Truman, influenced by the Zionist lobby, and in particular Dr. Goldmann of the Jewish Agency,[87] on August 12 finally informed Attlee that he could not give formal support to the Morrison-Grady plan as ' the opposition in this country to the plan has become so intense that it is now clear it would be impossible to rally in favour of it sufficient public opinion to enable this Government to give it effective support '.[88]

Towards the end of August the British military had the terrorists under

81 *Cab 128*, 6, f. 54, Cab. 74 (46), Secret, July 29, 1946.
82 *Ibid*, ff. 56–57, Cab 75 (46) 1, Secret, July 30, 1946.
83 *Ibid*, f. 70, Cab 77 (46), Secret, Aug 7, 1946.
84 *Ibid*, f 75, Cab 78 (46) 1, Secret, Aug 14, 1946
85 Sykes, pp 358–59
86 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 677–78, 867N 01/8–946 Telegram, Attlee to Truman, 9 8 1946
87. *Ibid*, pp 679–82, 867N.01/8–1246· Telegram, Acheson to Harriman, 12 8 1946
88 *Ibid*, p. 682, 867N 01/8–1246: Telegram, Truman to Attlee, 12 8 1946

control in Palestine. The Arab states accepted the invitation to consultations in London. The Jewish Agency in Paris, however, would not negotiate on the Morrison-Grady plan—under the instigation of Goldmann and Rabbi Wise it demanded partition.[89] Weizmann, initially not unfavourable to the Morrison-Grady plan[90] was won over by the extremists.[91] By early September, Wise and other Zionists were urging Truman to issue a statement in favour of partition in Palestine.[92] Zionist tactics were modified: on September 16, Goldmann told Bevin and Hall that the Jewish Agency was prepared to attend the conference to state its views.[93] The Arabs submitted their counter proposals on September 19, demanding an independent Palestine as a unitary state and an immediate end to Jewish immigration.[94]

It is evident that throughout this period Truman took personal charge of the Palestine problem. Much of the correspondence with Britain did not even go through the Secretary of State or the State Department.[95] On the British side, as Harriman, the United States ambassador in Britain commented, Bevin looked upon the Palestine question as his ' own primary responsibility '.[96]

Conversations between Bevin, Hall and the Arab delegates prior to the meeting of the Palestine conference at Lancaster House on October 2 brought out that the Arabs were inflexibly opposed to the establishment of a Jewish national state in Palestine. The Arabs thought this would prove a bridgehead for Jewish political and economic penetration, first from the rest of Palestine into Trans-Jordan, Syria, and then into the whole Arab world. The Arab fear was that the Zionists would fill their state with immigrants from Europe, creating conditions which would warrant a demand for more *lebensraum*. This could then be used as a reason for progressive encroachment into the territories of neighbouring states. The Arabs wanted a unitary state in Palestine with a permanent Arab majority. The Jews were to have no more than one third of the seats in the legislature, and immigrants were not to receive voting rights for ten years.[97]

When the Palestine conference met on October 2 it was adjourned immediately. The British wanted more time to study the Arab proposals, and international meetings made December 16 the earliest possible date for the resumption of discussions.[98] The British Prime Minister also thought that there was a possibility that the Jewish Agency might send a delegation to London. Attlee and Hall saw Weizmann on October 1 and explained that Britain was not prepared to release detained Zionist leaders as a price for Jewish participation in the conference. Britain was willing to have a truce in

89 *Ibid*., pp 688-9, 740 00119 Council/8-2146: Telegram, Harriman to Acheson, 21.8.1946.
90 Reports of Conversation with Hall, *Cab 128*, 6, f. 69, Cab 77 (46) 2, Secret, 7 8 1946
91 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp. 692-3, 867N.09-546, Memorandum of Conversation with Wilson, 5.9.1946.
92 *Ibid*., pp. 693-5, 867N.01/9-1246, Memorandum by Clayton to Truman, 12 9 1946
93. *Ibid*., pp 697-98, 867N.01/9-2046. Telegram, Gallman to Byrnes, Sept. 20, 1946.
94 *Ibid*., pp 698-99, 867N 01/9-2346· Telegram, Gallman to Byrnes, Sept. 23, 1946
95 *Ibid*., p. 686, 867N 01/8-1746, Byrnes to Wise, Aug. 17, 1946
96 *Ibid*., pp 689-90, 740 00119 Council/8-2146: Telegram, Harriman to Acheson, Aug 21, 1946
97. *Cab. 129*, 13, ff. 26-7, CP (46) 358, Secret, Oct 5, 1946
98 *FRUS, 1946* (7), p 700, 867N 01/10-246: Telegram, Gallman to Byrnes, Oct 2, 1946.

Palestine with the Jewish Agency co-operating with the administration to restore law and order and thus enabling the detainees to be released. The Jewish leaders would meet Hall again to discuss this matter and then discuss the broader issues with Attlee.[99] The outcome of the meeting with the Jewish leaders on October 4 was that the Zionists would not participate in the conference until the detained members of the Jewish Executive were released in Palestine. There were hopes that an agreement about law and order in Palestine could be reached enabling such a release and that Jewish delegates could be brought into the conference even before the return of the Arab delegates.[100]

Truman ended any prospects of Zionist moderation with a statement on October 4, the eve of the Jewish Day of Atonement, in which he effectively supported nothing less than the radical Zionist solution of the Palestine problem. Truman seemingly endorsed partition by saying that it would command the support of public opinion in the United States. He insisted that immigration could not wait for a solution: it should start at once. Attlee was informed of this in advance,[101] and asked Truman to postpone the statement to enable consultations with Bevin in Paris[102]. Truman refused.[103] In doing this Truman went against his foreign-policy advisers and gave in to his political staff who had their eyes on the forthcoming elections in New York and concern for the Zionist vote.[104] Attlee was furious. He told Truman:

> I have received with great regret your letter refusing even a few hours grace to the Prime Minister of the country which has the actual responsibility for the government of Palestine in order that he might acquaint you with the actual situation and the probable results of your action. These may well include the frustration of the patient efforts to achieve a settlement and the loss of still more lives in Palestine.
>
> I am astonished that you did not wait to acquaint yourself with the reasons for the suspension of the conference with the Arabs. You do not seem to have been informed that so far from negotiations having been broken off, conversations with leading Zionists with a view to their entering the conference were proceeding with good prospects of success.[105]

Bevin raged. It seemed that Truman was prepared to sacrifice Western security on the altar of domestic politics. The Foreign Secretary told the Cabinet on October 25 that he had hoped for more satisfactory progress in the informal conversations with Jewish representatives, but that the prospects of persuading them to adopt a more reasonable attitude had been impaired by the statement of Truman.[106]

99. *Ibid*, pp. 700-1, 867N.01/10-346. Telegram, Attlee to British Embassy Washington, Oct 2, 1946.
100. *Cab 129*, 13, ff 26-7, CP(46) 358, Secret, Oct 5, 1946
101 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp 701-703, 867N 01/10-346: Telegram, Truman to Attlee, Oct 3, 1946
102 *Ibid*, p 704, 867N.01/10-446. Telegram, Attlee to Truman, undated
103. *Ibid.*, p 704, 867N 01/10-446 Telegram, Truman to Attlee, Oct 4, 1946.
104. See Stevens, *op.cit*, pp 155-60.
105. *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp. 704-705, 867N.01/10-1046: Telegram, Attlee to Truman, Oct 4, 1946.
106 *Cab 128*, 6, f. 136, Cap. 91 (46) 2, Secret, Oct 25, 1946

By the end of October British Palestine policy was in a state of suspension. On October 5 Attlee appointed Arthur Creech Jones, a known Zionist sympathiser, as Colonial Secretary in an attempt to win the good faith of the Zionists. But on October 18 the talks between Britain and the Jewish Agency were terminated without any undertakings on either side.[107] On October 25 Bevin asked the Cabinet not to formulate their views on the future policy towards Palestine until he had had conversations with the United States administration and representative Jews during his forthcoming visit to New York. The situation would also be eased on the Arab side if the Anglo-Egyptian treaty negotiations were successfully concluded. Arab apprehensions might also be allayed if the United States showed some willingness to receive displaced persons. The Foreign Secretary then went on to outline the three possible courses confronting the Cabinet if there were no prospect of reaching a settlement at the beginning of December through continued negotiations. The first course was to impose a settlement acceptable to one or other of the two communities in Palestine: the Chiefs of Staff had advised that Britain did not have the means to impose a solution that was resisted by both sides. The second alternative was to surrender the mandate and withdraw from Palestine: this would seriously affect Britain's strategic position in the Middle East and British prestige throughout the world. The third possibility was to propose a scheme of partition which might provide for the Arab part of Palestine to be merged into Trans-Jordan.[108]

Early in November the British government was able to release the Zionist leaders in Palestine detained on June 29, 1946. Certain Palestinian Arabs undergoing detention were freed at the same time. This move was made possible by the public dissociation of the Jewish Agency from the use of violence, and its promise to suppress terrorism.[109] Jewish representation at the London Conference on Palestine now seemed more likely. But as the Zionist Congress in Basle was unlikely to have appointed a new executive before December 23—and it was thought that until then no Zionist representatives could speak with authority on the future of Palestine—the British Cabinet thought it necessary to postpone the reconvening of the Palestine Conference until after the agreed date of December 16. With the internal situation in Palestine deteriorating this was a move taken with regret, as the members of the British administration and the armed forces there were subject to increasing strain.[110] British policy was that nothing should be decided before the reconvening of the London Conference on Palestine. Bevin's conversations in the United States with Arab and Zionist leaders, as well as with the United States administration, were seen as entirely 'exploratory'.[111] The British

107 *FRUS, 1946* (7), pp. 709-10, 867N.01/1846. Telegram, Gallman to Byrnes, Oct 18, 1946

108. *Cab 128*, 6, f. 136, Cab. 91 (46) 2, Secret, Oct. 25, 1946

109 *Ibid.*, f. 136, Cab 91 (46) 2 Secret, 25 10.1946, f. 149, Cab 94 (46) 4, Secret, 4.11 1946; *FRUS*, 1946 (7), pp 721-2, 867N 001/11-546. Telegram, Gallman to Byrnes, 5 11 1946

110. *Cab. 128*, 6, f. 156, Cab 99 (46) 3, Secret, Nov 21, 1946.

111. *FRUS, 1946* (7), 867N.01/11-2246, Memorandum of Conversation by Acheson, Nov. 22, 1946

Cabinet when pressed to give an assurance that it was favourably disposed towards partition as a solution in Palestine, in the hope of a beneficial effect on the Zionist Congress, maintained that there could be no commitment in advance before all the alternatives had been fully discussed in a resumed Palestine Conference. Bevin was instructed that even his discussions with the United States administration should be on the basis of ascertaining the probable attitude of that government towards the various possible solutions.[112]

While British policy towards Palestine was in a state of suspension military decisions were being taken which suggested the continued importance of Palestine as a base for British forces in the Middle East. By December 1946 this was increasing rather than diminishing, particularly as attempts to renegotiate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty were reaching an impasse.[113] In December 1946 it was decided to move a further division from Egypt to Palestine. That would leave only administrative troops in Egypt, and by April 1, 1947, the numbers there would have been reduced to 32,000.[114]

After eighteen months in office, and following several commissions of enquiry, the British Labour government was still unable to enunciate a definite policy for Palestine. Although Bevin, as Foreign Secretary, assumed responsibility for that policy, he was also beset by an even more serious preoccupation with Russian moves in Europe and his attempts to awaken the United States to these realities. Palestine did occupy a good deal of Bevin's time and energy, and he could be said to have given his own peculiar stamp to that policy, but in the years following the end of the Second World War Britain could not treat Palestine policy in isolation. At a time of severe financial stringency, difficulties in maintaining the strength of the armed forces, and the need to consolidate the Anglo-American special relationship, the affairs of the mandate had to be weighed against other considerations.

Bevin and Hall were limited in what they could do by the attitude of the United States. Throughout these months, on the whole, Truman assumed personal control of Palestine policy. Largely for reasons of domestic politics Truman favoured the Zionist solution—virtually directing the British government to implement it without being prepared to accept any responsibility for the military consequences, and initially without offering even to assume any of the financial burden. To British statesmen this seemed irresponsible. Bevin did succeed in making the question one of Anglo-American concern rather than an exclusively British responsibility—with both the Anglo-American commission of enquiry, and the Morrison-Grady talks in London. But Truman was not prepared for the United States to do much else than talk. He avoided any serious commitment to American participation in a solution, and consistently overrode warnings and advice from both the military and the State Department. This placed Britain in a ' Catch 22 ' situation: at a time when the United States was becoming increasingly committed to the

112. *Cab 128*, 6, f 177, Cab. 101 (46) 2, Secret.
113 *Ibid*, f 157, Cab 96 (46) 3, Secret, Nov 14, 1946
114 *Ibid.*, f. 193, Cab 105 (46) 4, Secret, Dec 12, 1946.

defence of Europe disagreement over Palestine could not be allowed to endanger the Anglo-American alliance. But Britain had strategic interests in the Middle East which in a wider sense were part of the West's defence against Russia, and Truman seemed to feel that these could be sacrificed on the altar of his domestic political concerns. Since Bevin had decided on cultivating the Anglo-American special relationship rather than concentrating on the Commonwealth or going into Europe, he was faced with the prospect of ordering Britain's Palestine policy to meet the requirements of the American President rather than Britain's strategic needs.

As early as August 1945 the British Cabinet had decided that policy in the Middle East had to be considered as a whole. The serious and demoralising situation in the mandate, therefore, had to be weighed against the attempts to renegotiate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and the effect of developments in the area on Moslem opinion in India. Indeed it was impossible to divorce the question of partition in Palestine from partition in India. It was felt that if there were partition in the mandate the Moslem case for partition in India would be strengthened. In 1946 this was thought undesirable. Moreover a stable Middle East was essential for maintaining the routes of Empire and securing oil supplies. With the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations reaching impasse, by the end of 1946 Palestine was increasingly being developed as a principal British base to secure the area—but it could hardly fulfil this objective in a state of revolution. The Middle East was to be a British area of influence in the postwar world. In 1945 and 1946 British statesmen were sensitive to any penetration of this preserve, and they would consider only a temporary American presence there. But in turn this had to be weighed against the towering threat of Russian moves in Europe. The most that Bevin could do was to suspend Palestine policy and to await events. So the policy of the British Labour government in Palestine during 1945 and 1946 may be seen as an attempt to stall for time, even at the cost of increasing loss of British lives in the mandate and demoralisation of the administration there. Faced with an intransigent American President, Bevin had little alternative.

BOOKS

THE ARMS TRADE: A REVIEW

Lawrence Freedman *

THE following is an impressionistic survey of the literature of the 1970s on the international arms trade. It is concerned with the failure of the British contribution to this literature in encouraging an appreciation of the foreign policy aspects of the arms sales issue.

The consequences of the active promotion by Western governments of the wares of their defence industries began to be noticed in the late 1960s. In 1970 a project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) culminated in seven reports.[1] Two years later the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published a survey of the arms trade, with the factors affecting its political control by supplier governments the major theme.[2] The most significant publication, however, came in 1971 when the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) brought out a mammoth and seminal volume. This provided detailed information on the flow of arms to ninety-one countries in the two decades following 1950, with case studies on the main suppliers and recipients and a discussion of proposals to put the trade under international control.[3]

These and other publications of this period[4] were essentially descriptive and more interested in the supply side of the problem than demand. The SIPRI book had the most influence, reflecting the enormous research that had gone into its production. It provided a data base that guided all future discussions, and which has been regularly brought up to date.[5] It also exhibited the standard SIPRI flaws of statistical overkill and a wide-ranging, but unsatisfactory, analysis. In the provision of the raw material for the analyses of others. SIPRI has made its mark primarily.

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1 The most important of these was Amelia C Leiss, *Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries* (Cambridge, Mass Centre for International Studies, MIT, 1970). Geoffrey Kemp, who participated in this project wrote a number of valuable articles on the subject, for example ' Dilemmas of the Arms Traffic ', *Foreign Affairs*, Jan 1970, pp 274 84

2 John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London Chatto and Windus for the IISS, 1972)

3 SIPRI, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Uppsala Almquist and Wiksell; New York· Humanities Press, 1971)

4 George Thayer, *The War Business* (London Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); Lewis Frank, *The Arms Trade in International Relations* (New York· Praeger, 1969) Robert Harkavy's *The Arms Trade and International Systems* (Cambridge, Mass. Ballinger, 1975) is an interesting piece of scholarship, comparing the weapons markets of the inter war and postwar periods, but has little to say on the late 1960s and early 1970s. A useful discussion of some of these books is found in a review article by Ilan Peleg, ' Arms Supply to the Third World—Models and Explanations ' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol 15, No 1, 1977, pp 91-103.

5 An abridged version of *The Arms Trade with the Third World*, bringing the analysis up to 1972 was published by Penguin Books in 1975 A register of the major deals to 1973 with a few aggregate tables was also published, without commentary, in 1975 SIPRI, *Arms Trade Registers The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1975). Full registers and tables are provided in the annual SIPRI Yearbook of Armaments and Disarmaments, of which the 1978 edition was published by Taylor & Francis, London SIPRI is beginning to extend its coverage to the arms trade within the developed world

It is the problem of accumuluting data that provides the first reason for the neglect of the political aspects of the arms trade. When government secrecy creates major barriers for the researcher, the effort to overcome these barriers can create a ' data-fixation ' in which information gathering becomes an end in itself or else, once gathered, the researcher tries to do far more with the information than its quality deserves. These tendencies can be seen in studies of most areas of defence policy (which tends to bring out the investigative journalist in academics), and they are particularly evident in studies of the arms trade.

All working in this area agree on the paucity of high quality information. Most information of value results from publicity over particular deals. From this some pattern can be discerned, but there is no way in which a firm statistical base can be provided which will allow for precision in identifying aggregate arms flows or comparing suppliers. A number of organisations maintain registers of major deals,[6] but there are obvious problems with this exercise: rumours are included; a delay in moving from letter of intent to contract may mean the same deal appears twice; once cancelled an order may not be removed from the list. Details of numbers of items involved and financing arrangements are even harder to come by.

In scanning any of the registers these difficulties become evident (because of the blank spaces) and can be borne in mind when drawing conclusions. Unfortunately, once these are aggregated and put in tabular form an illusion of precision can be created. The main culprit here is the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) which provides the most comprehensive statistics on the arms trade.[7]

ACDA does not make available the raw data it uses to put together its statistics, and whereas the American government has access to information unobtainable by independent research organisations, it should not be assumed that it is in possession of all the facts. Intuitively, many of the ACDA figures do not ring true. The disparity between its figures and those of SIPRI (which errs on the side of overstatement) is so large, well beyond any shared margin of error, as to be the despair of the analyst. The despair grows as one realises that SIPRI is less comprehensive than ACDA, covering only deals of major items of equipment with the Third World. ACDA includes the smallest items and equipment for defence industries though it excludes the crucial area of training and technical services. The reasons for the variations may be different estimates of value (for the attachment of a price to these deals is usually artificial) or simply SIPRI's tendency to include all deals, however doubtful, and ACDA's tendency to wait until delivery of the hardware has been confirmed. This marked discrepancy between ADCA's figures and those officially provided, for example by the British government, adds to the confusion.

In the preface to SIPRI's 1971 study, Frank Blackaby, the project leader, claimed value in making it possible ' to examine the relationship of big and small powers by reference to a " hard " instrument of policy—the movement of arms—and one that, unlike most others, can be measured '.[8] But as we have seen measurement here is extremely tricky and inexact. Any hypotheses generated by available statistics must be treated with great circumspection. Furthermore, it is not necessarily true that adequate statistics would provide the best insight into the sort of international relationships connected with arms transfers. It is often those things that defy statistical presentation—methods of payment, political context and strategic relevance—that

6 In addition to SIPRI, IISS publishes a register in the annual edition of *The Military Balance*. Regular lists of deals appear in *Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest* (published by Copley and Associates in the United States). In Britain the Campaign Against the Arms Trade (5 Caledonian Road, London N1 9DX) produces a monthly collection of newspaper reports of British involvement in the arms trade.

7. The most recent edition was ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1967-76* (Washington: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 1978).

8. SIPRI (1971), *op. cit.*, p. vii.

capture the essence of a relationship far better than the aggregate, notional value of a collection of identified sales.

The use of monetary value as the best available measure encourages the discussion of arms purchases by developing countries in terms of their opportunity costs, mainly those of economic development. It discourages consideration of the strategic consequences of particular sales. Too much is taken for granted regarding their dangers for international stability without subjecting it to searching analysis. Another approach is to note the advanced nature of the military technology being transferred, with the implication that distributing high quality hardware to politically immature nations makes everything worse.[9] However, the fascination with high-value deals involving sophisticated equipment, distracts attention from the fact that most of the bloodiest fighting of the 1970s has been in Africa—least touched by the trade in the most modern and expensive equipment—and has been conducted largely with a variety of small arms and basic items of army equipment.

* * *

The real importance of the high-value deals is that these are the ones that, because of their visibility, have the major consequences for the political relations between supplier and recipient. As the 1970s progressed it became apparent that, though the growth of the arms trade could be discussed as a global phenomenon, it was concentrated in the Middle East. This was not simply because of the suppliers' desire to recoup some of the revenues being paid to OPEC It was also felt that, in the absence of the West's willingness to commit intervention forces, the military position of local regimes needed to be bolstered. Of these regimes, that of the Shah in Iran was the most important as it could potentially exercise a calming influence throughout the Gulf. It was in 1972 that President Nixon told the Shah that in the future he could buy any conventional weapons he wanted from the United States. From 1974 on, with the added lure of numerous petro-dollars to serve as an incentive for the arms salesmen, it seemed as if this free choice applied to virtually any regime, so long as it was reasonably well-disposed towards the West.

Because the Nixon and Ford administrations explicitly presented arms sales as an instrument of diplomacy it was in foreign policy terms that their critics responded

As the volume of trade grew a number of Americans began to raise the alarm about the hostages to fortune being created. Warnings were sounded about the number of Americans involved in training programmes, and the dangers of becoming too associated with regimes of doubtful stability or of fuelling regional arms races.[10] The point about these concerns, and the initiatives of the Nixon and Ford administrations to which they were responding, was that they were related to the specific political interests of the United States, and not to more general fears over the unhealthiness of all these arms transfers for the world community. For example, it was becoming apparent that whatever the hopes of Henry Kissinger that arms sales would provide leverage over countries such as Iran, the opposite could be true. A ' reverse influence ' was evolving, limiting ' the ability of the US to exercise the policy option of cutting off military support to Iran '.[11]

9 Anne Cahn argued in ' Have Arms, Will Sell ', *Arms Control Today*, IV· 10 Oct. 1974, pp. 1–3, that ' a more meaningful criterion (than monetary value) is to examine the quality of the arms traded ' SIPRI has done a lot of research on this aspect.

10 Anthony Sampson's history of the trade illustrates the fascination, as the subtitle indicates, with the arms trade as big business Anthony Sampson, *The Arms Bazaar The Companies, The Dealers, The Bribes* (London. Hodder and Stoughton, 1977)

11 Staff Report to the Sub-Committee on Foreign Assistance of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *US Military Sales to Iran* (US Senate, US GPO. July 1, 1976), p 53 Most of these concerns are exposed in the first section of Anne Hessing Cahn *et al.*, *Controlling Future Arms Trade* (New York McGraw-Hill, 1977)

Britain followed the American lead, though not to the same extent, in establishing a close military relationship with a number of Middle East countries. In an article published in this journal a year ago, I observed that, in contrast to the United States there had not been a similar debate in Britain concerning the political risks of the policy.[12] For the rest of this article I want to consider some reasons why this has been so.

* * *

One obvious reason is that the data problem is particularly acute in Britain. There have been no full parliamentary debates on the issue, and questions on specific deals receive a standard, official answer affirming a policy of non- disclosure. Only one figure is published on the forecast value of the previous year's arms sales, with an estimate for the coming year. This figure is provided without explanation, and is admitted within Whitehall to be lacking in precision.[13] Figures for sales directly involving the government are available but otherwise there is no disaggregation—no information on types and quantities of weapons nor recipients nor even most favoured regions. It is claimed that this policy is mainly for the benefit of recipients, who wish to preserve their anonymity, but it is hard to avoid the suspicion that even if the recipients wished to brag as loudly as possible about their new acquisitions, Whitehall would still insist on silence.[14]

This furtive approach, selling arms to other nation states as if selling contraceptives in Ireland, introduces an air of official embarrassment into the whole issue. This encourages the traditional British approach to defence matters, in which the Centre and Right affirm their loyalty to established practices and institutions, leaving it to the Left to ask (and answer) the fundamental questions.[15]

The sharpest published critique of British policy was provided by a controversial 1977 report by a Labour Party Study Group.[16] The arms trade is an obvious target for the liberal conscience. When the jargons of modern advertising and the military are

12 'British Foreign Policy to 1985 IV: Britain and the Arms Trade', *International Affairs*, July 1978, p 389 This was taken from a larger study on *Arms Production in the United Kingdom Problems and Prospects* (London: RIIA, 1978) In retrospect, my own discussion of these problems was not as pointed as it might have been

13 It is the best estimate of the value of actual deliveries of defence equipment for which export licences have been required during the relevant twelve months. It does not include the value of spare parts, electronics and support services If these were included the published figure might grow by more than 50 per cent!

14 This impression is reinforced by a table in the excellent study by the Congressional Research Service on *Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy* (Washington DC: Library of Congress, Sept 22, 1977). The table on pages 26 29 lists proposed sales about which the Defense Department, in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act, has notified Congress 45 deals to 18 different countries (including a number of Britain's Third World customers) were mentioned Apart from one sale to Taiwan, the only sale in which the value is classified is that of Harpoon missiles to Britain! In 1980 the results of a major study by Martin Edmonds and Michael Dillon of the University of Lancaster on public accountability and arms sales in Western Europe should become available

15 There are important exceptions to this rule but they are not, on the whole, very accessible A working party of the British Council of Churches published a lively little report in 1977, mainly on the international aspects of the problem. *The Sale and Transfer of Conventional Arms, Arms Systems and Related Technology* (BCC Publications, 10 Eaton Gate, London SW1, May 1977) The most thorough discussion of issues related to a British arms sales policy (modestly excluding my own work referred to in n 12) is a collection of papers from a conference at Chatham House jointly organised by the Foreign Office and the Arms Control Group of the British International Studies Association (BISA) in Sept 1977 This includes two defences of British arms sales policy by officials, which are notable for their rarity value and, in the case of a contribution by Arthur Hockday, Second Permanent Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defence, its impressive philosophical competence John Simpson, ed., *The Control of Arms Transfers* (London: Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, FCO, 1978).

16 Report of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, *Sense about Defence* (London: Quartet Books, 1977), pp. 99-110

combined in sales promotions, there are plenty of opportunities for expression of disgust. But the Left has not moved beyond traditional liberal suppositions concerning arms races and the dangers of war that often have only slight empirical foundation. Furthermore, it has not come to terms with the proposition that rather than preserving colonialist ties by encouraging the diffusion of military power, the arms trade facilitates political independence. Whatever the fate of the New International Economic Order, developed and developing countries have connived to produce a ' New International Military Order ' with important implications for the pursuit of Western interests. Those on the Left that recognise this diffusion of power argue that it encourages the wrong sort of Third-World leader and the wrong sort of development (militarist, repressive and ignoring ' basic needs ').[17]

In the report of the FCO/BISA conference (see n. 15) Dan Smith provides a critique of policy along the lines of the Labour Party's Study Group (in which he also played a major part). Smith suggests that the political case for arms sales—that they lead to an extension of British influence—is ' constantly overstated and oversimplified '. Replying, Gloria Franklin, of the Ministry of Defence, properly noted that such claims are rarely made by the government.[18] In fact, again typically for Britain, the case for participating in the arms trade is presented largely in terms of putative economic benefits rather than political benefits, with concern about the quality of British policy focusing on maximising the commercial dividends.[19] ' Politics ' appears solely as a constraint limiting potential customers.[20] Alternatively, on occasion broad justification will be provided for arms sales, noting the right of other nations to defend themselves and the care taken to ensure that nothing untoward is done with the weapons Britain supplies.[21] By stressing the commercial benefits, the government helps to confine the debate, leaving the critics either contrasting economic expediency with some higher morality, or else attempting to solve the unemployment problems that would be created by a withdrawal from the arms trade.

What is lacking on all sides is an appreciation of the relationship between foreign policy and specific sales. The Labour Party Report reassured us that it was not suggesting that ' the supply of arms is in all cases wrong, or that we should withdraw entirely from the arms trade '. It emphasised, quite rightly, that ' no arms sales policy can be disinterested in its political implications '.[22] However, the British critics in general seem to have heeded the warning by Emma Rothschild, an influential figure on the Left, who argued that the only way to cut down on sales was to refuse to supply anyone. This would avoid the ' case-by-case ' approach (shared by both the British and the Americans), which most reflects the needs of foreign policy but draws critics into

17. Robin Luckham, ' Militarism Arms and the Internationalisation of Capital ', *IDS Bulletin*, Vol 8, No 3, March 1977, pp 38-50 Having prepared this article, I found that Mary Kaldor had used a similar phrase (International Military Order) as the title for an article in the *New Statesman* (May 25, 1979) In this Ms Kaldor notes that ' the connections between under-development and armaments are rarely mentioned ' and then makes a brave attempt to assess the connections

18 Simpson, *op cit*, pp 73, 83

19 The only time in recent years that the Sub-Committee on Defence and External Affairs of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee examined defence sales (and this was only in passing) it concerned itself with the activities of the Defence Sales Organisation, whether ministers were doing enough to promote sales and whether the wily French were stealing a march on us Seventh Report from the Expenditure Committee, House of Commons Session 1975-76 *Guided Weapons*, 2 vols. (London: HMSO, July 1976) A similar orientation is found in the contributions to ' Defence Policy and Arms Sales ', *RUSI Journal*, Dec. 1976, pp 59-67

20 A detailed memorandum submitted by the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC) to the Expenditure Committee provides an insight into industry views on political constraints. Seventh Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1975-76, *op cit*, Vol. 2, pp 172-86.

21 For example, Sir Ronald Ellis, ' Defence Sales ', *RUSI Journal*, June 1979. He notes that barely 5 per cent of the British equipment sold over the past ten years has been used in anger

22. *Sense about Defence, op cit*, p 107 Dan Smith goes a bit further in Simpson, *op. cit*, but he still advocates as the minimum necessary improvement greater ' selectivity ' (p 74).

opposing the ' felt needs ' of other countries.[23] The tension between these two approaches could be seen in the United States. In an influential article of late 1976 Leslie Gelb argued that ' the United States should approach arms sales as a foreign policy problem, not as an arms control problem '.[24] He then went on to join the Carter administration which posed the problem entirely in arms-control terms.

The problem is, as President Carter has found in his unsuccessful attempt to implement his arms transfer control policy, that other international considerations persistently intrude. Sadly, this policy, which provided a rallying point for British critics, has diverted attention from the international politics of arms sales towards debate on the feasibility of various methods of general control, none of which turns out to be very promising.[25]

The issue of whether or not to sell Harrier jets to China has generated a lively discussion of the merits of arms sales that is couched in foreign policy terms.[26] However, it is events in the Middle East that most demonstrate the need for this sort of discussion. The global problem of the ever-expanding arms trade has always been, at its core, a problem of the Middle East. Here, it was assumed that major political interests—demonstrating solidarity with the various regimes, tilting towards the Arab cause, bolstering Iran as a regional power— were supported by arms sales. To take one example, British arms sales to Egypt were important in aiding President Sadat's move away from the Russians and signalling approval of his ' moderate ' approach to the conflict with Israel.[27] Events of 1979, with the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, and the withdrawal by Saudi Arabia of finance for Egypt's armaments purchases, raise questions about the wisdom of a policy which may have resulted in Britain ' backing losers '. Maybe time will show that the policy was wise, if Iran does stay closer to the West than it might have done because of dependence on military supplies or if President Sadat's peace initiative finally succeeds. My point is only that these are the sort of questions to which the proponents and opponents of arms sales should have addressed themselves, and did not.

23. Emma Rothschild, ' The Arms Boom and How to Stop It ', *New York Review of Books*, Jan 20, 1977, p 27

24. ' Arms Sales ', *Foreign Policy*, No 25, Winter 1976–77, p. 5.

25 One example of the consequences of this distraction in a rather dated piece by Lawrence Franko ' Restraining Arms Exports to the Third World. Will Europe Agree?' *Survival*, XXI 1 (Jan./Feb. 1979), pp 14-25 that discusses the European position solely in terms of the needs of defence industries and answers the question in the title by advocacy of market-sharing arrangements.

26. I have dealt with this issue in *The West and the Modernization of China* (London RIIA, 1979).

27 ' Britain is now emerging as the chief supplier (of Egypt) '—Andrew J. Pierre, ' Beyond the " Plane Package " Arms and Politics in the Middle East ', *International Security*, III:1, Summer 1978, p 156 The relation of arms sales to the Arab-Israeli conflict is also discussed in Chapter 6 of David Astor and Valerie Yorke, *Peace in the Middle East: Superpowers and Security Guarantees* (London: Corgi Books, 1978).

REVIEWS

CHATHAM HOUSE BOOKS

Power Politics. By Martin Wight. Edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad. *Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1978. 317 pp. £7·50. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979. Pb: £1·50.)*

MARTIN WIGHT was, in the quarter century which followed the end of the Second World War, the outstanding exponent in British academic life of the theory and practice of international relations. His published work was not voluminous but was of the highest quality, alike in solidity of content, intellectual honesty and clarity of style. Through his students, mainly at the London School of Economics and later at the University of Sussex, through his colleagues at these two institutions, and through others who were less formally associated with him in various common activities, his influence spread as circular ripples spread across a lake, in Britain and further afield.

His famous pamphlet *Power Politics* was published by Chatham House in 1946. In the next two decades his main task, in the time that he could snatch from teaching or administration, was the revision and expansion of that essay into a full-length book. This task was incomplete at his death in 1972, but a lot was left in manuscript form. The draft chapters were written at different times, and in some cases there was more than one draft. Professor Bull and Mr. Holbraad took on the task of putting the pieces together, and where necessary rearranging the order and deleting passages. The full-length book which results from their labours contains nothing that was not written by Martin Wight.

The editors must be congratulated. This is a book full of thought, which must help any reader, who takes the trouble to read it attentively, to think more clearly. Though it cannot be the fully rounded and balanced masterpiece at which Martin Wight, with his rigorous standards, was aiming, it is still a work to be studied with benefit by both the beginner and the mature. For those who enjoy limpid expression and economy of words it is a pleasure to read. Those who prefer the more modern method of taking each little idea and wrapping it up in ten pages of opaque jargon would be unwise to try it.

Not only is the style the same, but the substance, as Professor Bull notes in his Introduction, differs little from the original essay of 1946. The completely new chapters are concerned mainly with strategic aspects, but also with diplomacy, alliances and the place of revolution and of war in international relations. The economic aspect is virtually ignored, and little is said of international relationships other than those of state governments. However, the absence of these important themes need not be overrated when we remind ourselves that this is a book about ' Power Politics ', and not an all-encompassing survey of all relationships between groups and individuals in different countries. Much more serious is the small attention given to non-European states, which distorts Wight's judgment both of contemporary issues and of the historical past, of which he had so deep a knowledge and love, and into which he makes several stimulating excursions in this book. As for the final omission noted by the editors—Wight's indifference to fashionable theories of international relations—this can be accepted with equanimity.

It is difficult to choose for comment any specific part of a work with such concentrated thought. This reader found especially fascinating Wight's parallels or contrasts between present and past. For example, he writes that ' the states-system of

classical antiquity grew up round a sea enclosed by land, while the modern states-system has grown up on a continent surrounded by the ocean ' (p. 77). Perhaps by the end of the twentieth century there will be a new states-system built round an ocean enclosed on three sides by continents - the Pacific, bounded by China, Russia and the United States, with the Japanese offshore islands corresponding to the British offshore islands in Wight's ' modern states-system '. In the age of jet aircraft, not to mention inter-continental ballistic missiles, the Pacific has shrunk to smaller dimensions than the Mediterranean in the age of Philip II and Suleiman the Magnificent, let alone that of Themistocles and Xerxes. That one should miss most painfully the chance to discuss such questions with the author, is at least a testimony to the book's appeal to the intellect and the imagination.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London HUGH SETON-WATSON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries Vols. 1-4. Edited by Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant. *Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana. 1978. 521 pp. $40.00 per vol.*

The Nonaligned Movement in World Politics. Edited by A. W. Singham. *Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill. 1978. 273 pp. Pb: $7.95.*

THE Academic world has not given enough attention to the international relations of the Third World in general and to the Non-Aligned Movement in particular. The tendency has been to say that the Non-Aligned cannot be of any significance in an age of detente, which is as meaningful as saying that the Republican Party must disband because the United States is not going to become a monarchy. In fact, the Non-Aligned have been considerably more active in the 1970s than they were in the 1960s and particularly so since the 1973 summit in Algiers. This is shown by a mere glance at the Table of Contents for Jankowitsch and Sauvant's collection of documents in which the materials for 1977 alone take nearly twice as many pages as those for the whole decade 1961-70.

The collection aimed to cover all the meetings from the first ambassadorial meeting in June 1961, called by Presidents Nasser and Tito to float the idea of a Non-Aligned grouping, up to the Foreign Ministers conference of September 1977. The editors identified a total of 131 meetings, of which 45 did not issue documents, for 9 minor ones information was not obtained and for 77 meetings a total of more than 300 documents are published in this collection. The decision was taken to exclude all speeches or proposals coming from individual countries which were not adopted by the Movement as a whole. In the introduction, the impression is given that only the official final documents of the meeting are included. However, we can detect what were the controversial matters of debate from summary records or committee reports of discussions for six of eighteen major conferences (and for many more of the minor meetings). It is a pity for political scientists that this part of the collection is not complete.

For the early years most of the documents have already been published in Belgrade, Cairo, Georgetown or New Delhi but it would be impossible now for anyone to obtain a complete set and Jankowitsch and Sauvant have performed a useful service in having them re-printed. For the more recent years, the detailed work of the various Groups of Experts, Co-ordinator Countries, Inter-Governmental Group on Raw Materials and the background papers for the Co-ordinating Bureau would not have been published elsewhere. Scholars of the Third World or of the UN or of international economic relations will be greatly indebted to the editors for putting together such a

comprehensive collection. Unfortunately, the price puts four volumes outside the pocket of individual researchers but no university or embassy library should be without a set. It is to be hoped that every three or four years additional volumes will update the collection with current documents.

Singham's book brings together some papers presented at Howard University in April 1976. As all the twenty-four contributors are sympathetic to the Non-Aligned Movement and most are Marxists or neo-Marxists, the book has more coherence than is usual when conference papers are re-printed. However, the title is misleading: only a quarter of the contributions are directly about the Movement. The book forms a general reader on five aspects of the politics of the Third World.

Part One contains statements by five political practitioners, the ambassadors to Washington of Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Cuba and Sri-Lanka and an Afro-American Congressman. This very limited selection of countries does give some idea of the diversity in the Movement. Each wishes to use non-aligment to help to legitimise their own world view. The Nigerian and the Sri-Lankan ambassadors set non-alignment in a general context of Afro-Asian solidarity and both refer back to the Bandung conference of 1955. This is a distortion of history, as Bandung in its composition and its decisions was the antithesis of non-alignment. On the other hand, the Yugoslav, who distinguished Bandung from the 1961 Belgrade summit, and the Cuban, who ignored Bandung, both refer back to the Bolshevik Revolution, in a way that very few of the other Non-Aligned would accept.

Part Two is on Global Mass Communication. H. I. Schiller describes ' Mechanisms of Cultural Imperialism '. To a non-Marxist it is surprising how strong an argument he has managed to make when concentrating predominantly on the direct commercial activities of the multinational companies as communicators. However, the issues raised in the UNESCO debates on the ' Declaration on the Mass Media ' are virtually ignored. This is compensated for in the contributions from two Indian diplomats; one recounting horror stories on how India is portrayed on American television; the other discussing the structure of the world communications networks. Van Dinh rounds off the section with a skeleton account of the attempts by the Non-Aligned to promote their own channels of communication.

Part Three on National Liberation has a three page general introduction to highly specific papers on Zimbabwe, Puerto Rico and the legality of national liberation movements. (The latter is a peculiarly pointless discussion, as legality is of the most peripheral concern in analysing these movements.) Part Four on the New International Economics Order, with essays by Samir Amin and by Galtung, makes a powerful impact. In essence both are arguing that even if the programme to improve the terms of trade and to begin industrialisation in the Third World were fully achieved the level of exploitation by the Western World would be unaffected. The papers in these two sections deal with issues which are central to modern non-alignment but the discussion is not directly linked to the activities of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Part Five on Afro-American reactions to non-alignment can in no way make any claim to be about the Movement, though it does provide interesting insights on domestic American Black politics. At one extreme, Garrett sees the Blacks as ' the vanguard national minority ', ' preparing to make the qualitative leap to help make the revolution ' (p. 218) and hence argues for a delegation at the 1979 Cuban summit, while at the other extreme Reed dismisses such ' Third Worldism ' as wishful thinking without roots in the Black community.

In the end the Singham book is disappointing. We are left with no idea of the extent of the organisation of the Non-Aligned Movement, little idea of its political significance and no basis to assess future developments. The best Marxist contributions give an impressive systemic view of international politics but fail to provide the detail that can distinguish, for example, aligned Iran from conservative

Non-Aligned Saudi Arabia or from radical Non-Aligned Libya. Much more work on the international relations of the Third World needs to be done.

The City University PETER WILLETTS

International Order and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Sketch of Post-War International Politics. By Friedrich V. Kratochwil. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. (Distrib. by E. Benn, London.) 298 pp. £13·75.*

FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL distinguishes international order (a pattern sustaining the requirements of co-existence among states) from world order (international order plus extensions of domestic order into it). Taking international order rather than world order as his subject, he divides his treatment into two parts, conceptual and historical. In the conceptual part he aims to establish how order-maintaining rules (or ' signals ') develop in the relations of states. Conflict is perceived as a process which progressively cuts out ranges of possible behaviour until participants relate in a fairly clear strategic game. This sort of conflict itself occurs within a more general setting of symbolic interaction; states inevitably respond to situations and situations are shaped by encompassing sets of symbols. The most obvious of order-maintaining rules are laws. Yet international law is often subordinated to the claims of states; it rarely substantiates authoritative adjudications among them, so it plays a relatively minor role among other kinds of rules. Mr. Kratochwil subscribes to a ' Humean ' view of order, as a form of co-ordination among choices that does not require the allocative authority of a sovereign. Doctrinal or policy rules can thus emerge directly from strategic situations, particularly in circumstances of mutual nuclear deterrence, which cannot fail to stimulate policy attention to the international milieu's propensity to engender generally harmful instability. Much more widely, rules may also emerge from ' routinised ' international interactions which are sustained by role images deriving their strength from public symbols and metaphors.

The second part of the book takes the ' origins and demise ' (p. 67) of the cold war as a case study in the application of the first part's understanding of international order. One chapter claims to show how questionable pre-cold war historical analogues and myths created a sense of universal struggle among the principal contestants. A second chapter explains how this ' mythical ' structure was changed during the course of the cold war by adaptations of the metaphors of ' containment ' and of ' liberation and capitalist encirclement '. A third describes modifications of doctrines, or policies, which took place during the emergence of the rule-engendering system of mutual nuclear deterrence. The tone of the concluding chapter is cautious, not to say weak: though rules may abound in the international order it does not follow that violence is necessarily excluded from it; and stable relations among first-rank powers (to which the book devotes most of its attention) need not bring great benefits to the rest of the world.

This book reads like a dissertation, being grossly overburdened with notes and quotations. Its repeated references to its own methodology do not succeed in concealing its want of development. The interesting historical section could, with little alteration, stand on its own, as could the theoretical section. Successive chapters are each well enough done, but they do not progressively contribute to a sustained argument. And though manifestly a work of ' theoretical history ', no coherent view of the relationship of theory to history is conveyed. The failure of the book to take off derives primarily from its almost total separation of international order from domestic order. By this initial move it is inevitably condemned to the higher sterility. This is not to aim another silly jibe at American ' scientism '. The shamelessly repetitive treatments of the international order by exponents of the English school of

International Relations amply demonstrate the same point year after year. At least Mr. Kratochwil comes to it from a fresh direction.

University College of Wales, Cardiff ROY E. JONES

An Idea and its Servants: UNESCO from Within. By Richard Hoggart. *London: Chatto and Windus. 1978. 220 pp. £5·95.*

RICHARD HOGGART, author of *The Uses of Literacy*,[1] went to the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation in 1970 as an Assistant Director-General. He stayed for five years, longer than had originally been intended, and has now written this account of his time there and his reflections upon it. He has done so partly to chronicle and make sense of what was a ' remarkable ' (p. 17) experience and partly in the hope of giving the Organisation a higher and more appealing profile in the developed world, where it is less well known and respected than elsewhere. Whether he will be successful in his second aim is problematical, but there can be no doubt that he has written a book which should fascinate all students of international organisation.

As Hoggart points out, UNESCO is on the one hand devoted to the disinterested exchange of knowledge but on the other is made up of states which, naturally enough, have their own individual axes to grind. The vast majority of them, moreover, show little domestic devotion to the idea of free enquiry. Inevitably, therefore, UNESCO generates tension between its intellectual and political poles, and ' all can gain from the dialectic ' (p. 58). But the author believes that in recent years irrelevant political issues have been too often introduced, and that there has been too much of ' the most pervasive of UNESCO's evasions: humbug of thought and language ' (p. 95). This appears most notably in respect of peace and human rights, resolutions on which ' include everything but the kitchen sink ' (p. 180). Nor, in these matters, does UNESCO's cause often receive much help from its Secretariat. For its members are all too often either looking over one shoulder to gauge the reaction of member states or over the other to check on their own position within the ' vast and uneasy hamsters' nest ' (p. 112) which the Organisation's Headquarters resembles. Good men and women are indeed to be found in it, but the bad habits of some affect the tone of the whole. Idleness, for example, in UNESCO, ' can reach such heights that one needs a more poetic word to describe it, such as '' sloth '' ' (p. 123). Thus it ' sometimes feels as though the human texture of the place, like brittle elastic, has dried out ' (p. 126).

And yet the author comes away neither completely disillusioned nor wholly cynical. He believes that UNESCO is ' still an immensely valuable ' (p. 23) organisation, and one which needs the support of the intellectual community. He calls for ' sober idealism ' (p. 57) about its potential, a greater commitment to it on the part of governments (the United Kingdom is charged with not taking it seriously nowadays), and a willingness on the part of its servants occasionally to take a stand. The world would be poorer if UNESCO had not existed, claims Hoggart, and it continues to recall the nations to their acknowledged duty to work towards certain important ideals. He concludes this most interesting and refreshing book by saying that ' In spite of all its fantastic, baroque, bewildering failings, UNESCO remains one of the more hopeful institutions created in this ambiguous century ' (p. 196).

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

1 London. Chatto and Windus, 1957

Unilever Overseas: The Anatomy of a Multinational 1895–1965. By D. K. Fieldhouse. *London: Croom Helm; Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 620 pp. £25·00.*

THIS is an impressive work. Fieldhouse, renowned for his economic history and analysis of imperialism, has delved long and deep into the fascinating tale of Unilever's spread abroad. He has visited the outposts of this multinational organisation, interviewed an array of its staff and waded through oceans of confidential minutes, records and letters. The synthesis of all this research is well presented. The style is lively and readable, the material well organised and the minutiae never overwhelming. The reviewer cannot, however, pretend that it is an easy book to read—the sheer size and amount of information contained tend to weigh down any reader who is not fascinated by the internal processes of the Unilever system.

The book opens with a scene-setting introduction and a description of the Unilever head office. It then launches into the overseas business, dealing with such questions as why the firm invested abroad, where the plants were located and how products were chosen, how the investments fared through the important historical change from colonialism to independence, and what the affiliates contributed to the host economy. This is done, in turn, for each of the following areas: Australia, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, Black Africa, Turkey (this is by Sheila Fieldhouse), the Pacific plantations, and the Belgian Congo. The chapter on the first two developed countries really serves an illustrative purpose; the main thrust of the book is to describe and assess the experience of this multinational in less-developed countries. A final analytical chapter draws the main conclusions of the country studies.

The book is addressed to two main types of audience The first is the historian, in particular the business historian. The second is the economist and the student of multinationals in less-developed countries. To the first, this book is likely to be a major contribution. The wealth of new evidence and the insights into company personalities, policies, interactions with government, and the response to independence, are valuable and original. In spite of the fact that there exists a large and detailed history of Unilever by Wilson, Fieldhouse breaks a lot of new ground as far as the peculiarly international nature of the enterprise is concerned.

To the economist and the student of multinationals, however, the contribution of this book is considerably less. Fieldhouse is convinced of the ultimate beneficence and rationality of multinationals, and this flaws the objectivity and analytical rigour of his argument. He is well aware of the dangers of generalising from the experience of a single firm, yet, despite his own qualifications, he often gives the impression that the behaviour of one multinational, in a low-technology and high-marketing industry, has fairly general relevance. As in his earlier works, he is concerned to attack Marxist and 'dependencia' arguments on imperialism: yet he does this with such intensity that the Marxists become mere straw men, by knocking down some of whose more extreme statements it is implied that there is little left in multinationals to criticise.

This is unfortunate. The economic literature is replete with genuine concerns about multinationals of a wholly non-Marxist variety—*viz.* technological choice, effect on local entrepreneurial development and on local technological learning, market concentration, effects of heavy promotion, predatory market conduct, and the like—which are ignored in this book. The techniques used to quantify the economic benefits of Unilever are too simple to cope with the task: there is no effort to analyse how the host economy may have fared had Unilever not undertaken production. Fieldhouse tells a good story, but he does not make a sound economic case.

Institute of Economics and Statistics, Oxford SANJAYA LALL

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

World War 3: A Military Project Founded on Today's Facts. Edited by Shelford Bidwell. *London: Hamlyn. 1978. 208 pp. £5·95.*

FUTUROLOGY is becoming rather like economics as an academic activity (other things being equal, of course); and this set of explanations and extrapolations is a bit more Club-of-Rome in flavour than the other current alternative which is General-Theory-of-Hackett in type. There is a lot of useful and interesting material in the first part, which deals principally with the apparatus of hostility in the Nato area; it is as good a general brief as one can find. The second part, ' Into the Abyss ', comprises only about one-third of the text; it deals with how a war in Central Europe might start, as a consequence of the loosening of Nato's unity, and is based on a new variation of ' The Hamburg Grab '. What the chosen scenario points up most clearly to me is, first, the crucial connection between political decision-taking and the narrow limitations available for efficient military response. The time-bracket in which technically adequate action can be taken looks as small in this World War as it was in the opening stages of the First World War. Second, there is the fragility of the linkages between governments and their military commands. Murphy's Law still rules, OK? Third, the possibility of restraining or confining the conflict also looks to be very fragile. Fourth, crisis management after conflict occurs seems almost as fallacious a concept as warning time before conflict starts. These, of course, are primarily the outcomes from a particular set of actions; other scenarios might produce different reactions, as Brigadier Bidwell is careful to point out.

The argument in the second part is less easy to follow than in the first part: any *tour de combat* is likely to be uneven. There is, and I suppose there has to be, an assumption that weapon-fits and weapon systems of 1977-78 will still be there, and still be capable, in 1983; but this adds a static touch to what is otherwise represented as a changing environment. And some of the detail is a mite purple; helicopters ' throbbed away ' on page 159, and when an air force general hears of the first use of nuclear weapons on page 153, he responds, ' By God, they've used them first !' No, by God: it was the Brits.

The pervading intention of the book is to illustrate how dangerous and how complicated the military balance, as we like to call it, is in Europe; and in this, it usefully succeeds. But the maps, which are not all accurate, and the diagrams, which are not all clear or easy to follow, tend to trivialise what is a very serious book, dealing with fundamental issues.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

The Seabed Arms Control Negotiations: A Study of Multilateral Arms Control Conference Diplomacy. By Bennett Ramberg. *Denver, Col.: University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. 1978 135 pp. (Monograph Series in World Affairs, Vol. 15, Bk. 2). Pb.*

THIS book will be of more interest to those concerned with the strategy and tactics of international negotiating, than to those concerned with the particularities of arms control and disarmament. It is focused much more on the process of the negotiations than on their substance, and the author is interested in why outcomes occurred, rather than in what they were or what their significance was.

The book is organised in five main sections. The first is quite straightforward, giving a useful, if rather brief, background to the negotiations, including the salient features of the issues and the character of the negotiating forum. The second section is similarly descriptive, giving a chronological survey of the negotiations in the

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from 1967 to 1970. This is efficiently done, though the complete lack of reference to what happened in the Seabed Committee after 1968 is rather surprising, given the close substantive connection between the mandates of the two bodies.

The third section is the core of the book, and develops a framework for analysing the techniques used by states to influence the other parties to the negotiation. These include: agenda manipulation, initial positioning, positive and negative inducement, and changing one's own position in the hope that others will reciprocate. This is a useful and interesting effort, but not wholly successful. The part on agenda manipulation is superficial, and insufficient effort is made to account for the difference which the role of a state in the negotiations makes to the tactics it adopts. The fourth section attempts an assessment of the effectiveness of the tactics outlined in section three. Some interesting observations emerge from this, but the deficiencies in the framework also begin to emerge. The author has too much difficulty linking causes to effects, and there is insufficient distinction between influence achieved within the negotiation (i.e. on the positions of others), and influence achieved on the outcome of the negotiation in the end.

The fifth section offers a wide range of conclusions, and seems a bit sweeping, given the scope of analysis in the rest of the work. Some conclusions which may be of considerable importance are not argued in enough depth—particularly that about *equitable positioning being more efficient than maximalist positioning* (p. 89). Others, for example numbers 11 and 13, seem superficially considered and misleading.

Despite its deficiencies this is a thought-provoking and coherent book which can be recommended to those interested in the problem it addresses. It is nevertheless difficult to avoid the conclusion that too much was tried here in too little space.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

Boundaries and Frontiers. By J.R.V. Prescott. *London: Croom Helm; Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 1978. 210 pp. £8·95.*

THIS book is based upon Prescott's *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries* which was published in the Hutchinson University Library in 1965, and which can properly be described as a classic. The present work is a complete revision of the earlier book but the essential structure and the approach to the subject remain the same. The principal changes are twofold. In the first place, the number of illustrations from African materials has been reduced and replaced by examples from Asia. Secondly, there is a new chapter on maritime boundaries. In addition, the number of map figures has been doubled. The appearance of a revision of Prescott's well-known study is to be welcomed. The only cause for sorrow is the fact that, unlike the publication of 1965, the present offering, in hard covers, appears to be aimed exclusively at the ' library ' market.

Those already familiar with Prescott's contributions to the study of boundaries and boundary disputes will only need to know that the virtues of the first edition are preserved. For latecomers to the subject it may be worth recording these virtues. The author is a professional geographer with a good command of the sources related to boundary problems in other disciplines. The resulting breadth of treatment is accompanied by a clear style and a careful and empirical approach. Certain geographers have insisted on the creation of clumsy conceptual vehicles for the study of boundaries. In his excellent first chapter, dealing with concepts and terminology, Prescott remarks crisply: ' Geographers have spent too much time in devising classifications and

generalisations about boundaries and frontiers which have led to little or no progress ' (p. 30). In his view geographers must be aware of what others are doing in the field and of what is expected of geographers by scholars in other disciplines. The consequence of these working assumptions is the great value which this—and Prescott's other work—has for non-geographers interested in boundary problems. It is worth recording that, in spite of its relatively modest size, this volume contains a good deal of material on particular boundary disputes together with useful guides to the literature.

London School of Economics IAN BROWNLIE

The New Politics of Human Rights. By James Avery Joyce. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 305 pp. £12·00.*

' NO-ONE has yet set out so plainly the full story [of the development of human rights], stretching from Jefferson's self-evident truths to the rights of privacy in an age of computerised technology ': so claim Dr. Joyce's publishers, giving an indication of the formidable task which he has set himself. He tells the story largely through the words of others, selecting quotations from a bewildering variety of sources, joined together by his rather extravagant prose. It is not a work of analysis and speculation so much as of reporting and of hope. Dr. Joyce believes that international society is, or shortly will, or ought to be, moving from one of sovereign states to a world community of individuals, the fulfilment of whose rights becomes the predominant duty of the states. He writes in the tradition of Lauterpacht and Jenks. If he writes without the weight of scholarship which serves to enhance their books, he does sometimes write with a vigorous passion. His chapter, ' Raising a Double Standard ', stands as a convincing polemic against the inconsistencies of the Western states towards human rights questions in South Africa, Chile, the Soviet Union and the Israeli-occupied territories. He rightly chides those who complain about the United Nations' failure to act when the real power to bring about change rests not with the Organisation but with certain of its member states. This is true, though, not only on the ' big ' issues but on less significant ones as well: the community has remained as ineffectual over Uganda as it ever was about South Africa. The ' Mobilisation of Shame ', another of Dr. Joyce's chapter headings, is a modest counter-weight to state policy and it is not clear whether he regards the words of General Assembly or Commission of Human Rights Resolutions as having some self-fulfilling power. The world, it is true, is not the same place as it was when the United Nations took up the cause of human rights but is it evident that it is a better place? Political decolonisation is almost complete but torture and ill-treatment seem more widespread than ever, even the minimum economic expectations of most of the world seem to be receding from realisation year by year; the number of open societies in the world has hardly increased while the number of states has tripled. The difficulty Dr. Joyce does not face is that, though many states regard human rights as an important goal, few, if any, states regard them as their most important value. Progress towards their realisation is likely to be slower and more uneven than is consistent with idealist conceptions of human rights. Dr. Joyce would doubtless argue that without such conceptions there will be no progress.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory: Bolshevism and its Critique. By Philip Corrigan, Harvie Ramsay and Derek Sayer. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 232 pp. £8·95.*

IF Stalin's theoretical method was not particularly impressive, some of his blunt assertions on matters of theory have stood the test of time rather well. One such is his

statement that Leninism is Marxism in the epoch of imperialism. Bolshevism was born in a revolutionary movement in a country which was economically and culturally backward and it has prospered in societies which have been subjected to the economic and cultural penetration of the West. Revolution, national liberation and Marxism-Leninism have gone hand in hand in the twentieth century.

The authors of the book under review would certainly not accept so bald a statement. For it is their aim to show that whilst Bolshevism contains a theoretical flaw which has distorted socialist construction in the Soviet Union, Maoism offers a pattern of social and political relationships which avoids this flaw and with it the distortions.

The critique of Bolshevism which the authors offer is not claimed to be new. The fundamental flaw to which they draw attention is the idea that technical change must ' precede and premise meaningful social change '. A series of other priorities are seen as stemming from this: modernisation before co-operation, industry before agriculture, accumulation before daily necessities, expertise before redness. Nor do the authors make any claim to originality in presenting the Maoist alternative. What is valuable in the book is not the novelty but the thoroughness of the argumentation. It can be recommended to anyone who wishes to inform himself on the present state of the argument amongst Marxists as to how the Soviet Union and China are to be appraised; or rather *were* to be appraised at the time when the book was being written.

For the question must inevitably be raised of the extent to which the sweeping changes sponsored in China by Deng Xiaoping under the rubric of ' the four modernisations ' affect the argument of this work. If, as seems likely, Maoism died with Mao, what is the value of the Maoist alternative? More importantly, what *guaranteed* the viability of Maoism during its brief and revolutionary flowering? Is Maoism, like Leninism (the Leninism of Lenin's life-time, that is) a product of a revolutionary phase, doomed to be ' devoured ' as the revolution stabilises—which means, in disadvantaged societies, as new elites address themselves to the task of national construction? For if China has now embraced Bolshevism, warts and all, in an assertion of expertise over redness, then there is some further thinking to be done. That thinking need not affect the major conclusions of this book. The critique of Bolshevism within a Marxist framework can stand. But the correlation between Bolshevism and revolution in culturally and economically disadvantaged societies now assumes a particular salience, and this does affect the view of the authors that backwardness and isolation are not necessarily major determinants of the way in which socialist construction can be expected to proceed. As Bettelheim says in his recent work ' Questions on China after the Death of Mao Ze-dong ': ' The defeat of the revolutionary line has not fallen from the skies. It is absolutely essential to explore the nature and the reasons for this set-back.'

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

The OPEC Market to 1985. By Farid Abolfathi *et al. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 406 pp. £15·00. $28.50.*

The Evolution of OPEC Strategy. By Fariborz Ghadar. *Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Teakfield, Farnborough.) 196 pp. £11·25.*

IT is widely assumed that OPEC possesses some kind of ' international personality ', i.e. a well-defined pattern of behaviour, which ' affects ' (other) actors in the international system. Professor Penrose has pointed out that this implication of homegeneity among members may be conceptually misleading: a more accurate depiction of OPEC might be that of a ' forum ', founded upon a specific interest, so

that effective concerted action is more of an ' ad hoc ' phenomenon, rather than indicative of an ongoing coincidence of the constituents' national political interests.[1]

Neither book questions this assumption, though Abolfathi *et al.* have touched upon this aspect when discussing the input data for their development models. Each member state is analysed under five main sections. The first considers enunciated development plans, and includes a brief discussion of the country's socio-economic history and planning capabilities. The second section identifies major characteristics of the economy, concentrating on sectoral composition by output and employment. Next, potential constraints to absorptive capacity are considered, including factors such as population, manpower and infra-structure. The fourth section projects growth in gross domestic product, individual economic sectors and imports—such forecasts being denoted ' high ', ' low ' and, ' best ', according to the ' mix ' of historical spending patterns and (projected) availability of labour, so that, ' Together, these three estimates create an envelope of realistic possibilities for the capacity of OPEC countries to absorb real goods and services over the next decade ' (p. 20). The final section looks at existing market shares of imports from the major trading areas of each country, with projections to 1985.

The authors emphasise that the scope of their study was never intended to be fully comprehensive in terms of factors/variables; thus, in focusing upon imports, they consider only one type of payment mechanism, that of offsetting trade flows—alternative methods, such as short- or long-term capital flows, or direct investment, have been explicitly omitted. Similarly, petroleum receipts (and projected revenues), accruing to governments, do not form an integral part of the main body of analysis, but are calculated separately.

This study, then, has a ' conditional validity ', and the authors freely admit that alternative scenarios would lead to different sets of forecasts. In a sense, this is relatively unimportant, because every scenario must include a significant degree of normative evaluation, since much input data is necessarily qualitative, the most obvious example is that of invoking the '*ceteris paribus* ' injunction in terms of a politico-administrative status quo. Furthermore, some quantitative data is clearly unsatisfactory, such as the estimates of the population of Saudi Arabia, which are subject to very wide discrepancies; again, the potential of each state's (economically) exploitable mineral resources is obviously speculative.

Despite these limitations, the authors have succeeded in producing an informative and stimulating book, one that is comprehensible to both layman and specialist. Four appendices detail all the data used in formulating each national economic model, and, perhaps of greater importance, provide a sound basis for continued research; it is in this heuristic capacity that the authors have been most successful.

Unfortunately, the same comments cannot be applied to Dr. Ghadar's book, which lacks analytical cohesion; the author provides an historical survey of the evolution of just three national oil companies (NOCs), NIOC, PETROMIN and PERTAMINA, by way of introduction, which is then employed to support a series of simplistic propositions concerning the ' nationalisation process ' of oil sectors within these (three) OPEC countries. He attempts to develop a three-stage ' model ', characterised by conflictual interactions between the host states and multinational oil companies, after which the consolidation process of these NOCs is seen in terms of their ' catalytic ' role within national economic plans and, ultimately, their (own) operational multinationalisation.

This ' stages of growth ' process with concomitant organisational diffusion and accompanying typology of ' barriers to entry ': ' scale ', ' technology ' and ' marketing ', is a teleological construction, since it is in effect a restatement of the author's ' potted histories ' in the introductory chapter.

1. See, ' OPEC's Importance in the World Oil Industry ', *International Affairs*, Jan. 1979, pp 18-32

The entire book suffers from being structurally disjointed: facts are repeated and the mass of statistical and graphical data, lifted from seemingly endless issues of specialist journals, are rendered superfluous in this context. The appendix contains data concerning NOCs not even discussed in the book (*e.g.* Iraq, Libya, Algeria), without any explanation. Of the three NOCs considered NIOC has as many pages devoted to it as the combined accounts of PETROMIN and PERTAMINA. The book should have been checked for accuracy before publication; just one example: SOCAL did not combine ' forces with TENNECO (later TEXACO) ', in 1936 (fn. ' b ' p. 103).

Professor Stobaugh writes in the foreword, that, ' This is the first of several studies of entities in the world oil industry sponsored by the Harvard Business School Energy Project.' Hopefully, products still in the pipeline will be of better quality.

G. R. D. JOHN

The Geopolitics of Energy. By Melvin A. Conant and Fern Racine Gold. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Benn, London.) 224 pp. £13·75.*

Western Energy Policy: The Case for Competition. By Douglas Evans. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 198 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·95.*

Energy and the Environment: Democratic Decision-Making. (Highlights of the Parliamentary Colloquy on Energy and the Environment, Strasbourg, 1977.) Compiled by Christian Lenzer *et al. London: Macmillan for the Council of Europe. 1978. 141 pp. £5·95.*

BOOKS on energy have a very limited shelf-life in these turbulent times, since they stand in great danger of being overtaken by events even before they are published. This built-in obsolescence explains the continuous flow of literature on energy policy, and sometimes tempts reviewers to dream of an effective energy-book conservation policy to stem the tide. The three books reviewed here all lead a blameless existence, and each in its own way provides an effective general survey of the problems of energy policy-making; it is, however, time for energy analysts to move on from broad, abstract analysis to more detailed and limited case studies of energy policy-making which we can use to modify the overall framework we already possess.

Mr. Conant and Ms. Gold originally produced their book as a report for the US Department of Defense, and both the emphasis on American policy options and the badly reproduced tables in this updated version betray its origins. Nevertheless the book provides an authoritative and well-organised introduction to international energy politics, and can be recommended as a basic primer on the subject. It begins by surveying the policies of producer and consumer states and the prospects for oil, coal, gas and nuclear energy from the present to the end of the century, before moving on to consider the policy options available to the United States in dealing with both short- and long-term threats to energy supplies. The book was published before congressional inaction on the Carter energy plan had taken place, but its main recommendations (relating to a comprehensive American energy policy based on a non-adversary government-business relationship) remain valid. The current debate on American foreign policy in the post-Shah era will doubtless include a re-examination of America's ' special relationship ' with Saudi Arabia, and the authors warn of ' the weak underpinnings of a group to which the United States is so deeply committed and for whose conduct in oil matters the United States will be held partly responsible '. Readers anxious to find out more should turn to page 198, since this expensive but useful book lacks an index.

The second book reviewed here, by Douglas Evans, covers much of the same ground but from rather a different perspective. Mr. Evans marshals an impressive

amount of evidence (even more impressive if it had been adequately attributed) to support his argument that energy policy is too important to be left to the politicians, and that the uninterrupted supply of realistically priced energy should be left to the operations of a free competitive market. Case studies of German and British energy policy within the European Community, and of the Carter energy policy in the United States, indicate that Mr. Evans is less sanguine than Mr. Conant and Ms. Gold about the prospects for coal and is downright hostile to nuclear-generated electricity. It is to be regretted that Mr. Evans did not have an opportunity to contrast British and Norwegian oil-exploitation policy, and that he does not explain why the West German government decided to create Deminex (the German national oil exploration company) in an apparent retreat from liberal market principles. Although it is hard to see how any government could now retreat to the sort of laisser-faire energy policy which Mr. Evans advocates, there is merit in his proposal that the British Energy Advisory Commission should be reformed to make it independent of the Department of Energy, though his confidence that a Parliamentary Committee on Energy would adequately safeguard the national interest seems to be based more on hope than experience.

Scepticism on the ability of parliamentarians to safeguard the public interest in the realm of energy policy is reinforced by the symposium on energy and the environment organised by the Council of Europe in November 1977 and now published in a revised form. A number of experts on different energy sources conducted a dialogue of the deaf while the attendant parliamentarians made clear the vast difference between electoral and technological time-scales. Even so, the resulting book is useful not only as a depressant but also as an up-to-date and in some measure provocative discussion of fossil, nuclear and alternative energy sources. Professor Buvet's assertion (p. 39) that ' batteries of windmills would transform the coastline of Europe and represent an intolerable aesthetic and acoustic intrusion for the local communities ' was not an attack on the Dutch way of life but part of a stimulating contribution on the costs of renewable energy sources, one of the novel issues covered in the wide-ranging debate on the problems of creating an energy policy in a democracy.

Chatham House MICHAEL HODGES

Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee: 1978 Review. Report by Maurice J. Williams. *Paris: OECD. 1978. 278 pp. Pb. $17.00. £8·30. F68.00.*

IN this journal, past reviews of the Development Assistance Committee's (DAC) annual Chairman's report have made two general points. First, the professional performance of the reporting function, which is the DAC Secretariat's bread-and-butter business, is magnificent, and improves still further from year to year. Second, there remains a measure of uncertainty about the policy conclusions to be drawn, which is reflected in policy chapters which all too often wander off into vague generalisations about *development* policy, as distinct from *aid* policy. On aid policy, the DAC Review is the established authority. On development policy, its status and indeed its value are much less certain.

This dualism—solid reporting, contrasted with a more volatile approach to policy—was particularly acute in last year's 1977 report, when the DAC Secretariat seemed to have lost its normally measured tone in its endorsement of the concept of ' basic needs '. The 1978 report provides an opportunity to reassess the DAC's work, if only because, as the last report of Mr. Maurice Williams's chairmanship, it has something of the quality of a valedictory address.

So far as the reporting function is concerned, the 1978 report more than maintains

the standards of preceding years. The two main reporting chapters which constitute a regular feature of the report—on the composition of financial flows and on trends in aid policies—remain required reading for any serious specialist in development assistance.

What, then, of the broader policy chapters, which have in the past been a more variable feature of the report? The tone is set, as in previous reports, by the Chairman's opening statement. It does three things. First, it constitutes something of a retreat from last year's extreme position, couched in carefully measured tones which fully restore the DAC's commitment to the possible. Second, it offers a stock-taking of what is now a fairly solidly established consensus on the main features of aid policy. Third, it translates that consensus into a feasible strategy for the 1980s.

The Chairman's statement starts with a consideration of some of the issues raised in discussion of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). That in itself is remarkable, since the NIEO is concerned with far broader and more fundamental aspects of North-South relations than the narrow focus on ' basic needs ' which has recently dominated discussion of aid policy. Among these aspects, three are identified as priority areas for the 1980s, namely the transfer of technology, structural adjustment of trading patterns, and enlarged and improved resource transfers in support of the development of hard-core poverty regions. Discussion of these priority areas leads, in turn, to identification of a number of strategic issues. The report endorses, rightly and as one would expect, the recently intensified focus of aid policies on the poorest countries, and in that context it identifies rural development as ' the outstanding development issue for the 1980s ' (p. 33). But the report also offers, for the first time, a serious discussion of strategy in relation to the middle-income countries which have recently emerged as a real force in the international economy. In this respect, the two main issues identified are the need to resist, for everybody's sake, the rising tide of protectionism in the developed countries, and the need for improved access to international capital markets.

So far as last year's emphasis on ' basic needs ' is concerned, the report recognises that the concept has been over-sold, due largely to ' over-zealous advocacy . . . by some Northern gospelers ' (p. 29). But it goes on to reaffirm the lasting consensus which the ' basic needs ' debate has at least served to underline. Aid, according to this consensus, is essentially addressed to and justified by the need for a long-term attack on poverty. It follows that identification of poor people as the true beneficiaries is the central issue in the development of aid policy and, more significantly, of aid practice.

By tradition, the DAC report contains one or two chapters on sectoral issues of current concern. The 1978 report follows this tradition, with chapters on science and technology and on rural development. Both are remarkable for being more purposefully embedded in the literature of current international debate than has been the case in previous reports. That is a welcome development, but care will need to be taken that the Secretariat, which is in a sense somewhat isolated from the main stream of debate, neither falls victim to the more meretricious elements of the international literature nor loses sight of its own particular role.

The dangers are well illustrated in the chapter on rural development. In the abstract, the propositions of this chapter would almost without exception be endorsed, calling as they do for a recognition of the depth and complexity of the problems. In the context of a discussion of practicable aid policy, however, one has doubts. It needs also to be recognised that full adherence to these propositions would constitute restoration, under the banner of aid, of the full panoply of colonial administration—enlightened administration, of course, and with all due respect paid to national sovereignty, but nevertheless colonial for that. So far as the practical limitations are concerned, there is one passing reference (p. 100) to what aid can and cannot be expected to do—a reference which is grossly inadequate to a debate of such large dimensions.

What is needed now is a far more rigorous assessment of the limitations of aid in the

light of current objectives, with a far stronger focus than hitherto on problems of aid management. In the 1960s, aid specialists were largely concerned with problems concerning the content, composition and distribution of aid. Most of those problems have now been solved. But the new perceptions of the early 1970s have thrown up a whole new set of problems which have not yet been tackled. Mr. Williams's chairmanship has been characterised by a consolidation of the understanding of aid that had been reached early in the present decade. He bequeaths to his successor the task of solving the new problems which will dominate the practice of aid in the 1980s.

Mr. Williams's successor is a distinguished scholar and practitioner in the field of development studies. He will be tempted, no doubt, as past chairmen have been tempted, to use his position as a platform from which to pronounce on broad development issues. With respect, it is a temptation to be resisted. The DAC has a specific and limited role, which is to analyse the limits of possible action, and to report the results of action, by the developed countries which constitute its membership. It performs that role well, and the role is worth performing.

JOHN WHITE

The International Monetary System and the Less Developed Countries. By Graham Bird. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 339 pp. £12·00.*

New Means of Financing International Needs. By Eleanor B. Steinberg and Joseph A. Yager. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1978. 256 pp. $11.95. Pb: $4.95.*

For a New Policy of International Development. By Angelos Th. Angelopoulos. *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 137 pp. £10·05. Pb: £3·60.*

Reducing Global Inequities. By Howard Wriggins and Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. *New York: McGraw-Hill for the Council on Foreign Relations. 193 pp. Pb. $5.95.*

THE four books under review address themselves to issues of great importance today, yet they all illustrate the difficulty of going beyond conventional wisdom to an improved real understanding of the range of issues involved and the formulation of original yet feasible solutions. While many researchers increasingly feel that specific sectors or countries cannot be studied in isolation from the context of structural changes at the international level, they will find little help, so far, from many of the writings that are situated at this international level.

Graham Bird's book, written primarily as a textbook, reviews the important and politically sensitive subject of the relations between less-developed countries (LDCs) and the international monetary system by breaking it down into the traditional headings: export instability of the LDCs, terms of trade, balance-of-payments adjustment, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), commercial bank lending to the LDCs, and so on. The coverage is comprehensive and the chapters are painstakingly written and footnoted, but the book feels more like a survey than a piece of analysis, and the chapters give the impression of being somewhat disconnected, perhaps because of the lack of a central theme and of an analysis of the problems underlying the financial, monetary ones. To be sure, there are discussions, for example, of the causes of export instability (ch. 2) or of balance-of-payments disequilibria (ch. 6), but the treatment is enumerative or taxonomic.

Given the importance of the IMF in the whole subject and the number of chapters devoted to it in the book, it is somewhat disappointing that the treatment of IMF criteria, procedures and philosophy is as sketchy as it is (pp. 183–86). Here the author gives the impression of one who has looked at the IMF through a pair of binoculars

ather than one who has gone to see it from within. The author also states, rather in assing, that ' LDCs which draw on the IMF do effectively put into practice the olicies advocated by the Fund ' (p. 187), and that ' the policies conventionally apported by the IMF are not necessarily the ones most appropriate to LDCs '). 186). For many people, the impact of IMF pressures on economic and political evelopments in borrowing countries is the most important and controversial subject 1 the relations between LDCs and the international monetary system, and the book 'ould have benefited by devoting more attention to it, perhaps by including one or two ase studies. Finally, the book almost completely ignores the World Bank. The IMF nd the Bank are twins, one designed to provide short-term, and the other, long-term nance, often to the same countries. This omission may well vitiate many of the ook's recommendations.

The Brookings study assumes that traditional bilateral funds and multilateral (for xample, World Bank) funds will be insufficient to meet growing financial equirements for international purposes. Just what these ' international purposes ' are r could be is not discussed in convincing detail, but the authors have in mind coping ith the world's environmental problems, improving the system of nuclear safeguards, aintaining peacekeeping forces, and raising the standards of living of the poorer ations (p. 195). The book then proceeds to examine a wide range of possibilities, her than the traditional ones, for raising finance. The core of the book, however, is evoted to an intensive analysis of three of such possibilities: taxes on trade and other ternational transactions; charges on polluters of the marine environment (mainly oil nkers) and revenues from the exploitation of non-living ocean resources in ternational waters (mainly hydrocarbons and manganese modules). Each of these ossibilities is subjected to competent technical treatment in terms of public finance conomics. In an international context, the question of which possibilities are most omising is above all a question of political feasibility and not one of public finance chnicalities. It cannot be determined in isolation from the purposes for which the inds are to be used, and here the book, apart from making a distinction between eneral and environmental funds, is rather vague. Countries are most probably not oing to agree to an international tax unless they know how they will benefit, dividually, from the spending.

On the revenue side and at a technical level, the conclusion is that ' all approaches volve problems and no single approach can be relied on to achieve an acceptable sult by itself ' (p. 205). Finally, the proposal for taxing polluters of the marine nvironment will yield, if implemented, not a great deal of revenue (about $25 million year), since it is based, not on damage caused, but on the cost of reducing pollution. the proposal, then, to be considered as a public finance measure or as an anti- ollution measure? If the latter, it might be useful to have a discussion of alternative eans of controlling or discouraging pollution. But despite its rather patchy treatment the political problems, administrative arrangements, and the purposes for which the venue is to be raised, the book may turn out to be useful in stimulating discussions in ew directions.

In his book, *For a New Policy of International Development*, Mr. Angelopoulos, ow Governor of the National Bank of Greece, argues that the current economic isis, which is so serious that he calls it a ' crisis of civilization ' (p. xx) and which is orld-wide in its nature and impact, is due fundamentally to an insufficiency of oductive investments. While he calls for new modes of thinking and for a new ternational economic order to cope with our problems, the solution to the economic isis depends, in the first place, on stimulating large-scale and productive investments the LDCs through sizeable transfers of financial resources. This would not only help alleviate poverty in the LDCs but would stimulate economic activity in the dustrialised countries and throughout the world.

One cannot help agreeing with Mr. Angelopoulos's calls for energetic measure make the world a better place, but one wishes that his analysis were more coherei articulated. It is true that insufficient investment leads to inadequate supply to n demand (hence demand inflation) and to insufficient workplaces to employ fi available labour forces (hence unemployment). In view, however, of the furious del about the causes of inflation, it is not enough to assert this or to point to the stagnai in investment levels. Moreover, the reasons why investment has been low need tc discussed. As to the proposed solutions, while one fully shares Mr. Angelopoulc desire to improve living conditions in the LDCs, it is not clear, from the book, v investment-led recovery has to start in the LDCs. Why not in the industriali countries, if not individually, at least as a group? References to the interdependenc the world economy are again not sufficient. This needs to be spelt out. Finally, as those who have worked in the development business argue, financial transfers are n sufficient condition for development. Absorptive capacity, and in many cases, political and social structures, have to be improved.

The statistics that Mr. Angelopoulos uses are often drawn from secondary sourc This could easily have been avoided. On page 97, the author argues that the Wc Bank should be reorganised and should co-ordinate the functioning of other bo such as the International Development Agency (IDA) and International Fina Corporation (IFC). In fact, both the IDA and the IFC are members of the World Ba group.

Reducing Global Inequities is published as part of the mammoth 1980s Projec the Council of Foreign Relations. The essay by Howard Wriggins explores strategies by which LDCs may try to change North-South relations more in tl favour: building commodity, regional or universal coalitions, association with a ma power, local wars, and terrorism. The conclusion is that the 1980s will be ' disorde messy, and punctuated by periodic disorders ' (p. 116). The essay might have offe more insights if it had been based more on a theory of the dynamics of change analysed the Third World in terms of blocs of countries with different econoi interests.

The second essay, by Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, is provoking and interesting if c because, after reviewing indicators of absolute poverty in the world, it propose radical change in philosophy. Given that economic growth for the upper and mic classes may actually exacerbate absolute poverty among the poorest strata, the aut proposes that we turn utilitarian philosophy upside down. Instead of maximis happiness, we should strive to minimise suffering. This will require political and so changes in the LDCs, and the West should support such changes, even if they lea socialist regimes, and help these regimes to solve the problems of absolute pove without becoming police states or dictatorships.

Chatham House YAO-SU HU

LAW

International Law and the Movement of Persons between States. By Guy Goodwin-Gill. *Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1978. 324 pp. £14·00.*

THE author of this work is Legal Adviser in the Office of the United Nations H Commissioner for Refugees. His impressive and detailed account of the internatic law relating to the movement of persons between states represents a welcc contribution to a field which is bedevilled by undefined areas of state discretion uncertain controls. The author's approach is to show how the discretionary powe states works within the limits imposed by international law, and to help define th limits.

Important preliminary matters, such as nationality, passports and immigration, are dealt with in the first part of the book. The relevant municipal laws of the United States and Britain are concisely but thoroughly treated, and reference is made to various West European systems, notably those of France and Germany. International legal obligations relating to these areas are critically examined. The author concludes that, while these areas are primarily a matter of discretion for the state, there are certain legal consequences attached to the exercise of that discretion by which the state must be bound. The author also examines the human rights aspects of the subject, and in particular argues that the principle of racial non-discrimination is established international customary law. He argues, controversially perhaps, that the principle is probably now part of the category of *jus cogens*.

After considering these main underlying principles, the author goes on to discuss the entry, exclusion and expulsion of foreign nationals in the light of legal obligations under municipal law, general international law and treaties. These are areas of state activity which are traditionally considered to be entirely within domestic jurisdiction. This is to some extent borne out by his examination of municipal rules, in particular those of the United States and Britain, which reflect the variety and complexity of differing national systems. He finds, however, that states have frequently accepted international obligations in relation to certain exceptional classes of individuals, including refugees, diplomats and international officials. In the case of expulsion, the author examines in some detail the considerations that must be taken into account, including, for example, the difficulty of assessing the ' acquired rights ' of a resident alien, and the manner in which the expulsion is carried out.

As far as the main treaty obligations are concerned, the most advanced sources of obligation are the European Convention on Human Rights and the Treaty of Rome. Both of them have considerable relevance to the subject, and provide comparatively sophisticated means of determining and protecting individual rights. It is not surprising that the author spends considerable time on the rules of these European systems, although obviously they constitute legal obligations for only a small number of states in a specific regional area.

Altogether, this is an interesting and valuable book which seeks to, and for the most part suceeds in, discovering legal limits on activities normally dismissed as being within state discretion. It is perhaps disappointing that there is no concluding chapter. Such a detailed and scholarly work might have been given more coherence by an attempt to put the questions of state discretion and the scope of the relevant legal obligations into an overall perspective.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth ILONA CHEYNE

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

' Overlord ': Normandy 1944. By W. G. F. Jackson. *London: Davis-Poynter. 1978. 250 pp. £6·75.*

GENERAL JACKSON has lucidly synthesised the multiple factors which determined the causes, timing, location and outcome of the Allied landings in Normandy on June 6, 1944. The author must be commended for his ability to compress into, and also clarify, in one short and very readable volume, not only the overarching conflict between the shifting advocates of Mediterranean, Cross-Channel and Pacific strategies, but the many ancillary factors which helped to determine the outcome of this conflict.

These ancillary factors, such as the novelty of amphibious operations, national and international civil-military relations, inter-service rivalries, German planning and response to an anticipated invasion of North-West Europe, and the ever-present

determinant of the availability of assault-shipping and landing craft, are presented as subordinate themes impacting to different degrees and on separate occasions upon the Grand Strategic design. The overall debate upon the latter is traced chronologically from June 1940 to August 1944, and is illustrated by useful maps.

The one real weakness of the study is the absence of any concerted attempt to relate the diplomatic events of the Second World War to the formulation of strategy. Here the reader will be better served by the work of Mark Stoler.[1]

Overall, General Jackson's study constitutes a signal achievement. It is enlightening, judicious, cogently written, and can be read with great profit by those with both general and specialist interest in the Second World War.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Patriot or Traitor: The Case of General Mihailovitch. Introductory Essay by David Martin. (Proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry for a Fair Trial for Draja Mihailovitch.) *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution. 1978. 499 pp.*

IT is odd what strong feelings are still aroused by the Mihailović-Tito controversy after more than thirty years; and it is admittedly difficult for anyone who was involved in it at the time, however remotely, to purge himself (or herself) of all trace of passion or prejudice. But David Martin, in his 164-page introductory essay in this book, does not seem to have tried very hard. He writes: ' it is my hope that the publication of this volume . . . will point the way to a more objective historical treatment of General Draja Mihailovitch and the role he played in World War II ' (p. 166). But his essay is in fact far excelled in the matter of objectivity and thoroughness by earlier works published in the United States, notably by Walter R. Roberts and Jozo Tomasevich.

The new material which David Martin presents is intended to prove that, contrary to British assertions at the time, Mihailović did in fact carry out ' important ' or ' major ' operations against the Germans, in particular in the autumn of 1943, when the British were already considering breaking with him and giving all support to Tito's Partisans. He finds his evidence in the operational log, or file of radio messages from British officers in the field, for this period, now in the War Office documents in the Public Record Office; he also asserts or conjectures that the information in the log was concealed from the Foreign Office and the government by pro-Tito or pro-Communist members of the Special Operations Executive and the Intelligence Service.

This assertion does not carry much conviction, since the radio messages concerned were embodied accurately enough in the weekly situation reports on operations both by Mihailović forces and by the Partisans which were sent by SOE to the Foreign Office and which can be seen in the Foreign Office files (FO 371/37612-6). If the Foreign Office officials concerned did not take much notice of them, that, in the circumstances of the time, was understandable. It is true that in the autumn of 1943, when the Italian collapse led Mihailović to expect an Allied invasion of the Balkans at any moment, he did allow the British, or White Russians, or, in certain cases, his own men, to carry out operations against enemy rail and river communications. But in comparison with actions carried out at this time by Tito's Partisans—and often witnessed by British officers— these actions were not regarded by the British as either ' major ' or ' important ', and they were overshadowed by the more frequent occasions when Mihailović obstructed or frustrated British efforts to organise or execute anti-German actions. Since Serbia was an operationally vital area for undermining the German position in the Balkans, the British turned from Mihailović to Tito.

In Greece, it was for operational reasons that the British refrained from breaking

1 *The Politics of the Second Front American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943* (Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press 1977) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct. 1978 p 662.

with the Communist-led EAM/ELAS, in spite of the political arguments in favour of such a move. So also in Yugoslavia, it was for operational reasons that they broke with Mihailović, in spite of the political arguments against this. It is not necessary to look for the cause—as David Martin does—in sinister left-wing machinations behind the scenes.

The second half of the book is taken up by the text of the testimonies given in 1946 by twenty American officers who had been attached to Mihailović or to the Partisans or who, as airmen shot down over Yugoslavia, had been rescued by Mihailović's men. The testimonies were made to the non-official ' Commission of Inquiry ' sponsored by the ' Committee for a Fair Trial for General Draja Mihailovitch ' which was set up, with David Martin as the moving spirit, to publicise the evidence in Mihailović's favour at a time when Marshal Tito's government were refusing to allow American (or British) officers to give evidence at the Mihailović trial in Belgrade. Inevitably in the circumstances, the Commission, of which distinguished American lawyers were members, seemed more anxious to elicit the evidence which could not be given in Belgrade than to carry out a dispassionate inquiry. All the same, the testimonies give a vivid and convincing account of the kindly, generous and indeed excellent treatment which the American airmen received from Mihailović and his forces.

Under questioning, all the airmen concurred, as did the Liaison Officers, in saying they had seen no evidence of collaboration between Mihailović and the Germans. Certain witnesses, however, seemed inclined to interpret some things which they saw in a remarkably charitable way, where others might have seen at least pointers to collaboration (see, for example, the testimony of Michael Rajacich, pp. 446 ff.) The question was not put, whether Mihailović might have had good reason to wish to conceal any collaboration from the Americans, if such collaboration there was.

The Commission did, however, put the question whether any witness had seen activity by Mihailović's forces against the Germans. The answers varied; most of the rescued airmen had had little or no opportunity to see such action. Those who had personally witnessed anti-German action were mainly members of Colonel Robert McDowell's intelligence mission, which only reached Mihailović in September 1944, when the Russians were already entering Yugoslavia while the Germans were withdrawing northwards. This was therefore the last moment for Mihailović to put into effect his long-standing pledge that when the time came he would give the signal for a national uprising This he did—but too late to do more than win momentary approval, quickly withdrawn, from the Red Army.

The testimonies of the American officers, though interesting, do not therefore radically change the overall picture of Mihailović's war-time activity. But the written statement of a key witness, Colonel McDowell himself, does raise questions about American policy towards Yugoslavia. In this he gave a sparse account, intended to clear Mihailović of all responsibility, of his own contacts in the autumn of 1944 with the German plenipotentiary in the Balkans, Hermann Neubarcher, through a German Foreign Ministry official, Rudolf Stärker. These contacts took place, on McDowell's insistence and in spite of Mihailović's reluctance, at Mihailović's headquarters (p. 493). Colonel McDowell's objective, as was confirmed by Neubarcher when he was interrogated by the Allies, was to obtain the surrender of German forces—but the question remains, to whom were they to surrender? Presumably not to Tito's Partisans nor to the Red Army, with whom McDowell was not in contact. Was the American plan therefore that the Germans in Serbia should surrender to Mihailović, a plan which if realised would have created the pre-conditions for a quite different postwar situation in Yugoslavia? The question is hypothetical since by the time the contacts took place, Mihailović was in no position to accept the surrender of foreign armies. But it would be interesting to know the answer.

ELISABETH BARKER

Nuremberg: A Personal Record of the Trial of the Major Nazi War Criminals in 1945–6. By Airey Neave. *London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1978. 348 pp. £7·50.*

AIREY NEAVE'S distinguished career in the Second World War ended, symbolically at least, at that satisfying moment when he was privileged to serve the document of indictment upon each of the defendants gaoled at Nuremberg. Having worked first in the British prosecution team preparing for the proceedings, he then spent the period of the trial proper as an aide to the members of the International Military Tribunal. On that basis, he was particularly well placed to make some substantial contribution to our historical and legal understanding of a unique event.

Unfortunately the opportunity has been largely missed. Much of Mr. Neave's book is devoted to character studies of the defendants. These essays, in themselves, are quite well done, and such an approach doubtless enhances the popular appeal of the work. Yet it has to be said that the path to this particular vantage-point is well trodden already and that what eventually comes into view is pretty familiar. The book hints at things of greater value in its accounts of the author's investigations into the Krupp empire at Essen, his sterling efforts quickly to assemble a passable panel of defence counsel, and his work as Chief Commissioner in connection with the outstandingly complicated matter of charges against ' criminal organizations '. However, Mr. Neave has not given himself the space to delve into these more promising matters at satisfying depth. Overall he takes a more sympathetic view of the trial than does Bradley F. Smith in his recent contribution,[1] but he has failed to express his conclusions anything like as penetratingly as the American commentator. Viewed as the concluding volume in Mr. Neave's series of war memoirs, this unpretentious book is welcome enough; assessed as a contribution to the scholarly study of the Nuremberg proceedings, it has far less to offer.

University of Leicester MICHAEL D. BIDDISS

Wartime Origins of the Berlin Dilemma. By Daniel J. Nelson. *University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press. 1978. 219 pp. £8·40.*

THE author has written an account of how war-time negotiations, decisions and agreements placed Berlin deep in the Soviet occupation zone, how the city was divided into four sectors, and how it came about that the provisions for surface (as opposed to air) access by the Western occupation powers were never formalised into a written agreement. He has provided interesting new detail from the records of the American delegation to the European Advisory Commission (EAC) and the recollections of the late Philip Mosely, the Political Adviser to that delegation from June 1944 to August 1945. Mr. Nelson does not alter our knowledge of the broad picture, and he is guilty of so many errors and omissions, that the merits of publishing this book in its present form must be questioned. He writes in a preface, dated September 1972, ' that no full account of these negotiations has heretofore been produced '. His book, not published until six years later, gives no indication that Mr. Nelson has considered whether any relevant new information had been produced in the intervening period.

Mr. Nelson writes that ' the significance of Berlin as a symbol was so great that it seemed almost inconceivable to locate the Allied control machinery anywhere else ' (p. 2). In May 1945, the hard-headed British Foreign Office conceived serious arguments for doing precisely this, even to the extent of considering a number of locations. The ' Attlee Committee ' did not begin life as the Armistice and Post-War Committee (p. 29). It took this title in April 1944; until then it was the Committee on

1 *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* (London: André Deutsch, 1977) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan. 1978, p. 118

Armistice Terms and Civil Administration. Since this was set up in August 1943, it was impossible for it to study proposals ' throughout the spring ' of 1943 (p. 29). And since the formal ' Attlee Plan ' did not emerge until December 1943, it could not be submitted to Churchill or the COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander) planners ' in the late summer of 1943 ' (pp. 30, 33). COSSAC saw an advance draft from a subordinate committee and Churchill saw COSSAC's proposal, not the ' Attlee Plan ' itself, which went direct from the ' Attlee Committee ' for Strang to table at the EAC.

For the same reasons, the Attlee proposals, as such, were definitely not discussed at Teheran, and there was no tripartite agreement, ' general ' or otherwise, at this conference, ' that Berlin should be jointly controlled by all three ' Great Powers (p. 32). It is incorrect to write that the ' subject of zones of occupation was not taken up until late in the [Yalta] Conference proceedings ' (p. 77), since the matter was vigorously pursued in the initial meetings. As to which delegation proposed, and when, that the final decision on the French sector should not be made by the EAC, and should be omitted from the Zonal Protocol (pp. 99, 202), the British records show it to be a United States proposal made on June 25, 1945. The assertion that there is ' no evidence that the heads of state [*sic*], the foreign secretaries, or the senior military commanders were vitally involved in the discussions of the French sector at Potsdam ' (p. 115), is belied by the British record of the involvement of Montgomery, Eden and Churchill. These records also contradict the judgment that ' we have no way of knowing what transpired in the negotiations among the generals at Potsdam ' (p. 117).

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

WESTERN EUROPE

Twentieth-Century Europe: Paths to Unity. By Richard Vaughan. *London: Croom Helm; New York: Barnes and Noble. 1979. 261 pp. £9·95.*

Engineering in Britain, West Germany and France: Some Statistical Comparisons. By Christopher Saunders. *Brighton: Sussex European Research Centre. 1978. 109 pp. (Sussex European Papers No. 3.) Pb: £2·00.*

DISTANCE lends not only enchantment, but also perspective; it is for this reason that historians have preferred to steer clear of European integration until the nature of the process and its end result (if any) can be determined with more certainty. Nevertheless, the memoirs of many of the founding fathers of the European Community are now available and official documents on the postwar economic reconstruction effort have begun to be released. Political scientists and economists, who are all too often obsessed with current problems, would welcome some assistance in setting these issues in a historical perspective which might encourage a more realistic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of regional integration.

Professor Vaughan has made a brave attempt to produce an accessible treatment of the way various European states attempted to create common institutions for dealing with the problems confronting them. He has been careful to give due prominence to the Scandinavian and East European experiences in regional co-operation, and does not neglect factors such as mass tourism and trade union co-operation which might contribute to regional solidarity. The book covers events right up to the early months of 1978 and is particularly informative on such matters as the intellectual history of European integration and the debates among European resistance movements in the final years of the Second World War concerning the future organisation of Europe.

The major flaw in the book is that it is so overwhelmed with half-digested facts

unsupported by adequate argument and analysis that it is unsuitable for the neophyte, while for the expert it lacks the normal scholarly apparatus of footnotes and bibliography which might otherwise have made it a useful primer on unfamiliar topics. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Professor Vaughan is himself unsure of the significance of the European Community and has therefore decided to assemble available information and adopt an agnostic stance. Sometimes quite contradictory statements are made in close proximity to each other; thus on page 157 we are told that throughout the 1960s there was ' no shift of power from governments to the community, rather the reverse ', but on the very next page we learn that the Community was responsible for a common market and a body of law which ' in some way or other bit into national sovereignties '.

Perhaps the biggest disappointment of the book is that it does not provide satisfactory analyses of such matters as the EEC's constitutional crisis of 1965 where most of the necessary information is available and where a historian's perspective would have been very useful; one suspects that the author's extensive research on contemporary press coverage of the Community has been at the expense of more scholarly accounts, though in the absence of footnotes it is impossible to substantiate this criticism. The author would have been better advised to eliminate irrelevant facts (such as the street address of the first meeting of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community) and discussion of current policy issues which are already outdated (such as the currency ' snake ') in favour of a more abstract approach which would define the various models of integration and then assess their historical validity. Lastly, sloppy editing has endangered Anglo-French relations by passing uncorrected references to a mythical French foreign minister, ' Delaissé ' (p. 106), and the anti-European activities of the ' Poujardists ' (p. 139).

Professor Saunders's monograph offers little comfort to those who believe that differences in national industrial performance are susceptible to quick policy ' fixes ' such as selective injection of capital. Using data from the late 1960s and early 1970s, the author has looked at productivity, competitiveness and trade performance in a number of branches of the engineering industry in Britain, France and West Germany. He finds that for those industries which are neither declining nor assured of future growth it is very difficult to find criteria on which to base a selective industrial policy, and that human capital rather than levels of investment are crucial in competitiveness and trade performance. Professor Saunders provides some ammunition for true believers in the Treaty of Rome when he argues that the positive correlation between levels of exports and import penetration of the home market for the same general categories of product indicates that trade encourages specialisation and promotes efficiency. Opponents of the European Monetary System will also note with dismay his conclusion that variations in exchange rates did not prove an effective instrument for radically adjusting competitive positions. All in all, this is not a book which will appeal to the creeping ' Fenlandisation ' of British applied economics, but it does provide in microcosm examples of many of the problems afflicting the European Community today.

Chatham House MICHAEL HODGES

Contemporary Europe: Social Structures and Cultural Patterns. Edited by Salvador Giner and Margaret Scotford Archer. *London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1978. 323 pp. £8·50. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS collection of essays aims to contribute to the development of macro-sociology (Margaret Archer). The reason for the attempt comes from an expressed dissatisfaction with the existence of various schools of theoretical sociology whose

discordance the work hopes to lessen through a discussion of issues on a transnational, but European, basis. The contributors thus consider a number of questions which are clearly of contemporary importance, ranging from the state of scientific management in industry (Angelo Pichierri) to the position of the migrant worker (Salvador Giner and Juan Salcedo), and includes a discussion of the current position of certain groups (Michalina Vaughan on intellectuals, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins on armies, Pierre Bourdieu and Luc Boltanski on the demand for education in the light of changing social structure).

Some of the authors are more strictly theoretical than others, ranging from those whose interests are almost entirely theoretical and who write in outright sociological terms for the benefit of the initiated to those who have been influenced primarily by one sociological school, such as conflict theory, and write within the appropriate context. Yet others produce a more empirical analysis of particular institutions, structures and current phenomena with little more than ritual references to theory. The lack of uniformity, both of type and of use of theory, which is almost inevitable in a collection of this nature, makes the overall objective very difficult to achieve. In fact the initial theoretical chapter does not seem to use much of the material subsequently presented for the purpose of supporting its argument.

Thus the value of the book lies more in the individual presentations and there is no doubt that the themes in themselves are important and their discussion valuable. Obviously they cannot present a comprehensive picture of modern European society and one wonders whether the issues were chosen on any particular criteria. The possibility of dealing with certain questions, such as the nature of modern industrial production, the size of the firm or the comprehensiveness of educational systems, on a transnational basis is now widely assumed, but to this reader it seemed that the evidence here presented suggests that divergence is still at least as important as conformity, thus making it difficult to generalise effectively. A good example is the chapter on religion (David Martin). Whilst organised religion generally remains as part of the social structure, its form, political significance and social influence is much dependent on whether we are considering primarily Protestant, primarily Catholic or mixed national communities. Equally interesting is the evidence of divergence concerning the relationship of private capital to the state as affected by the size of the firm or by the importance of the peasant farmer (Gordon Causer), or the chapter on the startling differences of the workers' perception of power-holding in Sweden and the United Kingdom (Richard Scase).

One notable gap in the material covered is the phenomenon of the welfare state, now so prevalent everywhere in terms of the scale of national spending, yet another area where contrasts of ideology and priorities are particularly striking.

A European macro-sociology will have to incorporate an analysis of the nation-state with all the implications of this term. The contrasts that spring out of so many of the papers in this book suggest that this particular social institution—its history, current power and its attraction of citizen loyalty—is a major stumbling-block to the development of transnational generalities of sufficient weight to allow macro-sociology to be more firmly based. Its existence, its health and its underlying nationalism have always been awkward for the substantiation of universal theories and perhaps the sociologists should consider its current position rather more closely and assess whether it is disintegrating under the impact of universal tendencies or merely adapting to new circumstances. Jaroslav Krejci's essay on ethnic problems comes the nearest to this problem, but his chapter does not suggest that the relief of ethnic tensions will be found in the dissolution of national sovereignty.

The influence of the nation-state on the issues here considered both was, and is, enormous despite the fact that, wherever one goes in Europe today, one cannot but be struck by the similarity of so many social issues to which the range of possible response

by authority is fairly limited. Europe is both one and many, and sociological theory needs to deal with both sides of the coin rather than just one. In this connection it may be significant that no attention is given to the growth of international institutions in Europe. Do these bodies, and notably the European Community (which possesses both supranational and international features) provide evidence of convergence or divergence in European society?

University of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

A Common Man's Guide to the Common Market: The European Community. Edited by Hugh Arbuthnott and Geoffrey Edwards. *London: Macmillan for the Federal Trust. 1979. 213 pp. £8·95. Pb: £3·95.*

THE project was to produce an up-to-date handbook on the European Community. The stimulus was the prospect of direct elections to the European Parliament, and the idea that the common man, in his role of voter, would be seeking background information on the Community to help him to follow the debates which would accompany the elections. The technique was for the Federal Trust to collect papers from eleven experts on various aspects of the Community, and to use these as the basis for the individual chapters of the book, though the whole was actually written by Arbuthnott and Edwards.

Despite the cartoon on the cover, and despite the imminence of direct elections at the time of publication, the book is unlikely to enter the non-fiction best sellers list. For one thing the cartoon is not particularly captivating or amusing. More importantly, voters are not as painstakingly rational in the performance of their democratic function as Federal Trust appears to believe. But for the rare common man who might be looking for some solid factual background to what he reads in his newspaper about the Community, and for the (more common) student looking for an introduction to the subject, this is likely to be a useful publication.

A great deal of ground, including some very complex matter, is covered in relatively few pages: the history of the Communities, the institutions, the policy-making process, Community law, the Common Market, agricultural policy, fisheries policy, industrial and environmental policies, energy policy, regional policy, social policy, the Community budget, economic and monetary union, commercial policy, relations with the Mediterranean states, relations with the Third World, and political co-operation. Inevitably only the basic facts can be given, and many questions which occur to the reader are not dealt with.

But the technique of using two authors to summarise the expertise of several contributors does eliminate the discontinuities of style which afflict collections of chapters by different writers. The editors/authors write clearly throughout, without oversimplifying the policies or the institutional relationships. And the short bibliographies at the end of each chapter indicate where those who want more may turn to find the answers to their questions.

Nobody would recommend a book of this nature as a good read, even if the title and the cover suggest that Federal Trust might be trying to make this one appear more lightweight than it is. But it does fill a gap: not as an election handbook, but as a basic student textbook for courses on the Community. Judged as such it scores highly, and it ought to establish itself rapidly on lecturers' reading lists.

University of Sheffield STEPHEN GEORGE

Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence. By Elaine Windrich. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 283 pp. £10·95.*

THIS account of the Rhodesian tragic farce brings the story up to late 1977, with the appointment as administrator of Rhodesia of Lord Carver—an appointment from which he resigned a year later. Dr. Windrich is thorough in her use of documentary sources, particularly British ones, but she has set herself a difficult task in telling the story yet again. It is, of course, more up to date than the others and written with authority, but it adds little to what is already known. It suffers, too, from the author's failure to explain, rather than recount, and, at a different level, from such irritating mannerisms as referring to Rhodesian ' Ministers ' in quotation marks. This shows that her heart is in the right place (which has never been in doubt) but betrays a rather naïve belief that the early rhetoric of legality still has more than a formal role to play. Nor does Dr. Windrich seem to have talked to the men behind the documents: perhaps it is too soon to obtain on-the-record interviews which would be really informative.

Winston Field, who preceded Ian Smith as Prime Minister of Rhodesia, refrained from talking about independence because he did not wish to figure in the history books as the Prime Minister who broke up the Commonwealth. It may be that Sir Harold Wilson, by his inept handling of the affair, has done more to pave the way for its dissolution than have the Rhodesians themselves. It would certainly be interesting to have had far more extended discussion by this author of how the issue has affected the Commonwealth and, indeed, the even broader question of Western standing in and attitudes to the United Nations. The latter would also have topical interest, both in the light of the Bingham Report and of the still developing political crisis of South Africa. (Perhaps the history books will identify sanctions against South Africa as the beginning of the end of the United Nations?)

As Dr. Windrich correctly says, no British government has emerged with credit from Rhodesia. Yet the Conservatives seem on the whole to have been more realistic (for whatever reasons), and the critical errors of judgment seem to have been made by Wilson. ' Talks about talks ' has gained immortality in the language of ineffectual politics, and Dr. Windrich is rightly puzzled by Wilson having told Smith in advance that force would not be used against him. She might usefully have told us more (even indulged in a little speculation) about the role of the Governor—and indeed about the Sovereign herself, who can hardly have taken kindly to being obliged to intervene unsuccessfully on behalf of men illegally condemned to death.

Finally, though she plots the considerable shift of emphasis in British policy embodied in the government's recognition in 1974 that the solution to the Rhodesian problem must be found in Africa (even at the cost of introducing an unmanageable cast of new actors) and then in 1977 that it was after all an issue for the United Nations, she again fails to set these important moves in context. Should they not be seen as part of an even more significant development in British policy, namely, a new determination no longer to take responsibility alone in southern Africa, but to share the load with the United States and the front-line Presidents as well as with the United Nations itself?

It may be unfair to reproach Dr. Windrich for not having written a different book. Though it must be said that it sometimes makes a tedious read for the specialist and may not grip the novice, it will, within its chosen limits, adequately inform them and as a clear and comprehensive work of reference it will be indispensable.

University of York CHRISTOPHER HILL

North Sea Oil in the Future: Economic Analysis and Government Policy. By Colin Robinson and Jon Morgan. *London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. 1978. 216 pp. £10·00. Pb: £4·95.*

THIS book concentrates on a discussion of the fiscal and depletion policies adopted towards North Sea Oil exploitation by the British government. There is a brief discussion of the depletion and tax policies in Norway. In addition the book contains a long section on the impact of North Sea Oil on Britain's balance of payments. The book cannot, however, claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of all the economic aspects of the subject and one of the main impressions left is the amount of detailed analysis that is conducted on some topics and the very brief accounts of others.

A useful feature of the book is the detailed account of how legislation has developed with regard to policies to control depletion. The extent of these controls is certainly clearly highlighted. It is rather surprising, however, to find no extensive analysis of the role of the British National Oil Corporation in the context of factors determining supplies for Britain. The authors conduct a fairly detailed analysis of the effects of the British system of oil taxation and conduct a fair amount of sensitivity analysis in this context. One might have expected rather more analysis of other unusual structural aspects of Petroleum Revenue Tax. The comparison of the British system with that introduced in Norway is interesting. The finding that the tax burden could be greater on marginal fields under the British system is rather surprising. The conclusion is valid at what may be regarded as very low levels of oil prices. At more ' normal ' price levels the burden tends to be higher in Norway.

The authors are, of course, enthusiastically in favour of free-market solutions to economic problems and very sceptical about the foresight and wisdom of governments. They would in fact favour a system of licence auctioning instead of taxation, but they need to provide a more convincing and detailed analysis of the positive case for an auction system.

The section of the book dealing with the impact of North Sea Oil on Britain's balance of payments is a useful one. The conceptual issues are presented very clearly. The distinction between potential and realised benefits is emphasised and the possible effects on the main items are clarified. Rather more emphasis on the exchange-rate effects would have made the analysis more comprehensive.

In sum, this book is rather patchy. It is interesting and provocative on the subjects on which it dwells at some length. The reader looking for a rounded view of all aspects of the subject will need to supplement his reading with other material. He will, for example, need to look elsewhere for a discussion of the impact of oil on the Scottish economy. But this book is still a worthwhile contribution to the subject.

University of Aberdeen A. G. KEMP

The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol. IV: Sound and Vision. By Asa Briggs. *London: Oxford University Press. 1979 1,082 pp. £25·00.*

' IN 1939 . . . the BBC entered the arena with the frozen animation of a virtuous maiden-aunt caught up in a nightmare by an intruder of whose honourable intentions she could not be entirely sure.' So Reith's biographer, Andrew Boyle, reviewing in *The New Statesman* the third volume of Lord Briggs's gargantuan survey, *The War of Words.*[1] The same image could well be applied to the Corporation's posture as it entered the arena of peace in 1945, the start of the decade examined in this new volume: ten years during which, because of another intruder's ' honourable intentions ', the BBC's monopoly was irretrievably shattered.

1 London: Oxford University Press, 1970

The great virtue of this long history has always been its copious and even ruthless quotations from the Corporation's own papers. Reading the exchanges of internal memoranda or the mass of documents written by officials preparing for, enduring and licking their wounds after successive Committees of Inquiry, one overhears the BBC talking to itself with all the revelatory frankness, and sometimes the naïveté, of a private conversation. Lord Briggs is occasionally accused of being too much the 'official historian', of cosmetic writing. Nothing could be further from the truth. His raids on the BBC's archives and his assiduous confrontation of its staff have produced yet another instalment whose rich and varied documentation exposes, for the percipient, many deep flaws in the Corporation's persona as well as its manifold virtues.

His opening chapters, for example, make it excruciatingly plain that during the immediate postwar years the BBC was nourishing a Platonic 'lie in the soul'. The evidence is overwhelming that none of the guardians of broadcasting's Grail understood the historic realities. That apparently impregnable position of the BBC in the late 1940s was in fact coincidental. It was not the result of a natural evolution, but the consequence of a world war and a subsequent phase of austerity which prolonged a unique but not inevitable dominance. Had there been no war, no Crippsian restraints, those forces which destroyed broadcasting monopoly by way of the Television Act of July 1954 must have come into effective play far sooner. Yet senior officers of the Corporation, scattering like confetti their slogans of 'standards' and 'values', continued until it was too late in the belief that commercial television was (a) beastly, (b) financially not viable, (c) politically too hot a potato and (d) probably unwelcome to its own faithful audience.

In charting, point by point, a decade's remorseless disproof of all these assumptions Lord Briggs shows how uncertainties at Westminster and the death of key figures—Bevin, Morrison—removed possible brakes; yet the sum of his story is that during these years (as Gandhi used to say of the British Empire), the BBC was 'on the toboggan'. As usual, he also provides ample accounts of the Corporation's specific activities—education, music, and so on—as well as valuable descriptions of the technical and political problems which slowed the development of international broadcasting and of the BBC's running fight with government to preserve the integrity and scale of its overseas transmissions.

But though Reith used to talk of 'the brute force of monopoly', at the heart of Lord Briggs's book lie other brute forces which, perhaps inevitably, broke monopoly—and a question which, though a social historian, he scarcely raises: were Sir William Haley and his like-minded colleagues correct, or bemused, in believing that a mainly philistine industrial democracy would exclusively support or even care, when it came to the crunch, about a quality product like the BBC of their dreams? The answer can be found in the Coronation Streets of today 'How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning!'

RONALD LEWIN

The Constitution and Constitutional Change in Ireland. By Basil Chubb. *Dublin: Institute of Public Administration. 1978. 122 pp. Pb: £3·52.*

Ireland at the Polls: The Dáil Elections of 1977. Edited by Howard R. Penniman. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978. 199 pp. $4.75.*

THAT Eamon de Valera dominated Irish politics for nearly half a century is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in the Irish Constitution—Bunreacht na hEireann—which was put into effect in 1937. Its adoption almost, but not quite, made Ireland

completely independent of Great Britain. The task was left for later, and by less competent, managers than de Valera. But his constitution is now problematical; what was acceptable for a rural, isolated Ireland which had drawn into itself in the period prior to the Second World War, is no longer as useful in modern, European Ireland. Indeed that document may now be an impediment to the types of social change and accommodation that Irish leaders desire, particularly accommodation with the North.

Professor Chubb's very interesting work is a thorough investigation not only of the origins of the different parts of the constitution, but of its evolution as well. The problem with the book is that it is a work for specialists. With the exception of the chapters on the Constitution and the questions of the EEC and a united Ireland, it is a book that will probably be read by the few people with particular interest in Ireland. This is a pity because the way in which institutions have adjusted to constitutional restraints is at the heart of comparative politics. A good example of this is Professor Chubb's all-too-brief discussion of judicial review. How do you reconcile a written constitution with a sovereign parliament? Not an easy question to answer.

The shadow of de Valera falls on the electoral arena as well. His political child, Fianna Fail, was once again swept back into power in the 1977 General Election. The background to that election, as well as the election results, is the theme of the work edited by Professor Penniman. In certain respects, it is a satisfying book. It is good to see Irish elections actually receiving attention outside of the Republic. The book provides a good, clear background not only to the election itself, but to politics in the Republic generally. The authors of the various chapters are certainly among the most knowledgeable Irish political scientists and commentators, and this is demonstrated in their analyses.

It is this latter point which makes the book less interesting than it might have been. Where it is weakest is in the analysis of the election results. Ireland's unique electoral system, which uses proportional representation with the single transferable vote, is hardly mentioned at all save in a conclusion by Professor Chubb. The transfer vote patterns, so interesting in analysing the volatility of voting often masked by first preference votes, are not really considered.

Still, the book is a worthy addition to the few volumes and articles that actually deal with politics in the Republic. It is a growing literature and this particular work has a contribution to make even if its level of sophistication is not exactly what one would wish.

University of Lancaster A.S. COHAN

The Government and Politics of France. By Vincent Wright. *London: Hutchinson. 1978. 280 pp. £6·50. Pb. £3·25.*

THIS book is about the Fifth French Republic and is organised around the central question of the impact of presidentialism on French politics. The book reviews the background to the French political scene in the mid-1970s and discusses the main controversies before providing a summary of the general argument and the author's conclusions. The first three chapters deal with the emergence of presidential government (the constitution and the political practice); the presidential sector; and then the mainly informal institutions which surround the presidency and enable it to operate.

The book goes on to discuss the French state and the French parliament's constitutional and political decline. There follow two chapters on the political parties, one on the presidential coalition and one on the opposition Left; both are up to date and include a wealth of statistics. There is a chapter on the state and pressure groups, and another on local government and administration. Finally, a conclusion draws

together the threads of the argument and relates presidentialism to the French power structure more generally. The facts and the ideas are strictly about the Fifth Republic with only as much history as is needed to explain the development of current phenomena.

The first three chapters are particularly interesting. They deal, amongst other things, with the presidential ' cabinet '— a thing not common in British politics, but vital to an understanding of French politics. The institutional and political mechanism of the Fifth Republic is explained and most of the behind-the-scenes activity given due attention. The book also puts the ' omnipotent ' French state into perspective, dealing with the myths of the *Etat* which is supposedly bureaucratic, centralised and monolithic. One chapter reverses the usual beliefs about the prefect/locality relationship (which is usually thought, by ' Anglo-Saxon ' observers, to be heavily weighted in favour of the central powers), in the process making accessible to the English student a summary of recent research on French local politics. The discussion of the politics and myths of the French bureaucracy is apposite and well written. The same goes for the studies of the presidential coalition and of the Left where the author again finds a balance between ' myth ' and ' reality ' in French politics.

There are many reasons why this is an excellent textbook for students of French government. First the style, which can only be called ' dialectical ', is very effective and an excellent teaching vehicle. Thus a chapter will lay out certain ideas about French politics, or general beliefs, give the basis for those beliefs, deal with their strengths and weaknesses before then synthesising the main contemporary views (and the author's) on the subject—this is particularly effective in the section on the prefects. Secondly, it compresses the current research in French politics and forms a reference book on the subject—greatly facilitated by the expansive index. Thirdly, with its relaxed and readable style, the book is suitable for the general reader as well as the student. It will undoubtedly remain the ' standard ' work on the Fifth Republic until overtaken by events.

University of Sussex DAVID SCOTT BELL

France's Vietnam Policy: A Study in French-American Relations. By Marianna P. Sullivan. *Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press. 1978. 165 pp. (Contributions in Political Science, 12.) £10·75.*

The French Stake in Algeria 1945–1962. By Tony Smith. *Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press. 1978. 199 pp. £10·50.*

FRANCE'S relations with her colonial and ex-colonial territories have formed a centrepiece of the overseas policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics. The works of Marianna Sullivan and Tony Smith offer two case studies. Noticeably, the authors attempt to prove almost diametrically opposed hypotheses. Mrs. Sullivan strives to show that the policy of the Fifth Republic towards Vietnam, and the United States' involvement there, cannot be adequately understood as ' routine Gaullist anti-Americanism ' (p. xi). Rather there are a series of rational explanations that make comprehensible the developing trends in French attitudes. By contrast Dr. Smith stresses that in explaining France's reluctant and uniquely painful withdrawal from Algeria, ' the heart of the matter will not be exposed so long as French behaviour is understood simply as having been based on rational self-interest ' (p. 164). Less tangible factors are called into play and Dr. Smith argues that the most effective framework for an understanding of France's inability to decolonise easily is not one that looks to rational interests or internal political instability, but one that insists on a ' collective conscience ' of the French political elite in regard to colonial issues. Mrs. Sullivan and Dr. Smith could perhaps learn something from one another.

English readers of *France's Vietnam Policy* may look askance when told that the factors determining the policies of the Fifth Republic were not only ' historical ' but ' relational ' and ' situational ' as well. What follows, however, is sound enough and unexceptionable, but rather thin. Mrs. Sullivan's nine-page conclusion merely restates her earlier conjectures and such repetition is surely unjustifiable in a book with only 118 pages of text, especially as each chapter ends with a short synopsis of the author's argument.

Of course, de Gaulle's foreign policy was not entirely irrational, but reflected his, albeit somewhat individual, appreciation of France's role in the world. In attempting to relegate de Gaulle's personal influence to more limited proportions, however, Mrs. Sullivan perhaps overstates her case. No attention is paid to the way in which de Gaulle was mistreated, and more particularly the way he felt he had been mistreated, by American politicians during the Second World War. After repeated failures to find an alternative to de Gaulle as the potential leader of postwar France, Roosevelt, even at the moment of the liberation, refused to recognise the General's authority. He insisted instead that a military administration should run the country until the wishes of the population were made known through elections. It was, in fact, October 1944 before the United States finally recognised de Gaulle's provisional government. This snub had an indelible impact on the future President's mind (as did his war-time associations with British leaders), and Mrs Sullivan's account is the poorer for ignoring it.

Mrs. Sullivan relies heavily on a large number of personal interviews in the compilation of her evidence. This makes her reluctance to give due weight to personal factors in historical causation all the more surprising. Apart from the example cited above, not enough attention is given in the discussion of the changes in French policy at the end of the 1960s, to the fact that Pompidou was a different man from de Gaulle, with a different set of prejudices and a different view of France's role in the world. Granted the distribution of power under the Fifth Republic's constitution such factors are clearly important. Similarly the account of the diplomacy of the Geneva Conference of 1954 is shallow since it fails to grasp the uniquely personal role of John Foster Dulles.

Dr. Smith's analysis of the Algerian problem offers a more substantial contribution to the historiography of French overseas policy, and shows a surer grasp of the historical context. He successfully shifts the focus of attention from the constitutional failings of the Fourth Republic to the unanimity of a remarkably wide spectrum of French political opinion that French international greatness and domestic vitality were linked to one another and that they depended to an appreciable degree upon the maintenance of control over the Empire and particularly Algeria. Thus the failure of the Fourth Republic derived less from its institutional shortcomings than ' its inability to break out of the terms of the colonial consensus once it was shown wanting ' (p. 57). Dr. Smith thus successfully extends into the field of imperial policy the familiar thesis that the constitutional instability of the Third and Fourth Republics concealed a deeper measure of continuity in French political life than might at first appear. While the author's arguments are largely convincing, he too could be said to overstate his case. However continuous the colonial consensus may have been, ministerial instability could neither have facilitated the implementation of that consensus in terms of carefully thought out policies, nor have permitted its rational evaluation to test its continued validity. Was Mendès-France's self-imposed deadline to settle the problem of Indochina, which itself reflected the constitution's instability, the ideal framework for the rectification of France's colonial difficulties? Similarly, while Dr. Smith is right to tell us that ' on closer inspection, the nature of the trade [with Algeria] seems relatively unimportant, the character of the investments remains to be demonstrated ' (p. 160), one is left wondering whether the political chaos of France in the 1950s was

the most conducive environment for such a rational appreciation. Dr. Smith's study remains a useful one. Unlike Mrs. Sullivan he does not fall into the error of assuming that historical developments fit always into a neat pattern of rationality.

University of Liverpool DAVID DUTTON

Sabers and Brown Shirts: The German Students' Path to National Socialism, 1918–1935. By Michael Stephen Steinberg. *Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1978. 237 pp. £12·25.*

THIS is the story of how, even before Hitler came to power, Nazi students had come to dominate most German universities. In free societies universities are peculiarly exposed to subversion and disruption by extremists. They lack built-in defences, because they exist on the assumption that learning is the common aim of both teachers and taught. When a hostile element disowns this aim, the political naïvety of the academic world lies exposed. The overthrow of the universities in the Weimar Republic at the hands of right-wing students was nearly repeated in the Federal Republic in the late 1960s at the hands of the Left. The basic reason in both cases was similar. In Weimar the defences of the nationalistic, but non-Nazi, students was undermined by ' the principle that there were no enemies on the Right ' (p. 73). In the 1960s the defences of student moderates were weakened by the equally mistaken assumption that there could be no enemies on the Left.

The narrative usefully illustrates in Weimar the divergencies between the new, radical Right, represented by the Nazi students, and the traditional Right, represented by the long established duelling fraternities. The atomised ' free ' students presented the Nazis with no problem; but the fraternities were rivals, even though they shared the Nazis' contempt for the Republic. In the struggle which followed the Nazis were able to exploit the resentment of the ' free ' students for the elitism of the fraternities. Michael Steinberg goes too far, however, in referring to ' the Nazi egalitarian ideology ' (p. 88). No Nazi, committed, as he was, to the *Führer* principle, could believe in equality, even among those of the same race. Steinberg does better when elsewhere he refers to the Nazis' ' leveling pretensions ' p. 121). He is also inclined to use ' totalitarian ' rather loosely, as in the sentence: ' In the months after the Nazi seizure of power, Germany was transformed from a pluralistic democracy into a totalitarian state ' (p. 132). Before the death of Hindenburg and the removal of Papen in 1934, Germany was still in the first stages of transformation; indeed it was only the war that enabled Hitler gradually to complete the process. This book provides a minor illustration of the point: the fraternities were allowed to linger on, under increasing attack, until 1935–36.

Whilst 1935 is perhaps a logical date for the end of this study, it would have been worth completing the picture by briefly describing in the final chapter how the Nazis, after emasculating the universities, virtually left them to their own devices. Instead of trying to use them to create the new elite of the ' thousand year *Reich* ', the Nazis soon began to set up their own institutions, such as the *Ordensburgen*. The massive inertia of the university system protected it in a way that no acts of heroism could have done. Indeed it was the stubborn tenacity of the unreformed system that supplied the tinderbox for the explosions of the 1960s.

Despite the lively title, this is a solid, not to say stodgy, piece of work. It has been very thoroughly researched and it is a pity that the index, from which there are numerous omissions, does not reach the same high standard.

University of Reading R. CECIL

A Balance Sheet of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: Evaluation and Documentation. By Honoré M. Catudal, Jr. *Berlin: Berlin Verlag. 1978. 303 pp. (Political Studies 13.) Pb.*

THIS is the companion volume to the author's earlier book, *The Diplomacy of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin: a New Era in East-West Politics*,[1]. The Foreword to the new volume, by Mr. Kenneth Rush, who, as American ambassador, played a leading part in the negotiation of the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement, also appeared in the earlier book. The new material is a succinct account of the way in which the Agreement has worked in practice, what improvements it has made in the lives of West Berliners and what difficulties and disputes have arisen in dealings between the Soviet Union and the three Western Allies, between the East and West German governments, and between East and West Berlin. This account is based on published statements, the reports, comments and interpretations carried in the German and American press, and, from time to time, comments or information from unnamed ' Allied ' or ' West German ' officials. The facts are clearly and systematically set out, and illustrated by sketch-maps, diagrams and excellent photographs. The interpretations, inevitably, are sometimes speculative or controversial.

The ' balance sheet ' of the title is in the author's view a positive one for Berliners, for West Germans and for East-West relations; and in this he is surely right. There have been a good many material improvements and an easing of restrictions which make it much easier for West Berliners to maintain contact with the outside world and also to visit East Berlin and East Germany. The number of visits from West to East has increased very greatly, though a price in hard currency has to be paid for this pleasure. West Berliners can telephone much more easily to East Berlin and East Germany. In the reverse direction, it is a little easier for East Berliners and East Germans to visit the West—especially for old age pensioners—but still very much harder than it is for Westerners to visit the East.

Nevertheless, as Mr. Catudal shows, there is a continuing struggle of wills over a key issue which was deliberately left open to argument in the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement: the ties between West Berlin and the Federal German Republic. The Western Allies are determined that these ties shall be maintained and developed—though not to the point of deliberate and unnecessary provocation of the Russians. The West Germans are equally determined, and at times have been prepared to risk such provocation. The Russians are determined to whittle away these ties, or at least to prevent them from being expanded. Hence the row over the establishment in West Berlin of a new Federal Office for the Protection of the Environment.

The other side of the coin is the persistent Soviet striving to establish West Berlin as a separate entity in the international context, an entity which has to be represented apart from, or in addition to, the Federal German Republic. The Western Allies seem more insistent than the Bonn government sometimes is on resisting this Soviet effort wherever and whenever it is exerted: they stick to the old assumption that unless they maintain their special rights in Berlin, dating from 1945, West Berlin will ultimately be swallowed up in the Soviet-East German sphere of control. This Western insistence has at moments led to friction with the Bonn government, but not so far of a serious kind.

These continuing problems are set out clearly in Mr. Catudal's book. It also contains the texts of the basic documents on the Berlin question from 1944 to 1977, together with statistics on freight, passenger and barge traffic, intra-Berlin crossings, and West Berlin's trade.

ELISABETH BARKER

1. Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1978. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1978, p. 498.

The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present. By David Calleo. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1978. 239 pp. £7·50.*

THREE QUARTERS of this short book are devoted to the years 1870–1945; the remainder to the period since then and to speculations about the future. Such summary treatment makes broad generalisations inevitable. The test of them must be both the extent to which they throw fresh light on known facts and to which the author gives the impression of knowing the facts.

Oddly enough, Professor Calleo does not refer to the controversy between those who, in interpreting German history, give priority to external forces (*Primat der Aussenpolitik*) and those who give it to internal ones (*Primat der Innenpolitik*). But the main thesis which he advances is really a compromise between the two. German history owes its distinctive character to the pressure of external forces on internal ones.

> Imperial Germany's international problem sprang less from its peculiar domestic characteristics than from the timing of its development. The lesson is not that Germans are peculiarly wicked but rather that even a deeply rooted civilization can rapidly descend into barbarism if put under intense sustained pressure (p. 159).

The idea is hardly novel but it is overlooked often enough to make a restatement welcome.

References to facts are less impressive. The reasons why Bismarck made the alliance with Austria in 1879 are said to remain a puzzle to historians—but the convincing explanation given by Rich in his life of Holstein goes unnoticed. ' By 1890 in fact German industry had not pulled out of its slump ' (p. 19); in fact its growth rate for the 1880s was higher than that for the 1860s and over the years 1886–90 averaged what was for those days the high figure of 2·2 per cent. A good deal of space is devoted to arguing that it was not persisting pre-capitalistic elites who gave German history its aggressive character, but no notice is taken of the view that Bülow, Tirpitz and the Kaiser deliberately engaged in imperialist expansion to distract attention from the threatening collision between those unyielding elites and the forces of democracy. Grey is accused of being ' slow-witted and diffident ' in July 1914 (p. 34) without any mention of the impediment offered to decisive action by the fact that Cabinet and party were split. A passage seeking to explain anti-Semitism is based almost entirely on Stern's biography of Bleichröder; recourse to Pulzer's *Rise of Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* would have enriched this. Mussolini's Greek campaign is twice said to have fatally delayed the start of Operation Barbarossa in 1941; in fact, it was the Belgrade coup which has usually been blamed and the validity of the charge has been effectively disputed by van Creveld and others. Finally, it is curious that a writer who professes so much respect for Bethmann Hollweg should not have noticed that he spelt his name without a hyphen!

The recent past is sketched in very lightly and the chief conclusion about the future is that it is ' highly uncertain '.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

Dictatorship and Political Dissent: Workers and Students in Franco's Spain. By José Maravall. *London: Tavistock. 1978. 199 pp. £7·95.*

THIS book may at first glance appear to be a rather artificial composite, or even one adopted on the basis of *parti pris*. In Western democratic countries, after all, and not just there, common opposition to the government by workers and students tends to be

an aspiration of middle-class revolutionary intellectuals rather than a description of political realities. And when Dr. Maravall dismisses that criticism as Anglo-Saxon ethnocentricity, he does not argue as convincingly as he could. Gestures of solidarity between movements struggling against oppression do not always reflect either mutual practical assistance or, at the rank-and-file level, mutual sympathy; and coincidence in the timing of developments in two movements may show us only their common dependence on similar external forces. Concentration on leaders of the workers' and students' movements, while probably inevitable when the author's research was conducted, may, one suspects, have obscured the greatness of the gulf between intellectuals and workers, even where both were organised by the same clandestine party; leaders would be precisely those who had the opportunity to see what role there was for each group to play. On the other hand, it is important to remember that the working-class movement has felt more in need of allies in Spain than it has in countries with parliamentary regimes, that the universities in that country have a tradition of political weight, and that the courage required by student militancy against an authoritarian state makes it difficult in those circumstances to dismiss as infantile histrionics. At all events, it is clear that the illegal trade union movement and the universities have both been of great importance in the survival of the Spanish Left through the Franco regime. Dr. Maravall's sensitive investigation of who became prominent in the workers' and students' movements, and of how recruitment was carried on and agitation organised makes an important contribution to our understanding of that survival. His account of the student movement in particular is a remarkable evocation, far more deeply thought and convincing than any other writing known to me on the subject. In comparison, the account of the working-class movement is less original and clearly stems less from the author's experience, but that part of the work too is most competent and readable, with some of its quotations giving a particularly fine insight into the sheer effectiveness of repression at the height of the Franco regime.

University of York J. W. D. TRYTHALL

An Economic History of Modern Spain. By Joseph Harrison. *Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1978. 187 pp. £8·50.*

THE scope of this book is ambitious. Mr. Harrison has set out ' to examine the economic and social development of Spain since the beginning of the eighteenth century ' (p. ix). Taking the substantial growth in population as his point of departure, Mr. Harrison continues by outlining the pattern of land holdings and the structure of agricultural production under the *ancien régime* and after. A recurring theme in the book is the failure of successive reformers from the late eighteenth century onwards to achieve any far-reaching reforms in the agricultural sector.

Spain's uneven industrial development, for the most part concentrated in Catalonia and the Basque provinces (and to a much lesser extent in Valencia) is described in considerable detail. Reference is made to foreign capital investment and to the part played by Spanish banks in industrial development. A chapter is devoted to the origins and growth of organised labour and the final chapter gives a brief outline of economic development from the end of the Civil War in 1939 to 1975.

A good deal of information is packed into the 170 pages of text. As a result, this book falls to some extent between two categories of reader. Those with some degree of knowledge of this period of Spanish history will not find a great deal that is new. Readers of Raymond Carr's *Spain: 1808-1939*[1] will be familiar, for instance, with the overall effect of external factors such as the loss of colonial markets and the impact of

[1] *Oxford Clarendon Press, 1966*

the First World War on Spain's economic development. Moreover, the constraints on industrial development arising from deficiencies of transport and the low level of purchasing power in the agrarian sector, the triumph of protectionism at the end of the nineteenth century (long before Franco's cult of autarchy) will also be known. On the other hand, the reader who is unfamiliar with the period is likely to find some of the political references confusing in a book which covers a large number of topics and a wide time span. Obviously Mr. Harrison has not set out to write a political history, but a short chronological table listing major events would have been helpful.

A second limitation is that the attempt to cover so wide a canvas in a short space has sometimes led to material being condensed, with a consequent lack of clarity. A sentence such as, ' As the war progressed, employers' organisations from throughout the Peninsula, urged on and championed by the Catalans, stressed the advantages for the country's long-term future of a fully fledged capitalist system ' (p. 95), needs more detail to be useful.

The book concludes with a detailed bibliography. One word of warning. The author rightly points out that ' Collections of data from before the present century must be treated with extreme caution ' (p. 175). A wary approach to statistics of more recent times would not, however, come amiss.

ALISON WRIGHT

The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic 1931-1936. By Paul Preston. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 264 pp. £10·00.*

THIS volume makes an important contribution to the debate about the origins of the Spanish Civil War. In particular it attacks the position of those who blame the Left and, above all, the Socialist Party for the process of political polarisation which led to violence. Proponents of this view have blamed the Republic's collapse on the radicalisation of the Socialist Party and its apparent espousal of a revolutionary posture. By contrast the Confederation of right-wing parties, CEDA, has been presented as a body which sought to work within Republican institutions but had its efforts undermined by left-wing revolutionary challenges.

Dr. Preston, in this lucidly presented and well-documented study, most effectively challenges this view. He certainly sees the conflict of the Socialists and ' la CEDA ' as the crucial political issue in Republican Spain but presents evidence to show that it is the latter which must bear prime responsibility for the final resort to arms.

The burden of his argument is that CEDA's commitment to the Republic was of a highly conditional kind. It initially saw working through Republican institutions as the realistic way of defending the traditional Spanish social order against any threat of serious structural change. Direct attacks on the Republic were, at the outset considered to be counterproductive. Rather, it is maintained, CEDA was concerned to neutralise and eventually to destroy the threat from the Left by working under cover of parliamentary institutions. The radicalisation of the Socialist Party is therefore largely seen as a reaction against right-wing provocations and as a response to the growing belief in Socialist circles that serious reform of the pre-Republican social order was not possible within a liberal-democratic framework. As Dr. Preston indicates the Socialists initially believed that Spain, in 1931, was embarking on a bourgeois revolution. Subsequent political developments were to persuade them, however, that the Spanish middle classes of the period provided no basis for such a revolution. Not least of the virtues of the book is the examination of different Socialist responses to these dilemmas. Largo Caballero's underlying motivation, for example, is lucidly analysed.

Dr. Preston perhaps pays insufficient attention to the psychology of CEDA's grass

roots traditional catholic supporters. The potency of the ' religious factor ' is probably underplayed. Nevertheless, the book makes a forceful and persuasive case. It needs to be read by serious students of modern Spain.

University of Manchester KENNETH MEDHURST

Greece and the European Community. Edited by Loukas Tsoukalis. *Farnborough, Hants.: Saxon House. 1979. 172 pp. £8·50.*

THIS timely volume is the outcome of a conference on the theme ' Greece and the European Community ' held in September 1977. The papers then presented have been supplemented by others specially commissioned to produce the work under review. Although the conference brought together diplomats, members of the negotiating teams, academics and journalists, the majority of the papers (and comments on the papers) in this volume are by academics. The three sections into which the book is divided deal with the history of the negotiations for Greek entry into the EEC, the likely economic effects of entry on both Greece and the EEC, and the broader context of the Greece-EEC relationship. All the papers have value, but in different ways. In the first section the views of some of the participants in the negotiations give a strong impression of their respective positions. These are supplemented by a broader essay from William Wallace on the response of the EEC countries to the Greek application. Greek strategy has been to stress their country's long-standing commitment to the EEC and the importance of treating their case ' on its merits '. But as Wallace points out in his admirable analysis, ' grand gestures ' of welcome on the part of the EEC gave way to ' second thoughts ' when it came to counting the cost. And inevitably, political and economic difficulties presented by the Greek application, almost marginal in themselves, were magnified by the Spanish and Portuguese applications.

The chapters of economic assessment are useful, and not so sophisticated that the arguments cannot be followed by non-economists (this non-economist reviewer had no difficulties in spite of ignoring the one or two equations that appear). The bulk of evidence suggests that the impact of the Greek economy on the EEC is likely to be limited, primarily because that economy is not sufficiently large to more than marginally affect Community industry and agriculture, even in sectors where EEC producers may be sensitive to competition. As regards the impact of the EEC on Greece, George Yannopoulos is optimistic about the prospects for manufacturing industry (premised on industrial restructuring), while John Marsh is more pessimistic about the prospects for agriculture (although in a comment Agne Pantelouri makes some observations that point in the other direction).

Of the three concluding essays, two—on Greek domestic politics and foreign policy—only consider the EEC peripherally, but this does not detract from their value. The third considers the ' second round ' of enlargement and makes a number of stimulating observations on the relationships between the three Mediterranean applicants and the Nine.

In sum, a useful collection of papers. In a small number of instances the use of English leaves something to be desired, and pages 137-38 are transposed in my copy.

PAUL ISAACSON

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Soviet Foreign Policy: Its Social and Economic Conditions. Edited by Egbert Jahn. *London: Allison and Busby. 1978. 159 pp. £6·50.*

The Soviet Union. Edited by R. W. Davies. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 191 pp. £5·95. Pb: £2·95.*

THESE two books are suitable for opposite ends of the spectrum of learning. *The Soviet Union* is a general introduction for sixth-formers and non-specialist undergraduates, while *Soviet Foreign Policy* is directed at the already initiated. First published in Germany, the translation copyright of *Soviet Foreign Policy* is credited to the English publishers, though there is no acknowledgment of a translator. References are sometimes made to German translations of Soviet writings. Some of these books exist in English translation, but in any case, the Soviet versions are more likely to be accessible to English readers than the German translations.

The authors of this collection of six essays edited by Egbert Jahn agree that Soviet society is neither capitalist nor socialist, but they do not agree on the precise nature of the society. They set out to examine the effect of internal social forces on foreign policy, and their approach is Marxian and critical of the Soviet Union. In the first chapter Jahn briefly describes four approaches to the analysis of Soviet foreign policy, and points to the fact that the relationship between the social and economic structure of the Soviet Union and its international strategy remains to be explained adequately. Ekkerhart Krippendorff concludes that while Soviet foreign policy is tactically counter-revolutionary, it retains ' an objectively revolutionary element ... [because] ... it is compelled to collaborate with social groups and political classes which wish to free themselves from the dominance of American capitalism and imperialism ' (pp. 38-39).

Hillel Ticktin presents the interesting argument that economic reform propelled the Soviet Union to increased co-operation with the West, and that this increased contact leads, in turn, to further reform. He claims that ' because [the system] can no longer get any return from administrative pressure but cannot turn to the market either, it has been compelled to resort to the compromise of market-like reforms combined with detente ' (p. 53). Internal pressure will ensure the continuance of economic co-operation, since this is the only way in which the Soviet elite can prop up its own social position. Antonio Carlo agrees with the view that the dominant bureaucratic class has no alternative but to continue the policy of detente. He examines the structural causes for detente and peaceful co-existence and contrasts the flexibility of Stalinist foreign policy (which aimed primarily at self-defence) with the stability of Soviet foreign policy from Khrushchev onwards. Since 1958, Soviet foreign policy has aimed at ' better relations with the West in order to eliminate the more dangerous structural dysfunctions by means of foreign trade ' (p. 65).

The impossibility of a socialist foreign policy as opposed to a capitalist foreign policy is discussed by Rainer Rotermundt and Ursula Schmiederer. As long as the capitalist world exists, there can be no foreign policy functions for a socialist state which are different from those of bourgeois states, since ' the choice is dictated by international conditions ' (p. 107). Jutta and Stephan Tiedtke investigate the extent to which the economic interests of the Soviet Union, and in particular labour shortages, caused the parallel and concurrent developments of a build-up in the military potential of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the reduction in Soviet military manpower in the period 1961-63. The authors find that although the international situation, the arms race, and the strategic doctrine of massive retaliation played some role in the decision, there is some evidence that the measures served Soviet economic interests.

Although these essays are provocative, challenging the reader's usual perceptions,

their emphasis on domestic social and economic conditions has the effect of making Soviet foreign policy appear to occur in an international vacuum. Moreover, while the book claims to analyse Soviet foreign policy within the framework of ' a fundamentally new concept of Soviet society ' (according to the blurb on the inside cover), nowhere is this framework made explicit; the reader has to piece it together from the contributions. The book lacks an overarching introductory chapter which sets out its framework, explains the controversies between the contributors, and makes clear the context of the symposium of which this book is the product.

The Soviet Union is based upon a course offered to first-year students at Birmingham University, and with one exception, the contributors all teach or have taught at Birmingham. The twelve chapters are comprehensive in their subject matter, and include political, social, economic and cultural history, as well as descriptions of these facets of contemporary Soviet life, set against a background of ' The Geographical Reality ' (ch. 1). Within each chapter the material is, of necessity, compressed. But the authors manage to condense without over-simplification or gross omissions, and the reader is encouraged to extend his understanding by the provision of a short, manageable bibliography for each chapter.

The editor points out that ' no consensus exists about the nature of the Soviet alternative, or the extent of its success ' (p. 9). The lack of consensus is reflected in the absence of an attempt to co-ordinate the views of the contributors, and the book explicitly aims ' to provoke informed controversy ' (p. 10). It succeeds in presenting a plurality of views in a tone of reasoned discourse. The book is attractively produced, abundantly illustrated (though the numerous ' socialist realist ' photographs are a slight aesthetic detraction), and it is easy to read. It should serve as an excellent introductory book on the Soviet Union.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy 1965–1975. By Avigdor Haselkorn. *New York: Crane Russak. 1978; London: Seeley, Service for the National Strategy Information Centre, Inc., New York. 1979. 139 pp. £7·50.*

THIS short book has an ambitious objective. It sets out to demonstrate that since 1965 the Soviet Union has pursued a ' long-range, unified and coherent strategic design ' (p. vii) aimed at establishing a collective security system all along its periphery. The author argues that the dispute with China had a ' profound impact on the political-strategic perspective of the Soviet leadership ' (p. 4), opening up as it did the prospect of facing adversaries on two fronts. As a result he claims that the Brezhnev-Kosygin government has subsequently pursued a consistent policy of establishing three intra- and interdependent subsystems based on the Warsaw Pact, the Middle East and India and the Far East, which collectively form ' a multioptional collective security system ' (p. 20). He goes on to argue that the creation of this system has been the result of four main elements: political strategic moves (especially in the form of bilateral treaties); internal military build-up; external deployment; and strategic mutual-support activity.

It is apparently not the author's intention to settle the question of whether the Soviet Union's purposes are essentially defensive or mask more aggressive goals (although the reader gets a fair impression where his sympathies lie in chapter 7!). Instead it is his objective ' to unearth and describe a process, a pattern, a developing strength which must be taken into detailed account by scholars and policymakers ' (p. xiii). The main strength of the book lies in this endeavour. In chapters 3 to 6 and in the Annex the author produces a wealth of useful information about the, ' belt of allies, air and naval bases, improved lines of communication and forward force deployments ' (p. 5) which the Soviet Union has built up in Eastern Europe, the

Middle East and South Asia/Far East in the ten years covered. He would no doubt point to recent events in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, South-East Asia and perhaps Iran to confirm his argument that Soviet initiatives are continuing in these areas.

It is one thing, however, to chart these events and quite another to conclude, as Mr. Haselkorn does, that they represent evidence of a grand design on the part of the Soviet Union. Apart from a certain confusion over the notion of a grand design which the author fails to clear up (cf pp. 20 and 44), the arguments supporting the existence of a Soviet long-range coherent strategy from 1965 onwards are not altogether convincing. To begin with, the choice of 1965 as a starting-point seems a little strange. It may be that Soviet attitudes towards China ' hardened ' at this time but the author seems to ignore the fact that many of the important weapons decisions which came to fruition in the late 1960s and early 1970s were in fact taken long before 1965. It must also be said that the existence of links or ' strategic mutual support ' between the three subsystems is not in itself sufficient to establish the existence of a blueprint. It would seem much more likely that, in this particular period, many of the Soviet decisions were taken incrementally and in reaction to the policies and perceived threat from the United States rather than as part of a clearly thought-out design.

Whatever the nature of Soviet policy, the fact remains that there has been a steady build-up of Soviet power. Mr. Haselkorn argues in his conclusions about the need for the development of a coherent Western strategy to match the Soviet design which he perceives. ' Without a viable strategy which can resist and hopefully defeat the Soviet effort ... the US strategic arsenal may become irrelevant ' (p. viii). But what exactly does he mean by ' a coherent Western strategy '? Is this a plea for a return to the headier days of containment? Is Mr. Haselkorn advocating the kind of interventionism which characterised American policy in the 1960s? Unfortunately, the rather brief final chapter does not take up these important issues.

The main value of the book then stems from the very useful detailed chronology of the build-up of Soviet power. The author largely fails, however, to provide sufficiently detailed and convincing arguments to support the general thesis put forward.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN BAYLIS

The Soviet Political Agenda: Problems and Priorities, 1950-1970. By Daniel Tarschys. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 217 pp. £10.00.*

' CONTENT Analysis ' of the press, laws, and so on is one of the ways in which quantitative research is done in political science, especially on countries like the Soviet Union where other raw material for research is limited. The content analysis reported in this book has novel features. It used certain computer methods new to this kind of work, so as to diminish the bias due to pre-selection of key words, and a homogeneous source consisting of all the editorials in *Pravda* for the three years 1950, 1960 and 1970. These years are essentially random, occur in the reigns of Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and are not distorted by Party congresses.

As the mouthpiece of the Party leadership, *Pravda* has unique authority in the Soviet Union. Its editorials are the daily message from the top, sometimes on foreign affairs but normally on domestic problems. They exhort and instruct all who wield more than petty departmental or local authority. Dr. Tarschys put into the computor 135,523 ' sign strings ' (key words) denoting kinds of problems found in the editorials. But unlike other researchers in quantitative politics, he does not allow the labour invested to blind him to the limited and ambiguous value of his results. He is aware that they cannot be more than hints about the Soviet polity and its changes.

The results are presented both in absolute figures and as degree of attention (for

example, whether an area is mentioned more or less than its population as a proportion of the whole Soviet population warrants). The various fields of public life (all public life is *Pravda's* concern) are shown both in broad aggregate (for example, the economy in eight sectors) or further broken down (for example, particular products).

The most interesting results are those for the numbers and nature of references to the Party itself and to administrative bodies. In an early chapter Tarschys gives a good conspectus of how Western work on the Soviet political system has used three main ' models '—the totalitarian, the bureaucratic, and the model of emergent conflicting interests. His results favour the bureaucratic model, that is, the study of the Soviet Union as an administered society. Over the twenty years the editorials have moved away from exhortations to Party organisations to deal with problems, towards much more specific indications of problems and instructions to professional administrators—whether central or local civil servants or the people who run the many ostensibly voluntary bodies. Since everything is administered, there is great difficulty in communication, and effective inter-relation generally, between administrative bodies. Tarschys says the *Pravda* editorials are like a megaphone. Everybody has to hear them above the confused din of the vast proliferating world of administration. One could go further and suggest that some institution like the Party becomes necessary in an administered society to interpenetrate, tie together and override the sectional administrative structures and sectional interests; thus all three models can be brought together—not only for understanding the Soviet Union but also for considering the way Western countries are going.

University of Glasgow J. MILLER

Political Economy and Soviet Socialism. By Alec Nove. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1979. 249 pp. £10·00.*

AMONGST academic writers on the Soviet Union there are few with such wide interests as the economist Alec Nove. The present collection of thirteen papers includes Russian history and socio-political aspects of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

' History, Hierarchy and Nationalities ' is full of ideas on the possible connection between Russian history and the social structure of the Soviet Union. It makes good use of perceptive reflections on his country by the poet Pushkin. ' A Note on Trotsky and the Left Opposition, 1929–31 ' is the fruit of reading Trotsky's *Bulletin of the Opposition* for that period. What comes out is a contradiction between Trotsky's acute mind and his inability to handle what he perceived in any terms other than those of romantic Marxism. The emergence of full Stalinism could not be anything other than a distortion of socialism—that Platonic ideal which was Trotsky's only framework for handling post-revolutionary Russia. The contributions by Rakovsky to the *Bulletin* are at least as perceptive and far less hidebound.

In ' Lenin as Economist ' Nove appreciates the contribution on the emergence of capitalism in Russia, to be found in Lenin's writings before 1900, but finds nothing of significance for economics in later works, whether on imperialism or socialism. A paper on Bukharin's ideas supports an impression that he was not inferior intellectually to Lenin or Trotsky, or less committed, but—unlike them—he did not have the self-assurance that moves political mountains.

Other papers in this collection range over theory and practice, including political factors, in discussing the problem of overall efficiency in Soviet-type economies. Nove suggests that there is a possibility of substantial economic reform in the Soviet Union after the conservative Brezhnev regime. More specific topics in the economic field include ' Can Eastern Europe feed itself? ' Not in the foreseeable future is Nove's

conclusion, despite the by now enormous resources allocated to Soviet agriculture in the form of very high subsidies as well as heavy investment. ' Inflation in Communist Countries ' discusses incomes and prices policy in the Soviet Union and in Poland, now that repression of dissatisfaction is not the sole solution, even in the former. These papers are examples of the best kind of economic and Sovietological journalism, full of relevant information and sensible discussion lucidly presented.

The essay, ' Is there a Ruling Class in the USSR? ', surveys various approaches and answers to this question. Nove himself has most in common with those who find existing social science or Marxist categories inadequate to handle the Soviet political and social system. In this reviewer's opinion, work on the Soviet Union in the Western social sciences has benefited economics, by encouraging new concepts, but has not similarly benefited political science or sociology to any substantial extent.

The last paper in the collection, ' Some Observations on Criteria for the Study of the Soviet Union ', is essentially concerned with a favourite theme of Nove's—that to achieve realistic work due consideration must be given to the limitations imposed by Russian history and geography, fallible human nature and even the ideology of politicians.

University of Glasgow J. MILLER

Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices. Edited by Jeremy R. Azrael. *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 390 pp. £17·50.*

THE problems and tensions coming increasingly to the surface in relations between the centralised government in Moscow and the subordinate nationalities of the Soviet Union is the subject of this symposium. While it contains a great deal of carefully assessed information, this massive and costly volume is on the whole disappointing. It is far from being a comprehensive study of the subject, as might be implied by the title. This is frankly admitted in the Preface by the Editor who warns the reader that given the enormous size of this subject, ' the coverage it receives is highly selective '. Nevertheless, a better balance might have been struck between the political and economic aspects of this subject. Thus while considerable space is devoted to well documented articles on language planning, linguistic Russification and national communism as reflected in the careers of Skrypnik and Shelest, economic matters are only cursorily mentioned. Moreover, two fine articles are historical and concerned not with Soviet but with Tsarist policies and might thus have found a place elsewhere. These are S. Frederick Starr's essay on ' Tsarist Government: The Imperial Dimension ' and John Armstrong's on the Baltic Germans.

Mme. Carrère d'Encausse contributes a brief but arresting conspectus of ' Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Policy '. The gist of her study is that the Kremlin is now confronted with the dilemma implicit in its nationalities policy: it can neither dispense with a national consensus nor renounce its ultimate goal of national ' fusion ' or ' unity '. It is provoking that Mme. d'Encausse gives no references for some of the points that most engaged my attention in her essay. It would, of course, be logical for the army to be concerned with the security aspects of decisions affecting nationalities on the Soviet frontiers. But, what is the evidence for the statement that the Party's authority was sometimes outweighed by the authority of the Army? Then, Mme. d'Encausse states that the post-Stalin Party apparatus has ' dramatically changed ', members being recruited not only on the basis of political but technical criteria with considerable consequences ' especially at the periphery '. ' This new technical elite ', she continues, ' has tended increasingly to hold that decision making should be a function of reality rather than of ideology. It has demanded an increasing share of power in decision making at the highest level, that of

the Party and has refused to content itself with a subordinate position.' These are developments of the highest political importance, if well founded, but one would like to have a lot more supporting detail. For example, as so many technocrats in the national areas are Russians (especially in Central Asia), are the ambitious characters described in this essay Russians or natives and in what circumstances have they voiced their demands—and with what consequences?

I am inclined to think that Mme. d'Encausse overdramatises the effect of the surprising results of the 1970 census on the Soviet leadership. The demographic stagnation of the Russian-Slav group accompanied by the demographic ' explosion ' of the ' oriental ' peoples, and the weak migration pattern, were all of course disquieting, but probably more economically than politically, in view of the present acute labour shortage in the Soviet Union. But to conclude that these consus results ' removed any justification for the central integrating role of the Russian nation and for the central system of centralized power ' seems to me very wide of the mark. The Russians still remain by far the most numerous of the Soviet peoples and their integrating role in the formation of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, as the ' elder brother ' among the less-developed peoples, is not based historically on their numerical superiority.

Developments among the Moslems of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, though a crucial factor in Soviet nationalities policy, are confined here to Professor Bennigsen's fascinating account of the defiance of Soviet persecution by the ultra-conservative Sufi brotherhoods of the north Caucasus. With expert knowledge, he traces their long history of opposing the ' infidel ' not only in the Caucasus and Turkistan but also in British India and South-east Asia. After the Soviet Revolution, they played a considerable role in the Dagestani-Chechen and Basmachi revolts and have subsequently successfully withstood all Soviet efforts to suppress them. When deported with the Chechens during the Second World War, they took new root in Central Asia and extended their influence there. The organisation of these brotherhoods (or tariqas) today, according to Professor Bennigsen, is a curious blend of the traditional and the new, even women being accepted in large numbers. The survival of Islamic beliefs and traditions is ascribed by Soviet sources to the clandestine but well organised activities of these tariqas. In Professor Bennigsen's opinion they have all but replaced the regular clergy in the lives of millions of Moslem believers.

Professor Azrael's final summary of the nationality problems confronting the Kremlin provides unexceptional countervailing evidence to the Soviet-Brezhnev claim to have solved these vexing problems. It should be useful to many general readers.

I hope I may be permitted to use this opportunity to condemn the increasingly fashionable practice of substituting algebraic equations for plain readily understandable English. Several essays in this symposium adopted this malpractice and being, to that extent, incomprehensible to me, are thus ignored in this review.

VIOLET CONOLLY

The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education and Control. By David Lane and Felicity O'Dell. *Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1978. 167 pp. £7·95.*

THE anatomy of this book is not complex and it is relatively short (167 pp.). The authors' purpose is to examine and comment upon the ' place and role of the Soviet Industrial worker in Soviet society ' (p. 1). The methodology chosen for the assessment relies on indigenous Soviet studies of the ' class position and on the ways that education affects socialisation and social stratification ' (p. 1).

The first chapter traces the evolution of the Soviet industrial working class, beginning with a statement of what the authors mean by this term and showing that at

the present day one has to consider both manual and the (increasingly significant) non-manual industrial workers within the working class. An historical review illustrates the macro-social changes that have occurred in the Soviet period: urbanisation, industrialisation, Sovietisation and the recent moves towards scientific intensification. Chapter 2 considers the worker in the industrial enterprise and particularly the administration of the factory, the special and unique part played by the local branch of the Party, the right and responsibilities of the trade union at the level of the factory with a brief comment on the organisational structure.

Most interesting and novel is Chapter 3 which is concerned with the classification of workers in the general sense and suggests that a new class, ' the incorporated worker ', is best used to describe the Soviet genus (see p. 50). The remaining chapters examine the ' right attitudes to work ' (ch. 4), labour discipline, job choice and material rewards (ch. 5), cooling of ambition and the alternative (education) route (ch. 6), and the social background to educational and occupational achievements (ch. 7).

It is a long-held view of mine (being originally a craftsman) that the fundamental basis of studying industrial workers or the working class in its occupational guise is to consider the special relationship between the worker and the work. Thus at the higher levels of skill (for example, patternmaking and toolmaking), there is a close and complex relationship between the worker and his tools and workplace. Even the ' unskilled ' have a relationship with their limited tools and their workplace. This aspect of the sociology of the industrial worker is missing from this present study by Lane and O'Dell and for this reason I find it both incomplete and not totally convincing.

The general conclusion that one draws from this book is that one has learnt a great deal about the environment which influences and possibly forms the Soviet industrial worker, but even so we have no detailed pictures or ' photokit ' of the worker and his work; perhaps the authors plan to remedy this with further studies.

The book has a number of inconsistencies, especially in the translation of technical occupational terms; brigade leader is normally translated as chargehand, section leader and master craftsman as foreman. But even with these reservations I will recommend and use this book, for it fills a serious gap in the literature on the Soviet industrial sector.

University of Birmingham T. JOHN GRAYSON

Religion and Modernization in the Soviet Union. Edited by Dennis J. Dunn. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. (Distrib. by E. Benn, London.) 414 pp. £14·85.*

IT is no longer possible to understand the evolution of the Soviet Union without understanding the religious situation there. If this surprises, it is because the West has been slow to take in the extraordinary change in educated Soviet opinion that has occurred in roughly the last fifteen years. How have the churches, the mosque, the synagogue and the Buddhist temple adjusted themselves to modern conditions in the Soviet Union? And how comes it that in spite of fierce persecution, religious belief is making such striking gains among the educated, particularly the young and educated—precisely those who under Tsarism so conspicuously rejected the Church? The evidence in this case does not lie on the surface; and in Soviet conditions it is easy for even intelligent observers to miss what is happening. But the evidence is only just below the surface and, so far as I know, all those who have given close attention to it are in general agreement with what I have just said. So this book is on an important subject.

It is a symposium that grew out of a conference at Southwest Texas State University

organised by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in 1976. The contributors are distinguished experts in their several fields and all their contributions are well worth reading. Those who already know a good deal will learn more from them, but anyone coming to the subject for the first time will be perplexed and might be misled. All the contributions show diligent reading but some of them give too abstract and legalistic a view. Nothing in the Soviet Union is quite what it seems to be, and most people need to have lived there some time before they begin to understand the unusual relation between words and reality. Anyone reading these pages without previous knowledge would scarcely discover the savage pressure to which believers can still be subjected, or the intensity of experience which has led them to stand where they now are. Nor is it made clear how hollow the ideological framework of Marxism has become, at least in Eastern Europe.

With this qualification the book is good; and it is better written than many academic works. Alexandre Bennigsen's chapter on Soviet Islam is an eye-opener, and will be of great interest to those concerned with Iran, as well as to Soviet experts. It is expected that by the end of the century there will be about 120 million Soviet Moslems, and they have almost all kept their religion. It is hardly too much to say that they have proved quite impermeable to Soviet notions though, like other people, they have to go through the motions of pretending to believe the ideology.

In several of the chapters it is amusing to find how often Soviet structures for the control of religion have a family resemblance to their Tsarist predecessors. It is illuminating to have these things brought to one's notice, but there is a danger of being too clever about them. There is a real difference between Soviet rule and Tsarism. Both can be cynical, inefficient and self-righteous. But the original self-righteousness and the present cynicism of Soviet bureaucrats far surpass that of the Tsarist *chinovniki*. Besides, there were so few Tsarist bureaucrats that their yoke was comparatively easy to bear.

Stanley Vardy's chapter on the Catholics of Lithuania and Latvia reminds one how diverse the Soviet Union is, but one must come back to the centre of the stage with William C. Fletcher's chapter on the Russian Orthodox Church. His treatment of the Church as an official institution is scholarly, but much religious life escapes from official constraints. Unfortunately there is no contribution which brings this out, though to my knowledge more than one of the contributors is well aware of it.

JOHN LAWRENCE

Socialisation Through Children's Literature: The Soviet Example. By Felicity Ann O'Dell. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979. 278 pp. £14·00.*

NOWHERE than in Soviet education is it more difficult to separate the cognitive from the affective. The two notions are inextricably interwoven. Moreover, the affective, represented by a Russian term which may be translated as upbringing or character education, dominates. Surprisingly little Western work has been devoted to this vital theme. Now Dr. O'Dell comes in, if not to fill the gap, at least to make a very substantial contribution to that end Her aims are to identify the purposefully socialising role and content of children's literature in Soviet society and to evaluate its success, strengths and weaknesses.

After a discursive opening section on children's literature and social control Dr. O'Dell summarises the theoretical basis of Soviet morality and introduces the key topics of collectivism, discipline, love of work, patriotism, internationalism and atheism. She then surveys significant aspects of the production and distribution of children's literature and analyses two major areas of the reading activity of children at the primary stage: school readers, and the magazine *Murzilka*. The changing

importance of specific values over time is demonstrated by an examination of *Murzilka* at the end of the NEP period, the Stalin apogee, in the Khrushchev heyday and the nondescript early 1970s.

The systematic proclamation of the civic virtues is evident. Its effectiveness is also evident, but less so. Sociological studies and press reports are adduced to witness to the mixed results: on the one hand, a significant moulding of attitudes; on the other, a marring of that process due to its own internal contradictions and a lack of congruence in the experiences of the subjects.

The author writes cogently and with a light touch. The readability of the book is further enhanced by humorous references, such as the 1920s denunciation of the Russian equivalent of Father Christmas, whose chimney-climbing activities seem to have been attributed to voyeuristic tendencies. So far, so good; but in one salient respect the book highlights the need for further research. The central part deals with primary-age children; the evaluative section uses Soviet studies which are *mainly* concerned with the senior end of the school. The difficult middle years remain obscure. What about the reading of the 12 to 14-year-olds? What are the effects of the Soviet upbringing process on incipient adolescence, and vice versa? What of the emergence and role of new, and especially unofficial, socialising agencies? Will Dr. O'Dell take up the torch again?

University of Birmingham N. J. DUNSTAN

Political Opposition in Poland, 1954–1977. By Peter Raina. *London: Poets' and Painters' Press. 1978. 584 pp. Pb: £6·00.*

PETER RAINA is a Kashmiri educated in the United States, but he received his doctorate from the University of Warsaw. In 1970 he published in German a sympathetic biography of Wladyslaw Gomulka[1]. His present weighty study is valuable for two reasons: first, because of his rewriting of the de-Stalinisation process in Poland as well as of the story of the 'Polish October'; secondly, because in tracing the development of political opposition in Poland he reproduces *in extenso* more than three dozen documents to support his assertions. These documents—generally letters of protest addressed to the party leadership, to the government and to the *Sejm*—are signed by hundreds of people, who give not only their addresses but even their telephone numbers. The signatories—writers, scientists and political thinkers—are not fomenting a revolutionary movement; they are protesting against violations of human rights guaranteed by two UN covenants ratified by Poland, against infringements of the Polish Constitution, the abuses of the state censorship and the interference of security services in academic life.

Politically, the most important document published by Raina is a letter addressed in October 1977 to the first secretary, Edward Gierek, by fourteen former members of the Party Politburo or of the Central Committee, including Edward Ochab, former chairman of the Council of State, and Jerzy Morawski, ex-ambassador to London. They criticise the government's attempts to repress the various protest movements, describing them as 'doomed to failure', and they propose a broad democratic discussion to clear up existing difficulties and to prevent further disturbances in the future.

The last document cited by Raina is the declaration of January 22, 1978, signed by 62 Polish scholars, announcing the founding of a Free University the main aim of which is to correct distortions in the official teaching of Polish national history.

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

1. *Gomulka: Politische Biographie* (Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan 1972, p. 139

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

West Bank/East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949–1967. By Shaul Mishal. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1978. 129 pp. £6·85.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the dates in the title this is a book of the highest topicality, appearing, as it does, at a moment when the problem of the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship has moved to the centre of the Middle East arena. This succinct and lucid little book (based in part on the files of the Jordanian intelligence service in the West Bank, captured by Israel in 1967, and now lodged in the Israel State Archives in Jerusalem) should provide an admonitory corrective to those disposed to take at face value the recent affirmations by King Hussein and Yassir Arafat of total solidarity and hostility to the American-inspired peacemaking process in the Middle East.

The tense, mutually suspicious, double-edged relationship between the Hashemite monarch and his Palestinian subjects and allies has, as Mishal shows, known similar situations before. In 1949 King Abdullah attacked in public the partition of Palestine, which he declared could never be acceptable to the Arabs, while privately he was negotiating with the Israelis. In 1965 the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) pronounced that the Jordanian government and the PLO were ' like two lungs in one body ' which worked side by side ' just [like] in Israel the Jewish Agency and the Government '. Then as now the public statements were in reality signs of the fragility of the bonds linking two elements whose fundamental political interests and long-term aims sharply diverge. Mishal demonstrates how skilfully the Amman regime between 1949 and 1967 used ' mechanisms combining elements of concession, suppression, and compensation ' to damp down Palestinian unease about the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in 1949, and in order to divide, confuse, or co-opt potentially hostile groups among its Palestinian population. Less successful perhaps is Mishal's treatment of the development in these years of the Palestinian political identity; this many-sided elusive phenomenon requires more expansive treatment than we are vouchsafed in Mishal's brief chapter. Nevertheless, within its small compass, this book provides a first-class analysis of the process whereby ' imperialism's foster-child ' (the Ba'th Party's label for Hussein) has managed to out-manoeuvre and outlast successive revolutionary challenges to his power.

University of Sheffield BERNARD WASSERSTEIN

Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968. By Majid Khadduri. *Washington: The Middle East Institute. 1978. 265 pp. $12.95.*

THIS book is the sequel to two previous works by the same author, published by Chatham House: *Independent Iraq* which, in its second edition, covered the period 1932 to 1958,[1] and *Republican Iraq* which covered the period from 1958 to 1968.[2] For this last volume the author has relied on official publications, newspaper reports, political memoirs and biographies, and interviews with leading Iraqi politicians. The first five chapters cover political events in the period 1968 to 1977, with heavy emphasis on the ' Arab Socialist Movement '. One chapter each is devoted to social and economic development and to foreign policy and there is a brief concluding chapter. The book ends with five appendices which reprint the Interim Iraqi Constitution, first issued in 1970 and revised in 1973 and 1974; ' the National

1 London, New York, Karachi. Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1960. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan 1961, p 110 (1st edn publ 1951, reviewed, April 1952, p 252)

2 London, New York, Toronto Oxford University Press for the RIIA, 1970 Reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1970, p 593

Action Charter ', proclaimed by the President in November 1971; ' the Manifesto of March 11 [1970] concerning the Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Issue in Iraq '; and the texts of the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1972 and the Iran-Iraq Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighbourly Relations of 1975.

In his introduction the author expresses his thanks to the University of Baghdad and to the Iraqi Ministry of Information for their invitations to visit Iraq and for their help during those visits. The latter institution certainly will have little reason to regret its hospitality, for much of this book reads like an apologia for the rule of the Ba'th party. We are told that ' The discipline maintained by the Ba'th party is indeed praiseworthy ' (p. 38), and that ' Today even strikes and popular demonstrations that often recurred and disturbed public order are no longer feasible ' (p. 178); but the reasons for this state of affairs, the creation and use of an internal security machine which has resorted to systematic and brutal suppression, are nowhere spelled out. The passing reference to the regime maintaining stability ' by applying various means of conformity, including disciplinary actions ' (p. 41) in no way redresses the balance; for two pages later the author informs us that ' The decisions of the [Revolutionary] Court, though often harsh, proved instrumental in the maintenance of public order by dealing promptly and effectively with adventurers who had been politically motivated to create disorder and jeopardize the leadership.' What, one might ask, is so sacrosanct about the leadership of the Ba'th party?

The chapters on economics and foreign policy are also far from satisfactory. The former describes the machinery of planning in Iraq, but it fails to point out the enormous gaps which separated stated aims from actual performance. Slow and inefficient administration, the distractions of war against the Kurds, the diversion of funds for military purposes, a chronic inability to disperse allocated funds to agriculture and industry, the lack of attention to regional development, these are the factors which needed consideration. The foreign policy chapter fails to discuss Baghdad's role as a centre for international political intrigue and the only reference to the regime's support for terrorism reads as follows: ' To counteract what is considered as defeatism, Iraq has supported radical Palestinian elements and despatched volunteers and weapons to assist them in their struggle against the enemy ' (p. 170).

The final chapter speaks of the creation of a welfare state and the possible emergence of ' social democracy ' in Iraq. Under a tyranny which has failed totally to legitimise its rule, and which has retained power solely by repression, such visions are truly preposterous.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London R. M. BURRELL

In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt. By Leonard Binder. *Chicago, London: Chicago University Press. 1978. 437 pp. £15·75.*

IN this excellent book, Professor Binder analyses the social and political role of Egypt's rural middle class, and in the process convincingly shows that this class, comprising no more than three per cent of Egypt's total population, has long dominated the parliament and party organisations and has acted as a grass-roots mediator between the government and the people. In effect, according to the author, the rural middle class has constituted the second stratum of the ruling class.

The ' second stratum ', a concept developed by Gaetano Mosca, represents the necessary mediating instrument without which the ruling class or the ruling oligarchy cannot rule. The political function of the second stratum extends from representive through expressive identification to the exercise of authority. Binder's operationalisation of this concept with reference to Egyptian politics stems from his underlying assumption that ' the pattern of political development within a given

society may depend upon the ideological formulations most favourable to the interests of strategically situated traditional elites or the sons of such elites ' (p. 111).

The book is divided into three parts: (1) the national structure of the rural elite, (2) the geographical distribution of the second stratum, and (3) the Arab Socialist Union and the second stratum. Parts 1 and 2 concentrate on the rural segment of the National Union (Egypt's mass-based party organisation of the 1950s), particularly on the social composition of the membership of the National Union committees in Egypt's sixteen agricultural provinces. In the first part of this painstakingly researched study, Binder begins by examining the distributions of the agricultural province officers, and then goes on to identify influential families, occupational clusters within such families, their origins and their mobility. In the second part, the study concentrates on the geographical distribution of the rural elite at the provincial, district and village levels. The third part of the book moves on to an analysis of the Arab Socialist Union of 1964 and 1968. In this section, the elite composition of the party is examined and a rigorous comparison is made with the National Union. The final chapter of the book looks at the Sadat era and compares the strategies of the present Egyptian leader with those of his predecessor.

This statistically-based study yields some very interesting findings. Thus, for example, we learn that ' the descendants of the notables of 1875 are found disproportionately among the more influential of the members of the National Union ' (p. 118). The same phenomenon is characteristic of the thirteen Egyptian parliaments, spanning the years 1866–1945, in which ' 37·5 per cent of the seats were held by ancestors of members of National Union committees ' (p. 130). Indeed, some family lineages were elected ' to as many as ten or twelve of the thirteen parliaments examined ' (p. 130). The unequivocal conclusion is, therefore, that ' the basis of the National Union elite or of the second stratum is agrarian local notability ' (p. 191). Even in the supposedly peasant and worker-dominated Arab Socialist Union, the study reveals that ' few poor peasants were elected as unit secretaries ' and that the notables were ' in charge of local affairs ' (p. 321).

There is little doubt that this book is a very important contribution not only to our understanding of Egyptian politics, but also to the study of political development as a whole. Professor Binder should be warmly congratulated for his comprehensive research and rigorous methodology. One point of warning though. This study is by no means easy reading; quantative analysis and statistical language pervade the entire book. With its 111 tables, 40 maps and 20 graphs, the book will appeal to the specialist social scientist rather than to the historian or the general reader, and consequently, its readership in Britain is bound to be limited. This indeed will be a great pity, for there is no doubt that Professor Binder's study is a seminal and path-breaking work of scholarship.

University of Keele ADEED I. DAWISHA

AFRICA

Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution. By Marina and David Ottaway. *New York, London: African Publishing Company. 1978. 250 pp. $22.50. Pb: $12.50*

MOST writers on the Ethiopian revolution have just dropped in from time to time, but Mr. and Mrs. Ottaway were there from the outset and until expelled in the middle of 1977; their work is the fruit of a sustained observation unequalled in the literature. Mrs. Ottaway worked in the University, where much of the revolutionary drive started, while Mr. Ottaway was correspondent for *The Washington Post*. Inconsistencies of romanisation betray poor Amharic, but it is obvious that they were

assiduous diarists and collectors of clippings, which they employed students to translate.

The revolution has been a variant on standard Leninist methods: land reform, class struggle and so on sound orthodox, but there has been no acknowledged ' vanguard Party '. Here and there, the authors emphasise external misconceptions (for example, that the Wollo famine, so distressing to foreigners, was significant for Hailé Selassié's fall), and also some internal paradoxes: although, to justify ' revolutionary violence ', Lenin postulated an historically inevitable fight-to-the-last by the defeated class, the Ethiopian aristocracy, almost to a man, surrendered quite voluntarily when called on to account for themselves (one of them even returning post-haste from abroad) and, like the spiritually paralysed Negus himself, were but woebegone captives at the moment chosen by the neo-Octobrists to butcher them. Again, in the plains of Dankalia, the effect of ' land-to-the-tiller ' in the name of social justice was to make well-to-do Galla labourers from the plateau, hired to work on cotton estates, owners of areas of the poverty-stricken Afars' tribal lands. In general, it was left-wing reforms by the old government which generated the discontents the left-wing revolutionaries exploited in order to seize power.

The book's strength lies in its showing that many, many factors shaped the revolution, with no single driving force. It does not provide the last word of analysis perhaps, and, although the description of the revolutionary public administration is admirably informative, it is plain that the authors had little chance to check how it worked far from Addis Ababa. Basic riddles go unsolved: from what source did Marxist-Leninist exuberance take hold of students (one in ten, but enough), and where did the secretive *Derg* come from? Did Russian and Chinese technical assistants have no hand in events? Lack of ' Party ' notwithstanding, there was a ' Politburo ', the *Derg* behaved like a Central Committee (acceptable translation of the Amharic), Marxist students managed ' peasant associations ' as ' cadres ', and the imperial civil service was ' commissared ' and put to use as a ' state '—all measures typical of new communist governments elsewhere; ' mass ' membership can be recruited at leisure, and a name adopted, as they were years ago in Vietnam.

Not everybody will share the Ottaways' complacency that the bloodshed (sometimes one revolutionary against another) attending the overthrow of the empire has been justified by better living standards and more personal freedom.

University of Kent DENNIS DUNCANSON

Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa. By Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, Jr. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1978. 357 pp. £11·00.*

THIS book combines various elements of economic and political theory in an attempt to analyse the design of public policy in Middle Africa. The first part examines the need for, and pattern of, public sector institutional change in African states, the next part reviews various decision rules for policy selection. The rest of the book focuses upon three areas of policy determination and implementation: multinational corporations, international economic integration and foreign aid.

The result is disappointing for two reasons: the overall structure and discussion is fragmentary, and the conception of public sector decision-making which underlies the analysis is weak. The literature on public policy contains varying views of the state and the factors which determine the content and impact of policy. The view implicit in this book is that the state is a cohesive body which sets and pursues national objectives within certain objective constraints given chiefly by resource availability and the international economic environment. Ethnic divisions may also constrain public sector

choice by necessitating the commitment of resources to the control of ethnic conflict. Within such constraints the main objectives pursued by Third-World states are expanded production, equity and increased economic independence. Different states give these objectives varying emphases (witness the relative emphases on these objectives in Kenya and Tanzania).

Against this ' objective ' background Rothchild and Curry proceed to a mixture of normative and descriptive discussion of policy design and impact. In the pursuit of national objectives, the criteria for the allocation of public resources should rest upon social cost-benefit analysis. The authors assume that to varying degrees this is already the case. However, improvements in resource allocation can be obtained from increased and more accurate data availability, increased skilled manpower to make the appropriate calculations, and the introduction of more efficient policy options, some of which the authors themselves suggest. The analytical techniques advocated for formulating the general problem of public sector choice (use of indifference curve analysis combined with the production possibility frontier and a budget constraint), and for the analysis of particular policy choices, are derived directly from neo-classical economics, broadened to include certain variables, such as increased economic autonomy, which may not be readily quantifiable. These sections of the book read like a précis of sections of certain economics textbooks.

In the discussion of policy options it is claimed that African states can increase opportunities for output growth through the adoption of appropriate policies towards multinational corporations, international economic integration and foreign aid. However, the discussion is characterised by a certain pessimism, particularly with respect to the prospects for increased economic integration. Here the authors note that past experience in Africa suggests that individual states will be unwilling to accept high levels of economic integration, even if it can be theoretically demonstrated that this would raise the growth rate. The overriding constraint lies in achieving agreement between individual nations upon the distribution of the benefits of integration. The policy recommended by Rothchild and Curry is therefore to work first for low but achievable levels of integration. Points such as this are unexceptionable. The main weakness of the discussion is more fundamental. It is remarkable that a book which purports to provide insights into policy analysis and formulation ignores almost totally the domestic political and economic pressures upon the determination of state policy, particularly since in the authors' view ' policy analysis seeks to determine what rational courses of action are open to decision-makers in the light of prevailing social demands and constraints ' (p. 9). The need to analyse internal pressures as major determinants of policy is excluded for the following reason:

> Whereas interest group and political party pressures for public and private goods are extensive in pluralistic Western Societies such sectors tend to be less organized and effective in African states. Demands for change are readily apparent, to be sure, but these are as likely to emanate from bureaucratic or governmental agencies, locally based expatriate groups, multinational corporate interests, foreign donor agencies or external powers as from the more conventional political and economic sources of the West (p. 17).

The Rothchild/Curry view of the state and the dominant pressures upon it leaves many issues unexplored. Other writers have attempted to analyse more fully the determinants of state action in underdeveloped countries as well as the sources of the extent of, and limits to, state autonomy.[1] Without any exploration of these issues it is difficult to take seriously the claim of Rothchild and Curry to analytical realism. For, as

1 See, for example, Brett, E. A., ' Relations of Production, the State and the Ugandan Crisis ', *West African Journal of Sociology and Political Science*, Vol I, Pt I, 1975

others have shown, the pressures that influence the determination and implementation of state policy are in significant ways more complex than is suggested by placing the emphasis so strongly upon domestic resource constraints and the international economic environment. There is, for example, little realism in an analysis of policy design and implementation towards multinational corporations which ignores the fact that key members of the state apparatus may hold positions in senior management or on boards of directorship of some of these corporations. Within the state apparatus or located in a strong position to influence it, there may be different groups each with a different vested interest, for example, (i) in allowing maximum freedom in investment and trade to foreign capital, and (ii) in the imposition of various restraints upon the same foreign enterprises.[2]

Such issues cannot be explored or analysed without an investigation of the changing nature of the mode and structure of production in underdeveloped countries and of the relative influence of different fractions of local and international capital upon state policy. Nor can the influence of the bureaucracy on policy formation be understood without the same investigation. As a result of such omissions much of the analysis of this book purveys an exasperating sense of unreality and an unawareness of the fundamental issues that actually determine the direction of public policy.

University of Sussex DIANA HUNT

International Pressures and Political Change in South Africa. Edited by F. McA. Clifford-Vaughan. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1978. 109 pp. £5·95.*

South Africa: War, Revolution or Peace? By L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 85 pp. Pb: $5.95.*

PUBLISHED collections of conference papers are best approached with a sense of foreboding. The usual characteristics of the genre are that the contributions either duplicate each other or have no common thread, that they vary greatly in quality, and that the whole publication is excessively long. Fortunately none of these criticisms can be levelled at *International Pressures and Political Change in South Africa*, which Clifford-Vaughan has edited. It is a short, thoroughly valuable collection. Each of the papers makes a contribution to a common theme and on the whole the authors complement rather than compete with each other. While most of the papers are written by political scientists there is one from an historian, A H. Duminy, and another from a sociologist, L. Schlemmar. Duminy compares the present situation with the build-up to the Boer War when as the Boers met each demand a fresh one was made on them. Duminy's conclusions, therefore, tend to be gloomy—that it is only after ' the actual demonstration of the will to survive on the battlefield ' (p. 38) that a negotiated compromise becomes possible. Schlemmar is hardly more reassuring in his study of White public views. Attitude surveys indicate that external pressures tend to integrate the Whites, especially in defence of their ' primordial ' values, but Schlemmar does offer advice on how Western states might become more influential.

Two of the papers by political scientists (those by Baker and Schrire) indicate the increasing attention which the United States is giving to Southern Africa. Baker provides a useful comparison between the policies of Kissinger and the Carter administration. Schrire starts his paper by emphasising the plurality of American policy-making but then rather spoils it by writing as though there was only one American view. The other two papers are from A. M. Johnson, who develops an interesting discussion on the linkage between domestic and external factors, and distinguishes between the West's ' status quo ' objectives and its revolutionary

2. See, for example, Swainson, N., ' The Kenyan Bourgeoisie ', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8, 1977.

statecraft in Southern Africa; and from P. L. Moorcraft, who examines future options based on psychological attitudes and South Africa's position as a pariah state. He believes that partition is a possibility but that it may come only after a war.

In such a short collection there must be gaps. I was disappointed to find so little attention paid to the behaviour of the Black states, and I thought the United States was given too much attention at the expense of West European and/or international organisations. But overall it is a valuable collection of papers.

In their book L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan have presented a clear, strongly argued case in support of the South African government, claiming that double standards are constantly used against it and that the contribution of White South Africans in their own country and abroad is much undervalued. The study is, however, based on premises which are open to serious challenge. The authors' world is one of ' real politik ' with a predominant bi-polar division in which the communists are the enemy and in which South Africa is a strong and much underrated bastion of the West.

Gann and Duignan would do well to read Johnson's article in the Clifford- Vaughan collection, where he deals with the ambiguity of South Africa's ' Western ' status, the relationship between the West and the Third World, and the increasing priority given to racial issues in the international community. The world is a more complex place than that presented by Gann and Duignan.

Open University, Milton Keynes JAMES P. BARBER

Namibia Old and New: Traditional and Modern Leaders in Ovamboland *By Gerhard Tötemeyer. London. C Hurst. 1978. 257pp. £9·50.*

THIS book is an updated version of the author's doctoral dissertation on the role of Ovambo elites in the political development of Ovamboland. The centre-piece of the book is a survey of attitudes among the Ovambo that highlights the conflict between the traditional leaders and a modernising educated elite.

The story that emerges is the familiar one in southern Africa of the decay of the traditional order, the propping up of traditional leaders by white authority, and their loss of legitimacy. This was most spectacularly demonstrated by the 1973 elections to the Ovamboland Legislative Council when fewer than five per cent of the electorate turned out to vote in support of the traditional leaders. Subsequent elections have been more successful from the South African government's point of view, but not very reliable as tests of opinion in view of the pressures put on voters to go to the polls.

Of particular interest is the role played by the churches as a focus of opposition to the government and their close relationship with the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), in Dr. Tötemeyer's view, ' the strongest political party in Ovamboland ' (p. 219). One indication of the churches' influence was that during the 1972 labour unrest strike meetings opened with a prayer and a Scripture reading, while ' the striking Ovambos returned to the homeland singing hymns ' (p 167).

The relevance of Dr Tötemeyer's research to the outside world is its bearing on the prospects for a political settlement in Namibia. Ovambos are far and away the largest ethnic group in Namibia, comprising a little under half the territory's population, while Ovamboland straddles Namibia's sensitive northern border with Angola. It therefore seems unlikely that there can be a stable settlement without the participation of SWAPO. This was not a view the South African government were prepared to accept and in 1976 Dr. Tötemeyer was expelled from the Nationalist Party.

However, it is difficult to recommend this book to the general reader. The technical shortcomings make for frustrating reading. The key to the abbreviations for the many

tables is buried in one obscure footnote. Finally, the absence of even one reasonably detailed map of Ovamboland reduces the book's value.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

ASIA AND AUSTRALASIA

India: Population, Economy, Society. By R. H. Cassen. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 419 pp. £10·00.*

THE title alone infers an almost impossible task, an inference readily confirmed by his advisers, including David Glass. Yet the author has accepted the monumental challenge of writing a volume about the population, economy and society of the country with the second largest population on earth, trying to pursue three admittedly irreconcilable aims: cover a wide range of topics, satisfy scholarly opinion and be read by the non-specialist. In essence he has tried to write a book about India from the viewpoint of population, with the main thesis that both population and development problems have essentially the same solution—employment-intensive growth which must in the early stages at least be predominantly rural. He sees improvement in the utilisation of labour as the key development problem, and feels that the solution must be found at village level, where indeed most of India's problems must be solved, not least a fundamental change in social structure.

In tackling this enormous task, the author has taken a very macro-approach, depending heavily upon national statistics, a voluminous literature and numerous surveys. He has obviously read voraciously over a wide range of the social sciences, and leaves few stones unturned. One must admire, in particular, the tenacity with which he tries to unravel the very difficult problems facing India today. He shirks little, and frequently comes to sane judgments after considering a variety of other views. Certainly he has assembled an immense amount of data, yet he has refused to be swamped by it, and attempts his own population projections, as well as many personal contributions on, for example, the cost of a child, nutrition, malnutrition, causes of death and the 1976 National Population Policy.

The surprising feature is the curious balance of the book. For instance, one can find no real justification for devoting four fifths of the first chapter, entitled ' Background ', to an ' extended detour ' on Malthus and the demographic transition in England, France, Japan and elsewhere. Surely it would have been more relevant to have considered the demographic history of India in greater detail? Equally odd is the digression about the population problems of China in the fifth and final chapter on ' The Future of Indian Society '; certainly there are comparative lessons to be learned from China, but there are other matters of less marginal significance which deserve more consideration. Although half the book is given over to the analysis of fertility, mortality, health and family planning, important topics like migration and urbanisation are given very scanty treatment. Finally, one can see little merit in the cumbersome and duplicatory system of notes and bibliography, which along with the appendices take up nearly a fifth of the book.

This criticism should not detract from the overall merit of the volume, which is a very commendable attempt to place India's population problems in a social, economic and political context. Of course, it is not comprehensive, but it will provide a mine of reliable information for its readers, specialist and non-specialist alike, and will clarify many of the complexities of that most complex of countries.

University of Durham JOHN I. CLARKE

Sons of the Soil. By Myron Weiner. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1978. 383 pp.*

India at the Polls: The Parliamentary Elections of 1977. By Myron Weiner. *Washington: American Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978. 150 pp. £3·75.*

THE first of these books describes and analyses many clashes between Indian migrants, who expect free movement throughout their own country, and the local people, who claim that the land is theirs because they were born on it and it is their home. These 'Mulkis' expect foreign intrusions to be controlled, even if they are from other regions of the same state. If they are not, demands for new state frontiers may be made, as in one of the cases probed in some depth by Myron Weiner, which he entitles 'Middle Class Protectionism: Mulkis Against Migrants In Hyderabad' (pp. 217–59). 'Hyderabadis' (residents born in, or assimilated to, the former princely state of Hyderabad incorporated into Andhra Pradesh) found themselves unable to cope with the more enterprising, better-educated migrants from the region of Andhra. They saw these intruders not only buying their lands and businesses, but destroying their distinctive culture, style of living and language. With the sharpening of cultural identity, political demands multiplied and strengthened, and it was only the refusal of the Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, to budge that prevented the break-up of Andhra Pradesh.

The author believes that a major question for any Indian government is whether it uses its authority to build up an internal common market with spatial mobility, or pursues internal protectionist policies to satisfy minority interests. This study is the rich fruit of many years of scholarly labour and should be read by all those interested in the problems arising from migration and ethnic conflict.

Since the 1960s Myron Weiner has built up the best political intelligence network in India, and his chosen informants and sources on each Indian state are hand picked and of the highest quality. This does not mean that all his political conclusions are equally convincing, as when he argues in *India at the Polls* that at the parliamentary elections of 1977 'In South India the Congress Party and its allies did nearly as well in the urban constituencies as they did in the rural areas' (p. 76). According to the table on page 79 in Andhra Pradesh the average percentage Congress vote for urban constituencies was 48·5, whereas state-wide it was 57·4, a difference of 8·9 per cent. In Maharashtra, the figures were 40 and 47, a difference of 7 per cent, and only in Karnataka, where the figures were 53·9 and 56·8, a difference of 2·9 per cent, can it be said that Congress gained nearly as many votes in urban as rural areas.

As a short and rapidly produced book this is a valuable account of the 1977 elections and one hopes that Mr. Weiner will follow it up with a deeply searching account of the north-south cleavage and the Janata Party's failure to capture the minds and emotions of southern voters.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London HUGH GRAY

Social Accounting for Development Planning with Special Reference to Sri Lanka. By Graham Pyatt and Alan Roe. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977. 190 pp. £9·00.*

THE intelligent layman coming upon this interesting book whilst browsing through the shelves of his local university bookstore will probably be disappointed, especially if he expected to find a simple treatise on social welfare policies in Third-World countries. For this is heady stuff for the uninitiated in macro-economic development

planning projection techniques as a quick glance at Professor Sir Richard Stone's foreword soon reveals. But the patient and diligent reader will be justly rewarded with a clearer understanding of the inner workings of an economic system if he perseveres with the lucid description of the social accounting matrix the authors employed in Sri Lanka.

In recent years policies to increase employment have come to be regarded as one of the most important means of achieving a more equitable distribution of income because they provide a source of cash income to those previously unemployed or underemployed. To help formulate appropriate strategies to promote development, it is necessary to construct a relevant data framework which incorporates not only gross national product components but also distributional variables that reflect significant differences in employment and household income. The data system described is designed to illustrate the important inter-relationship between the structure of production, the allocation of factor incomes and the composition of household demand given the existing income distribution. It is also linked to an underlying conceptual model which defines the various behavioural and technical relationships assumed to exist between the identified variables. For Sri Lanka, the authors have initially introduced the necessary simplifying assumptions of fixed coefficients, linear transformations and the exogenous determination of certain key elements so as to produce a practical operational planning model. They also admit to some glaring deficiencies in the basic statistics. Extensions to the basic system can be made to permit greater flexibility and non-linearity in order to accord more closely with reality but many would stop short at attempts to incorporate, mainly for completeness, the endogenous determination of such variables as investment, prices and exports in the model because this implies introducing some rather sweeping behavioural assumptions.

The social accounting matrix described is, in the first instance, primarily a systematic and consistent data classification system coherently linked to an acknowledged analytical framework. Much painstaking effort is needed not only to formulate the model but also to quantify it and calibrate its performance. Although similar frameworks have been introduced elsewhere—often under the direct initiative of the same authors—it seems doubtful whether, at this stage, many low income countries can afford to maintain such a system on their own. But since the question of living standards and their determination within the context of a policy-focused macro-economic model is central to this exercise, it must be hoped that international agencies and aid-donor countries will give their continued support to such studies. In producing a valuable guide for practitioners and indicating—if only implicitly—the economic and political difficulties of achieving a development path combining growth and poverty alleviation, the authors have rendered an important service to the technique of development planning. An important question, nevertheless, remains to be answered; can any system that primarily utilises financial data be used to evaluate effectively the impact of social policies whose outcomes can really be measured only in physical terms? The appropriate lead may well be found in the association of manpower data with income levels in the model.

Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex MICHAEL WARD

The United Nations in Bangladesh. By Thomas W. Oliver. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1978. 231 pp. £10·80.*

THE suffering that witnessed the birth of Bangladesh had by 1971 become a major indictment of the impotence of contemporary international organisation. A combination of war and natural catastrophe resulted in devastating distress on a vast scale. Many governments and private organisations responded to Bangladesh's plight,

not always very effectively, but in some cases very generously. The organisation of international relief obtained its principal impetus from the United Nations' role as the central co-ordinating agency. The UN Relief Operation in Dacca (UNROD) and the UN Relief Office in Bangladesh (UNROB) were both the umbrella and the linchpin of the relief effort as a whole. The relative success of their operation demonstrates the gains which might accrue from combined bilateral and multilateral efforts, and indicates the co-ordinating function the United Nations could play in international relief co-operation.

Thomas W. Oliver, Senior Reports Officer of UNROD in 1973, has undertaken the first analytical account of the United Nations' relief operation in Bangladesh. He highlights the pivotal role of the UN Secretariat in establishing and directing relief activities; and he underlines the key personal role of the then Secretary-General, U Thant, as well as that of Kurt Waldheim in continuing his predecessor's initiative. In fact, perhaps the chief merit of Dr. Oliver's survey of the experience of UNROD/UNROB is that it affords useful insights into the work of the UN Secretariat at a time when it is fashionable to denigrate the United Nations and question its relevance as a forum for tackling international problems.

Dr. Oliver adopts a chronological approach in unravelling the United Nations' operation. He begins with U Thant's offer of assistance in the second quarter of 1971, at a time when Bangladesh was still technically the eastern province of Pakistan. The narrative is then carried through until the winding-up of the relief operation in the second half of 1973. Dr. Oliver conveys a real sense of purpose in his day-by-day descriptions of events. His obviously deep personal commitment to his mission occasionally mitigates against the degree of detachment desirable in scholarly texts. His diary style is also at times somewhat tedious, but the book is clearly written and represents much painstaking research. It is a worthy addition to the literature on the UN Secretariat's positive contributions to international co-operation.

KENNETH TWITCHETT

Bhutan: The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis. By Nari Rustomji. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1978. 150 pp. £4·50.*

THE partial opening-up and development of Bhutan in the later years of the reign of Jigme Wangchuk were marred by family intrigue and the assassination of Prime Minister Jigme Dorji, the King's brother-in-law, in 1964. Nari Rustomji observed these events while himself playing an important role, as adviser to the Bhutan government. His vantage-point was closest to the Dorji family, which he sees in this book as the principal agent of outside influence and modernisation. He had access to and respected the King, however, and tends to give him the benefit of the doubt in describing the estrangement between King and Queen which followed the assassination.

At a general level, Rustomji presents what is really the only feasible explanation of the murder—that it resulted from a plot among people who felt threatened by modernisation or by the Dorji family. The details of the conspiracy are more controversial, particularly the questions of how far it extended, if at all, beyond the King's uncle, the army chief, who was executed for his part in the crime, and whether it involved the King himself. Rustomji's final position is rather curious: he does not believe the King ordered or sanctioned the murder, but suggests that illness made him a ' mere observer of events ', ' compelling him to allow his self-appointed well-wishers to take matters into their own hands ' (p. 119). This is unsatisfying, because it is both obscure and to some extent contradictory. (It appears to allow for patriotic motives despite the earlier identification of the conspirators' self-interest.)

The charm of the book lies rather in its intimate cameos—of the Dorji family's

attitude to the King's mistress, of the King's relations with the Queen, of the atmosphere of the administration and of Bhutan itself, of the role of the Queen's sister, Tashi, after the assassination, of other members of the Dorji family, and above all of the character of Jigme Dorji to whose memory the book is dedicated. Rustomji provides a valuable picture of some of the personal drama of a court in time of tension, and the national drama of a state in time of change, in that now rare situation when both are virtually one and the same.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London PETER ROBB

Burma 1942–1945. By Raymond Callahan. *London: Davis-Poynter. 1978. 190 pp. £5·50.*

APART from the somewhat excessive length of its paragraphs, this is a pleasantly written book, and it may appeal to those who like their war-time histories to be of an unexacting kind. For anyone with a serious interest in the subject, however, it is worth very little, and adds scarcely anything to what can already be found in the official histories of the *War Against Japan* and the *Grand Strategy* volumes.

This is not the first book in its series (supposedly dealing with ' The Politics and Strategy of the Second World War ') to have huge lacunae in its source material. In the first place, its title is seriously misleading, since the work is in effect concerned only with Britain and Burma. No unpublished American sources have been used: not the papers of, say, Chennault or Stilwell or Wedemeyer; not the official papers of the China-Burma-Indian theatre; not even the published memoirs of men like John Davies (Stilwell's Political Adviser). Yet even if we focus upon Britain alone, the gaps are huge there, too: no use made of the papers of the Governor of Burma, Dorman-Smith, of the Viceroy, Linlithgow; of the India and Burma Offices, of Admiral Somerville, of the Foreign Office (including its Political Warfare files); no Harvey or Cadogan published diaries; not even the unpublished South-East Asia Command (SEAC) diary, or the files of the Chiefs of Staff in London.

With such inadequate foundations, the substance of the book is naturally satisfactory at only the broadest narrative level. To take just one issue involving personalities and manoeuvrings within SEAC, it entirely fails, for example, to probe the position of Wedemeyer as Mountbatten's (American) Deputy Chief of Staff, giving the impression that the former was loyally at one with his Supreme Commander in the strategic tussles with Washington in 1943-44. (Wedemeyer to Admiral Leahy in a private letter of January 20, 1944: ' My short contact with all of you [from Washington] in Cairo served as a happy interlude. When you all turned your paths westward, I wished with all my heart that I was still a member of your party instead of a staff officer for " His Majesty the King ", dispensing, imposing, or propagandizing imperialism to the people of the Far East.') Likewise, the book's main conclusion—that the ' primacy of politics over strategy is nowhere better illustrated than in Britain's war against Japan '—is simplistic. In all, one is again left wondering quite what is the point of this series when its offerings tend to fall so far short of the expectations created by its title.

University of Sussex CHRISTOPHER THORNE

The Five Faces of Thailand: An Economic Geography. By Wolf Donner. *London: Hurst for the Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg. 1978. 930 pp. £16.50.*

A major problem in the composition of any major geographical text is that geography as a discipline is dynamic. It is extremely difficult to compose a work on any aspect of

human geography, in particular, which is both comprehensive and up to date. When the work focuses on a country which is developing as rapidly as is Thailand, then the dilemma is even more extreme.

This dilemma has not been solved in Wolf Donner's *The Five Faces of Thailand*. In a monumental work, the author attempts to give a detailed account of Thailand's ' up-to-date economic geography ' (p. xix). In this task he fails on a number of counts. Admittedly it is difficult in any economic analysis of a developing country to obtain current statistics, but Donner's relate exclusively to his own period in Thailand between 1969 and 1972, and mostly to 1969-70. More recent data are available and could have been obtained. Since then Thailand has moved into a second decade of formal development planning—surely a major focus of any economic geography—but even the Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (1971-76) is given only cursory mention. This is significant since many of the policies affecting the economic geography of Thailand have undergone fundamental changes in this and the subsequent Fourth Plan.

If there is some excuse for the failure to update statistical material, then there remains parts of the text for which there can be none. Donner's description of the major region of the Khorat Plateau, for example, is unfamiliar to one acquainted with that area today. He relies too heavily on dated secondary sources in commenting on a shifting cultivation in the region whereas in general, it has now been made permanent by the demands of cash cropping; while the mention of ' the most common method ' of livestock marketing being to ' drive the herds ' on the hoof smacks more of Credner's time than our own (p. 620). Indeed this reliance on the gospel according to Credner pervades the book and condemns it to giving a dated analysis.

If this negates Donner's claim to be an up-to-date work, then there is much in his emphasis which leads one to question its title as an economic geography. The author spends considerable time on a detailed examination of the physical geography of the country and of each of its five regions in turn. This might be justified if this physical background were related to the economic activities in the same detail; on the contrary, Donner fails to balance this with detailed analysis even of such an important aspect of the Thai economy as Central Plain rice production (which merits only 1½ pages) and certainly does not relate this either to local physical conditions, or to what most economic geographers would consider more important, the distribution of government agricultural development activities in the region.

Thus this book appears to be neither up to date, nor an economic geography. It is more a compendium of facts, arranged with a repetitious regularity liable to induce ennui, and relating to a description of a country of a decade or more ago, not to present-day Thailand.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London HARVEY DEMAINE

China's Role in World Affairs. By Michael B. Yahuda. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 298 pp. £10·95.*

SINCE the beginning of the nineteenth century, China's prospective international role has evoked either apprehension or optimism about a fabulous future of golden promise from the Western World. The tone of Michael Yahuda's analysis is inevitably optimistic as it has been based primarily on the premiss that Chinese foreign policy is best understood from the intellectual formulations of the Chinese foreign policy elite. The framework that emerges is based on decisive and significant shifts in Chairman Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line over the past thirty years. The Sino-Soviet split provides the decisive watershed between China's role as a member of the socialist camp and its emergence after 1963 as a self-reliant autonomous international actor. While demonstrating convincingly that it was Mao who was instrumental in imposing

sudden and often unexpected changes in the framework of foreign policy, for example in 1966 when he roundly denounced the ' weak-kneed people in Peking ' (p. 184), the book does not neglect to cull available evidence which may point to alternative positions adopted by Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and others.

The key decisions revolve round China's relations with the two super-powers, against which Mao consistently had the supreme confidence to measure China's international status. The break with the Soviet Union was courageous enough on its own, but when combined with denunciations of super-power collusion during the 1960s and the shrill xenophobia and chauvinism toward countries of both the first and second intermediate zones during the Cultural Revolution, the confidence verged on a foolhardiness and stubborn dogmatism that can only have been extremely trying to Mao's immediate associates. The background to the opening toward the United States after 1968, when ' once again the orientation of China's foreign policy underwent a rapid and marked change in response to perceived change in the world at large ' (p. 208), is tantalisingly sparse. It points up one of the limitations that attend a content analysis of purely intellectual formulations of policy, even given the availability of hitherto unpublished speeches of the ' Great Helmsman '. When well-elaborated statements, such as the theory of the three worlds enunciated in Deng Xiaoping's speech of April 1974 at the United Nations, are to hand, the technique comes into its own and is ably exploited by Dr. Yahuda in his concluding chapters. One of the questions that could have profitably been explored with the technique, however, might have been the degree to which the intellectual formulations of foreign policy principles were intended for domestic, as opposed to external, consumption.

Dr. Yahuda is well aware that ' the main problem which affects the conduct of China's foreign policy arises from its relative weakness as a global power ' (p. 265) and he points to the contradictions that have arisen between Mao-centred analyses and the more orthodox Marxist analyses over the degree of significance to be assigned to social and economic factors as explanation of political behaviour. The weakness of Mao's attempts at applying the theory of contradictions to economic policy has been amply demonstrated since the 1950s and the final attempt to justify its continued application to China's foreign economic policy by the so-called ' Gang of Four ' was carried away in the floodtide of determined efforts by the Hua regime to eliminate China's economic and technological weakness through recourse to the world market. Mao's dominant personality and moral authority enabled him to impose his interpretation of the theory of contradictions on foreign policy for quarter of a century, but could China have afforded the break with the Soviet Union had it not been for the accessibility of oil technology from Rumania and Albania and of grains from Canada and Australia? A Mao-centred analysis of elite behaviour is undoubtedly a very necessary part of the explanation of Chinese foreign policy since 1949 and Dr. Yahuda is to be congratulated for the skilful way in which he has brought all the most recent evidence together in this excellent textbook. Now that Chinese foreign policy spokesmen are gaining in self-confidence in their relations with the Western media, we may look forward in the future to an interpretation of fuller and more sufficient explanations of the role of China in world affairs.

University of Sussex J. W. M. CHAPMAN

The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study. By Hong Yung Lee. *Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1978. 369 pp. £11·25.*

China: The Impact of the Cultural Revolution. Edited by Bill Brugger. *London: Croom Helm, New York: Barnes and Noble. 1978. 300 pp. £9·95.*

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION continues to inspire a spate of books about this

extraordinary and unique event in the unfolding story of Chinese communism. Probably by now the general outline is well-known to readers of the literature, who will be aware that it had its origins much earlier in the ' Hundred Flowers ' of 1957, and the ' Great Leap Forward ' in 1958. Probably these three developments constitute for most people the highlights of the Maoist form of communism.

The Cultural Revolution was, by this reckoning, the final and most sensational confrontation between Mao and his opponents in the Party hierarchy. This important new book by Hong Yung Lee takes us through its major phases, beginning with the attack in 1965 on the Peking municipal Party committee, broadening out into a stimulated revolt on the campuses and the formation of the ' Red Guards ', and then on to the tormented year of 1967 with friend and foe locked in struggle across the country. Who was which was not always easy to discern. There was the ' January power seizure ', the ' February adverse current ', and the Wuhan incident. The reader must be prepared for a mass of detail in what proved to be a highly complex and fluctuating campaign lasting into 1968.

This is no mere historical reconstruction. What distinguishes this book is its attempt to relate the power struggle between the major protagonists to emerging socio-political conflicts in Chinese society, the interaction between elites and masses, and the vertical and horizontal divisions at both levels. Thus the author takes seven political ' actors ', as he calls them (Mao, the Cultural Revolution Small Group, the army, the Party, the government, the radicals and the conservatives among the mass organisations), and looks at them operating on three different levels (the supreme leader, the elite and the masses). Some may be puzzled by the distinction between radical and conservative, for instance among the Red Guards, believing them to have been of a revolutionary character and acting in the Maoist cause. That question exemplifies the complexity of the issues raised by the Cultural Revolution. It is analogous to the question of ' class ' in Communist China, whether it is a matter of economic and social background or something that can be determined by one's political standpoint. These, of course, are questions that go back to the origins of a communist movement in an Asian peasant society. In a later chapter, the author takes a case study of the Cultural Revolution in Kwangtung to test his radical-conservative hypothesis that the radicals came from the under-privileged sectors of society, those with ' bad ' or bourgeois backgrounds, while the conservatives were those of favoured worker or peasant origin, usually in Party organisations and with a pre-1949 revolutionary history. All in all, he makes an interesting and original contribution to a continuing debate.

That debate, of course, is bound to be somewhat inconclusive as regards the effects of the Cultural Revolution, and whether Mao or his opponents in the Party were the real victors. It all depends on what it was intended to achieve. Those who would assess the impact of these events in China have found their verdict at risk in the speed of successive changes of policy and personalities in Peking, shortly before and after Mao died. So it is with the second volume under review. This is an Adelaide contribution, assembled by various hands employed in institutions of higher education in that city. Overtaken by events, the editor, Bill Brugger, had to apply a cut-off date of 1969–73 to his contributors, with only marginal additions to those themes, such as education, most in need of later review.

There is a lot of theorising here. Class again raises its ugly head. References in China during the Cultural Revolution to those of bourgeois or even landlord class, let alone ' capitalist-roaders ', provoked comment abroad as to how such things could be, so long after 1949. In his historical Introduction, and again in his perceptive Conclusion at the end of the book, the editor explores these notions and some of the theories put forward to ' explicate ' them (his word). Ideologues might be interested in whether new bourgeois elements can arise in a socialist society, and the consequent

need for continued class struggle, and indeed, a cultural revolution. They may hover between a residual and a generative view of class, or even between ' cultural lag and initial superstructural push ' (p. 25), in the context of what is called ' uninterrupted revolution '.

Others will be more interested in looking at the actual effects of the Cultural Revolution on the economy, here dealt with in three chapters, and one each on the Party, the army, education and foreign policy. In keeping with the tendency of the book, China's recent foreign policy initiatives are given a theoretical treatment by Greg O'Leary. The view of quite a number of scholars that the opening to the West is motivated quite simply by power considerations, as a reaction to the Soviet threat, or as a result of the ascendancy of internal revisionism in Peking, is dismissed. ' In this way, China's foreign policy is denuded of revolutionary initiative and intent ' (p. 206). Instead we are offered a rationale of Marxist-Leninist consistency, based on Mao's ' On Policy ' dating back to 1940. China's new policy, we are told, implies no retreat from revolutionary principles, but is ' married to a new assessment of the international balance of class forces ' (p. 248). Life is getting complicated. What exactly these forces are in Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and China's own invasion of Vietnam, must remain in doubt.

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

Island China. Ralph N. Clough. *Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1978. 264 pp. £8·75.*

Two Chinese States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests. Edited by Ramon H. Myers. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 84 pp. Pb: $5.95.*

THE theme for both these books is set by the statement agreed in the Joint Communiqué issued at Shanghai in February, 1972, on the occasion of President Nixon's visit to China, that ' progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries '.

Over the next seven years, the barrier to this desirable progress, the Taiwan problem, remained immovable, and changes in leadership made no difference. President Hua Guofeng in his address to the opening session of the Fifth National Congress in February 1978, re-stated the Chinese position:

> At present the attitude of the U.S. government toward the question of Taiwan is the obstacle to normalization . . . The U.S. must sever its so-called diplomatic relations with the Chiang clique, withdraw all its armed forces and military installations from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area, and abrogate its so-called ' mutual defense treaty ' with the Chiang clique.

President Carter, in his State of the Union message to Congress on January 23, 1979, reaffirmed the United States' position: ' We will continue our commitment to a prosperous, peaceful and secure life for the people of Taiwan.'

Both books under review argue that this impasse is only apparent; that many of the benefits of normalisation can be secured if both nations are willing to play down the Taiwan issue, and to postpone the formal exchange of ambassadors until that issue can be resolved, perhaps after many years have passed. Clough does point out, however, that

> until embassies are exchanged, no high-level Chinese official will visit the United States, no long-term scientific or student exchanges can take place, and no American newsmen can be stationed in Peking. Negotiations on the disposition of US claims against the PRC for confiscated property and PRC claims against the United States for frozen assets seem to have reached a stalemate pending the

> establishment of diplomatic relations . . . Until the claims are resolved, US and PRC ships and planes cannot enter each other's ports or airports, and trade exhibits cannot be exchanged, as Americans with claims against the PRC could petition the courts to attach PRC property in this country to satisfy their claims (p. 205).

Myers marshals his arguments to conclude that ' This leaves the United States with only one policy option—that of adopting and trying to implement the " equilibrium strategy ". This strategy calls for a moratorium on all discussions related to normalisation except by the liaison offices in Peking and Washington, and an avoidance of package-agreement diplomacy ' (p. 75).

Both books take the position that progress towards normalization will be, and ought to be, very slow, extending cautiously over a period of years. It is fortunate, if ironic, that within a very few weeks after the publication of both *Island China* and *Two Chinese States*, ambassadors-designate for the United States and China had been appointed; Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping had paid a wildly-publicised visit to the United States; five ' package-agreement ' accords had been signed, covering the opening of regional consulates in both countries; exchanges of students and scholars, of newsmen and of cultural groups; the sale by the United States to China of a 500 million-dollar satellite communications system and of a 200 million-dollar electron-volt accelerator for nuclear research. A sixth accord, for the settlement of outstanding claims for confiscated property and for frozen assets, is expected to be completed before this review appears in print.

If events have made obsolete the policy recommendations of these two books, both are still valuable for the insights they offer regarding the recent history of Taiwan. *Island China*, longer and the work of a single author, is the more complete and the more useful of the two, but C. Martin Wilbur, who contributed one of the five essays included in *Two Chinese States*, gives an excellent account of Taiwan's rapid development into a consumer-oriented society. As a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, Taiwan had made considerable progress towards modernisation, while mainland China was declining into anarchy and war-lordism. The island escaped the enormous destruction inflicted on the mainland by the Japanese invasion and by the civil wars there, and while the Kuomintang occupation of Taiwan in 1945–49 was little less brutal it involved no serious destruction of physical assets. The influx of mainlanders in 1949 brought with it much wealth looted from what is now the Peoples' Republic; for fifteen years United States economic aid was injected into the Taiwanese economy at an average rate of 100 million dollars per year, enormously strengthening the infrastructure of a territory with a tiny area and a population of only fifteen millions. After aid was phased out in 1965, American capital continued to flow into Taiwan. Loans and guarantees committed by the US Export-Import Bank amounted to 1,600 million dollars by the end of 1976, and an equal amount of private investment, chiefly American, Japanese and Overseas Chinese in origin, was attracted by the low wages, the favourable labour laws, and the access to the American market offered by Taiwan. This enormous injection of outside capital, much of it carrying little or no charge for debt service, has not only modernised the economy of Taiwan, but has made it an indigestible component for the economy of mainland China until a corresponding degree of industrialisation can be attained in the Peoples' Republic.

Both China and the United States, it would appear, have decided to overlook the contradiction inherent in their policies towards Taiwan. The United States is reported to have withdrawn all its military forces and installations from Taiwan and the Straits, to have suspended its training programs for the Taiwanese forces, and to have curtailed its military sales to Taiwan, going a long way to meet the conditions laid down by President Hua in 1978. Vice-President Deng has gone even farther to meet the

demands of the United States and has promised that China ' will respect the realities on Taiwan, and the Taiwanese authorities as a local government will retain their rights and powers . . . they can maintain a certain amount of their own armed forces. As for trade with foreign countries, they can continue. They may also maintain their present (i.e. capitalist) system and continue their own way of life . . . The solution may take a long time . . . we demand of them only that there will be no two Chinas.'[1]

Deng's assurances would seem to mean that, unless Taiwan declares itself an independent state, or tries to substitute an alliance with the Soviet Union for its present alliance with the United States, China will not attempt to overthrow the present regime in Taiwan. In theory, of course, the civil war will continue between the governments in Peking and in Taipei, each claiming to be the government of the one China in which both believe, but this will be only a war of words—much the nicest kind of civil war if the fifty-year-old struggle can not yet be abandoned without an unacceptable loss of face.

C. S. BURCHILL

Japan: Economic Growth, Resource Scarcity, and Environmental Constraints. By Edward A. Olsen. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. (Distrib. by E. Benn, London.) 139 pp. £10·65.*

THE author has contrived to make a book out of what should have been an article. His basic contention is that, in a world of scarce natural resources and developing resource nationalism, countries poorly endowed with natural resources, of which Japan is a conspicuous example, will eventually become exceptionally vulnerable economically. He then proceeds to speculate about how Japan's foreign policy may evolve in order to cope with this problem. He considers several courses of action open to Japan, from territorial expansion to international co-operation, and comes to the conclusion that co-operation of ' utopian ' dimensions in the sharing of the world's resources would be needed to rescue Japan from its dilemma. He believes such co-operation is unlikely, and that Japan will eventually become an ' albatross slung around the neck of its allies and trade partners '.

To reach such a conclusion, of course, one has to have a very pessimistic view of the way economic systems are able to adapt to relative scarcities. In this respect Dr. Olsen is a self-confessed ' neo-Malthusian '. This appears to mean that he believes that the society, the polity, the economy and the external relations of a nation are ultimately a function of its command over resources alone—a kind of resource determinism. There is not the space here to criticise this theory, except perhaps to say that it suffers from the faults of all monocausal theories; resulting predictions, of all but the most trite kind, are likely to prove wrong.

There is a second strand to the argument, a kind of sub-thesis. This is that there is something in the way that the Japanese view nature which enables them to ' compartmentalize their values into areas so that their aesthetic sensitivities do not interrupt the continued economic activity of that society '. In addition to the observation that this must be true of all societies and *a fortiori* of industrial societies, it must also be pointed out that he reaches a questionable conclusion: that it is this view of nature which has got Japan into the position where environmental damage as a result of the depredations of the industrial process are more marked than elsewhere. Equally questionable is the corollary he draws: namely, that this same outlook is preventing the Japanese from appreciating the true magnitude of the constraints imposed by resource scarcities on industrialisation, and will continue to do so in the

1 *Time*, Feb. 5, 1979.

future as along as supplies from abroad enable them to avoid ' the total destruction of their remaining natural areas '. Anyone who writes at length on Japan can make the occasional statement which rings true in the ears of those who know the country, as indeed Dr. Olsen does. However, the totality is not impressive and illustrates the perils, frequently encountered, of writing about Japan after a less-than-thorough acquaintance.

Lastly, it must be said that the language of the book is frequently impenetrable, and that this reviewer finds the jargon-ridden style grates on his ear like the proverbial thumbnail across a blackboard. This book will give comfort to those who believe that futurology is not a proper academic concern, and that to connive in dressing it up as a scholarly work does no one a service.

University of Sheffield D. W. ANTHONY

Japan's Food Prospects and Policies. By Fred H. Sanderson. *Washington: Brookings Institution. 1978. 99 pp. Pb: $2.95.*

THIS book serves once again to emphasise how closely integrated with the world economy is the economy of Japan. We are familiar with the fact that Japan's endowment with the raw materials of industry makes it enormously dependent on imported oil, iron ore, and so on. Mr. Sanderson shows us that Japan is also heavily dependent on imported food, and that the true size of this dependence is not well understood or properly taken into account in Japan's policy towards its farmers.

He begins by demonstrating how important a market Japan has become for United States exporters of grain and soyabeans; and, conversely, how reliant Japan is on the United States for a substantial proportion of its consumption of these and other agricultural commodities. Proceeding towards his main thesis, he shows in some detail, and with admirable clarity, how the diet of the Japanese has changed over the period of rapid postwar economic growth. From a diet with a low calorific intake derived almost wholly from vegetables, the Japanese now obtain many more calories from a diet, a significant proportion of which consists of eggs, meat and milk. The calorie intake of the Japanese is still below that of the peoples of other advanced industrial nations, as is their meat consumption. However, the trend is upward, and the contribution made by meat consumption is likely to increase further.

As a result of such changes, the composition of agricultural output has also changed. Postwar land reform bequeathed Japan an agriculture carried on by small-scale, owner-farmers. Double cropping, an extremely intensive use of fertilisers and so forth have enabled farmers to achieve remarkable increases in output. A costly price-support policy has resulted in a plenitude of rice, but has nevertheless left Japan increasingly reliant on imports to meet its requirements for soyabeans, sugar and grain, both for human consumption and for animal feedstuffs. The ' food crisis ' of 1972-76, and especially the short-lived embargo imposed by the United States in 1973 on soyabean exports, drove this point home to the Japanese government. However, increasingly costly measures designed to increase the output of these commodities has not reversed the trend towards increasing import dependence. The growing livestock industry, which receives infant-industry protection, with its burgeoning consumption of feedstuffs, serves only to widen the gap between domestic production and total grain requirements.

Nevertheless, Ministry of Agriculture projections, contained in a 1975 report, speak of large increases in the domestic output of grains, soyabeans and sugar, as well as in livestock. Combining this with forecasts of demand for various kinds of food, the report predicts self-sufficiency rates in the mid-1980s which are higher than in the mid-1970s. The author takes issue with this conclusion. He argues that to aim for

such a policy is to misunderstand the true nature of the global food problem, and to underestimate the capacity of the major exporting nations to meet likely future demand. He goes on to argue that the report's estimates both of future demand for meat (beef in particular), and of the future domestic output of grain, etc., are wrong. He reworks the statistical demand calculations, using both cross-section and time-series analyses of the relationship between income and consumption, as well as international comparisons, in order to support the first contention. He reiterates the fact of the failure of present-day costly price-support policies to halt declining production in support of the latter contention. He could further have strengthened his case by a more detailed analysis of the structure of agriculture, and its degree of commitment to part-time farming supplemented by the earnings from by-employment by male family members.

While the prediction of future demand for various kinds of food is a task fraught with difficulties, the author has done enough, I believe, to cast real doubt on the accuracy of the projections on which present policy is based. The Japanese are quite likely to eat more beef in 1985 than their government expects. They will probably have to import more grain to feed the animals. Self-sufficiency rates are likely to be significantly lower than anticipated, and Japan's involvement in the world farm economy concomitantly greater. This valuable little book concludes with a brief summary of how Japan, along with other net importers, and the major food exporters, may best come to terms with this fact. That is to say, what future international arrangements for trade in food are, in his opinion, optimum.

University of Sheffield D. W. ANTHONY

Australia in Peace and War: External Relations 1788-1977. By T. B. Millar. *London: Hurst. 1978. 578 pp. £13·50.*

WHENEVER it was that Australia began to have a foreign policy, its external relations began at the time of the first settlement. Dr. Tom Millar provides here a comprehensive account of the history of these external relations, something which no one previously has tried to do. There are sections on the attitudes of the pre-federation colonies to defence, immigration and trade; on the British or imperial phase, federal Australia's external relations 1901-39; on the crisis of the Second World War; on the ' American ' phase 1945-72; and on the ' Whitlam experiment ' of 1972-75 and its aftermath. There are chapters on relations with particular countries and areas and also on the making of foreign-policy decisions, on immigration and on the Australian states as international actors.

Specialists in archival research, to whom this book is clearly not addressed, will complain that much of what is said about the earlier periods rests on secondary sources. Radicals will note that Dr. Millar sees no need to attend to what Marxists have said about Australian foreign policy and speaks of ' ideologically inclined ' governments as if they had existed only on the Left (and as if belief in an ideology were some kind of unfortunate mental disability). Academic purists will complain that too much of this book is exposition for the general reader and that no profound or novel thesis is investigated.

But Mr. Millar brings to this subject a deep knowledge and a broad perspective. In dealing with many aspects of it—defence, UN affairs, the Commonwealth, the role of Lord Casey—he is drawing on his own previous writings. He has a more than merely bookish knowledge of Australian foreign policy because of his long and close involvement as a commentator upon policy in the making. There is a mass of information and of practical guidance for students of the subject, an underlying structure of sound common sense, and there are many penetrating observations.

Dr. Millar notes, for example, that Deakin's proposal of 1909, that the United States should extend the Monroe Doctrine to all the countries around the Pacific, exemplified a recurrent tendency to put forward an idea ' which at first flush in the eucalyptus retreat of Melbourne or Canberra looked eminently reasonable, but which failed entirely to take into account the viewpoints and preoccupations of the people to whom it was directed ' (p. 107). He thinks that Australians are mainly conservative, conformist and hedonistic; that their foreign policy has consisted mainly of reactions to events elsewhere; and that Australia—no longer the junior partner of Britain or America, and not wanted as a partner by Japan or ASEAN—is more isolated than it has ever been before.

Balliol College, Oxford HEDLEY BULL

Politics in New Zealand: A Reader. Edited by Stephen Levine. *London: Allen and Unwin. 1978. 437pp. £10·95. Pb: £5·95.*

THIS collection of articles for use in university courses, teachers' colleges, and polytechnics in New Zealand is a good introduction to both the country and the profession of political science there. The twenty-nine contributors include a cross-section of lecturers in politics and a sample of graduate students at work, as well as three politicians, two civil servants and a journalist. The product of their labours—thirty-four essays, all, except two, specially commissioned—is almost a monument to the growth of the New Zealand Political Studies Association. The editor, the co-author of a book on the 1975 General Election, contributes the results of a 1976 opinion survey of New Zealand political science students who were asked to comment on their own political system and political parties, and to assess the effects of being exposed to courses in politics. These results showed that students were demoralised by the inculcation of scepticism—' creating for them a political isolation which political science does little to bridge ' (p. 364).

This volume helps to place the juxtaposition of more scholarly research and more student scepticism in its context. The authors all concentrate on the period since Mr. Kirk's Labour government came to power in 1972. At the centre of all their accounts is the election of Mr. Robert Muldoon as leader of the National Party in July 1974 and his subsequent victory at the polls in 1975. They are all able to compare the brief period of Labour Party power with subsequent events. Their writings of course fall short of Mr. Muldoon's second victory in November 1978 which they could not have anticipated, but the book does contain details of the redistribution of parliamentary seats in 1977 which was the most extensive revision of boundaries since 1946. Nobody foresaw that with five more seats to contest, the Labour Party would obtain a slightly larger share of the votes cast but still lose the election. The editor's second contribution to this book is an account of the by-election in 1976 at Nelson where Labour held the seat with an increased majority. Not surprisingly, the leader of the Social Credit Party's contribution to this collection is a plea for proportional representation.

Is ' the style ' of Mr. Muldoon compatible with what the editor calls the aim of political science ' to civilise the exercise of choice by citizens and governments alike ' (p. 364)? John Henderson organises Mr. Muldoon's beliefs into an ' operational code ' and shows that his pragmatism means outspokenness and aggression with little reference to expert advice (pp. 367–82). It might be better to select essays from this book for a first reading by following the theme of Mr. Muldoon's impact rather than the editor's groupings into seven sections. If I were re-reading this collection, I would certainly begin with Keith Jackson's account of leadership in the National Party (pp. 161–81), then move to his essay on the Cabinet (pp. 63–77), and go through the

section on Parliament before looking at Chris Wilkes on television (pp. 207–21) and Robert Gregory on broadcasting (pp. 427–37). This sequence would be closer to the Muldoon theme. His campaign slogan was, ' New Zealand—the way you want it '.

Readers of this journal should be warned that apart from Juliet Lodge on the European Community and Mary Ensor on the agricultural sector's search for reform in wool marketing, these essays do not carry a strong emphasis on foreign policy, not even Mr. Muldoon's. There are two short essays on defence and on the select committee on foreign affairs. The compilation appears to have been completed before the appointment of the Plimmer Committee on foreign service administration and therefore long before the proposed reforms for managing an ' overseas service ' were put into effect. The absence of an index makes it difficult to find a reference quickly.

Birkbeck College, London J. M. LEE

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Economies and Societies in Latin America: A Geographical Interpretation. By Peter R. Odell and David A. Preston. 2nd edn. *Chichester, New York: Wiley. 1978. (First publ. 1973.) 289 pp. £10·00.*

THE appearance of a second edition of Odell and Preston's book five years after the first, reflects both the high quality of the original and the dynamism of social and economic change in Latin America. The authors present a useful background to, and skilful portrait of, contemporary Latin America. Their discussion of the contemporary scene combines a perceptive outline of major trends in the development of the continent with apposite use of detailed case studies.

This new edition is no mere updating of a few statistics. It has clearly been carefully re-worked, with a polishing of phraseology and the addition of small sections for clarification or to indicate recent trends. Some concessions are made to new jargon and current fashion—for example the substitution (though not consistently) of ' Afro-American ' or ' black ' for negro. Several more substantial sections have been incorporated, dealing with topics such as minifundia, the Green Revolution, and the development of Brazilian Amazonia. The themes of migration and economic integration now merit separate chapters, the former consisting of new material and the latter of the amplification and updating of a section of the first edition. Some, though not all, statistics have been updated to circa 1973, and the useful bibliographies to each chapter incorporate material up to 1977. The substantial number of maps have been re-drawn and a dozen new ones added. In general these improve on the first edition, though a few have not been well reproduced. One criticism of the maps is that the date to which they refer is not always given, a factor which may account for some of the interesting but unexplained discrepancies between some maps in the two editions. Indeed one would almost welcome an appendix explaining some of the changes to maps and text between the two editions; on the other hand they provide a source of speculation and interpretation for the reader!

This is overall an excellent book—for academic, politician, businessman or general reader—as a succinct and up-to-date portrayal of a continent in process of change, and as a source of suggested (and sometimes provocative) policy strategies. If one flaw persists from the first edition, it derives from the book's greatest strength, namely the careful and relevant use of detailed case studies. For these the authors draw on their substantial first-hand knowledge of parts of Latin America. In consequence the examples draw heavily on the central and northern Andes, and Middle America, so that exemplification from the Antilles, Brazil and the ' Southern cone ' is more limited in quantity and quality. A similar comment might apply to the otherwise

excellent photographs; if illustrations enhance the text, they should surely not be limited to examples from Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia.

University of Liverpool JOHN P. DICKENSON

Mexican Democracy: A Critical View. Rev. edn. By Kenneth F. Johnson. *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 267 pp. £10·25. Pb: £3·50.*

KENNETH JOHNSON'S revised edition of *Mexican Democracy* aims at de-masking the cynicism and corruption which lie at the heart of Mexico's ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Together with its two antecedents, the PRI has governed Mexico without a break for almost forty years, and claims exclusive rights to the political inheritance of the savage Mexican Revolution (1910–17). Official opposition is confined to three, small, ideologically moderate parties, but the most successful one, the Partido Acíón Nacional (PAN), is systematically prevented from establishing an electoral-territorial base by PRI vote-rigging.

Johnson eschews the rigorous social science approach in favour of a rewarding humanistic treatment which sets Mexican politics in the context of national history and culture. He draws heavily on the creative and reflective writings of Carlos Fuentes, Octavio Paz and Oscar Monroy Rivera and argues that the PRI is ' a pyramid of power ', wielded by the dominant class as an instrument for its own financial benefit. The symbol of the pyramid is related back to the Aztec period, while the Mexican president is compared to the Tlatoani or Aztec high priest. Hence the government's premeditated slaughter of students at Tlatelolco, on the eve of the Olympic Games in 1968, is interpreted as a secular version of an Aztec sacrificial ritual. But now the president has ceased to be a proud Tlatoani; he has degenerated into an *enano*, a dictator dwarf, who survives by cloak-and-dagger tactics.

The essence of Mexican politics, according to Johnson, is paternalism and mass manipulation. The government allows token opposition to create a facade of democracy, but ' without real opposition, without a genuine win, the PRI must use rhetoric to a maximum as a means of symbol manipulation in the hope that popular allegiance will follow ' (p. 46). Looking beyond the political system, Johnson contends that ' surfaces deceive, ostensible happiness and outward professions of a commitment to change and progress are in fact masks to hide the war of all against all raging in Mexican society ' (p. vi).

This is a thoroughly up-to-date and skilful analysis of Mexican political life, which deals effectively with the presidency, opposition parties and guerrilla groups, and examines case studies from the American border region, as well as the question of illegal Mexican emigration to the United States. Johnson demonstrates how the PRI feeds off the civil service by filling bogus posts with its own appointees, and he portrays the presidential succession as settled not by osmosis—the popular interpretation—but by presidential fiat.

It is annoying to encounter the same phrase carried over from one chapter to the other; and surely it is incorrect to call *ejidos* ' collective farms ', since so many are in individual cultivation. But a more significant problem lies in Johnson's argument that the PAN may make inroads into the PRI pyramid through municipal elections (possibly a correct conclusion), without examining local politics at all. Moreover, the author says nothing about radical *priistas*, except that a group has recently been purged from the influential daily, *Excelsior*, and has created the left-wing weekly *Proceso*. It would be interesting to have a more thorough evaluation of the potential of ' non-conformists ' as a catalyst for change within the PRI. Finally, Mexican society is never brought into focus with sufficient clarity for the reader to be able to judge

whether corruption is confined to the PRI or whether it is endemic to Mexican life in general.

Kenneth Johnson has written an interesting book which gets to the core of Mexican politics. It is also refreshing to read an author who does not depict dependency as the culprit for all Latin America's ills, though his underplaying of the American presence in the Mexican economy will surprise most social scientists. More astounding still is Johnson's allusion to the possible absorption of Mexico by the United States as a solution to Mexican political corruption. This is an extraordinary proposition in view of his own reminder to American readers of Mexicans's justifiable dislike of *gringos*, engendered by past American political depredations which have involved land seizure, and diplomatic intrigue.

University of Liverpool COLIN G. CLARKE

U.S. Policy in the Caribbean. By John Bartlow Martin. *Boulder, Col.: Westview Press. 1978. 420 pp. $19.00*

AS the United States learns to live with the new Caribbean it is doing so piecemeal, and it is not doing it very quickly. Yet the Caribbean forms about a fifth of the United States' borders, and twice in the last two decades changes there have forced a drastic reappraisal of the United States' strategic, economic and political interests; the first, in 1959, at the time of the Cuban Revolution, and the second, in 1973, with the world oil crisis and the great recession that followed. In this Twentieth Century Fund Essay, Professor Martin, formerly United States ambassador to the Dominican Republic and now professor at the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, was commissioned to examine and report on the problems of the area as a whole, and to make recommendations for an overall policy for the area.

The bulk of the book consists of, after a very brief historical introduction, an analysis of the foreign policies in the area of the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon-Ford administrations. Professor Martin is critical both of the activist policies of the Kennedy period, whose cornerstone, the Alliance for Progress, he observes today ' seems almost as old-fashioned and irrelevant as the charge up San Juan Hill ' (p. 112), and of the Nixon-Ford ' low profile ', which in Latin America ' worked out to simple neglect ' (p. 250). Today, as he observes, the Caribbean states are indeed conducting a ' new dialogue ', but with the Third World and not with the United States. ' It is the underlying thesis of this book ', he tells his American audience, ' that the United States has vitally important economic, political, and strategic interests in the Caribbean; that we have neglected the Caribbean for at least a decade; that during that time much of the Caribbean has been transforming itself radically; that it has been detaching itself from us politically and making economic demands upon us, some of them legitimate, to which we have responded inadequately; and that it is now time to adopt a whole new set of Caribbean policies ' (p. 277).

To normalise relations with Cuba and conclude a new Canal treaty with Panama he sees as the *sine qua non* of those policies. Politically the United States needs a friendly Caribbean which will be an example of its good will to the rest of the world; economically the Caribbean is bound to remain linked to the United States but only in a relation of mutual self-interest will both sides be content. This means a special relationship—if necessary distinct from that with South America—entrusted to a special deputy assistant secretary of state, advised by a long-range planning group, backed by better liaison with Congress, and where necessary by new agencies to handle relations with statist economies. This relationship would involve both aid and trade on terms better for the Caribbean states, co-operation on a wide range of common projects, and better control of ambassadors, the CIA and the multinational

corporations. In this lively and well-written book there is much besides that is interesting and provocative, and it is certainly timely.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

The Caribbean Yearbook of International Relations (1975). Edited by Leslie F. Manigat. *Leiden: Sijthoff for the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies/Trinidad and Tobago. 1976. 673 pp.*

THIS Yearbook ostensibly commemorates the Tenth Anniversary of the University of the West Indies Institute of International Relations, a body devoted to the teaching, research and study of international relations in the Caribbean. Professor Manigat, his editorial associates (among them S. S. Ramphal, Alister McIntyre, William Demas and Professor Ralph Carnegie) and publishers are to be complimented on having produced an original and significant work in a complicated field—original in that it treats of a field ' still undeveloped to a large extent ' (p. 3); significant in that it adds to our understanding of international relations a new dimension originating from within the Caribbean basin.

In scope and structure it is a genuine Yearbook. In scope it encompasses comparative analyses of the foreign policies of Caribbean states; Caribbean bilateral and multilateral relations with major metropolitan powers and institutions such as the United States, Britain, France and the EEC; co-operation and conflict within the Caribbean area; dilemmas of the small states of the Caribbean, Latin America and the Third World in the international system; and Caribbean economies viewed from an international perspective.

In terms of structure, Henry Gill's ' Chronology of Events Related to the International Relations of Countries in and around the Caribbean for the year 1975 ' in Part 1 represents a unique feature of the Caribbean Yearbook and is difficult to fault as a factual summary of particular historical development. But such an article is perhaps inherently arbitrary in the criteria for selection of events since there seems to be no standardised procedure, no hard and fast rules as to which events should be selected and which rejected. The only guarantee as to proper selection here seems to be the skill and discretion of the ordinary observer.

Manigat's article ' The Year 1975 in perspective ' charts the course by which the Caribbean has emerged on the international scene since the late 1950s. It usefully delineates differences between ethocultural, geo-historic and socio-economic conceptions of the Caribbean. While Manigat adequately describes the geographic, historic and socio-economic foundations of Caribbean foreign policies, he does not however sufficiently emphasise the significance of external factors on the foreign policies of Caribbean states, comprising a highly penetrated subsystem within the wider Latin American regional system. Manigat is perhaps at his best as he discusses the eclipse of the traditional model of the Caribbean as an American ' lake ' or ' preserve ' and advances with ' cautious optimism ' his belief in the advent of a new model (pp. 78-102). His reflections on centripetal and centrifugal forces operating for and against regional unity are also instructive. His discourse on solutions for regional underdevelopment however never evidences historic similarities between the economic programmes of Arbenz's Guatemala and Castro's Cuba in the early days of the revolution (p. 83). And moreover in his hasty demolition of the traditional model he glosses over the reversals in Guyana (which he even calls British Guiana p. 81) between 1953 and 1975, the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1964, the neutralisation of Chile's Allende regime in 1973, the recent allegations of attempts at destabilisation and possible economic constraints imposed by exogenous forces on regional development as a political price of the new model. Another

drawback lies in Professor Manigat's failure to draw any meaningful conclusion from his analysis save that the Caribbean at present needs most of all a regional leadership ' capable de maitriser la conjoncture ' (p. 137). Such a conclusion is surprising not so much because it suggests a call for regional caudillism but because of Professor Manigat's earlier allusion to ' the new policy of initiative taking at world scale,' (p. 56). On balance, however, Manigat's contribution constitutes an excellent, introductory synoptic survey of Caribbean international relations, scrupulously fair but marred on occasion by the repetitiveness and obscurity of the language.

The Caribbean—United States relationship receives further treatment in Part II in ' The View from the Top: United States Perspectives and Attribution of Roles in the Global System 1945-1968 ' by Vaughan Lewis. The article however contains certain methodological weaknesses connected with its lack of proper conceptual guidelines and the author's selective use of contemporary statements by American officials to illustrate America's definition of its commitments to countries in both the developed industrial world and the Third World (p. 142), and to show how the United States (in accordance with its role as the dominant power of the period) developed a particular language or vocabulary of politics to describe and legitimate its activities. This approach implicitly raises (although Lewis eventually skirts) wider but crucial questions as to the nature of the relationship between language, legitimacy and political activity. At another level, the use of various official statements to explain American foreign policy, as with Truman's ' I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures ', represents a failure to distinguish between the declaratory and operational aspects of policy.

The history of American domination of the region is further highlighted by Professor Manigat's ' Haiti's shift from French Hegemony to the American sphere of influence at the beginning of the twentieth century ' which authoritatively traces the political and economic misfortunes of Haiti before the First World War and eventual American preponderance over British, French and German interests. Manigat well demonstrates the linkage between American financial and economic preponderance and the military intervention resulting in the American occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934, and the era of open and unchallenged American predominance (p. 208).

' Chaguaramas Revisited ' by Carl Parris represents a persuasive and well-written piece in which the author contends that the Trinidad and Tobago government in its approach to the Anglo-American condominium vis-à-vis the base at Chaguaramas had three options: one, acceptance of a foreign military base on its soil, the position adopted by the Federal Government; two, live with the American presence but negotiate more reasonable terms for their presence; three, seek the release of Chaguaramas for the site of the Federal Government Headquarters. In all, it remains an interesting article particularly in view of the scheduled American withdrawal of its Naval Facility in Barbados in March 1979.

Outstanding among the legal and economic articles is ' The Legal Order of the Lomé Convention ', by Amechi Uchegbu. Uchegbu in his legal analysis argues that the Lomé Convention wrought a fundamental change in the international economic relations between capital importing and capital exporting countries thereby expanding the province of international economic law by obligating the contracting parties to accept certain principles, such as non-reciprocity and other principles governing the operation of Stabex, as being subject to legal regulation. The establishment of close intra-ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) co-operation and ACP-EEC collaboration manifestly contributed to international economic co-operation. Interestingly, Uchegbu points out that aid in general, and Stabex in particular, could erode the pretention of non-alignment among certain developing countries.

In Part III ' The Policy of Venezuela towards the Caribbean ' by Demetrios

Boersner and ' Conflict in Trinidad and Tobago Relations with Venezuela ' by H. S. Gill represent contrasting views on Venezuela/Trinidad and Tobago relations. Professor Boersner, a literary rather than a scientific historian, chronicles the history of Venezuela and the Caribbean before and after Columbus. He envisages the development not of imperialism but growing brotherhood and co-operation among all the old and new nations in the Caribbean region (p. 463), but this is at best a cosmetic exercise. On the other hand, Gill's article ranges over a wide terrain covering trade, absence of shipping and communication links, similarity of production lines and high protective tariffs imposed by Spanish speaking countries on industrial imports, migration, territorial claims, smuggling, the Antillean surtax, and the dispute over fishing in the Gulf of Paria. Despite the problems inhering in these areas, Gill concludes that there are still some areas of co-operation remaining and Dr. Williams's efforts have not been entirely in vain. Gill's article by and large is comprehensive, sober, systematic and informed in its treatment of Venezuela/Trinidad and Tobago relations, and remains impervious to the challenge of substantive criticism,

In summary, this volume represents a worthy contribution to the study and research of international relations. It remains only to be pointed out that it contains much that is factual resumè but is relatively short on analytical propositions and theoretical considerations. Another shortcoming is that while the authors consider myriads of issues relating to the emergence of the Caribbean on the international scene, there is a deafening silence as to the role played by Caribbean States in international institutions, such as the UN, the OAS, the Commonwealth, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Inter-American Development Bank, UNCTAD, UNCLOS, and the ILO. Here, Caribbean States caucus actively and form a distinct sub-group within the larger Latin-American group. The Caribbean position in the new international economic order is also given rather short shrift (p. 54). These then are perhaps the more serious omissions of the volume. Nevertheless, the first Yearbook is an impressive work.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge CALEB M. PILGRIM

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

The World of Learning 1978-79. Vols I and II. 29th edn. *London. Europa. 1979. 2,038 pp. £28·00.*

THIS is the only directory which gives detailed and up-to-date information on the cultural, educational, and scientific institutions of the world. It opens with a section dealing with some 400 international organisations and then proceeds country by country from Afghanistan to Zambia. The present edition contains entries for the institutions of higher education which have been re-opened in China.

Chatham House D. H.

Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice. 5th edn. Edited by Lord Gore-Booth. *London: Longman. 1979. 544 pp. £14·95.*

OVER twenty years have passed since the last edition of Satow and during this time many small countries have achieved independence, international organisations have multiplied, economics and commerce have become increasingly important and terrorism and violence increasingly prevalent. In addition, during the 1960s three important conferences were held in Vienna at which much of the international law governing diplomatic practice, which had been laid down at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, was revised. Lord Gore-Booth, who is a former Head of the British diplomatic

service, has therefore had to make considerable revisions, alterations and additions to the fourth edition. Nevertheless the pattern remains the same and devotees of earlier editions will still feel quite at home.

Chatham House D. H.

The Far East and Australia 1978–79: A Survey and Directory of Asia and the Pacific. *London: Europa. 1978. 1,311 pp. £26·50.*

THIS annual is one of a series on different parts of the world produced by Europa publications. Part I contains eight articles on population, religion and economic problems, part 2 gives up-to-date information on regional organisations and part 3, which has nearly a thousand pages, is a country-by-country survey and directory. The whole is well produced and easy to handle and should be a useful addition to reference libraries which deal with queries about Asia from the general public or business firms.

Chatham House D. H.

Human Rights: International Documents. 3 Vols. By James Avery Joyce. *Alphen der Rijn: Sijthoff and Noordhoff. 1978. 1,707 pp. Fl.245.00 for 3 vols.*

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THE OIL PRICE IN PERSPECTIVE *

Mohammed Abu al Khail **

This article by the Saudi Finance and Economic Minister looks at the world energy situation from the point of view of the oil producers. The response of the Western industrial oil consuming countries is examined in the article which follows.

MUCH has been written about the rise in oil prices since 1973, the effects of this on economic activity and inflation in oil importing countries, and the implications of continuing oil price increases for the future health of the world economy. Not all of this discussion has, however, taken proper account of the longer-run availability of the oil resource and the need for a proper balance of the interests of both oil producers and oil users and indeed of the interests of the world as a whole. The purpose of this article is to review the questions posed above from these viewpoints, together with the policies followed by the oil exporting countries in facilitating international adjustment to higher levels of oil prices.

The Situation before 1973–74

The world oil situation in the years preceding the recent increases in oil prices was marked by a number of features. The oil industry had, of course, been long dominated by major international companies that have derived their power from their vertically integrated operations and from joint ventures and interlocking directorates in one or more of the integrated stages of the industry. Moreover, they had the backing, directly or indirectly, of the political and economic power of their respective governments. They controlled exploration and production of crude oil and, through their control over transportation and refining, the distribution and marketing of the products. The major companies co-operated closely in the making of decisions concerning price and supply; until the growth of the independents and the wider prevalence of arm's-length sales, the ability of the major companies to price their products within the integrated system was unquestioned.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the oil price remained at what should now be generally viewed as low levels. This was the period of an extraordinary pace of exploration and development of oil, particularly in the Middle East and

* Most of the statistical information has been derived from IMF sources, such as *International Financial Statistics*, *Annual Reports* and *Direction of Trade*.

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North Africa. At the same time demand was buoyant. Postwar reconstruction and economic development efforts created rapidly growing markets for energy in many areas. The low price enabled oil to maintain a competitive edge over substitute energy sources and to make rapid gains at the expense of coal in these markets. The major companies considered it to be in their interest, particularly after the dispute over the control of the Suez Canal in 1956–57, to expand supply potential, as this lessened their dependence on any one particular area and strengthened their bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the governments of the producing countries. Moreover, a concessionaire company is not expected to take a long view; to it the present value of any oil that might be left in the ground in the distant future is necessarily very low. Because of the growing energy demand, maintenance of low prices for oil greatly expanded the volume of sales, increasing total profits.

Production and demand reinforced each other; the easy availability of oil was no doubt an important factor in making it possible for the European countries and Japan to stage a dramatic recovery and expansion in their economies within a short period after the Second World War. And there evolved a life-style in the industrial societies that was based substantially on the abundance and cheapness of oil.

Towards the end of the 1950s several new developments occurred that upset the calculations and the pricing policy of the major companies. The more important among these were the rising number and growing strength of independent companies in the world oil market, mandatory import controls in the United States virtually closing that market to increased supplies of foreign oil, and the impact of oil exports from the Soviet bloc, and particularly the Soviet Union, to Western Europe. Oil was being widely sold at substantial discounts below posted prices, particularly by independents who found their American market outlets closed off. The governments of the importing countries saw little justification for the majors charging their affiliates the posted prices; for the companies themselves a reduction was needed to maintain their share of the market and bolster profits. On the other hand, the interest of the oil exporting countries was to freeze posted prices, because on these were based the taxes and royalties owing to them. In February 1959 the companies chose to cut the price of Middle Eastern oil without consulting with the governments concerned; and despite the uproar that this caused, they made a further unilateral reduction in the price in August 1960.

This prompted the formation of OPEC in the following month. While these price cuts dramatised the need for a concerted stand against the decline of prices and hence of government revenues, there were other factors which had by that time brought the exporting countries closer together. Most of these countries were dissatisfied with their concession agreements—which they considered to be inequitable and to have been granted in many cases under duress, and they sought ways of amending them. At the same time political and other leaders in these countries were becoming increasingly conscious of

the importance and irreplaceable character of their hydrocarbon resources, and the crucial role that oil revenues must play in the development of their economies and the improvement of the living standards of their people.

OPEC's achievements in the next few years were rather modest. It prevented a further decline in the posted prices; for the next ten years these prices remained at the August 1960 level, or some 12 per cent below the 1958 level. The rise in export prices of industrial countries between 1958 and 1970 was over 15 per cent, so that the real value of crude oil and of per barrel government revenues declined during this period by some 25 per cent or more. The purchasing power of oil revenues in terms of development equipment fell even more sharply, for the prices of imported capital goods rose a good deal faster than general import prices in this period.

Under conditions of excess productive capacity the buyers' market continued well into the late 1960s, and efforts by OPEC to secure increases in the posted prices of crude were of no avail. The OPEC countries had not at that time acquired sufficient political authority and cohesion among themselves to push through their claims. Market prices began to firm up after June 1967 when several factors—including the transformation of the Suez Canal into a military frontier—began to pose difficulties for oil purchasers. However, despite supply problems and an upsurge of demand for oil products that was beyond expectations, posted prices remained unchanged until 1970–71 when Libya's successful negotiations with the oil companies set in motion negotiations by other oil exporting countries. These and the following years saw a gathering strength among these countries as the withdrawal of foreign power and foreign military presence was completed, and as their divisions began to be narrowed. The long era of cheap oil and a buyers' market came to an end. At long last the producing countries began to exercise legitimate control over the use of their own resource. The price of oil, as is well known, rose in several stages over 1971–73 and quite sharply at the beginning of 1974.

The Wasted Respite 1974–79

The period before 1974 was one of unbridled optimism concerning oil. For the consuming countries there was no thought of an energy crisis in even the distant future to be brought about by the diminishing supply of oil. The near-term situation of excess supply did not encourage a stocktaking for later years. As the growth of demand had for years been more than compensated by the growth of supply, the possibility of an energy gap was, if anything, an academic curiosity. It must also be added that the producing countries for their part cannot be totally absolved of their share of the responsibility. Even allowing for their diverse circumstances and interests, and their political situation and weak bargaining power, they lost valuable time in controlling the operations of the oil companies in their countries and asserting their interests in the determination of the price.

The succession of events leading to the 1974 price increase brought about a much-needed, although belated, awakening to the facts of life of world oil. There have been numerous assessments since then of the demand and supply arithmetic of oil. These assessments are necessarily tentative, depending on the many assumptions that must be made for the future years. On the demand side, there are the questions of the rate of growth of the economies of the oil importing countries, of the energy coefficient of growth—which would depend on conservation measures as well as the development of technology—and of progress in bringing to fruition plans to develop substitute energy sources. All of these raise complex issues not only with respect to new investment and scientific innovations, but also with respect to ecological and safety considerations.

On the supply side there are the questions of a correct estimation of existing oil reserves and, on the basis of geological assessments and probability calculations, of the rate of discovery of new proven reserves to stretch the life-span of world oil. There is, further, an important consideration, very often ignored as a factor of any consequence in the deliberations of western analysts, concerning how rapidly the oil producing countries themselves should allow the depletion of their oil resource. While each new discovery of oil potential, whether in Mexico or in China, creates a new burst of optimism and complacency, more realistic estimates inevitably point to the existence of limits in ultimate reserves which assures a transition period of only a short number of years before a global energy balance depending substantially less on oil must be attained. Many of the functions that are now performed by oil, functions that are critical for the economic machinery that the world has built over centuries—for its industrial and agricultural growth and for modern societies, however organised—will have to be performed in the not too distant future by other and newer energy sources.

Looked at from this perspective, reflecting the hard facts of world demand and supply, what should be the appropriate price for oil? The economic range within which the price should be set is a very wide one, with the lower limit defined by the cost of production and the upper limit by the cost of producing alternatives to oil. It is this wide range that has created confusion in the minds of people who believe that the price of oil in recent years has not followed the hallowed rules of demand and supply. Until 1970 the price was closer to the lower limit although well above that level, but considering the particular characteristics of oil, it should have been at or near the upper limit. The 1973-74 price corrections therefore had to be of a somewhat drastic character, being the first decisive attempt by the oil exporting countries to set things in the right direction. It was an attempt to begin the process of removing the longstanding distortion of the oil price *vis-à-vis* prices of other commodities, to signal the need for conservation and the efficient use of oil resources, and to pave the way for a concerted drive to close the gap between longer-term energy needs and their supply through the development of other energy sources.

In the four years following 1974, the OPEC countries exercised considerable restraint in their price policy, even at the cost of their own interests, in order to afford the consuming countries the time necessary for the required adjustments. Between 1973 and the end of 1977, the price of oil barely kept up with other prices, the real value of oil remaining steady or falling somewhat. In 1978 its real value fell sharply as the dollar price of oil remained relatively stable in the face of world inflation and the falling value of the American currency. There have been increases in the price in the current year and, as a consequence of the adjustment in June 1979, for the first time since 1974 the oil price has risen relative to the increase in other prices over the same period.

Unfortunately, the breathing spell offered by the four years since 1974 of a fall in the real value of oil did not foster a sense of urgency in the large oil using countries to take the necessary steps to curb their voracious appetite for oil. Instead, in many countries, it revived to some degree the easy complacency of the previous era—and valuable time has thus been lost in setting firmly the fundamentals of a viable energy policy. Rather, the governments of importing countries have sought temporary palliatives by bringing pressures on the oil exporters to raise existing capacity to meet their consumers' relatively unrestrained demand. Immediate exigencies have continued to hold sway over longer-run interests. Nevertheless, perhaps the events of 1979 will create an impetus towards achieving a satisfactory international energy policy.

The Economic Effects of the 1974 Oil Price Increase

The 1973-74 increases in the price of oil understandably caused a tremor throughout the oil importing countries. In the confusion of those days, there was endless talk of the approaching doom for Western civilisation as the industrial world would have to make a rapid transfer of a large part of its wealth into the hands of a few, largely small and undeveloped, countries that would not know how to use responsibly their newly acquired affluence and the considerable power that it would give. Five years later, one hears little of these doomsday fantasies.

This is not to say that the rise in the oil price did not have its effects or that the adjustments in the importing countries to new, considerably higher, oil prices have been completed. Take, for instance, the question whether the oil price rise of 1974 made it substantially harder to control inflation in the oil importing countries.

It has no doubt affected the structure of prices—indeed this was a desirable change in so far as it removed previous distortions and brought the new set of prices into closer conformity with the real value of petroleum products. This effect is not very different from that of an upward adjustment from an artificially low level in the price of capital to reflect its scarcity in an economy, or in the price of an important consumer good such as bread from a very low subsidised level. What gives an oil price increase particular significance is that

it affects a large number of countries at the same time and that the use of oil is pervasive in the processes of production and consumption. On the other hand, from the point of view of an efficient use of resources, it was necessary for the oil price to be increased relative to other prices.

It is nevertheless true that the impact of the 1974 oil price increase on the general rate of inflation ran its course within a year or two in most countries. The prices of goods and services that used petroleum as a source of energy or as a raw material were marked up to reflect most, if not all, of the increased costs. The indirect effects, namely pressure for higher wages in response to higher consumer prices resulting from the oil price increase, are more difficult to trace. Consumer prices have been affected by various other factors in the periods both prior to, and subsequent to, the oil price increase. These factors have had considerably more pronounced effects on consumer prices than the oil price increase, and the main motivation for wage push—where this was a strong element in the spiralling of inflation—would appear to lie in the general factors sustaining inflation rather than in the specific matter of the price of oil.

Inflationary forces were already very strong before 1974, both in the industrial and in the developing countries. The upsurge in global demand in 1972-73 came on top of an inflationary momentum which had been in existence for a number of years and which had its primary source in American fiscal policy in the late 1960s. Public attitudes and institutional practices became geared to an assured expectation of continuing advances in costs, prices, and rates of remuneration. The policies followed by governments to mitigate inflation were inadequate to cope with these forces, and the rate of inflation reached a high level during 1973. It rose further in 1974 and 1975, and the oil price increase was an element—but not a major one—in this rise. In the three following years 1975-78 the average inflation rate of about 7 per cent in the industrial countries remained below that of 1973, although it was still unacceptably high. The relatively slow rise, and later the virtual freezing of oil prices in this period contributed, if anything, to moderating the forces of inflation, which were fuelled by a complex of factors including institutional rigidities.

Has the higher oil price contributed to the slow pace of economic recovery in the industrial world, or hindered the economic development efforts of the non-oil developing countries, or disrupted the functioning of the monetary system? Various incomplete arguments have been advanced tending to answer these questions in the affirmative. We shall look at them in turn.

One argument is that the oil price increase has exerted a deflationary force on aggregate demand. At first sight this appears to be a plausible analysis. This argument runs as follows: after the increase consumers in the importing nations pay higher prices for energy and, given that demand for petroleum products does not respond significantly, if at all, to price changes, they therefore purchase less of other goods. These cutbacks in purchases spread through the economy, having their effects on sales, output and jobs, all of

which are reduced in the consumer goods industries. These initial reductions in turn cause further reductions in demand, output, and employment through the familiar multiplier process.

There were also other arguments pointing to further worldwide disturbing effects of the oil price increase. The aggregate current account surplus of the oil exporting countries implied an equivalent deficit for the importers. However, individual countries might not wish or might find it difficult to maintain these deficits—indeed some countries might regard as unwise the incurrence of substantial debt to finance the deficit. Further, the recycling of funds from OPEC countries is unlikely to match up with the distribution of deficits among the non-OPEC countries—so that not all countries are able to borrow, or if able, to borrow on reasonable terms. Attempts by such countries to reduce their deficits by reducing non-oil imports or expanding exports to other oil consuming countries might improve their trade balance, but only by worsening the trade balance of others. Such attempts do not help international adjustment and, if followed generally, they would lead the world down the path of a progressive reduction of effective demand and of world trade.

The fear has also been expressed that the surplus of the OPEC countries might pose a threat to the stability of the international monetary order. Over a short period, it was forecast in 1974, a substantial proportion of the liquid reserves of the world would be owned and controlled by a few countries. They would thus be in a position to shift the funds around between money centres in ways that might cause serious disruption in the world monetary system.

So much for the arguments as to the disturbing effects of the oil price increase. The fact is that events since 1974 have lent little support to these arguments and have belied the gloomy prognostications. A crucial assumption behind them was that the oil exporting countries, being undeveloped, would have little productive use for their newly acquired wealth. Consequently they would continue to accumulate their growing surplus revenue—which then would represent a threat to world demand and to the adjustment of international payments. In mid-1974 a World Bank estimate placed OPEC's investable surplus in 1980 at some $650 billion. Several other estimates at that time also pointed to very large cumulative building of OPEC assets. In fact, however, it has turned out that, if the current account positions of the major oil exporters are aggregated, the cumulative surplus is of the order of $185 billion over the period 1974-78 (see table below). Of particular interest is the fact that the aggregate surplus on the current account of this group of countries fell from some $68 billion in 1974 to as low as $7 billion in 1978.

If we look at the development of official reserves, the total of such reserves held by major oil exporting countries amounted to about $13 billion at the end of 1973; this figure rose to some $56 billion at the end of 1978, an increase of $43 billion over a period of five years. The share of these countries' reserves in

the total of world reserves rose from about 7 per cent at end-1973 to 16·5 per cent at end-1978—certainly not a disproportionate increase when account is taken of the relatively rapid growth for the economies of these countries. The share of the total imports of these countries in the world total has, for example, more than doubled in these years, from 3·7 per cent in 1973 to 7·8 per cent in 1977.

Payments Balances on Current Account, 1973-78
(In billions of US dollars)

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Major oil exporting countries	7	68	35	40	33	7
Other developing countries	—11	—30	—38	—26	—21	—32
Industrial countries	19	— 4	23	5	— 1	29

More will be said about these developments in the oil exporting countries in the following section. The point that needs to be emphasised here is that, as the increased earnings of the oil exporters were used to purchase a larger volume of goods and services from other countries, the initial deflationary effect on demand as a result of the rise in oil prices in these countries was offset by the subsequent growth of demand for their products. Similarly, as higher outpayments on account of oil brought in their wake higher receipts from exports of goods and services, the problem of payments adjustment did not arise.

Moreover, by comparing the current account surplus and the reserves increase for the OPEC countries it can be seen that as much as four-fifths of the current account surplus was offset by an outflow through the capital account of the balance of payments. These were capital exports from the oil producing countries to the rest of the world, whether through purchases of longer-term assets or through loans. These capital exports not only helped the receiving countries to finance their current account deficits, but those governments and individuals who came to be in possession of the funds increased their own demand for goods and services—thus neutralising the initial dampening effect on demand induced by the oil price rise.

The development of the current account balances of various groups of countries presented in nominal terms, as in the preceding table, does not give an adequate view of the real change that has taken place in the structure of international payments between the pre-1973 period and the present. In the 1977 annual report of the International Monetary Fund, the annual averages of current account balances for the major groups for the years 1967-72 (a period described in the report as having little bias in cyclical conditions) are scaled up to 1977 levels of world trade prices and real economic activity in the respective groups. These adjustments yield the following results:—

Comparison of Adjusted Current Account Balances
(In billions of US dollars)

	1967-72 Actual Average	1967-72 Average rescaled to 1977 levels	1977 Actual	1978 Actual
Major oil exporting countries	+ 0·7	+ 3	33	7
Industrial countries	+ 10·2	+ 31	— 1	29
Non-oil developing countries	— 8·1	—28	—21	—32

With the indicated adjustments, the current account deficit of the non-oil developing countries in 1977 was thus lower than what it was in the 1967-72 period, while the pre-1973 surplus of the industrial countries was replaced by a surplus for oil exporting countries. Extending this analysis to 1978 by rescaling the 1967-72 averages to 1978 levels of trade prices and output, it can be seen that the 1967-72 averages correspond fairly closely with the actual structure of current account balances in 1978.

This line of analysis yields a very important conclusion. By 1978 the adjustment of world payments balances to the 1973-74 oil price increases had been largely completed. The industrial countries did not resume their traditional role of providing real resources or financing to the rest of the world until 1977. However, the surplus funds accruing to the oil exporting countries were placed in the financial markets of industrial countries, and from these markets they were available to the non-oil non-industrial countries to finance their deficits. But in 1978 the industrial countries returned to their traditional surplus, and the current account position of the oil exporting countries in real terms also approached that of the period before 1974.

The non-oil developing countries have clearly shown much courage and determination in adjusting to higher oil prices and maintaining the momentum of their economic growth. The growth rate over the past five years in these countries has averaged about 5 per cent. This is somewhat lower than the rate attained in the years before 1973, and it certainly cannot be considered adequate from the point of view of the needed improvement in the standard of living—particularly in countries with high rates of population growth. But when account is taken of the sluggish demand for their products in the industrial world as a result of slow economic recovery, of the obstacles placed by many wealthy nations in the way of their exports, and of the lack of interest of the developed countries in the expansion of direct transfers of resources, the maintenance of this rate of growth in the non-oil developing world must be regarded as a commendable performance. In contrast to the generally

unfavourable trends and attitudes encountered in the industrial world, these countries have benefited substantially from large-scale grants and other development assistance from the OPEC countries and the greatly enlarged flow of remittances from their nationals employed in the OPEC states.

The Absorption of the OPEC Surplus

It is useful to look more closely at the developments that have led to the very rapid shrinkage of the surplus that accrued to the major oil exporting countries in 1974. The greatly enlarged earnings from oil export had the initial effect of virtually lifting the financial constraints on their plans to restructure their economies. There was a sharp acceleration in expenditures on economic development, in particular on building the domestic infrastructure. At the same time major programmes for social improvements were undertaken at government initiative. A large part of this expansion was met by rapid increases in imports, which were facilitated by the maintenance of a liberal import policy. The rapid progress of imports is reflected in the following figures:—

Imports of Major Oil Exporting Countries

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Value (US$ billion)	20	36	56	68	84	98
Percentage increase in value		77	57	21	24	17
Percentage increase in volume		38	42	19	14	4

The value of imports registered a very steep rise in 1974 and 1975; in 1975 it was nearly three times the level of 1973. After 1975 the growth in import values slowed, but it was still substantial. The value figures, of course, show the effect of continued inflation in import prices. But even in volume terms the increase in imports remains striking. The increase in real imports has, moreover, been strongly reinforced by an increase in net payments by the oil countries for external services—over the 1974–78 period this increase was as much as $22 billion. There has thus been a remarkably rapid absorption by these countries of increased amounts of both goods and services, which has been the principal reason for the shrinkage in their surplus.

Despite the increase in imports, the oil exporting countries have had to contend with strong inflationary pressures, particularly in the early part of this period. Domestic spending by governments raised demand well above what could be met from the increase in domestic output and in imports. Moreover, the rising prices of imports themselves added fuel to the inflationary fires. In

this situation, most of the oil exporting countries in 1975 and 1976 gave priority to the control of inflation by restraining domestic spending. In some countries, as in Saudi Arabia, much weight was given to the improvement in the standard of living of all citizens, and hence to the provision of educational, medical, housing, and other social services. In these countries measures were taken to reduce the impact of inflation by expanding free health and welfare programmes and increasing subsidies on essential items of consumption and housing. Along with these policies, the governments took steps to relieve the bottlenecks in transportation and distribution, particularly those that impeded the flow of imports. They gave special emphasis to the expansion of port capacity by constructing new facilities and by taking measures to speed up the handling of goods.

Greater attention to the control of inflation has not prevented the oil exporting countries from sustaining relatively high levels of economic growth. The non-oil sector in these countries has grown in the 1974-78 period by over 10 per cent on the average. The rate was higher in the early part of the period but tapered in later years to some 8 per cent in 1978. Some countries were no longer in surplus and were therefore not in a position to maintain the pace of growth; a part of the decline in 1978 also reflected political developments in Iran which impaired economic activity. Contrary to the general trend, the growth rate of the non-oil sector in Saudi Arabia has risen from year to year, averaging as much as 18 per cent in the five years ended 1977-78.

In implementing ambitious development plans, a critical problem—particularly in countries with small populations—has been the shortage of manpower, not only of professionals and skilled workers but also of unskilled labour. The oil exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa have followed a liberal immigration policy, attracting workers from other Arab countries and also from several non-Arab countries, particularly in South and East Asia. The demand for expatriate labour in the oil exporting countries has thus led to the growth of a viable international labour market for many developing countries. In some of these countries foreign exchange earnings from this labour market have financed a sizable proportion of their imports; in a few cases these earnings have been substantially higher than their export receipts. The total amount of remittances has increased over time; on the basis of estimates in a recent World Bank staff study the volume of remittances received by 12 major beneficiary countries in 1977 was at least $7 billion, and was probably much higher.[1]

How has the surplus that has accrued to the oil-exporting countries been disposed? At first the net cash surplus was mainly invested in liquid assets in the major industrial countries—bank deposits and short-term government securities. But over time there has been an increasing switch in favour of longer-term and less liquid forms of investment. These latter investments have formed the bulk of the net placements of funds in the last two years. There is

1 Some of these remittances were from workers employed in Europe.

no evidence that the governments or the monetary authorities in the oil exporting countries have altered the currency or asset composition of their holdings in response to short-term fluctuations in exchange markets; or that their actions otherwise have caused an aggravation of exchange rate instability. But there has, of course, been a tendency gradually to diversify holdings.

A sizable proportion of the surplus has consisted of official grants and loans to developing countries. Precise information on the amount of these flows is hard to find, but rough estimates of bilateral aid, contributions and capital subscriptions to regional and international development agencies, investments in the 1974-75 oil facility of the International Monetary Fund, and direct purchases of World Bank bonds would bring the total to an annual average of approximately US$7 billion in the 1974-78 period. As a proportion of the gross domestic product of the oil producing countries this amount is several times the United Nations target for official development assistance—which has so far remained well beyond the reach of the industrial countries. If the annual value of remittances is taken in conjunction with this assistance, there has been a very substantial flow of financial resources from oil exporting countries to other developing countries in the years since 1973.

To channel this development assistance effectively the Arab countries have set up a number of institutions either as agencies of their own governments or as regional intergovernmental agencies.[2] The first national institution in the Arab region for providing financial and technical assistance—the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development—was set up as early as 1961; its operations have greatly expanded since 1974. This was followed in the 1970s by the Abu Dhabi Fund (1971) established to provide loans and guarantees or acquire equity participation in projects within Arab countries, and by the Saudi Fund (1974) for the purpose of financing projects in developing countries throughout the world. Among the regional institutions are the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development (1971) established by members of the League of Arab States to assist the Arab countries, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (1974) also established by members of the League to finance development projects and provide technical assistance to member countries of the Organization of African Unity, and the Islamic Development Bank (1975) sponsored by members of the Islamic Conference to foster the economic development and social progress of its member countries and of Muslim communities. The lending by these institutions—both national and regional—is made available on highly concessionary terms and serves to finance mainly economic infrastructure projects. Total loan commitments in 1977 amounted to about US$2·0 billion, and the commitment rate is higher today.

Looking to the future, an important question is whether the oil exporting countries could or should maintain the rapid pace of economic growth attained in the recent years. These countries need to take stock of their recent

2 OPEC also has established a Special Fund for making loans to developing countries on easy terms

development and analyze the contribution that this is likely to make in providing a secure future basis for growing income and employment. Rapid growth inevitably brings in its train problems that have important social and political repercussions. Continuing high inflation causes distortions and inequities. Migration into the towns, the relative decline of agriculture and traditional pursuits, and the need for a continuing increase in the employment of foreign labour—all of these have important effects on social equilibrium and cohesion and the maintenance of traditional values. It would seem prudent at the present juncture for many of the oil exporting countries to temper the feverish pace of activity and concentrate on the consolidation and rationalisation of what has been achieved.

Prospects for the Future

For the present and the coming years, it is important that a common worldwide understanding is reached concerning the use and valuation of oil. Such an understanding can be based on the simple fact that use of oil is the use of a fixed stock of capital. For the consuming as well as the producing countries, it is borrowing from future generations. This inter-temporal consideration should remain paramount in our decisions concerning the use of oil. It is to the common interest of all countries that the period of transition to non-oil energy sources be stretched as far as possible, and that this period is used effectively to develop these sources. For the producing countries, whose main source of subsistence for the foreseeable future is oil, the oil revenues must be invested to generate productive capital either domestically or abroad—investments that yield a rate of return commensurate with the real value of their resource.

The current disarray in the markets for oil—for which the oil companies and the importing countries must assume a large share of the responsibility—must be ended. Beyond that, it should be realised that dependence on increased production of oil to meet an uncontrolled expansion of demand will be a highly unrealistic policy. A major reason for the limitation on the level of output of oil stems from technical factors—there is a capacity constraint on the efficient optimal rate of production. But even apart from this there is, as we have seen, an optimal rate at which the economies of the oil producing countries can be further expanded. This rate should be guided not only by economic considerations of efficiency and of the availability of the complementary factors needed for production growth, but also by considerations of social equity and social balance. Nor are there the appropriate opportunities abroad at any particular time that would justify the rapidly growing investment of oil revenues. Thus a continued fast increase in oil production would be imprudent and would place an unwarranted burden on future generations.

The lesson from all this is self-evident. If resolute action is not taken on the side of demand, the price of oil will continue to rise. The increase in the price this year is a clear reflection of this. Much attention has recently been given to

the upsurge of prices in the spot market, but it should be realised that the volume of transactions in the spot market is limited and that the major part of the oil continues to be sold under longer-term contracts at the official selling prices of the exporting governments. Contrary to the exaggerated reactions that the recent higher prices have evoked, the direct effect on growth and inflation rates of the increase that has taken place is quite small—well below one per cent in respect of growth and somewhat more than that in respect of inflation. Although the indirect effects may be considerable, the recent oil price increase should not pose an insurmountable obstacle to the control of inflation and the maintenance of steady growth of the world economy. It is, however, a reminder of the fundamental fragility of the present situation and of the urgent need in the consuming countries to conserve energy and develop alternative sources. To hope that the oil exporting countries will expand production to stabilise prices is merely to postpone the basic correction.

As the supplier of a vital resource, the oil exporting countries recognise their responsibility of ensuring that it is made available in sufficient quantity so that there is no serious setback to the continued growth of the world economy. But as countries struggling to develop their economies, they expect to benefit from a transfer of technology and experience from the industrial nations, from free access of their newer exports to the markets of these nations, and the maintenance of stable prices for equipment and other goods that they need to import. In this, their interests do not differ from those of other primary-producing developing countries. These latter not only need Western 'know-how' and appropriate conditions of trade, but because of the balance of payments constraints that they face in their development effort, they also need large-scale transfer of financial resources on appropriate terms.

OPEC has consistently sought Western co-operation since 1973 on a number of issues—the transfer of technology, the protection of the real value of overseas assets, and effective and sustained aid to the non oil developing world. What is needed is a major new thrust toward a co-ordinated approach to world development. This is the rationale of the effort to establish a new international economic order—a project which has generated endless discussion but has made little tangible progress. Neither the North-South dialogue nor the discussions between industrial and developing countries in UNCTAD and at other international forums have succeeded in bringing about a significant change of attitudes and policies in the industrial world. The oil issue is one of a complex of issues that now divide the industrial and developing countries. Its solution, no less than that of the others, requires a common and balanced approach that rises above selfish national interests.

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE WORLD ENERGY CRISIS

Robert J. Lieber *

This article, which should be read in conjunction with the preceding one by the Saudi Minister for Finance and National Economy, examines the response of the Western oil consuming countries to the world energy problem.

THE second world energy crisis in 1978-79 did not begin in a drama comparable with the movement of Egyptian forces across the Suez Canal in October 1973 which inaugurated the first energy crisis. Instead the course of events has flowed more slowly and unevenly, from the initial disturbances in Iran, through the disruptions and reductions in Iranian oil production and the departure of the Shah, to a world petroleum shortfall of approximately 2 million barrels per day (mbd) followed by disruptive competitive bidding on the oil spot market, a steep 65 per cent increase in OPEC petroleum prices (from $12·70 per barrel in December 1978 to an average of $21 in July 1979), and culminating in newspaper headlines reporting ' La Guerre du Pétrole ' [1]—a war not between producers and consumers but rather one pitting the consumer nations against each other.

But although the current energy crisis has developed more slowly and less dramatically than that of 1973-74, it has implications which are perhaps more profound. In particular, it should dispel lingering doubts that the energy problem is anything less than a critically important and enduring affair. This second crisis should also make it clear that the energy problem is not susceptible to the application of a single magic remedy—whether a technological breakthrough, or the collapse of OPEC, or the closer control of the major multinational oil companies, or the unfettered operation of market mechanisms, or a plunge towards nuclear power, or oil from Mexico, Alaska or China, or, indeed, even a Middle East peace.

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1. *Le Figaro*, May 31, 1979.

In the last analysis the energy problem exists because the international demand for petroleum is near—or beyond—the amounts which the OPEC countries are willing to make available, whether for economic, political, or—ultimately—for technical reasons. In the words of Ulf Lantzke, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, ' from now on the oil supply operating system will be at or near its maximum capacity '.[2] This constraint is very likely to worsen during the next two decades and, as a result, international petroleum arrangements will become increasingly vulnerable to periodic shocks. In this light, the Yom Kippur war and the Iranian revolution are more accurately understood as catalysts rather than fundamental causes. And, if the present pattern continues unabated, we may expect a series of disruptive energy crises in the future, as a result of ' unexpected ' events including not only war and revolution—as in 1973 and 1978-79—but also technical problems, accidents, natural disasters, sabotage, and even plain bad weather.

Looking backward, the period from mid-1974 to the end of 1978 may thus be seen as one of only temporary respite during which, following oil price increases of more than 400 per cent—from $2·10 per barrel on 1 October 1973 to $9·48 on 1 June 1974 [3]—there was a lull marked by modest oil surpluses and a slight reduction in the real (inflation adjusted) price of crude oil. Future respites are not inconceivable, but even if they do occur they are certain to be of briefer duration—and they may well be followed by increasingly disruptive crises, unless the means are found to manage more satisfactorily relations between the major consuming nations and, eventually, between the consumers and the producers.

In the United States the problems of the Alliance have tended to be identified with matters such as SALT and the question of European security. These are unquestionably significant: but what is not yet enough appreciated in America is the fact that there is in many ways more concern in Europe today about energy—in terms both of the physical availability of oil and the means to pay for it—than about the more traditional foreign policy issues. As one leading foreign policy authority recently observed to this author, ' the real danger for France today is the petroleum crisis, not the SS-20 '. Yet perspectives such as these have remained largely ignored in the development of American energy policy. Together with an unsympathetic and inadequate European understanding of the American situation, it is no wonder that real

2. ' The Middle East After the Shah—Implications for Oil Prices and Supplies ', Chatham House Conference (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, June 20, 1979)

OPEC's estimated ' maximum sustainable ' production capacity is around 36 mbd, compared with OPEC production of approximately 30 mbd in mid-1979. However, some of the major producers—particularly the so-called ' low absorbers '—have a considerable economic incentive to leave oil in the ground as a future resource rather than produce currently at maximum rates. Further, development of surplus capacity, especially in Saudi Arabia, has fallen far short of the figures predicted a few years ago for the early 1980s.

3. Figures represent ' average cost of access ' for ' Arabian light ', as calculated in Thierry de Monbrial, *L'Energie, Le Compte à Rebours*, Rapport au Club de Rome, Recommandations de Robert Lattès et Carroll Wilson (Paris: Editions Jean-Claude Lattès, 1978), pp. 286–87

co-operation in international energy matters has been difficult and that the subject has increasingly become another irritant in the 'troubled partnership'.

In an effort to get behind the welter of recent events and better understand the emergence of international energy policy as a serious problem in European-American relations, this article first briefly re-examines the lessons of the 1973-74 crisis. It then gives an account of the present problem, emphasising the effects of the reduction in America's capacity for hegemonial leadership both generally and in the specific field of energy. Next it contrasts the imperatives for international co-operation with the effects of domestic considerations in Europe and especially in the United States obstructing this co-operation. Finally, it assesses the chances of future co-operation in energy matters, and the factors that can either prevent or encourage the development of more constructive relations among the oil-consuming countries.

America and Europe in the First Energy Crisis

Instead of stimulating the members of the European Community to greater efforts of co-operation in the face of necessity, the 1973-74 crisis proved painfully disruptive to the Nine. On October 17, 1973, the Arab Oil Producers (OAPEC) had announced a selective embargo which divided the Europeans into three categories: favoured countries (France and Britain) to receive normal shipments; disfavoured countries (Holland) to be totally embargoed; and others (the remaining members of the EC) to experience phased reductions of 5 per cent each month. National anxieties about oil supply thus predominated during the initial weeks of the crisis. Efforts at co-operation within the Community and other multilateral frameworks were mostly unavailing, and some members of the Community adopted a *sauve qui peut* approach in the hope of negotiating bilateral deals with particular oil-producing countries. Most strikingly of all, some of the Europeans, including Britain and France, were willing to comply with the Arab boycott of the Netherlands—in flagrant contravention of Community rules.[4] It took a month before the rest of the Nine quietly moved to support their Common Market partner, and this occurred only after some arm-twisting by the United States, Dutch threats to curtail natural gas exports to France, Belgium and Germany, and a realisation that in any case the oil companies were able successfully to allocate available oil supplies among all the consumer countries.

As it became clear that oil supply shortfalls would be manageable, attention began to shift toward finding the means to cope with the financial implications of increased OPEC oil prices. It was in this second phase of the crisis that the United States was able to exercise effective alliance leadership and reassert a measure of hegemony. The turning point came at the Washington Energy Conference in February, 1974, at which the Americans achieved a reversal of

4. Robert J. Lieber, *Oil and the Middle East War: Europe in the Energy Crisis* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1976), pp. 13-16.

positions the Nine had agreed to earlier in the year—isolating France and obtaining agreement on the creation of what became the International Energy Agency (IEA).[5] It was in effect accepted that the management of the crisis at this stage required the broadest multilateral means, including not only the IMF, the OECD, and a variety of petro-dollar recycling mechanisms but also the creation of a new multilateral agency in the shape of the IEA. All of this extended well beyond the reach of the European Community. It was the United States alone which possessed the continental size, the domestic energy resources, the economic strength and even the military power which could underpin the IEA's emergency oil-sharing scheme and enable the West to address with some confidence the as yet uncertain consequences of the crisis.

Thus in the end the American approach prevailed, and the view of Europe which was current before October 1973—an economic super-power on a level with the United States in a world in which traditional kinds of military, political and resource power no longer mattered—came to be seen as erroneous or premature. The crisis caused more traditional concerns to reassert themselves, and the inherent strengths of the United States in these areas, as well as the inherent inequality in the present pattern of European-American interdependence, the lack of European political unity, and the existence of serious disagreements among the Nine all contributed to a powerful reassertion of American leadership. What is more, the *sauve qui peut* approach adopted by some countries produced little tangible result for them. In the end, the international oil companies allocated the reduced supplies on a pro-rata basis and most countries found their oil shipments reduced by roughly comparable amounts of around 7 per cent. The basic lessons of the crisis were that the European Community by itself was too limited a forum for comprehensively addressing the energy problem on behalf of its members, that even modest reductions in oil supply could touch off huge price increases and wild competitive bidding for available supplies, that international co-operation was required, and that the United States was best placed to provide the necessary leadership in organising a common response to this kind of problem.

Five Wasted Years?

Marked by such events as the lifting of the Arab oil embargo against the United States in March 1974 and the stabilisation of oil prices at their new high levels, the most dramatic aspects of the first energy crisis had eased by the spring of 1974. Yet, after the ensuing five-year lull—in which oil prices, adjusted for inflation, actually declined slightly from their 1974 peak—the world, and particularly the advanced industrial states, now faces a new crisis:

5. On February 5, 1974, the EC Council of Foreign Ministers agreed that the Washington Conference should not give rise to a confrontation with oil producers nor create a new permanent organisation, that work following the conference should take place through existing bodies such as the IMF and OECD, and that discussions with the less developed countries and oil producers should begin no later than April. See Lieber, p. 21.

an oil shortfall of 4 to 5 per cent or 2 mbd according to IEA estimates, an average 65 per cent increase in OPEC prices (based on the results of OPEC's June 1979 Geneva meeting which lifted prices to between $18 and $23·50 per barrel, compared with a December 1978 price of $12·70), and renewed problems of inflation, balance of payments disequilibrium, reduced economic growth, recession, and increased unemployment. According to President Carter, in the United States the OPEC price increase will cause additional inflation of 2 to 2·5 per cent and a rise of 800,000 in unemployment. For the European Community, a March 1979 estimate suggested that every dollar per barrel above the December 1978 price of $12·70 would result in a $3·6 billion annual increase in the Community's oil bill, a $3 billion worsening in its balance of payments on current account, a 0·4 per cent reduction in economic growth and a 0·3 per cent increase in inflation.[6]

These developments are painful, but not in the least surprising. Following the 1973–74 crisis, a number of important studies of the world supply and demand for oil pointed to the danger of emerging shortages. Most of these studies suggested that shortfalls would occur in the mid- to late 1980s or early 1990s. For example, in 1977 Carroll L. Wilson observed that non-communist world demand for petroleum would probably overtake available supplies around 1985 to 1995, but that this could occur as early as 1983.[7] Robert Stobaugh of the Harvard Business School observed that, for the time being, oil prices would remain basically stable in real terms while part of OPEC's oil surplus capacity was reabsorbed. Then, prophetically, he added that ' at some point, demand will begin to run up against even Saudi capacity, and with that, the Saudis will lose control of the international petroleum market. Prices will then move up to substantially higher levels—over 50 per cent or more above current prices '.[8]

It is enlightening to recall these forecasts. While many of them were at the time regarded as over-pessimistic, events have proved them to have been rather conservative: the oil ' crunch ' has in fact come earlier than even these observers had anticipated.

Our present difficulties were thus forecast in the years after the 1973–74 crisis. What did the Western industrial states actually do to anticipate these problems? Jointly, they established the IEA within the OECD. This body has registered two major achievements: an emergency oil-sharing scheme to be invoked in the event of oil shortfalls reaching 7 per cent or more, and the provision of a forum where the developed non-communist industrial states could at least attempt to address common energy problems. Although France

6. European Community Commission, Brussels: ' Community Energy Policy ', March 7, 1979.

7. Energy: *Global Prospects 1985-2000. Report of the Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977). Preface.

8. ' After the Peak. The Threat of Imported Oil ', in Daniel Yergin and Robert Stobaugh (eds.), *Energy Future. Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School* (New York: Random House, 1979).

stayed formally outside the IEA, it in fact remained associated with it through participation in OECD. France was also linked to the IEA emergency sharing system through its membership in the European Community, whose own arrangements paralleled those of the Agency and eight of whose members belonged to the larger body.

Neither the IEA nor the Community proved able, however, to bring about the significant, even radical, changes in current behaviour which the energy situation dictated—particularly with regard to dependence on imported oil. Within the Community, differences over the question of floor-prices for British North Sea oil, over subsidies for European-produced but costly (twice the world price) British and German coal, over the development of nuclear power, and about the balance between free market and dirigiste economic strategies prevented the Community from developing a powerful and effective energy policy. It did succeed in taking some small and not insignificant steps in encouraging modest measures of energy conservation, promoting efforts to reduce energy import dependence, and subsidising pilot projects for energy research and development. But these remained limited in scale and impact, and in the main the results which were achieved in Europe were due primarily to the various national policies. In sum, the Nine succeeded in modestly lowering their energy import dependence from 59 per cent in 1973 to 55 per cent in 1978, and they are forecast to reach a figure of between 48 and 53 per cent in the years 1985 to 1990.[9] Further, they limited the increase in their oil consumption from 485 million tons oil equivalent (mtoe) in 1973 to 505 mtoe in 1978, and reduced their net oil imports from 484·1 mtoe in 1975 to 472 mtoe in 1978 [10]—although much of the reduction was due to increased European oil production (i.e. British North Sea oil) as well as to recession and lagging economic growth.

As for the United States, under Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter energy policy made little progress. Minor conservation measures received limited encouragement with the major significant achievements being the 55 mile per hour speed limit and regulations mandating improved automobile gasoline mileage at the average level of 27·5 mpg (8·5 litres per 100 kilometres) by 1985. On the energy production side, major institutional, environmental, economic and political obstacles remained in the way of expanding the use of coal and nuclear power, and although commitments were made to new energy sources—for example, solar energy—these remained more declaratory than actual. Further, American consumption actually increased, by 8 per cent, from an average of 17·3 mbd in 1973 to 18·7 mbd in 1978. Together with the

9 European Community, Commission: ' Energy Situation in the Community and in the World ', Information Memo p 26, March 1979, (1) COM (79) 142.

10. Figures from *Les Chiffres Clés de l'Energie*, Ministère de l'Industrie, Paris, 1979, p 39, and European Community, Commission: ' Energy Situation in the Community and in the World ', March 1978, COM (78) 101; and March 1979, Information Memo p. 26 (1) COM (79) 142. From 1973 to 1978, even excluding Britain, the EC reduced its oil imports by 9·6 per cent (OECD figures)

decline in American petroleum production this caused net oil imports to increase substantially, from 6·25 mbd in 1973 to 8·27 mbd in 1978 [11]—or a growth of 32 per cent. American dependence on imports as a source of oil accordingly increased from approximately one-third of consumption in 1973 to nearly one-half in 1978.

So, on the eve of the second world oil crisis the Europeans had managed to hold oil consumption and demand at or below the levels of 1973, while American oil consumption and imports had continued to rise. Nevertheless, the Europeans remained overwhelmingly dependent on imported oil, and neither Europe nor the United States had yet given evidence of ability to carry out far-reaching measures to conserve energy and use it more rationally so as substantially to reduce the direct relationship between increased economic growth and additional energy consumption. Nor, despite enormous discussion, had either the Americans or the Europeans made an effective commitment to the development of renewable energy sources. Judged by these criteria—as well as by the failure to devise ways of avoiding competitive bidding for oil, of reducing imports, or of achieving a long term stability in the oil market (whether by softening demand, by negotiation, or even coercion)—their accomplishments were inadequate. It may be harsh, even uncharitable, to say it, but the industrialised world, and especially the United States, wasted much of the five years' respite between the first and the second energy crises.

It is a striking feature of this interim period that the ability of the United States to organise and provide leadership for its IEA and OECD partners became progressively less effective, for two principal reasons. There was an emerging stalemate over energy policy within the United States, so that no one of the several possible alternative approaches to the energy problem could be developed in a comprehensive and convincing manner. And at the same time American energy consumption and imports continued to rise. Together these circumstances made it difficult for the United States to provide coherent and substantive leadership, while it became potentially more and more vulnerable to the actions of the oil producers and to the economic effects of the energy problem. They also led to serious European resentment at the consequences for themselves of America's continuing neglect of public transportation, its gas-guzzling cars, overheated and overcooled buildings, and inability to develop its extensive domestic energy resources. To be sure, there were important mitigating circumstances, some of which we shall observe below, but the effects in the realm of international co-operation were nonetheless damaging for all that.

In energy, as, for example, in respect of the international monetary system, the management of interdependence requires changes in the face of the decline in America's preponderance. Benjamin J. Cohen has recently observed, with regard to the debate of the mid-1970s over macro-economic policy and the

11. *Economic Outlook* (Paris: OECD, December 1978, No. 24), table 57. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent figures are based on OECD statistics.

failure of the United States to secure German and Japanese agreement to expand their economies simultaneously, that ' the lesson . . . is that American hegemony is failing, and the means for establishing a new co-operative regime of shared responsibility have yet to be found '.[12] In respect of energy policy there is evidently a comparable situation. A new basis for co-operation among the major consumer states is essential, but its establishment poses substantial difficulties. At least until the middle of 1979, the obstacles to co-operation were enough to prevent the creation of a meaningful international energy policy at the levels either of the OECD, the IEA or the European Community. The results of the Tokyo summit in June 1979 between the seven leading industrial powers—the United States, Germany, Japan, France, Britain, Italy and Canada—were achieved with some difficulty because of this situation; and in the long run, giving practical effect to the summit's decisions will depend on whether the necessary co-operation can be sustained.

National Obstacles to an Effective International Energy Policy

The world energy problem intrudes upon the domestic economics, politics and society of all the oil-consuming countries. In turn, the complex effects of the energy problem are so extensive and widely-ramifying that they often make it difficult for countries to respond in a coherent way, perhaps particularly in the pursuit of co-operative measures at the international level—which could permit the alleviation or improved management of many troublesome aspects of the problem. The character of this difficulty will become evident as we examine, even briefly, the positions of France, Germany and—in more detail—the United States.

France

During the first crisis and its aftermath, France was the least disposed of the OECD countries to seek a co-ordinated international approach through such instruments as the IEA. However, her preferred alternative policy of seeking to negotiate bilateral deals with the oil producers did not prove a marked success. During the supply phase of the crisis France experienced reductions in oil deliveries comparable to those of its European partners. Nor, subsequently, did the policy secure petroleum at rates below existing world prices. The French-sponsored multinational negotiations with oil producers and with non-oil less-developed countries brought only very limited results, both in the Euro-Arab dialogue and at the 1977 Paris Conference on International Economic Co-operation.

French domestic politics were a basic obstacle to the pursuit of a more OECD-IEA oriented policy, which would have been regarded as inconsistent with the Gaullist tradition in foreign policy. However, the Gaullist theme of independence had more positive effects: in order to reduce France's dependence upon imported energy, the government embarked on an extremely

12. ' Europe's Money, America's Problem ', *Foreign Policy*, No 35, Summer 1979, p. 41.

ambitious nuclear-energy programme as well as on a widely publicised energy conservation effort. Despite some slippage in its timetable, the nuclear programme seems likely to provide 19 per cent of France's total primary energy needs in 1985 as compared with less than 2 per cent in 1973; and the conservation programme aims to economise approximately 13 per cent of previously anticipated energy consumption for 1985.[13]

The effect of these and other measures, including recession and slower than anticipated economic growth, has allowed France to reduce its net oil imports by 14 per cent between 1973 and 1978. Apart from Britain, with its increasing production of North Sea oil, this was the best performance of any major OECD country. By a striking paradox, although France had originally adopted the least sympathetic attitude to formal measures of consumer co-operation, the results of its energy policies were the most constructive in terms of the fundamental common necessity—the reduction of oil imports. Ironically, these results were almost precisely the opposite of those of the Americans, who, while seeking maximum formal co-operation, were unable to prevent a 32 per cent rise in their oil imports over the same period.

Yet French policy did not cease to evolve, and in the second crisis France was one of the powers most actively favourable to co-operation within the European Community and subsequently at the Tokyo Summit. The reasons for this change lie not only in the shift in the Presidency and Foreign Ministry from Pompidou and Jobert to Giscard and François-Poncet but, more fundamentally, in the realisation that France cannot avoid the consequences of energy decisions made elsewhere. Her level of energy independence will have increased by 1985, despite her nuclear and conservation programmes, from 24 per cent in 1973 to only 33 per cent,[14] while her oil imports represent less than 9 per cent of OECD's total volume. France is consequently profoundly affected by the overall pattern of supply and demand in the international oil market as well as by the actions of the major consumers and OPEC. Indeed, even energy conservation is more effectively pursued in a co-operative setting, where each state has less to fear that its own competitiveness may be undermined if it requires its industries to undertake costly conservation or energy substitution measures while its partners do not.[15] Reduced demand for oil is most effective in shaping the overall international balance when it occurs generally among the major consuming nations rather than among just a few of them. In the last analysis, the more co-operative French posture reflects the realisation that few viable alternatives exist, whether in the shape of bilateral deals or by way of reliance on national policies. An effective approach to the energy problem can, in fact, scarcely exist without active co-operation between the Europeans, the North Americans and the Japanese.

13 Calculated from *Les Chiffres Clés de l'Energie*, pp. 28–29, 124.

14. *Op. cit.*, p. 31

15 Overall real prices for electricity declined 10 per cent between mid-1973 and mid-1979. To raise these, as Electricité de France (EDF) may have wished, would have contributed to inflation and higher manufacturing costs

Germany

In the case of the Federal Republic, a combination of strong European and Alliance ties and a strong commitment to market mechanisms dictated an internationalist approach in the first crisis. That is, the Germans supported European Community and IEA efforts and followed pricing policies which encouraged some reduction in oil consumption and imports. By 1978 they were importing 5 per cent less petroleum than in 1973. Yet, in paradoxical contrast with the development of the French situation, domestic imperatives have tended to lead Germany towards a potentially less co-operative posture in facing the second crisis.

German attachment to free-market concepts reflects the natural bias of a powerful and efficient export-oriented economy; and a healthy balance-of-trade surplus allows the Federal Republic to buy oil worldwide including on the Rotterdam spot market—where it has customarily obtained as much as 40 per cent of its heating oil—without concern that its economy may be unable to earn the foreign exchange to pay for increased prices. Just as the United States was the strongest advocate of an open international economy in the 1950s and 60s, and the British of free trade for generations until the 1930s, the Germans have now discovered the advantages of being the strongest players in an open competitive system.

But, while the market and price mechanisms have highly important functions to fulfil, they are not always sufficient in themselves. Many of Germany's neighbours—and trading partners—do not have the same confidence that they can compete as effectively for scarce, high-priced oil. Indeed, reliance on the price mechanism alone could mean that, at a time when the IEA countries are experiencing shortfalls of 4 to 5 per cent, the willingness of the German—or the Japanese—to pay any price in order to secure full supplies of oil could cause their partners to face proportionately greater reductions.

In the short-to-medium term, demand for oil tends to be somewhat inflexible, i.e. inelastic. For instance—the 400 per cent increase in OPEC prices in 1973 produced a fall in OECD net oil imports of only 2·4 per cent from 1973 to 1974 (or 11·3 per cent if we refer to 1975, which saw the worst recession in the entire post-war period). And, since both production and price decisions are in large part determined by a producer cartel in the shape of OPEC, there exist still further limits on what the market mechanism by itself can achieve.

Domestic political pressure also plays a role in influencing German attitudes. German autobahns have no speed limits, and a mandatory reduction to 100 kilometres per hour (62 m.p.h.) would save 5 per cent of present gasoline usage.[16] Most other countries have long since imposed some limit. However, German public opinion appears passionately attached to fast driving

16. Germany also has an automobile accident and death rate twice that of Britain. *International Herald Tribune*, July 2, 1979.

as a psychological outlet, and it resists limits as a restriction on personal freedom as well as a possible threat to the automobile industry. In this light, fearing the political consequences, no German government has yet been willing or able to enact speed limits.

In sum, attachment to the free market as a means of regulating supply and demand for oil, unwillingness to interfere with the ' liberty ' of motorists, and a view that some of the alternative measures of international co-operation may be both excessively bureaucratic and at the same time ineffective have caused the Germans to approach with great caution more recent European proposals for a common approach to energy. These include, among other things, the regulation of the spot market. Nevertheless, the Germans have also recognised that any substantial shortfall—e.g. the IEA 7 per cent threshold for emergency sharing—would require co-ordinated and deliberate co-operative measures, that Germany could not engage in a costly and unrestrained competitive bidding process against her partners without touching off an economic or political backlash, and that serious energy-related damage to the economies of other OECD countries would jeopardise important German export markets. As a result, the Federal Republic accepted both the European Community's Strasbourg agreements in June 1979 and the decisions of the Tokyo summit later that month, but with some reluctance and without providing leadership.

The United States

The United States has been widely criticised for its apparent lack of effective action on energy, and particularly for its increased level of petroleum imports, inadequate measures of conservation, the slow development of domestic energy resources, and insufficient concern for the consequences of its actions on other consuming nations. Some of these criticisms are excessive. For example, America has made at least a beginning in conservation through the 55 m.p.h. speed limit, the establishment of automobile mileage standards, the provision of small-scale incentives for conservation and solar energy, congressional de-regulation of natural gas prices over the next several years, and presidential action substantially to de-control the price of domestic petroleum for a twenty-eight-month period beginning in June 1979. Nevertheless, the United States can be faulted with justice on two principal grounds. Since the 1973–74 crisis its overall record of oil imports and energy consumption and conservation is substantially inferior to that of its OECD partners; and over that period it has not been able to provide really effective leadership for the West since the creation of the IEA.

To be sure, there are mitigating circumstances. These include geography—a large population spread across an entire continent; recent history—a pattern of suburban sprawl, massive highway construction, and overwhelming reliance on private automobiles for transportation; and the historic availability of unlimited domestic natural resources—patterns of behaviour formed in two centuries of reliance on cheap and readily available

energy. Nor are alternative domestic energy supplies as readily available as may appear from a distance. The exploitation of massive coal- and oil-shale deposits, particularly in the West, faces obstacles arising from the major environmental damage it would impose, the limited availability of water, seriously inadequate transportation infrastructures, and local government regulation. Nuclear power—even in the unlikely event of its being developed as rapidly as technically feasible—could provide no more than 7 per cent of American primary energy over the next decade as compared with its present contribution of 3 to 4 per cent.[17] And the United States has already been extensively explored for petroleum—more than 2·4 million wells have been drilled—so that the de-regulation of petroleum prices is expected to produce no more than an additional 750,000 mbd by 1985; (that is, only an additional 7½ per cent of domestic petroleum production).[18]

There is, however, a great deal more the United States could reasonably do to face the energy problem. Americans continue to use more than twice as much energy and petroleum per capita as the inhabitants of the European Community, and a series of recent studies suggest that up to one-third of American energy could be saved through serious programmes of energy conservation over the next two decades, even while maintaining high living standards.[19]

One of the most serious obstacles in the way of an effective American energy strategy arises from the relationship between President and Congress. Even were the Carter administration's leadership in the energy field forceful, coherent and imaginative—and this has not consistently been the case—there would remain intractable Congressional problems. The legacies of Vietnam and Watergate have weakened the Presidency as an institution, increased scepticism in Congress and among the public about presidential leadership in all fields, and indirectly strengthened the power of Congress. Yet the Senate and the House remain within themselves a set of fragmented and competing centres of power, particularly among their committees and subcommittees, and this has made it difficult for Congress to produce a coherent programme of its own as an alternative to accepting the administration's proposals. The changing characteristics of Congress, its members and procedures, and the weak and unprogrammatic nature of the two American political parties, have enabled parochial pressures to make themselves felt on behalf of particular regional, economic, or other interests, even when these are applied at the expense of national priorities. The trucking industry opposes higher fuel prices and is hostile to the 55 m.p.h. speed limit; the auto industry is unhappy with

17 Estimates of Irwin C. Bupp, cited in Yergin and Stobaugh, 'After the Second Shock Pragmatic Energy Strategies', *Foreign Affairs*, v 57, n 4, spring 1979, pp 836-71

18 U S Department of Energy estimates The oil well figure is from B F. Grossling, 1976, cited by Pierre Desprairies, Institut Français du Pétrole.

19 This point has been made effectively in a number of excellent studies, including those of Yergin and Stobaugh, and more generally by Leon Lindberg (ed) *The Energy Syndrome* (Lexington, Mass. Lexington Books, 1977)

improved gas mileage standards; local communities prefer that nuclear power plants be sited elsewhere; oil companies have obtained windfall profits without devoting these sufficiently to energy investment; and environmentalists follow their own objectives, sometimes without consideration of overall energy supply consequences. In contrast, energy conservation and overall national energy planning have had much weaker constituencies.

Public opinion in the United States has, in fact, not been receptive to effective energy-policy leadership. Many Americans remain attached to traditional consumption patterns in which energy was cheap and abundant, and President Carter's exhortation to the effect that the energy crisis was the ' moral equivalent of war ' fell on deaf ears at a time when gasoline was still readily available at 60 to 70 cents per gallon—roughly one-third of its price in Europe. In December 1978 a poll for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations found that by a margin of 50 per cent to 7 per cent, the American public would oppose increasing prices of gas and oil by 25 per cent to discourage people from using as much—although opinion leaders favoured such measures by 51 per cent versus 24 per cent. Indeed as late as March 1979, an AP/NBC poll reported that 68 per cent of the American people thought the oil shortage was a hoax to drive up prices.[20]

There have been important reasons for these patterns. Since 1973-74, oil prices in America—which is still the world's second largest producer of petroleum—have been kept far below international levels, effectively insulating Americans from some of the more visible effects of the crisis. Efforts at oil and natural gas price de-regulation have met with a large number of objections, many of them quite serious. Such measures fall most heavily upon the poor, and upon those living in colder climates and in the cities of the north-eastern United States. The political representatives of these regions and groups were accordingly reluctant to support de-regulation without compensating financial measures—e.g. a ' windfall profits ' tax—to offset some of the most harmful impacts. Although the effect of higher energy prices in decreasing demand is the most important feature of deregulation, they, and others, have been deeply resentful at the extraordinary profits already obtained by the major oil companies in response to events since 1973, and sceptical as to whether de-regulation will in fact produce significantly greater quantities of domestic hydrocarbons. The actions of many large oil companies—for example in diversifying their investments through the purchase of department store chains and non-energy natural resources—contributed to this scepticism.

The net effect of these divergent interests has been to create an energy policy stalemate in the United States. Given the American taste and aptitude for technology and large scale projects of the put-a-man-on-the-moon variety, attention has tended to gravitate toward the possibilities of large-scale and extremely costly projects for synthetic oils—e.g. coal gasification—rather than

20 *Washington Post*, March 28, 1979.

to the politically difficult and less exciting, but more effective, alternative of major commitments to energy conservation and ultimately to solar energy.

Changes in this pattern of diffuse leadership, public scepticism and congressional stalemate cannot be ruled out. The experience of the second world energy crisis, with its annoying and widely publicised gasoline shortages, will certainly make themselves felt—but the direction of this reaction is less predictable. A negative and nationalist reaction, with a search for domestic or international scapegoats—government bureaucrats, oil companies, foreign consumers or producers—is not impossible. Yet, to the extent that the energy crisis begins to be perceived as a reality and even as a threat to American national security, it could lead to a coalition of divergent interest groups on behalf both of energy conservation and increased energy production, in order to decrease American energy import dependence and to avoid some of the most damaging economic consequences of that vulnerability. The potential constituency for such a coalition would include those concerned about the outcome for employment, economic growth and inflation, for international trade and finance, with America's national security, the security of Israel, with the environment, and those with economic interests in energy conservation industries. Further, there could be an additional impetus from America's alliance and economic partners to the extent they help to put over the over-riding importance of American energy responses for mutual economic and even security interests. In the interim, however, if America is to deliver upon the commitments undertaken, for example, at the June 1979 Tokyo summit—to hold oil imports at 1977 or 1979 levels in the years up to 1985—substantial changes in American domestic policies will be required. And they will not be easy to achieve.

Elusive Co-operation

Energy has been the field for the most recent and dramatic in a series of difficulties between the United States and Europe, and co-operation has been limited. For example, the American measure in late May 1979 to provide a $5 per barrel adjustment for certain petroleum imports provoked a storm of European reaction. In fact, the actions taken were extremely limited in scope—they were aimed only at refined diesel and heating oil from Caribbean refineries—and they involved compensating payments (entitlements) among importers and refiners rather than a direct government subsidy. However, the Administration's complete failure to consult or even inform European leaders came as a shock. The measures in question were a characteristic response to a domestic political climate in which it is far easier to act by focusing on energy supply rather than on decreasing demand.

Subsequently, and much more constructively, the June 1979 agreements at Strasbourg and Tokyo constitute new and important steps, most fundamentally in their commitments to limit oil imports at present levels until 1985. Yet the difficulties which have previously frustrated effective international co-operation

must make it far from certain that the major industrial countries will be able to meet their new commitments.

In the recent past the chief difficulties have stemmed from the decline of American hegemony on one hand, and, in its absence, the inability of the West to arrive at a negotiated, co-operative approach to common problems, basically because of the counter-pressure of domestic considerations, political, economic and social. Whether this situation will now change will depend upon whether increasing recognition of the real gravity of the energy problem, and the visible necessity for common approaches together with the lack of alternatives—particularly at the national level—will compel governments, the general publics and political and economic groups concerned to support new policies. This may sound sensible or even obvious, but—for example—the German resistance to speed limits, the French commitment to cheap electricity, and the long-term American obsession with carefree automobile use and cheap gasoline are not behaviour patterns which will easily be changed. Choices will have to be made. Not all forms of traditional and new energy supply, along with serious economies of energy, can be developed with equal vigour and intensity at the same time. Yet unless what one German energy official has described as the ' myopic selfishness ' of peoples and governments can be overcome there will be no effective co-operation or solution.

A truly effective international response to the second energy crisis will require implementation of the commitments to freeze petroleum imports. This demands, above all, increasingly serious and widespread measures of energy conservation which—although some important steps have been taken—no country has yet effectively achieved. An oil import reduction of 2 mbd by the OECD countries, as called for by Sheik Yamani, the Saudi Arabian oil minister, would make a major contribution and would mean a nearly 5 per cent reduction against 1978 consumption of 41·3 mbd.

Beyond this, however, serious and co-ordinated longer-term efforts will be inescapable if oil imports and energy consumption are to remain restrained in an orderly rather than disruptive manner. This is essential if economic growth is to continue, both traditional and new forms of energy are to be developed, and destructive competitive bidding is to be avoided. In its broad outlines, the energy problem can only be met at the international level. Yet until now, each major consuming nation has had its own compelling series of priorities, political considerations and national interests. These have thwarted all but a limited degree of co-operation. Yet in view of the fragility of the international energy balance, particularly that for oil during present and coming years, the nations will have to be willing and able to co-operate in fundamental ways. If they fail in this there will not only be an increasingly ' troubled partnership ' among the consuming nations of the Western world, but almost certainly a series of increasingly disruptive energy crises with political, economic, and social consequences which are disturbing to contemplate.

INTEGRATING DIVERGENT ECONOMIES: THE EXTRANATIONAL METHOD *

John Pinder **

WHETHER the yardstick be inflation, external balances or growth rates, the behaviour of European economies in the 1970s has been extremely divergent. In reaction, the discussion of integration has concentrated on the need for convergence. But the effect has been the opposite of the intention: integration has been prevented because attention has been diverted from the practicable to the impossible.

Although hopes have been raised once more by the launching of the European Monetary System (EMS), they are only too likely to be dashed once again, unless the reasons why the earlier scheme for economic and monetary union failed are properly understood. For the EMS could be driven into the same cul-de-sac as the project for European Monetary Union (EMU) if its development is based on the same insistence on convergence as a precondition of further integration.

The goal of parity-locking and the reality of divergence

This urgent insistence on convergence arose only because the permanent locking of parities was chosen as the Community's central medium-term aim. Convergence in some sense is doubtless helpful to integration in various forms: similar growth and productivity trends allow long-term equilibrium in conditions of free trade; similar economic structures make it easier for the costs and benefits of membership to be fairly distributed; similar economic weight can be a condition for a balance of political power. But it is only the fixity of exchange rates that requires the convergence of economic trends in the short term; for if price trends differ substantially among the member countries,

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payments disequilibria under fixed exchanges quickly require their governments to apply deflationary or inflationary policies to an extent that they do not wish to accept. Ironically, the aim of parity-locking was adopted a decade ago at the same time as economic divergence was beginning to put quite new pressures on the exchange rates. Price trends differed widely, so the snake was quickly broken and the goal of parity-locking receded into the distance. Those who saw it as central to the Community's progress therefore pressed for convergence as the basis on which integration could recommence.

Unfortunately for this concept, the contemporary economies proved remarkably resistant to the efforts to make them converge. Whether the approach to economics is monetarist or Keynesian, whether the remedy to price divergence is monetary or by means of income policy or both, the structure of the modern economy makes it hard to combine price stability with full employment and growth. Imperfect markets breed cost and price push whose strength depends on a country's social behaviour and economic institutions. Even in Germany, where behaviour and institutions are more favourable than in most other countries, the price of controlling inflation has been, so far, half a decade with a million unemployed despite the employment-creating trade surplus and the return home of many migrant workers. Elsewhere, the trade-offs between inflation and unemployment (which may perhaps be called, for short, propensities to stagflation [1]) are worse. There is a strong adverse current against which policy has to push; and if policy pushes hard enough to keep inflation down to German rates, other countries will suffer worse, or much worse, unemployment and growth than the Germans do. If the purer monetarists are right, all can return to a paradise of price stability and growth after a purgatory of severe monetary discipline. But the time in purgatory could be long; and those of lesser faith will fear that paradise may not follow.

It is against such intractable economic facts that the Community has sought convergence through the co-ordination of member governments' economic policies, but inflation rates continue to diverge by margins which keep the goal of irrevocable parity-locking as distant as ever. If the imperfection of markets in advanced economies has reached a point where new methods of economic management, such as incomes policies, must be developed in order to combine price stability with full employment and growth, a convergence on compatible economic performances may take a very long time to bring about. But whether new methods must be developed, or the orthodox monetary medicine can suffice, it will be some years before the inflation rates of member countries are similar enough for parity-locking to be sustained.

This brings into the foreground a second conclusion, political rather than economic, which can be derived from the experience of recent years: that the co-ordination of the Community member governments' policies through the

1 Following G. Magnifico's original coining of the term 'propensity to inflation', in his *European Monetary Unification* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 13.

use of member states' own policy instruments is not enough to secure effective common action towards an aim as important and difficult as the achievement of compatible economic policies.

Co-ordination of national policies: an ineffectual method

This ineffectiveness of policy co-ordination has not been caused by any tendency on the part of the member states to defy their legal obligations under the Treaties when these are subject to judgment by the Community's Court. With few exceptions, they have been legally punctilious. The problem arises when their Community obligations are not of the kind that can be regulated by precise legal texts. Compared with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from which many of our ideas about federal and confederal systems are derived, so much of modern government involves policies that require political and executive judgments more than precise decisions in the courts. General economic and monetary policies are essentially of this type. It is hard to envisage a law fixing the inflation rate at 0·5 per cent or a prime minister being impeached for failure to carry it out. Objectives of this nature cannot reasonably be defined in terms that are amenable to judgments in law, for the fact is that, except in the most rigidly controlled or the most laisser-faire economies, the methods to be used cannot be defined exactly in advance, and changing circumstances impose constant revision of both objectives and methods. Co-ordination of economic policies requires, therefore, a constant Community influence on the interpretation of objectives and the use of instruments by the member states.

Since economic policies are at the centre of politics in modern parliamentary democracies, this means that the Community must influence the central political processes in the member countries, in a matter where the detail of what has been agreed can be subject to continually changing interpretation. Common sense indicates that, in such circumstances, the interpretation that is given in practice will respond to the stronger political pressures; and given the existing political structure of the Community, these come from inside the member states. So, however genuine the intentions to co-ordinate may be, actions based on national policy instruments are inherently centrifugal in any matter that is important enough to be an issue in national politics and imprecise enough to escape decision in the Community courts.

The need for common instruments

We should not be surprised, then, that attempts to co-ordinate have achieved little of political importance where the Community lacks its own policy instruments, whereas the Community's outstanding achievements are firmly based on such instruments. The common external tariff has made the Community equal to the United States, or perhaps even the world's greatest power in international trade negotiations; on the other hand, the achievements of foreign policy co-ordination among the Nine have not been remotely

comparable. The common agricultural policy, whatever one may think of its present impact on British interests, has been enormously more effective than Community energy policy where the common instruments are, by contrast, relatively slight. By the same token, the commercial policy and the agricultural policy stand in a different class from Community monetary policy, where efforts at co-ordination without substantial common instruments have resulted in the exchange of information rather than in real influence on national monetary policies. The exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS will have a decisive effect on monetary policies if it leads to the permanent locking of parities or, in effect, to a common currency as the central economic instrument for the Community. But until this happens, the EMS exchange-rate mechanism is more like the former adjustable-peg system in the IMF than a common instrument for a more closely integrated monetary union. Even if parity-adjustments are to be agreed through a Community procedure, it is hard to believe that member governments who will themselves wish to retain the right to adjust will prevent their partner-governments from doing so.

Without a policy instrument brought to bear from beyond the nation state, then, the co-ordination of policies in a politically important matter is not likely to be effective. Where there is a hegemonial power, such as the United States in NATO or the Soviet Union in Comecon, the weight of its own instruments may be sufficient to influence and if necessary coerce its partners—although the relationship of France with NATO shows that among democratic countries such influence may be limited. Within the Community, where there is no hegemonial member, the examples of commercial and agricultural policy have shown that common Community instruments may be required.

Anarchy, autarky or centralisation: an awkward trilemma?

Does it follow that the permanent locking of parities, leading to a single Community currency, is the only way to give the Community real influence in the conduct of member countries' economic policies? Without an unlikely degree of convergence in the differing propensities to stagflation a single currency is not likely to be adopted, for it could force very high levels of unemployment and perhaps inflation on different member countries. Even if they were to accept this risk, the likely consequences would hardly be a favourable context for such a massive transfer of sovereignty to institutions that may still be too weak to bear such heavy political responsibility. Yet the indefinite continuation of what amounts to anarchy in international economic and monetary policy is not an encouraging prospect. Over a fifth of the gross products of the member countries enters into international trade, half within the Community and half without; international flows of money and of people and the multinational organisation of production further erode the governments' control over their national economies; and this erosion is a continuing process with the secular internationalisation of the economy. It surely follows that a capacity to manage the European and international

economies must be established, if we are to regain and retain adequate control over money, the conjuncture of the economy, the externalities of specialised or large-scale industries, the development of advanced technology, and security of supply for energy and other materials. For it is hard to conceive as a serious alternative a return to autarky, reducing our levels of technology and living standards and endangering international co-operation.

The argument up to now confronts us, then, with a most awkward trilemma: a single currency which could cause high unemployment and inflation in different countries at the same time as there is a sharp transfer of sovereignty to weak institutions; a scarcely conceivable return to autarky; or a continuation of international anarchy, which will do increasing damage to our national economies as they become more and more internationalised. The hopes that convergence may lead to a single currency, or that an adjustable-peg system with co-ordination of national policies can bring the anarchic international economy under control, merely obscure the failure to envisage an alternative that is both palatable and effective.

Parallel instruments

The most successful of Community policies, dealing with external trade relations, is based on the common external tariff, which has replaced the former tariffs of each member country. Likewise the generally accepted concept of integration, reflected in the use of the word supranational, is of a Community that is, in the fields where integration has taken place, above and superior to the member states. It is not surprising, then, that the model for monetary integration should have been a single currency which would replace the member states' several national currencies, or the irrevocable locking of parities and freeing of movement of money within the Community, which amounts to the same thing with only a cosmetic difference.

In fact, however, most of the Community's instruments do not suppress and replace the instruments of the member states. The regional, social and development funds do not suppress the member countries' own regional, social and aid budgets. The guidance part of the Community's agricultural fund does not preclude the member governments from providing additional money to help their farmers make structural adjustments. The European Investment Bank does not stand in the way of the numerous public bodies that supply finance for investment in the member countries. The Community's research centres work in parallel with research centres established by individual member governments. Its share of up to one per cent of value-added tax (unlike the customs duties and agricultural levies, which are exclusive to the Community) leaves the member governments free to raise any further percentage of VAT that they may wish. Its anti-trust laws, while they take precedence over national legislation where cases affecting intra-Community trade are concerned, leave national legislation intact for all other cases. In the

matter of ' harmonisation ', since the change of policy after 1973 under Commissioner Gundelach, common Community specifications often define a product whose sale all member countries agree to accept in their territory, while leaving them free to allow in their own markets the sale of products that meet their own existing specifications.

Each of these Community funds, enterprises, taxes, laws and regulations operates, then, *in parallel with* member countries' funds, enterprises, taxes, laws and regulations. It has not been found necessary to pre-empt the exclusive right to legislate or possess policy instruments in order for the Community to do something useful for the member countries. It is the contention of this article that such parallel instruments are enough to enable the Community to embody many of the common interests of the member countries; and that, in particular, parallel monetary instruments could do much to satisfy the needs for economic and monetary co-ordination, without requiring a degree of convergence in performance that is at present out of reach for the member countries' economies.

A parallel currency

The concept of parallel instruments was introduced into the discussion of European monetary integration by J. Williamson and G. Magnifico,[2] and has been carried further by a number of other sources, including the All Saints Day group of economists,[3] the Community's Optica group of experts [4] and the Commission's contribution towards the Tindemans Report.[5] Now, in the context of the EMS, there is for the first time an opportunity for parallel monetary instruments to be developed on a major scale. But this is hardly noticed in the excitement about another new exchange rate mechanism. What is needed is to recognise the importance of this opportunity for Europe's political economy and to ensure that, instead of losing it by default, the Community goes on to realise its full potential.

The greatest potential in the present EMS plan lies in the depositing of 20 per cent of the participating states' gold and dollar reserves in the European Monetary Co-operation Fund (EMCF) in exchange for European Currency Units (ECUs) to regulate central bank interventions. The EMCF is now a good deal more than ' a plate on a door in Luxembourg ' [6]; and by 1981 a European Monetary Fund is to be created, in which the reserves held by the EMCF are to be placed, thus becoming Community reserves in parallel with the member states' national reserves. Provided the decision-taking process for the use of these Community reserves is sufficiently effective, the ECU can then become a

2 *European Monetary Integration* (London Federal Trust, 1972)

3 *The Economist*, Nov. 1, 1975

4 *Towards Economic Equilibrium and Monetary Unification in Europe*, Optica Report 1975 (Luxemburg Commission of the European Communities, Jan 16, 1976), II/909/75 E final

5 *The European Union*, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/75 (Luxemburg: Commission of the European Communities, 1975).

6 Loukas Tsoukalis, *The Politics and Economics of European Monetary Integration* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1977), p 151.

genuine parallel currency, with the roles of a reserve and an instrument of settlement.

Outside the scope of the ECU's official reserve functions, the Community is also developing its financial instruments in the capital markets. The Investment Bank has, since the foundation of the EEC, been such an instrument, and now that its annual lending amounts to more than a billion European Units of Account it has some weight in the international capital market and in the field of public investment. The ' Ortoli facility ', whereby Community bonds of up to a billion Units of Account are being floated, is a further instrument that operates in the international money markets, with the proceeds to be used for Community purposes.

Such parallel instruments should begin to give the Community weight in its dealings both with member governments and with external monetary authorities such as the United States Treasury and Federal Reserve system. The governments will continue to make their own monetary policies with their own currencies, reserves and monetary institutions, and the national economies will not be forced prematurely into a common monetary straitjacket. But the common Community interest—when defined in the Community institutions—will have behind it the means to influence national policies in the form of reserves equivalent to the reserves of a major member state, together with other funds that can be used as an incentive for co-operative behaviour. The Community could similarly intervene massively with its common reserves in the market for dollars or other non-Community currencies. It would thus be better able to influence the policies of the United States and other countries, as well as the IMF. This influence both within and outside the Community would, moreover, be multiplied in so far as the strength of its own monetary resources can act as a catalyst or focus inducing the member states to align their national policies on a common policy more readily and effectively than before.

The idea of the ECU as a European equivalent of the dollar in its international roles will remain only very partially realised, however, until the Community parallel currency is more fully developed for commercial use. Following the original contribution by Williamson and Magnifico[7] a number of proposals for this have been made. What has been lacking is the political decision to implement them. Some of the proposals [8] have raised fears that the parallel currency would in fact replace the weaker national currencies in the Community, thus presenting for them the same risks as an exclusive single Community currency. But exchange controls on the movement of the parallel currency could, in principle, be similar to those on the movement of member countries' currencies within the Community and of the dollar across its frontiers. The aim should certainly be to reduce controls on the ECU as far as possible, in order to get the benefits of monetary integration and to strengthen the position of the ECU by developing its use in the capital markets. Controls

7 *Op cit*

8 For example the All Saints Day statement, *op cit*

on it should for this reason be somewhat lighter in any case than those on the dollar. But so long as they wish to, the member countries could ensure that their national currencies are not replaced in their national uses by the European currency. The essential aim of the parallel currency would be to meet the need now met by the dollar in its international roles, both official and commercial. In this way it should, without awaiting a degree of convergence that will be a long time coming, enable the Community to gain the sort of influence that the United States has had on both national and international monetary policies.

A parallel Community

The parallel currency is the most important of the parallel instruments so far proposed or established in the Community. At the same time it symbolises an idea of more general application.

Much of the political debate about Europe presents the crude alternatives of a Community which is above the member states, dictating to them on central political issues, or a Community below the member states, subject in all its actions to the several wills of nine (soon more) parliaments and governments. The parallel instrument embodies a different concept: of a Community alongside the member states, possessing its own instruments with which to act in matters of common interest—particularly in those international matters which a single member country can no longer itself control—while leaving the member countries in possession of their own instruments to implement their own national policies.

In a pure form, this concept of a parallel Community could imply that all the Community's instruments would be parallel ones—like the regional, social and development funds, the Investment Bank and the elements of European currency so far established. But this would unduly restrict the potential for common action. Parallel specifications, for example, are perfectly suited to such products as bread and beer, where cultural diversity demands differing definitions in different countries, while there is enough common taste to justify an additional common definition that will encourage international trade. Differing specifications for machinery may be less justifiable and more detrimental to economic efficiency, and here common specifications can with advantage replace the national ones, rather than be introduced alongside them.

The application of national anti-trust laws to international transactions creates obvious conflicts, as European reactions to the long arm of American anti-trust have shown; and if national anti-trust is not applied to them, the vast and growing international sector of the economy escapes any such legal control—unless anti-trust laws are introduced at the international level. This is the logic behind the Community's anti-trust policy, which has been among its most successful activities. Here, the Community law necessarily takes precedence over the member states' laws where transactions affecting intra-Community trade are concerned. To this extent, the Community law is

supranational rather than parallel. Yet the national jurisdictions remain for cases that do not involve intra-Community trade; and the national courts administer the Community law, while the Community court is available for appeals. So the national laws and courts continue to apply and the national and the Community systems operate in parallel, even if for some purposes they have been unified. This suggests that the concept of parallel instruments can be used at a certain level of aggregation. Despite the precedence for Community anti-trust law where intra-Community transactions are concerned, the Community and the national laws and courts are certainly operating in parallel if we consider the application of anti-trust laws to business in the Community as a whole. Perhaps, with the growth of intra-Community transactions, the Community share in this field of law will become the more important. But if we aggregate it with other fields of commercial law, the concept of parallel Community and national systems, rather than of supranationalism and subordination, will surely remain valid for a very long time, if not for ever.

If one aggregates the several branches of external economic policy, one finds that the unification of the external tariff is still balanced by the national retention of control over the national currencies. However, overseas aid, contributions to commodity schemes and various other instruments are shared between the Community and the member states. Thus it may be said that the Community and member states are acting in parallel in the field of external economic policy taken as a whole, with neither in a dominant position. The justification for common action in this field by the Community's members, as small and medium powers in a harsh world economy, is nevertheless pretty strong; and if the parallel currency realises its full potential, external economic policy will become mainly a Community function. But if we extend the aggregation either to external relations or to economic policy in general, we will still find that the Community's activity, taken as a whole, is parallel, not superior, to that of the member states.

Generalising the concept to the limit, we could say that a Community whose whole set of instruments, fully aggregated, was equivalent to that of one of the major member states would be a parallel Community, neither superior nor subordinate to the member states but an equal alongside them. If this is not the usual view of what a well-developed Community would be like, the centralising concept propagated by many Europeanists may be to blame. The common market itself, if reduced to a witchhunt against any ' distortion of competitive conditions ', can become the enemy of diversity and autonomy; and some neo-liberal purists together with Jacobin centralisers have combined to give it more than an element of this. Those with a centralist view of political organisation may, conversely, prefer to retain their national capital as the exclusive centre; and it is no accident that Britain and France, as the most centralised states in the Community, contain so many last-ditch defenders of national sovereignty, who believe that the development of the Community can lead only to a tightly-centralised superstate.

This view that policy integration may become a snowball, gathering all the important decisions into the Community institutions, has been supported by some political scientists.[9] But it is quite unrealistic. The member states retain the preponderance of policy instruments and political power, and they can easily prevent any seeping away of power to the Community. The problem is, rather, the reverse: member states resist proposals to increase the Community's capacity for action, partly because governments, political parties and the public in some of them see the exercise of new functions by the Community as leading to a centralised superstate. This harms the interests of all the member countries, for their mutual economic interdependence, and their common economic and political insecurity as small and middle powers in an uncertain world, demand greater capacity for common action than the Community now has; and the need is continuing to increase.

Decentralised federalism?

If the Community is to develop in order to meet this need, we must have a less centralist idea for its development. The parallel Community, itself disposing of resources of the order of those of a major member state, could be such an idea. Various names may be given to it, such as extranational (rather than supranational) Europe, or Europe as a middle power.[10] Although the monolingual federations such as Australia, the German Federal Republic or the United States are much more heavily centralised, it is not so different from federalism as seen by the Swiss. But a union of modern, developed nation-states is likely to differ from earlier federations—which is why it is better to consider the essential conditions for enabling the Community successfully to embody the common interests of the member countries, rather than relying on historical models to point the way or warn us off the course.

We have observed that modern economic and social policy requires the use of policy instruments as well as the support of the law, and that the Community is ineffectual when it tries to act solely through the member countries' policy instruments. It follows that if the Community is to be effective it must be allocated not just functions but also instruments. Meanwhile, although the possession of adequate instruments would enable the Community to have political weight, because the member states are determined to maintain their political identity they have to be assured that these instruments are such that the Community will not dominate them. Thus while the Community's instruments must be enough to embody the common interest, they cannot be too much more important than those of a major member state. The point at which the Community's arsenal of instruments

9 See, for example, Leon Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would Be Polity Patterns of Change in the European Community* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 68

10 Some have been tried out in John Pinder, 'Europe as a Tenth Member of the Community', *Government and Opposition*, Autumn 1975, and 'Das Extranationale Europa', *Integration*, 1/78, Bonn, 1978

would become too powerful is a matter of judgment; but it is a judgment which, if plans for further integration are to be practical, has to be made.

Common instruments will not embody the common interest unless they are used efficiently, which brings us to the Community's institutions. It is, again, a matter of observation that the Community, despite the political weakness of its constitution, has succeeded in acting effectively when it has a common instrument such as the external tariff. The governments have reached agreement when the need to use the common instrument required them to do so. Yet the largely inter-governmental method is slow and indecisive and gives formidable blocking power to a recalcitrant defender of the status quo. If the Community gains new responsibilities as well as new members, overload on the already creaking system would make these problems worse; and the inter-governmental method might prove unable to deliver the decisions that the Community and its member countries need. A move towards parliamentary democracy at the Community level is the obvious solution for a group of states which are all parliamentary democracies. So far this has been resisted by at least some member states, for fear that they would become subordinated to a superstate. Perhaps the idea of an extranational Community which does not acquire preponderant political weight—so that the member states are co-ordinate with it and not subordinate to it—would allay these fears; and the member states could then accept that the Community needs a more democratic and efficient system, based on a greater role and powers for its elected Parliament alongside the Council of Ministers.

Applying the extranational method

Whether this general idea of an extranational Community carries conviction will doubtless depend on the measures by which it is developed in practice.

The parallel currency is perhaps the most important example, for which the EMS provides a promising springboard. If the European Monetary Fund and the reserve role of the ECU evolve as foreseen, and the ECU's commercial use is promoted as well, an extranational instrument will have become central to the conduct of economic policy in the Community.

The Ortoli facility also has great potential. Although the Council of Ministers has so far agreed to the issue of these European bonds to the value of only a billion Units of Account, there is now a strong case for a much larger amount. For the jump in the price of oil has raised the expected OPEC surplus for 1979 from $10 billion to some $40 billion, and the new European bonds could play a big part in recycling it. With the dollar weak, they should be an attractive investment for the holders of petrodollars; and the Community could find good use for the money to improve its infrastructure and at the same time reduce unemployment. The Channel tunnel is but one of the transport facilities in which the Community could invest; and with the accession of new peripheral members, the case for Community investment in transport and regional development can only become stronger. There are also sound

proposals for Community expenditure on industrial restructuring and energy production. But both the sale of European bonds and investment of the proceeds, however important, would take place in parallel with similar financial and investment activities in the member states. There are no grounds for any attempt to give the Community an exclusive right to act in these fields.

In energy policy, it may on the other hand be in the Community's interest to fix a common price level above the world price, in order to reduce consumption and encourage indigenous production. Such a policy would require an exclusive Community decision on prices and on the collection of an import levy (though the raising of taxes or levies on indigenous production could remain with the member governments). This could neatly offset Britain's net contribution to the budget with respect to the common agricultural policy. On the expenditure side, the common energy policy would encourage research, development and production, paralleling the efforts of the member states as with the guidance part of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.

In external relations, the instruments of Community policy are likely to remain almost entirely economic ones for some time to come: the common external tariff, the European Development Fund, the agricultural levies and—if the projects considered here were implemented—an expanded Ortoli facility, the common reserve fund, the parallel currency and energy levies. But in order to link the use of these instruments with a view of the common interest in the field of foreign policy, a new parallel institution would seem desirable, in the form of a secretariat and planning staff to bring more continuity to the process of foreign policy co-operation—at present organised by the foreign ministry of each member government taking it in turns every six months.

An extranational Community along these lines would, then, possess parallel monetary instruments as substantial, for international purposes, as those of a major member state. There would be a parallel budget, fed by revenue from European bonds and energy levies as well as the customs duties, agricultural levies and a proportion of value-added tax—a budget that might in a few years approach the 2½ per cent of gross Community product foreseen by the MacDougall Report.[11] There would be significant parallel legal instruments such as the ' optional ' specifications and the anti-trust legislation. Indeed, with the exception of the common external tariff, the agricultural prices and levies and the energy prices and levies, the more important instruments of the Community policy would almost all be parallel, not exclusive. Yet the Community would possess the resources of a middle power, at least in the economic field; and where the instrument is exclusive, like the common tariff, or when the member states align their own policies, using their own instruments, with the common Community policy, the Community could match the United States in weight and effectiveness.

11 *Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration*, (Brussels. Commission of the European Communities, April 1977)

The member countries might well conclude that an extranational Community constructed on these lines would meet their needs for common action. If they did, there would be no automatic accretion of further power to the Community. The political weight of the member states would remain too great for that. Thus the extranational Community could remain indefinitely in equilibrium with the member states. If, however, the member countries found the time was ripe to lock their parities irrevocably to the ECU, and thus in effect replace the national currencies by the common currency, or if for other reasons they found it desirable to tilt the balance towards the European institutions, they would be well placed to carry out their political decisions to do so. Meanwhile, extranationalism may provide the concept the Community needs if it is to consolidate the launching of the EMS and of the European elections into a new and more dynamic phase of Community development, compatible with both the needs for common action and the facts of economic divergence.

SALT II AND AMERICA'S EUROPEAN ALLIES

Lord Chalfont *

In this article Lord Chalfont urges the United States Senate to reject SALT II, or subject its ratification to stiff conditions and a renewed American military effort. The following article, by Dr Christoph Bertram of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, calls upon the Senate to ratify the agreement.

WHETHER or not the United States Senate eventually ratifies the SALT II agreement in its present form is essentially an American concern since it is a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union—and a great number of Americans have provided testimony about it from a broad and deep reservoir of experience, political wisdom, and technical knowledge. Some of them have explained why they believe the SALT II agreement to be potentially disadvantageous, indeed some would say dangerous, in its effects upon the national security of the United States; others have disputed this proposition.

Yet there is a very real sense in which SALT II is a Western European concern as well. In the first place, if it is true, as some American strategic experts and military advisers have suggested, that the sure defence of the United States against attack would be put at risk by SALT II, that in itself is a matter of grave concern to America's European allies. For it is as true today as it has been since the end of the Second World War that the safety—indeed the very survival—of Western Europe depends upon the strength, confidence and security of the United States of America. The Western Alliance is indivisible; and while it is possible that American national security *might* be assured without a free and strong Western Europe, it is certain beyond doubt that Western Europe cannot be defended without a free and strong America.

Apart from this central and simple proposition that anything that is bad for the United States is bad for Western Europe, there are certain aspects of SALT II which, it can be argued, are intrinsically bad for Western Europe whether or not they are perceived to be bad for the United States. Before examining these specific issues, it is as well to deal with a question which is already in the minds of many members of the United States Senate, and which clearly demands an answer. Many of the foremost political leaders of Western Europe have already endorsed the SALT II agreement in unequivocal terms and have expressed the

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hope that it will be ratified by the Senate. As they presumably have access to the best intelligence and military advice available in their respective countries Americans are entitled to ask why their views should not be accepted without further reservation as the position of Western Europe on this issue.

There are, in fact, two main reasons why it would be unwise for Americans to draw this conclusion. In some cases these prompt endorsements of SALT II have been made, often against the weight of military and other expert advice, for a political reason which is perceived, it may be mistakenly, to be of overriding importance. This consideration derives from the belief that failure by the Senate to ratify SALT II would deal a severe blow to the prestige and credibility not only of the American President, who signed the treaty, but of the Presidency itself—and therefore of the United States in its relationship with the Soviet Union. But the criteria which govern all other arms control agreements are surely applicable equally to SALT II. Arms control and disarmament, like military defence and economic power, are aspects of the broader concept of security. An arms control agreement which enhances national or alliance security is likely to be a good one: any such agreement which erodes that security is bound to be a bad one. And *if* SALT II can be demonstrated to be bad by that definition, its ratification is likely in the long term to do more damage to the prestige and credibility of the United States than its considered but forthright rejection before it enters into force.

The Obsolescence of MAD?

Moreover the expressions of support for SALT II from the leaders of Western Europe have frequently been based upon an outdated perception of the character of the strategic confrontation between the super-powers. It is not generally recognised in the United States that the level and sophistication of strategic analysis and debate in Western Europe is, by American standards, amateurish and simplistic. European political leaders are not accustomed to the kind of constant academic examination of strategic issues which is readily available to the American political establishment. One of the results of this is that, except in a few centres of advanced study, SALT II is being assessed in the context of a strategic conception which has ceased to be valid or even relevant—the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, otherwise known as the nuclear stalemate, or the balance of terror. This is based upon the idea that each side in the strategic confrontation possesses such a devastating and certain power of retaliation that neither side could win a nuclear war, or even survive a nuclear exchange; and that therefore nuclear weapons would never be used.

Western Europe is, as usual, some way behind the United States in realising that recent technological innovations have cast serious doubt on the validity of the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine—and that there is evidence that the Soviet Union is incorporating these innovations into a strategic posture which might confer upon it the ability to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons with some degree of credibility. One of the more direct forms which this might

take is the achievement by the Russians of a nuclear arsenal so powerful, accurate, penetrative and invulnerable that they become able—and are seen clearly by the United States to be able—to destroy such a large number of American land-based missiles in a surprise attack, using a relatively small part of their own missile force, that retaliation by the United States would be suicidal. The balance of power would then be decisively changed, and the political will of the United States to resist Soviet pressures would be seriously eroded. If SALT II is seen in this context, instead of in the more symmetrical and stable perspective of a mutual capability for assured destruction, some of the provisions of the agreement assume an entirely different significance—especially in the specific context of the security of Western Europe.

This is not to suggest that the possible acquisition by the Soviet Union of a first strike option against the United States is simply or exclusively a function of SALT II. There is good reason to suppose that Russian planners have been moving in that direction for some time, and that they will achieve their aim, irrespective of SALT, unless the United States takes certain decisions in strategic nuclear policy entirely outside the context of the arms control dialogue with the Soviet Union. On the other hand SALT II itself contains a number of disquieting implications. For example, the entitlements of each side in the deployment of strategic delivery systems appear to be equal, but they do not reflect the capacity or the will of the two opposing sides to take advantage of their quotas. Whereas it is probable that the Soviet Union will take up its full allocation of 820 ICBMs with multiple independently guided warheads (MIRVs) it is unlikely that the United States will go much beyond its current level of 550.

Furthermore the SALT II agreement, in concentrating on numbers of launchers, has ignored some of the more significant characteristics of nuclear weapon systems—notably their potential for destruction in the counterforce role. As a result, during the lifetime of the Treaty, on the evidence of recent developments in the force structure of both sides, the strategic balance is likely to shift progressively towards the Soviet Union. It will not be until the late 1980s, if by then the American Missile X is deployed, that this trend might be halted; and if, as many well-informed observers believe, the SALT II agreement cannot be adequately verified by national means, the Soviet Union—by the sort of ' flexible ' interpretations of treaty obligations only too familiar to students of Russian foreign policy—might achieve such a degree of strategic superiority that the United States would be unable to close the gap without a crippling economic effort. Indeed one disenchanted American observer has gone so far as to suggest that the imbalance between the two sides at the end of the Treaty period is likely to be so great that it is pointless to worry about the adequacy of verification procedures: the Americans have been so generous in their concessions that there is no need for the Russians to cheat! This, indeed, identifies the central problem for the United States. SALT II, certainly not a measure of nuclear disarmament, does not even ensure a satisfactory strategic

balance. By its very nature it can neither guarantee nor prevent the achievement of such a balance—that will depend substantially upon whether the United States administration has the will to take certain important decisions in the procurement of strategic weapon systems.

The apparent readiness of President Carter to make important unilateral concessions has further undermined the already precarious confidence of many Europeans in the credibility of the central deterrent in the specific context of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. It is in this important respect that the SALT debate in the United States has begun to affect strategic thinking amongst the European members of NATO. The concept of nuclear deterrence has always been more psychological than technical—it is a matter of instinctive confidence rather than rational analysis of computer print-outs and hypothetical scenarios. Many Europeans have always had profound reservations about the wisdom of a strategy which relies upon the decision of an American President to authorise the use of nuclear weapons in a situation in which the territorial integrity and security of the United States itself were not at risk. But in general Europeans have lived with these doubts, partly because there was no practical alternative to doing so, and partly because the Americans *themselves* have always seemed confident about the state of the strategic balance and, by extension, about the validity of their own nuclear guarantee. Now neither of these certainties can any longer be taken for granted—and as a result there is a greater concern with what is sometimes called the Eurostrategic balance. In this context SALT II raises at least two important questions for Western Europeans: the effect of the Protocol to SALT II on European defence options; and the confusion surrounding the provisions of the Treaty regarding ' non-circumvention ' and the transfer of technology.

The Problem of the Protocol

Under the Protocol to the Treaty the United States has undertaken not to construct or deploy land-based or sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) with a range of more than 600 kilometres, without extracting any comparable concession from the Soviet Union. This undertaking assumes a special significance at a time when the theatre balance has already moved perceptibly in favour of the Soviet Union. Since the removal of the American *Thor* and *Jupiter* missiles in the early 1960s, the Warsaw Pact has held a demonstrable advantage over NATO. This is now being emphasised by the development of the SS20 missile and the *Backfire* bomber, and by the progressive obsolescence of comparable NATO nuclear delivery systems such as the British *Vulcan* bomber. The SS20 is an especially significant factor since it has a clear counterforce capability—carrying with it the possibility that, in a kind of microcosm of the central strategic balance, it could be used to destroy the airbases and nuclear stockpiles of NATO in Europe, thus effectively destroying the theatre retaliatory capacity.

One of the obvious answers to this threat is the long-range cruise missile, an

option now apparently foreclosed by the Protocol to SALT II. It is true, as the proponents of SALT II are at pains to insist, that the Protocol is supposed to last only until December 31, 1981. Yet, as Dr Kissinger has pointed out, it would surely be flying in the face of all historical experience to suppose that when the Protocol expires the American President will at once be liberated from all its restrictions. And in case anyone should believe that he *would* be free to go ahead with such programmes as long-range SLCMs and GLCMs, the Soviet Union has lost no time in making its own position clear. In *Pravda* of February 11, 1978, American criticism of the restrictions on cruise-missile development was described as:

> a blatant attempt to ensure right now that after the three-year term of the Protocol ends, there is freedom of action to develop such missiles and increase their agreed range above 600 km, and ultimately to retain the possibility of deploying them outside the United States . . . yet another attempt to emasculate the limitations already agreed on and to wreck the agreement as a whole.

There can be little doubt that the expiration of the Protocol will, at best, be followed by further protracted negotiations on the subject of long-range cruise missiles. SALT II has, in effect, ruled out the GLCM and SLCM as a theatre nuclear system for as long as the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in negotiations for SALT III; the experience of SALT I and II suggests that this may well take us very near to the end of the century.

To these uncertainties it is necessary to add some powerful reservations about the transfer of technology and what is generally known as the ' non-circumvention ' clause in the SALT II agreement. The peripatetic advocates of the Treaty—irreverently known as the salt-sellers—have been energetic in their campaign to persuade West Europeans that there is nothing in the Treaty which will affect ' the normal pattern of technological co-operation ' between the United States and the rest of NATO (much as they have been insisting, with many a genuflexion towards the great God of ' classified information ', that the United States has the capacity for adequate unilateral verification of the Treaty). However, if one considers the Protocol restrictions and the non-circumvention provisions together, it is possible to speculate that not only will GLCM and SLCM systems be forbidden to the West European members of NATO, but that there may also be a prohibition, under the terms relating to technological transfer, against the mounting of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on tactical aircraft based in Europe. The implications of all this are that there will be, to say the least, violent disagreements about the interpretation of these provisions in the Treaty; and America's allies are far from being confident that these disputes will be resolved in a way which will safeguard the security of Western Europe.

The consequences of SALT II and the scepticism which it has aroused concerning the credibility of the central strategic deterrent may yet go deeper than a simple preoccupation with the Eurostrategic balance and the modernisation of theatre nuclear forces. Some Europeans are once again beginning to flirt with the idea of some kind of collective West European

strategic nuclear striking force, possibly based upon the existing French and British national systems. The appalling difficulties of the command and control of such a strike force, in the absence of a single centre of political and military decision-making in Western Europe, need no elaboration to anyone with memories of the Multilateral Force fiasco of the 1960s. And it scarcely needs saying that the establishment of any nuclear weapons system involving the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany—and it is difficult to conceive of any effective European nuclear striking force *without* German participation—would abruptly cancel out any advantage which SALT might be thought to bring to the climate of relations between the Soviet Union and the West. As the nations of Western Europe begin to realise that the achievement of strategic superiority by the Soviet Union cannot be redressed by European action alone, an even greater danger might emerge—a temptation in some European NATO countries to bow to the apparently inevitable, seeking separate accommodation with the Soviet Union while it is still available.

In considering, therefore, whether it should ratify the SALT II agreement, the United States Senate ought to insist upon one clear and indispensable condition. It is that the Administration should halt the progressive decline of the West into a condition of strategic inferiority and recreate through a vigorous military policy the condition of strategic stability which SALT II has failed to ensure. This will involve, amongst other things, modernising the existing ICBM force to improve its capacity to survive a Soviet first strike; improving the capacity of the American offensive systems to penetrate and destroy Russian *military* targets; modernising the strategic air force to provide platforms for ALCMs; and maintaining unequivocally the right to transfer cruise-missile and other relevant technology to the European members of NATO.

Finally, the Senate can hardly ignore the vital matter of ' linkage ' between strategic arms control and the general direction of Soviet foreign policy. Any ratification of SALT II should be made contingent upon the adoption by the Russians of a foreign policy fundamentally different from the aggressive, expansionist *weltpolitik* which it is pursuing relentlessly, especially in Africa and the Middle East. The real significance of SALT II lies not in arcane arguments about non-circumvention, throw-weight, launch-on-warning, or transfer of technology—as important as these considerations may be to international arms control negotiators. It lies to a very large extent in perceptions of America's continuing resolve to act as the leader and protector of the free world. That resolve is, to say the least, a matter of some doubt in the hearts and minds of many Europeans; it is, therefore, possible that the same doubt is beginning to take shape in the minds of the Russians as well. The security of the West depends upon the ability of the American President to extinguish this doubt before it begins to affect their foreign policy calculations. This, one can only hope, will be a decisive factor when the Senate votes on the ratification of this agreement.

SALT II AND THE DYNAMICS OF ARMS CONTROL

Christoph Bertram *

This article forms a companion-piece to Lord Chalfont's. Dr Bertram urges the United States Senate to ratify the SAL agreement and presses American and West European leaders to begin thinking seriously about new approaches to arms control in SALT III.

WHEN this article is published the United States Senate will almost have completed its examination of the new Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Arms—SALT II. It has already proved to be an exhaustive examination, from which the Treaty has emerged well. As the witnesses have proceeded through the hearings on Capitol Hill, it has become clear that there is little to fault in the Treaty over-all, as well as its specific clauses: it is the well drawn-up product of a long-drawn negotiation lasting almost seven years, and it represents a careful balance of concessions, diminishing the security neither of the United States nor of the Soviet Union. But in this debate another feature has also emerged—the Treaty itself has moved from the centre of the stage to the wings. It has been overshadowed by the more fundamental issue of whether the United States has fallen behind in the strategic balance, and if so what is needed to restore the balance. As the dynamics inherent in the over-all strategic situation have come to the fore, the Treaty itself has become less and less controversial.

This article will, therefore, devote only its first part to the specific clauses of the Treaty and the objections that have been raised against them. The second part will discuss some of the limitations of arms control which the Treaty and the debate have underlined. The third and final part will address some of the problems that the Treaty and, more important, the dynamics of SALT will pose for America's allies in Europe.

Judging SALT II

How one judges the Treaty depends to some extent on the yardsticks against which it is to be measured. Those who judge arms control on the basis of whether or not it produces effective disarmament must be disappointed by this Treaty (as they must have been by its predecessor, SALT I). It stipulates actual reductions only in respect of one criterion of strategic power, and an old-

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fashioned one at that: the number of all strategic delivery systems is fixed at such a level—a total of 2,250 for land-based, and sea-based intercontinental missiles and strategic bombers—that the Soviet Union will have to phase out some 250 strategic weapons.[1] In all other respects, the Treaty applies the formula that distinguishes the control of arms from disarmament: it sets *upper limits*—for land-based missiles with multiple warheads (MIRV), for sea-based missiles with MIRV, for strategic bombers armed with missiles, for the maximum number of warheads for strategic delivery systems, for the introduction of new strategic weapons, etc. It will, therefore, not produce a reduction in nuclear arsenals. On the contrary, if both sides do no more than is permitted under the Treaty, they will end up by 1985 with substantially increased nuclear forces. Judged by the standards of disarmament, this Treaty is, therefore, a failure.

But it is, on the other hand, a success by the standards of arms control. It provides basic predictability for strategic planning, and it establishes a set of obligations against which the behaviour of the other side can be measured. Without it, the Soviet Union would not necessarily—as some SALT supporters claim—continue forever the consistent increase in its strategic forces that has marked the past decade: but the resulting unpredictability would leave worst case analysis unchecked. SALT II checks it. Further, without it there would be no set of rules to which the other side could be held accountable. SALT II provides it. Here—no more, but also no less—lies its contribution to arms control. It is an important and valuable one, particularly at a time of major technological and political change—when unpredictability in the strategic relationship could lead to dangerous miscalculation.

Against this, the critics of SALT II have raised a number of objections, some more weighty than others. It has been argued that the Treaty freezes the United States in a state of strategic inferiority. But nothing that American strategic planners regard as essential for the maintenance of a sound strategic balance is prohibited by the Treaty. It has been claimed that the Treaty is asymetrical because it allows the Soviet Union to have some 308 ' heavy ' missiles and not the United States, and because it leaves out of the equation medium-range weapons—like the *Backfire* bomber or the SS-20 missile—which only the Soviet Union has. But the United States has no place for heavy missiles in its own strategic plans, and the Treaty would not prohibit it from building medium-range systems similar to those which the Soviet Union possesses.

Most important in inducing some of the scepticism over SALT has been the issue of verification. Since the Soviet Union, so the argument goes, cannot be trusted to stand by the obligations of the Treaty, they are only worth as much as the ability of the United States adequately to verify Soviet military programmes; and this ability, the critics say, is by no means assured.

It is true that many innovations in strategic nuclear forces are qualitative

1 The United States arsenal is below that level already

rather than quantitative, and hence much less readily observable through satellite and other verification techniques. This is one of the increasingly weighty limitations of the traditional quantity-based approach to arms control. The strains this produces are visible in the text of the SALT II Treaty itself, which obliges both parties to make their military programmes more transparent precisely in order to make the task of verification easier. Even then it seems unlikely that the United States—in spite of the panoply of watching and listening devices at its disposal, on the ground, under the sea and in space—can fully monitor the whole spectrum of Soviet strategic military efforts, particularly if the Russians sought to camouflage them deliberately. Complete verification is impossible.

But complete verification is also not needed. What is required is that the United States should have the ability to detect those violations of the Treaty which, if unchallenged, could rapidly lead to significant military advantage for the other side. And such ' adequate verification ' does seem to be assured. Although the classified nature of verification procedures and results make it impossible for any outsider to assess this with utter certainty, at least three factors render plausible the claim by the American Administration that SALT II is adequately verifiable.

(1) To judge by existing East-West arms control agreements, the Soviet Union has, as a rule, stuck to the obligations it has entered into whenever these were clear and unambiguous. It is when the obligations were open to a range of interpretations that the Soviet Union has pushed to the limit of what was formally permissible—and thus often beyond what Western governments regarded as corresponding to the implicit, rather than the explicit, meaning of the relevant restrictions. Soviet ' cheating ' has thus usually consisted not of the violation of clear-cut rules but of the exploitation of ambiguities. The SALT II negotiators have made a major and largely successful effort to reduce—through precise language and jointly agreed interpretations—the area of ambiguity. The unilateral termination in 1962 by the Soviet Union of the nuclear test moratorium—an incident often referred to as evidence for the alleged untrustworthiness of Soviet undertakings—is a case in point rather than an argument to the contrary. The test moratorium was a voluntary, non-formal understanding of unilateral restraint by the nuclear weapon states of the time—it was not a binding international agreement.[2] That such an understanding was revoked provides no evidence for Soviet non-compliance with formal agreements; rather, it argues for formal and precise agreements to bind the parties in a clear and unequivocal manner.

(2) The second factor which lends plausibility to the confidence of the American administration in the adequate verifiability of SALT II lies in certain features of the Treaty itself. Because many weapons improvements are not observable once they are introduced, the Treaty has sought to cover not only

2. Indeed, President Kennedy had declared in 1961 that the United States considered itself free to resume testing at any time of its choice.

actual weapons but also preparations preceding their actual introduction—when new technologies are subjected to observable tests. This does not, of course, eliminate all risks of covert circumvention: but it does make it less likely that the Soviet Union could spring on an unsuspecting Western world new strategic capabilities which would threaten significantly to alter the strategic equation.

(3) Perhaps most important, the Treaty gives both sides such latitude with their strategic programmes that they can quite legitimately pursue those military efforts that they deem necessary. Why act clandestinely—thus risking the humiliation and political consequences of detection—when you can do what is necessary straightforwardly and above-board? This consideration does, of course, emphasise once again the distinction between arms control and disarmament. SALT is not disarmament. It is an attempt at regulating super-power strategic competition, and SALT II probably represents the sum of the restraints that both sides have been willing to accept. None of the critics of the Treaty has so far been able to offer evidence that more would have been negotiable.

SALT II and the Wider Issues

However, it is not by accident that the SALT debate has tended to bypass the Treaty itself. Strategic arms control is no longer supported by enthusiasm—it is surrounded by uneasiness. The reasons for this are two-fold: disappointment over arms control as an instrument of security policy, and the political context in which the debate on the ratification of SALT II takes place. Just as the critics have found it difficult in reality to fault the Treaty, so its proponents have found it difficult to present it as a major contribution to America's—and the West's—security. The debate has by-passed it because the contribution it makes is secondary: SALT has been unable to address adequately the major strategic concerns of the United States as they have emerged in recent years.

These are, on the face of it, hardware concerns. The growing accuracy of intercontinental nuclear missiles will increasingly undermine what has been held, for two decades, to be the essential condition of strategic stability: the invulnerability against attack of second-strike nuclear forces. Yet SALT II does not—and cannot—produce solutions to this problem. For this, much more radical answers will have to be found than the management-orientation of traditional arms control is capable of producing. Arms control—the effort to limit and regulate military power, to channel it into less dangerous directions—is almost by definition evolutionary and not revolutionary.

Beyond this growing concern there is another, which arms control is even less able to satisfy—a concern arising from the fact that the period of Soviet-American arms control (1969-1979) has been, at the same time, a period of Soviet strategic advances and American strategic retreats. It does not, in the first instance, matter whether this circumstance is the result of a decline in

American power or of Soviet expansionism. Indeed, closer scrutiny of the international situation reveals that the alleged ' successes ' of Soviet power beyond the traditional Soviet zone of influence are at best precarious: if a power of the size and strength of the Soviet Union is limited in its alliances to the likes of Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola and Cuba this is scarcely an impressive record of expansionist success. Similarly, a closer distinction between the realities and the appearance of America's influence in international politics will reveal much more real effectiveness than Americans give themselves credit for. It is true that the peculiar style of the Carter administration has weakened the respect for, and the credibility of, American power; but it says a great deal for the potential of American influence that it continues to make itself felt throughout the world in spite of this.

The fundamental reason why the uneasiness over the changing appearances of power has undermined, for many in the United States and elsewhere in the West, the relevance of the kind of dividends that arms control can bring probably lies here—in the fact that arms control seemed to hold forth the promise of fixing the status quo, but that this measure of stability has not been achieved. The Soviet Union has consistently demonstrated—in its strategic programmes, as in its activities in the Third World—that it does not share this notion of stability; for from the Soviet perspective the status quo generally describes a state of affairs favouring the West.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the SALT debate has focused more on how to cope through means other than arms control with Soviet challenges to stability. If a consensus seems to have emerged, it is this: that SALT II should be used to apply pressure on the administration to undertake a major stepping-up of military expenditure over the next years, and to increase leverage on the Russians by making Soviet respect for stability a condition for maintaining the SALT regime of strategic arms control—thus, in Henry Kissinger's words, ' putting the Soviet Union on notice that continued attempts to upset the global equilibrium will not be tolerated '.

If these conditions should be accepted, the result may not be bad policy—particularly if it gives renewed confidence to the Americans. But here is yet another indication of how difficult it is to integrate arms control properly into Western policies. Arms control only if arms programmes are intensified: this surely implies that arms control is a risk to security which must be offset by additional armaments. Arms control only if the Soviet Union respects Western interests beyond the Treaty: this implies that the West needs SALT less than the East and that it has a higher stake in Third World stability than the Soviet Union has in the expansion of its power. The misunderstanding of arms control is evident in both instances (and even the tradition of political bargaining within the American system of government does not fully exonerate it): if arms control is bad, then not even the most ambitious arms programme can offset this; and if it is in the Western interest on its own terms, then treating it as conditional on Soviet ' good behaviour ' makes little sense.

The difficulty, so evident in these examples, of integrating arms control into the spectrum of Western security policies is compounded by the special circumstances in which the SALT ratification debate is taking place. The negotiations leading up to the Treaty have taken very long indeed, prolonged both by the ambitions of the new Carter administration, in 1977, to put its own stamp on the SALT process, and by the changing political climate of American political opinion. Had President Carter decided in 1977 to complete the negotiations undertaken by his predecessor SALT II would have been over two years ago. Instead he decided to change the thrust of the talks, only to find that the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the proposed changes. This meant valuable time lost. Not only did the administration have to overcome its own disappointments—but it was faced with an increasingly powerful and articulate anti-SALT movement. Much of America's negotiating effort over the past two years has been taken up in the frustrating task of seeking to protect the eventual Treaty against SALT's critics; the result may be a sounder and tidier agreement—but whether these mostly marginal improvements will have been worth the delays must remain open to question. The political costs will be starkly evident if the Senate should fail to ratify the Treaty—since this would amount to nothing less than a central blow to the President's international authority. If an administration which has put so much effort and political capital into the Treaty negotiations should be incapable of engaging the necessary legislative support its authority would be shattered across the board—for allies and adversaries alike, for Asians, Arabs, Africans and Europeans. America would appear incapable of orderly international conduct. It is the fear of these consequences which has been at the root of the widespread support for the ratification among America's allies. Precisely because so much effort was given to the negotiation of an agreement in which the President's authority is so clearly invested, the political consequences of rejection would have profound and disturbing international implications—at least for those nations whose security depends on America's ability to act coherently.

The fact is that, in the absence of other major areas of bilateral co-operation, SALT has become for all intents and purposes identified with Soviet-American detente. This is clearly not a happy condition in which to pursue arms control, but it is the consequence not least of action taken by those in the United States Congress who prevented the laying down of other planks, for example in respect of trade, upon which Soviet-American relations might have rested more broadly. In the Kissingerian concept of a network of Soviet-American agreements which would combine incentives for constructive Soviet behaviour and sanctions against Soviet misconduct, arms control was just one aspect. It is of course true that failure to ratify SALT would not jettison the whole detente relationship. But, as matters stand strategic arms control has been asked to carry that relationship almost single-handed—and this is a task which it simply cannot perform. If SALT II were a bad agreement, it would be counter-

productive to detente. The agreement is reasonable; but even so it is not sufficient to carry alone the weight of the overall Soviet-American relationship.

There are two major lessons to be learnt from this experience. Arms control cannot be the substitute for other policies—neither for effectiveness in maintaining national security, nor for the improvement of East-West and Alliance relations. It is an instrument of security and foreign policy, and to ask it to do more means to discredit the instrument. The second lesson is closely related: unless the West succeeds in integrating the instrument of arms control with other instruments of security policy, it will be able to pursue neither sensible measures of arms control nor sensible defence policies. That it is easier to point to these lessons than to apply them is obvious—but it is nonetheless imperative to learn them.

Looking Towards SALT III

The experience of SALT II must caution us against the assumption that in the next round of strategic arms limitation talks we should merely continue along the road that the present agreement indicates—more limitations, perhaps real reductions, more qualitative restraint through quantitative limits, more of the same. This general argument for new thinking is emphasised further by the concerns of America's allies in Europe. For the real military problem SALT II poses for Europe lies in the dynamics it generates for SALT III.

Much of the European concern as to the immediate implications of SALT II has been laid to rest by the final text, as well as by assurances given by the Carter administration. The existing patterns of American co-operation with the allies in the nuclear weapons field will not be constrained by the Treaty: this applies to the transfer both of strategic nuclear technology and weapons systems (e.g. *Poseidon* to Britain), and of medium-range theatre nuclear capabilities to Western Europe (e.g. the *Pershing 2* missile and cruise-missiles). These assurances are further likely to be incorporated in formal reservations by the Senate attached to the Treaty. The Protocol to the Treaty does commit the United States not to deploy ground and sea-launched cruise-missiles of a range over 600 km; but this commitment runs out on December 31, 1981—that is, before such systems would be available anyway. If SALT II were the last East-West agreement on nuclear weapons the European allies of the United States would have little cause for concern: nothing that West European governments would wish to do to strengthen their nuclear capabilities over the next seven years is barred by the SALT II agreement.

But SALT II is *not* the end of the road. The interest of both super-powers in seeking to regulate their nuclear strategic competition is too powerful, and the political appeal of arms control is too strong not to expect future efforts by both sides to reach new and further-reaching agreements. In the light of the problems we have identified it would be wise for the United States and the Western Alliance as a whole to sit back for a while, to learn the lessons of

SALT II and seek to apply them, after a good deal of reflection, to the new round of negotiations. But it is here that the dynamics of SALT II come into play: the Treaty has attached to it a joint Statement of Principles that should apply to future talks, to be started once the present agreement is ratified. These emphasise the need for further reductions, and they undertake to address, among other matters, the issues raised by the Protocol. In other words SALT III—to judge by the formally declared intentions of both signatories—should indeed seek more of the same.

It is obvious that one major objective of the Soviet Union will be precisely a new and more durable curb on those weapons which the Protocol addresses and which Moscow is clearly concerned about: ground and sea-launched cruise-missiles. Moreover, the reference to the issues dealt with in the Protocol will inevitably introduce into new negotiations the whole range of weapon systems commonly defined as 'forward-based systems'—non-strategic nuclear weapons that can reach, from forward positions such as Western Europe or Cuba, the homeland of one of the two superpowers. This is more than merely a technical, it is an eminently political point: since these are weapons upon which NATO's doctrine for defence and deterrence in Europe rests, their introduction into Soviet-American negotiations will also introduce directly American-European matters into the talks as well. Some European concerns—over the Soviet SS-20 missile and other Soviet systems that are as yet excluded from SALT—point in the same direction; indeed some European governments are known to have pressed for the inclusion of these weapons in SALT III. The trouble is that to date nobody really knows how to achieve this—and the political as well as the military risk of getting things wrong is considerable.

The other shadow that lies over SALT III and the 'more of the same' approach is that the major American strategic concern during the 1980s, the worry over the vulnerability of American land-based strategic missiles, is unlikely to be met by such additional limitations and even reductions of nuclear arsenals as can realistically be expected. And arms control that is peripheral to prevailing security concerns could become politically counter-productive.

However, none of the dynamics of SALT III are inevitable. There is still time to define a position for the next round of negotiations—to be expected sometime in 1981—which will meet the security interests of the United States and its allies and also succeed in marrying arms control to security policies. The point is that this is by no way an automatic process. Rather than relying on the directions laid down by SALT II, Western preparation for the next round should endeavour:—

1. to identify the main strategic security problems of the 1980s;
2. to assess the ways in which the instrument of arms control can help in meeting them;
3. to set up, in the Alliance, procedures for consultation and co-ordination

which can help to minimise the political strains that the extension of SALT to other than traditional ' strategic forces ' could so easily generate.

Above all it will be vitally important for the United States and the Alliance, as they prepare to enter the next round, that they know roughly where it is that they want to arrive at the end. The old dictum—if you don't know where you're going, every way will lead you there—simply does not apply to the sensitive effort of seeking security through constraints on military power.

WHATEVER HAPPENED TO ' EUROCOMMUNISM '?

Edward Mortimer, Jonathan Story and Paolo Filo Della Torre *

THE word ' Eurocommunism ' was coined in 1975 by the Italo-Yugoslav journalist Frane Barbieri. It had an immediate and extraordinary success, being rapidly adopted by commentators in many countries and, by the end of 1976, accepted as a label by the three largest Communist Parties of Western Europe: those of Italy, France and Spain. In November 1977 it was condemned as ' a dangerous term ' by the then Foreign Secretary, Dr David Owen. Throughout these years, culminating in March 1978 with the formal entry of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) into the governing parliamentary majority and with the legislative elections in France—which until the very last moment seemed likely to produce a Socialist-Communist coalition government—controversy raged in Europe and beyond about the extent and significance of the changes in major Western communist parties. But this controversy was nourished chiefly by the fear, or the hope, that one or more of these parties might soon succeed in imposing itself as a partner in the government of a West European country. Since the defeat of the Left in France, the swing of public opinion to the Right in Italy in the wake of the Moro kidnapping, and the stabilisation of Spain's new democracy under centre-right leadership, public interest in the phenomenon has waned. Indeed, the change of policy by the French Communist Party (PCF) and the sharp differences of opinion it has had with its Italian and especially its Spanish counterpart, have led some observers to join Dr Owen in questioning whether the term has any real content at all.

This article attempts to summarise the main developments in each of the three main ' Eurocommunist ' parties during the last year or so and then to draw some tentative conclusions about the nature of the phenomenon and its future, if any.

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Paolo Filo della Torre, Edward Mortimer and Jonathan Story are the editors of *Eurocommunism, Myth or Reality?*, published by Penguin Books in September 1979. The present article covers the most recent events since this study went to press.

The Italian Case

In Italy, the Communist Party is now going through one of its most difficult periods since the war. The general election in June confirmed the loss of support which had been sensed for the past year: its nationwide vote was down five per cent—from 34 to 29—but the losses were greater than average among workers and young people. The leader of the Young Communists, Massimo d'Alema, has admitted a drop in membership of 25 per cent. Some of the defectors have gone to the Radical Party, including leading intellectuals such as the Sicilian novelist Leonardo Sciascia. A few have gone to groups further left such as Il Manifesto and Lotta Continua, or even to the ' Partito Armato '—the generic term for the violent revolutionary movements such as Autonomia and the Red Brigades. But the largest number have abandoned politics altogether—a fact reflected in the unusually high abstention rate in the general election. Among those who remain there is widespread criticism of Enrico Berlinguer's leadership, essentially on the ground that his tactic of giving Communist support to a minority Christian Democrat government did not pay off, but rather rebounded on the party—which now has to share the blame for the consequences of thirty years of Catholic *malgoverno*, with all the privilege and corruption that that entails in the eyes of the party's traditional supporters.

In the big towns where Communist administrators took over after their spectacular local election victories in 1975, they are now in trouble. They have been unable to keep the promises made in opposition, partly owing to the debts which they inherited and the economic crisis affecting the whole country, but partly also to their own unwillingness to expose the inefficiency or dishonesty of their Christian Democrat predecessors, since these are still presented as potential allies.

Yet Berlinguer's strategy remains the official line. At the party Congress in March and in the Central Committee after the elections he was able to get it re-endorsed and to secure the re-election of his own supporters to key jobs, in spite of the growing opposition within the party. This opposition is now led by Pietro Ingrao, who refused re-election to the Speakership of the Chamber of Deputies in order to resume active political life. Outside the party Ingrao has links with the Manifesto group, the Radicals, the Socialists and even some left-wing Christian Democrats. He is opposed to the party's ' embourgeoisement ', and echoes the dissatisfaction of the young people and workers who are leaving it. But Berlinguer has resisted this pressure from the Left, as well as that from the Right—principally some of his own lieutenants—for an open revisionism which would transform the party into a kind of North European Labour or Social Democratic movement. Berlinguer has defended NATO, the European Community, the mixed economy and the profit motive; and from time to time he criticises repression in Eastern Europe. But he is not prepared to break the party's special relations with Moscow or to disown Marxist-Leninist theory.

This last point was the centre of a bitter polemic between Communists and

Socialists during the summer of 1978. Under Bettino Craxi, its leader since 1976, the Socialist Party has repeatedly challenged the Communists to disown their Leninist heritage, and has put itself forward as the nucleus round which all those who dislike the Communist strategy of ' historic compromise ' can gather, from the extra-parliamentary Left to the liberal-centre. In fact the historic compromise originally proposed by Berlinguer in 1973—a strategic alliance for progress between Communists, Socialists and Catholics—has not been achieved. Instead, there has grown up a tactical understanding between the PCI, now dubbed by Berlinguer a ' conservative revolutionary party ', and an influential fraction of the Christian Democrats.

Berlinguer's idea was that this understanding should lead eventually to a government of national unity including Communists. He knew that the Christian Democrats needed time to accept this, and would himself have been prepared to wait. But at the beginning of this year his hand was forced by pressure from inside the party and he had to put an ultimatum to the Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti, threatening to withdraw support from the government unless Communist ministers were appointed. Andreotti—who had taken over Moro's tactic of entangling the Communists little by little in the system of coalition government—was prepared to compromise with Berlinguer by appointing ministers who were not actually members of the PCI but ' independents ' elected to parliament on its lists. But this was vetoed by the right-wing Christian Democrats on the advice of Indro Montanelli, editor of the influential anti-communist newspaper *Il Giornale*.

As a result Berlinguer was forced to carry out his threat. The Andreotti government fell and a general election was called. Within the Christian Democrat party the strategy of using the Communists' loss of support and internal conflicts to isolate them has gained momentum steadily since then, culminating in August with the formation of a centre-right government led by the former Interior Minister, Francesco Cossiga, and the return of the Communists to formal opposition. This strategy is identified with the Christian Democrat elder statesman, now President of the Senate, Amintore Fanfani, but has also been discreetly encouraged by the Socialist leader, Craxi. The apparent emergence of an axis linking these two men is an important new development, and may presage the revival of the old centre-left coalition, excluding the Communists, later in the year. (For the moment, the centre-right government depends upon Socialist abstentions.) Beyond this, Fanfani's ambitions are believed to include his own accession to the Presidency of the Republic and the transformation of the political system to invest that office with powers similar to those enjoyed by the Head of State in France or the United States. To this end his supporters are now once again campaigning for major constitutional changes. Similar campaigns have failed in the past; but they could now be favoured by the swing to the Right affecting Western Europe as a whole and Italy in particular. Such a development would have very serious implications for the Communists, whose power, as the largest minority party, is derived in

great part from the workings of the present parliamentary system. At the end of August, in an article in the party weekly, *Rinascita*, Berlinguer strongly reaffirmed his belief in the historic compromise and also in the need for austerity policies to solve Italy's economic problems. This was generally seen as a bid to strengthen the position of Andreotti and of the Christian Democrat general secretary, Benigno Zaccagnini, against the expected challenge from hardliners supported by Fanfani at the coming Christian Democrat congress.

France—Two Steps Forward, One Back

In France, by contrast, the leadership of the PCF appears to have weathered more or less successfully the internal crisis which it provoked by its sudden abandonment of the alliance with the Socialist Party (PS) in 1977. Georges Marchais has been able to fulfil his pledge, given just as the storm of criticism was breaking after the Left's electoral disappointment in March 1978, that none of the critics would be expelled; and yet he has managed to exclude them from all the party's central decision-making bodies and has forced them to publicise their views for the most part outside the party, in the ' bourgeois ' media. Dissent has once again been presented as a marginal phenomenon, affecting mainly intellectuals and serving—' objectively ' if not subjectively—the designs of the party's opponents, among whom the Socialist Party now takes pride of place alongside ' le pouvoir giscardien '. This presentation seems to have been accepted, more or less grudgingly, by rank-and-file working-class Communists—or at least those who do not accept it have preferred to stay away from meetings rather than give overt support to the critics. And the party's electoral support has not suffered, at least if the results of the European elections in June are anything to go by. The campaign against the PS has apparently succeeded in stopping, if not yet in reversing, the drift of voters from PCF to PS which characterised the period of alliance between 1972 and 1977.

Some would say that the price of these limited and negative achievements has been the abandonment of ' Eurocommunism ', whether in the sense of democracy within the party, of independence from Moscow, or of the development of a common line with the other major communist parties of Western Europe. The way Marchais has handled the crisis has emphasised the fact that the PCF's organisation is still very much more centralist than democratic. The party's Twenty-Third Congress in May 1979, while referring to some imperfections of the ' socialist countries ' in the matter of democracy, none the less accorded them an ' overall credit balance ' (' *bilan globalement positif* ') and endorsed the Soviet position on most of the international issues of the day. And the PCF's fierce opposition both to the further integration of the European Community and to its enlargement has brought it into conflict with the Italian and Spanish parties (PCI and PCE)—which in the latter case has burst out into open polemic. Jean Elleinstein, an

internal critic who supports the Italo-Spanish version of Eurocommunism, has coined the word ' Gallocommunist ' to describe the PCF's present attitude.

Certainly it would be hard to argue that the PCF since 1977 has pursued its Eurocommunist development at the pace which it set itself in the winter of 1975–76. But it is fair to note that none of the positions taken at that time have actually been abandoned. Rather the development has been more or less frozen at the point which it had then reached, a point well short of the one reached by the PCI and PCE at the same period. But Marchais himself, in his report to the Twenty-Third Congress, went out of his way to assert that Eurocommunism, as he understood it, was neither dead nor dying, declaring that ' far from being outdated . . . the democratic road to a socialism in French colours, as defined by our Twenty-Second Congress (in February 1976), remains more than ever the only possible road . . .' And Elleinstein has admitted that the Twenty-Third Congress was not the straightforward reversal of the Twenty-Second which he and others had feared. Although he and his fellow-critics were not able to attend it, a great part of its time was devoted to refuting their arguments, and some of these were discreetly echoed in a speech by Claude Frioux, one of the authors of a pamphlet, *L'URSS et Nous*, which contained a critical account of the party's reaction to Khrushchev's revelations at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, and which had been published with the blessing of the party in the autumn of 1978. Marchais actually commended Frioux's speech to journalists attending the Congress, and even admitted that ' some of the criticisms addressed to us are well-founded '. He added that the party regarded the intellectual ' front ' as of crucial importance, and that intellectuals were not to be regarded as second-class citizens within the party. The fact that none of the critics have been expelled or disciplined is in itself an important break with the habits of the past; and to general astonishment Roland Leroy, believed to be the main advocate of a hard line within the leadership, has been dropped from the party secretariat.

With hindsight one can say that it was probably a mistake to regard the PCF's adoption of Eurocommunism as an aspect of its united Left strategy. It is true that its cautious and visibly reluctant steps in that direction before 1974—moves towards acceptance of plural democracy as a permanently valuable phenomenon, compatible with socialism—were generally wrung from it as the price of successive stages in the creation of a united Left. But the much more spectacular innovations of 1975–76 came well after the PS had begun to outdistance the PCF in opinion polls and by-elections, after its absorption of the ' courant autogestionnaire ' including Michel Rocard and leading members of the CFDT trade unions, and after a year of vigorous polemic between the two parties, notably on the subject of Portugal. In short it occurred at a time when (it now seems) the alliance with the PS had already become tactical rather than strategic; and the emphasis of the ' historic ' Twenty-Second Congress was not on unity of the Left but on the ' union du peuple de France ', dependent on ' the irreplaceable role of the party of the working class '. So describing itself,

the PCF implicitly relegated the PS to the role of representing some of those secondary social forces over which the working class was to exercise its 'guiding role' ('*rôle dirigeant*')—and thus served notice, though the warning went unheeded, that it would not agree to play second fiddle in a left-wing alliance in which the PS had become dominant. Eurocommunism was adopted not as a means of cementing the alliance with the PS but rather to compete more effectively with it.

The assumption underlying the united Left strategy had been that within the united Left the PCF would be the dominant force. This assumption must have been seriously questioned within the PCF leadership from the autumn of 1974, and finally abandoned in September 1977 when the PS resisted the PCF's pressure for a radical updating of the common programme. It was by then obvious that the programme as it stood was inapplicable to the economic circumstances of the late 1970s, and that the PS wanted to keep its hands free to revise the programme in a reformist direction once in office, while the PCF's role would be confined to delivering working-class support. The PCF leaders were not willing to play this role. They accepted that their overriding priority must now be to re-establish their own party's hegemony of the Left—and this meant demolishing the new and vigorous Socialist Party which they themselves, by their united Left strategy, had unintentionally helped to create. They now admit that, by signing the Common Programme of 1972, they gave the PS a kind of undeserved certificate of proletarian legitimacy, and thereby contributed to the revival of that social democracy which earlier generations of communists had recognised as their most dangerous rival—but which in more recent times had been successfully 'unmasked'. Now it has to be 'unmasked' all over again, by the old tactic of the united front from below—i.e., summoning rank-and-file Socialists to joint action on specific issues (such as unemployment in the steel industry) while vigorously denouncing their leaders as reformists and allies of Giscard.

It is too early yet to say whether this will work, but the latest signs are hopeful from the Communist point of view. The PS, whose strategy was based on the assumption of Communist support and its morale on the assumption of early victory, is now both demoralised and deeply divided. The PCF on its side retains many contradictions, and lacks a clear and credible positive strategy. But in that it is hardly unique.

Spain—the Italian Road

In Spain, the PCE has on the whole had an easier time than either the PCI or the PCF, principally because it has not had such high expectations to disappoint. By 1976 it was clear that Spain was not going to have a revolution of the Portuguese type—and that even if it did the Communists would not necessarily come out on top. The best hope for the Communists lay in a controlled transition to democracy, which would enable them to organise openly and build up their long-term strength while protecting them from a

military or fascist backlash. Seeing this, the party leaders adopted a consistent policy of impressing on their followers and on the country at large that the PCE intended to play a responsible role in the consolidation of democracy, thereby ensuring for itself a permanent position of influence, rather than to seek power in the short term. Their attitude was modelled on that of Togliatti in 1944, rather than that of Berlinguer or Marchais in 1976.

Their policy bore fruit when the party was officially legalised in April 1977; and it was on the whole justified by its showing in the first general election for forty years, which was held in June 1977. With 9·4 per cent of votes cast, the PCE was clearly not on a level with the PCI (34 per cent) or the PCF (20 per cent). But it was the third largest party in Spain, and something more than a marginal force. These results have been confirmed in the general and municipal elections held in the spring of this year.

The emerging pattern of Spanish politics bears some resemblance to that of France, with a centre-right party in power and a large, dynamic Socialist Party (PSOE) needing the support of the voters represented by the Communists in order to displace it. But so far neither PSOE nor PCE has proposed a formal left-wing alliance, except for the limited purpose of forming local administrations after the municipal elections this April—when this tactic was a marked success. Both parties fear that a left-wing alliance, recalling the *Frente Popular* of 1936, would reopen the wounds of the Civil War. But while the PCE's conclusion is to favour a period of government by broad consensus, the PSOE believes it can secure national consent for left-wing policies provided it is not yoked to the PCE. The victory of the centre-right UCD in the general election in March 1979 showed this belief to be unfounded, at least for the present, and has led to a crisis of identity within the PSOE similar to that which has beset the French PS since its defeat in March 1978. As in France, this can only benefit the Communists, for whom it must be a high priority to prevent the PSOE from realising its dream of a two-party system in Spain.

Another similarity with the PCF is that the PCE compensates for its relative electoral weakness by controlling the strongest trade union movement, the Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.), whose dominant position was confirmed in the union elections of March-April 1979—when it won over 40 per cent of votes cast, against 30 per cent for the Socialist UGT. But the PCE has used this strength rather in the Italian than the French manner—offering to deliver working-class support for government policies in return for a say in their fomulation. This was the basis of the Moncloa Pact between all the main political parties, signed in October 1977 at the residence of Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, which marked a further stage in the PCE's accession to respectability and enabled it to participate in the drafting of the new Constitution. But as with similar pacts in Italy and Britain, its economic benefits have failed to impress rank-and-file trade unionists—with the result that both Communist and Socialist trade unions lost ground during 1978 to more radical groups without party affiliation. The PCE has had in effect to

shelve its own economic policy proposals of 1975, which included extensive nationalisations, agricultural and tax reforms, and worker participation, in favour of wage restraint, a credit squeeze and efforts to reduce the government deficit. Fortunately 1978 did bring a slowing-down of inflation and an improvement in the balance-of-payments, but even so many party members remained sceptical; and in 1979 it seems likely that the PCE will have even less to show in the way of material rewards for its responsible attitude.

The main achievement claimed by PCE leaders in the last two years is to have contributed to the atmosphere of political calm and maturity in which it was possible to draft a new Constitution enjoying broad national support: this was finally voted by the Cortes in October 1978 and ratified by referendum in December. To achieve this they were willing to abjure their republican traditions and accept the monarch as arbiter and mediator, concurring in the definition of Spain as a ' parliamentary monarchy '. They also allowed the main institutions of the Franco regime—judiciary, armed forces, civil service, big business—to retain considerable influence in the new system, without undergoing fundamental reforms or purges. They even supported state subsidies to church schools—which did not stop the Catholic hierarchy from warning voters in March this year against ' materialist ' parties. This was perhaps typical of the reaction of the establishment to all the PCE's gestures of moderation: the concessions were gratefully accepted, but the general scepticism about the party's ulterior motives remained. Where reforms were introduced they were ones which the Communists were not alone in demanding—and the government had little dificulty in taking most of the credit for itself.

Moderation in practice was reflected in an adaptation of PCE theory. On the advice of its leader Santiago Carrillo, the PCE at its Ninth Congress in April 1978 agreed to drop the label ' Marxist-Leninist ' and describe itself henceforth as ' Marxist, revolutionary and democratic '. This was also the occasion for a demonstration of the party's internal democracy, since the proposal did not go through without a vigorous debate in the Congress, including sharp criticisms of the Central Committee and ending with 20 per cent of the votes cast against the motion. Similarly, at a lower level the old party cells have been replaced by larger units whose meetings are open to the public. But the formula of ' democratic centralism ' has been retained, and the dominant role of the General Secretary scarcely questioned.

The dropping of the Leninist label helped to accentuate competition with the PSOE, since both parties were now claiming to be simply ' Marxist '. But the Socialist leader Felipe González decided that this label, and the confusion with the PCE that it aroused, was a major obstacle to his party's success in broadening its support. This was the issue on which the crisis in the PSOE came to a head after the elections this spring: the majority of the PSOE Congress refused to follow González's advice and he resigned, leaving his party in considerable disarray. By contrast the PCE at present seems relatively

serene. It may be only in the longer term that it will face difficulties similar to those the PCI is now experiencing. But many of the same ingredients seem to be there. The policy of ' national concentration ' has begun to yield diminishing returns since the Constitution was adopted, and as in Italy the spread of terrorism casts the Communists in the awkward role of defenders of a state which in the eyes of their supporters is still very far from perfect, and which is unable to hold down either unemployment or inflation. Pressure from below to adopt a clearer opposition line, with emphasis on direct action, is bound to grow. But the PCE's leaders will certainly be very reluctant to yield to it, being well aware that only 20 per cent of the total labour force is unionised, and that most Spaniards are employed in small firms, already severely hit by the post-1973 slowdown in the economy and ill-equipped to absorb further rises in labour costs. Ironically, much of the labour movement's energy is at present devoted to a defensive struggle to preserve Franco's legislation guaranteeing job security against demands from employers for its repeal.

The PCE has so far contained the contradiction between its promotion of workers' demands and its avoidance of confrontation with the conservative establishment. But the task is getting gradually more difficult.

Waiting for the Tide to Reverse

At first sight the most striking thing about these three brief sketches of the scene in Italy, France and Spain may be the differences between them; both between the political situations in the three countries and between the parties themselves and their responses. Does ' Eurocommunism ' then mean no more than the freedom of national communist parties to work out their separate responses to national circumstances?

It does indeed mean that, and given the history of the international communist movement that is in itself a highly significant development. One reason at least for the lack of co-ordination between the three parties' policies is precisely their determination not to subject themselves again to anything remotely resembling the Comintern or Cominform, even on a purely regional basis.

We would argue, however, that Eurocommunism is also something more. The parties we are concerned with have rejected not only the international discipline of the Comintern but also the model of the Russian revolution. While for the most part accepting that Soviet society is in some sense ' socialist ' though Carrillo has questioned even this—they insist that the ' socialism ' they wish to build in their own countries is completely different from what exists today in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Even though in the last year or so all of them have made some attempt to improve their relations with Moscow and avoid further spectacular disputes, none of them has withdrawn from that fundamental position. Indeed this very improvement in relations can be read as reflecting an increased confidence in the recognition of their own

identity and independence, both by Moscow itself and by public opinion in their own countries. It takes the form of a diplomatic rapprochement between separate entities on a basis of equality and mutually accepted diversity, rather than a falling-into-line of subordinates behind a commander. There has been no question even of another European conference of communist parties like that at Berlin in 1976: Moscow has been forced tacitly to recognise that the movement which such conferences purport to represent no longer exists.

In fact, none of the positions adopted between 1975 and 1977 and generally identified with ' Eurocommunism ' has been abandoned. But nor has there been any further striking advance: it is rather as though each party's development in that direction had been frozen at the point it had reached by the autumn of 1977. This has served to emphasise the incompleteness of the development in each case, and also the fact that the development was far from exactly synchronised between the three parties. In the matter of democracy and open debate within the party, in particular, the PCE was out in front while the PCF lagged well behind. The PCF remains much more tightly controlled and more secretive about its real decision-making processes than the other two; and this gives it greater manoeuvrability. The PCF leaders were able in 1977 not only to discern the dangers into which their strategy was leading them but to impose on their followers a sudden and radical change in it, and then to ride out with relative *insouciance* the ensuing storm of protest and dissent.

It has been argued above that this change of strategy did not in itself amount to an abandonment of Eurocommunism. There is after all no inherent connection between Eurocommunism and the notion of unity of the Left. In Italy indeed it has been specifically associated with the rejection of Socialist proposals for a ' left-wing alternative ', on the grounds that a left-wing government with a narrow majority is too vulnerable to the fate of Allende in Chile. On similar grounds Carrillo in Spain refused to follow the PSOE in 1977 in campaigning against Suárez and the monarchy, and argued instead for a ' government of national concentration '; while since 1976 Berlinguer has been calling for a government of national unity, or national safety, with Communist participation alongside Christian Democrats and other non-socialist parties. Whether or not Marchais nurses similar aspirations in the longer term—as some French Socialists suspect—it can just as much be argued that in abandoning the union of the Left he was aligning himself on a Eurocommunist position as the reverse.

But what is true is that he was able to do so very swiftly, and to get away with it, largely because he did it *before* allowing Eurocommunist ideas on party organisation to be pushed too far. It can be argued, and perhaps would be argued in private by French Communist leaders, that by late 1977 the danger to the PCI of continuing to support the Christian Democrats was no less apparent, indeed more so, than the danger to the PCF of continuing to support the Socialists. But the PCI leaders have found it much more difficult to adapt their strategy to changing circumstances, and have had to face much more

open and serious opposition within their own party. Marchais may well conclude that *that* is one aspect of Eurocommunism he must avoid as long as he can.

All three parties, then, have been marking time in their development of specifically Eurocommunist positions while confronting some setbacks and difficulties in the application of their national strategies. The feeling the authors had, when trying to analyse Eurocommunism in 1977 and early 1978, of observing an animal that would not stay still long enough to be drawn, had been replaced by the feeling of watching a film whose image has frozen on the screen, or listening to a gramophone record that has got stuck. On the whole this confirms one major conclusion which we drew just over a year ago: that Eurocommunism is not an autonomous phenomenon, but rather a response to external circumstances. In the mid-1970s almost all West European countries were seeking to confront the economic crisis by policies of concertation and consensus. The guiding idea was that it could be solved by obtaining the consent of the working class to wage restraint in return for a role in the shaping of general policy through the participation of its representatives in government. In the Latin European countries, where for historical reasons the largest labour organisations are communist-led, this implied integrating the communist parties into the political system. Eurocommunism attracted attention essentially because it seemed to provide a way round the ideological obstacles to such integration. The communist leaders developed Eurocommunism in response to a demand, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, from non-communists who needed their co-operation.

Several things have now interfered with this process. One was the incomprehension and hostility which it encountered in the United States and West Germany, where the problem does not arise in the same form but whose economic and political influence is such, particularly in Italy, that their support was virtually essential if the experiment were to go ahead. Another was the inconclusive or mediocre results of consensus policies on the economic level, and the consequent disillusionment of the economic elite with trade unions and their leaders as political partners, while on the ideological level Keynesian economic theory has been routed by monetarism. Perhaps most important of all has been the general deterioration of the international climate, both political and economic, since the plateau of the mid-1970s when it seemed that the Western world could be stabilised on the basis of detente with the Soviet Union and the re-cycling of petrodollars from the oil-producing states.

All this has led to a swing to the Right throughout Western Europe. For this some would blame the Italian and Spanish Communists for failing to offer a clear left-wing alternative,[1] or the French Communists for sabotaging the left-wing alternative which did exist in France. But it seems probable that the causes are more profound, and that Eurocommunists of both varieties were

1 See F. Claudin, *Eurocommunism and Socialism* (London: NLB, 1978)

right in thinking that in the climate of the late 1970s the left-wing alternative would have come to grief: either it would have resigned itself to piloting capitalism through the crisis, like the socialist governments in West Germany, Portugal and Britain, and then been jettisoned once capitalism had no further use for it; or it would have confronted the capitalist system head on, in which case it would almost certainly have gone down in blood like Allende.

For the time being parties are in power and policies in vogue which leave little role for Eurocommunism, other than a purely defensive one, and Eurocommunists, in common with the rest of the Left, seem unable to offer a convincing alternative. But the world economic climate may prove no more favourable to right-wing experiments than to left-wing ones. The working class may succeed in thwarting the monetarist offensive. In a year or two fashion may swing back to consensus and managed economies. If Eurocommunists can hold their parties together until then, they may yet have a role to play.

BOOKS

CHINA'S ECONOMY IN 1985: A REVIEW *

Werner Klatt * *

Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers. Joint Economic Committee, 95th Congress of the United States. Vol. I: Policy and Performance. *Washington: US Government Printing Office. 1978. 880 pp.* Vol. 2: Recomputation of Chinese National Accounts (*forthcoming*).

THE political pendulum in China has reversed its swing in the last few months: both inside and outside the country, last year's euphoria has given way to a reassessment of current performance and future possibilities. The young intellectuals of the People's Republic have been given to understand by their country's new leaders that personal freedom is a matter of licence rather than one of right. Political posters have been scraped off walls which small groups of dissidents had made their own. In place of their slogans neon lights have begun to appear advertising domestic and foreign wares. At the same time national and provincial planners have revised their views of what can be achieved during the remaining six years of the current Ten-Year Plan (1976–85), which came into force when the original Five-Year Plan (1976–80) failed to get off the ground. After two years during which wasted capacity was put back into use, the pace of advance is to be slowed down. According to Chairman Hua, the next three years will be devoted largely to readjustment, reconstruction, consolidation and improvement. This review of what seems possible in the few years which lie ahead is not unconnected with the outcome of the punitive incursion by the People's Liberation Army into Vietnam's northern areas, which proved costly in men and material. This experience was bound to call into question the likely success of the programme of ' the four modernisations '—an all-embracing concept which requires a periodical reassessment of political options accompanied by a reallocation of scarce resources. This process has just been completed for the year ahead. Some drastic retrenchment was approved at the second session of the National People's Congress (held in June 1979)—a mere fifteen months after the first session, at which a most ambitious set of targets for 1965 was announced.

In spite of being bedevilled by the effects and after-effects of the Cultural Revolution, which caused a great deal of waste, the last ten years yielded an average annual growth rate of at least 6 per cent. A continuation of this performance—let alone the improvement anticipated by Chairman Hua when announcing the outline of the Ten-

* The author wishes to thank members of the Chatham House Press Library for their assistance in the preparation of this article.

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Year Plan—will require a political stability and the husbanding of economic resources which China denied itself during almost half the period since planning was introduced in 1952. As the concept of economic self-reliance accompanied by political xenophobia gave way to an unexpected openness towards the world outside, foreign manufacturers, traders and bankers saw opportunities which had not existed for three decades of splendid isolation. Missions of merchants and technicians went back and forth. Their conversations with their Chinese counterparts raised hopes of unprecedented benefits at a time when world trade badly needed a boost. When as a result of these exchanges, the business prospects were assessed, not surprisingly a good deal of double-counting occurred. Moreover, in the absence of any firm data from official Chinese sources, trade and credit expectations could not be related in any meaningful manner to what China's political and economic potential was thought to be. To come to grips with the orders of magnitude in question, the uninitiated have to turn to the assessments emanating from the United States, where academics and civil servants are endowed with financial and material resources which are not available elsewhere in the Western world.

This is not the place to review the entire Western literature on the subject of China's economy.[1] Suffice it to say that in the United States, more than anywhere else, international area studies have greatly benefited from an uninterrupted dialogue between senior members of government departments and the country's most distinguished institutions of learning. The most prominent academic 'China-watchers' of the last decade include Yuan-li Wu of the Hoover Institution, Dwight Perkins of Harvard, Kung-chia Yeh of the Rand Corporation and the late Alexander Eckstein of Michigan.[2] Whilst far from agreeing with each other either in matters of detail or in their overall appraisal, they have contributed significantly to the understanding of China's overall performance, as expressed in terms of gross national product and gross domestic investment. On technical matters they have been supported by a large number of specialists in essential aspects of farming, industrial production, communications, energy, trade and finance. In working parties and conferences these analysts have shared the results of their researches with their opposite numbers in government departments, such as the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of Agriculture and of Commerce, Library of Congress and others. This co-operation has resulted, *inter alia,* in the Reports of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, the fourth of which was published in November 1978.[3]

In transmitting the Report to the members of the Joint Economic Committee of the 95th United States Congress, its chairman, Representative Richard Bolling of Missouri, refers to China as a '*major factor in world stability*'. His predecessors, Senators William Proxmire of Wisconsin and Hubert Humphreys of Minnesota, had described China respectively as an '*enigma and a potential threat to world stability*' and as a '*potential factor in world stability*'. These changes were more than verbal quibbles. They reflected shifts in domestic and foreign policy in both the People's Republic of China and the United States. Thus the Congressional Reports deserve greater attention than they are generally given outside the restricted circles of China-watchers and American legislators. Not surprisingly, during the period of more than

1. W Klatt, *China's National Accounts As Seen by Western Analysts* (Cologne: Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, 1978)

2 Yuan-li Wu, *PRC Developments Under the Teng-Hua Coalition* Hawaii Conference of the Pacific Forum (Hawaii, 1978), Dwight H. Perkins, ed., *China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1975), King-chia Yeh, *China's National Accounts* (forthcoming); Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge Mass Cambridge University Press, 1977)

3 Previous issues 90th Congress, *An Economic Profile of Mainland China* 2 Vols. (1967), 92nd Congress, People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment (1972), 94th Congress, *China A Reassessment of the Economy* (1975) published by the US Government Printing Office, Washington

ten years during which these Reports have been published, some of their contributors and some members of the Committees receiving them have been replaced by newcomers. Even so, a certain continuity of presentation was maintained, whilst changes in the political climate were reflected in the contents of the Reports. On Capitol Hill, Senators Proxmire of Wisconsin, Sparkman of Alabama and Javits of New York, and Representative Bolling of Missouri have belonged to the Congressional Committee on the economy of China since its inception. Among its members one looks in vain for a representative of the State of Washington; yet Seattle used to have—and is bound to have in the future—ties with China and other countries of the Far East (the Far West, as seen from that coast of the United States). The Vice-Chairman of the Committee has always been a Texan. Perhaps the smell of Chinese oil was in the air earlier than ordinary mortals realised!

The Reports are symposia to which most of America's China-watchers have contributed at one time or another. Among them, the reader invariably finds the familiar names of John Aird, the demographer; Arthur Ashbrook, the analyst of overall accounts; Robert Michael Field, the pioneer researcher in the industrial area; Leo Orleans, whose talents extend over spheres as diverse as manpower and education as well as science and technology; and John Hardt of the Congressional Research Service, who edited the last three Reports Among the great American institutions of learning, at one time or another Cornell, Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Michigan co-operated in the preparation of the Reports. Lately, the campuses on the West coast, such as Berkeley and Seattle, have been noted for their absence from the list of contributors; yet the intellectual interests of these communities in the affairs of the Western Pacific region have always been intense.

In passing judgment on China's performance, it is worth recalling the dearth of data on which to base any assessment. This lack of factual information is borne out by a glance at the tables of indicators as presented for 150 countries in the United Nations Statistical Pocketbook:[4] the table for China, the largest country in the world, shows less than 70 entries and has 80 blank spaces (the adjacent table for Columbia gives twice as many data). The position has hardly improved since Mao's death. At the Fourth National People's Congress in 1975 Zhou Enlai gave a dozen or so index figures on China's past economic record. Three years later, at the Fifth National People's Congress, Hua Guofeng limited his statistical documentation to a mere five firm target figures covering the Ten-Year Plan. Even the budget data released at the second session of the National People's Congress—for the first time in two decades—are sketchy in the extreme. Information on industrial and agricultural output is fuller than in the past. Whilst this makes possible comparisons of the economic record for 1952-57 and 1977-78, it is hardly sufficient for a reliable assessment of the country's overall economic performance. Thus the calculations and unofficial estimates contained in the Congressional Reports (and in other Western publications) are still essential parts of the travel kit of anybody venturing into what must be regarded as the world's largest *terra incognita*

The Reports should not be read as expressions of official American government opinion and policy. This is not to say that their authors are immune to the influences to which they are exposed both when visiting China and when working at their desks in the United States. Indeed, if one were to generalise from the account given by one member of the American intelligence community, the Nixon administration apparently at one time exercised a certain measure of persuasion on its officials to abandon their own departmental estimates and to aim at data conforming with what were believed to be official Chinese claims. It is impossible to say how successful this operation was: in any event, the US Department of Agriculture, for one, abandoned its

4 *World Statistics in Brief* (New York United Nations, 1978)

own estimates in 1975 in favour of Chinese claims, which had previously been thought to be on the high side. Officials were probably more exposed than others to influences of this kind. Nevertheless, some academics also underwent significant changes in their attitude towards Chinese sources and their meaning. Thus, in the early 1960s Professor Eckstein criticised the lack of reliable information from Chinese sources and described his method of analysis as ' economic archaeology '. Yet some fifteen years later, in his last work—published posthumously—he chose reconstructed official data in preference to his own estimates. In the course of this transformation, Eckstein raised by one-third and one-half respectively his estimates of overall and *per caput* economic growth rates for the period from 1957 to 1970—which included the unsettling years of the Cultural Revolution and those following the Great Leap Forward. Apparently under Eckstein's influence dramatic changes were also made in the Congressional Reports. These come to light when the findings of the second and third Reports are compared. For the years from 1958 to 1971—roughly the period covered by Eckstein's revisions—the third Report gave increases, compared with its predecessor, of between 40 and 50 per cent for industrial output and gross national product, and of 110 and 150 per cent respectively in the cases of agricultural output and *per caput* gross national product. No explanations for these amendments were given beyond a claim that the combination of a high population growth rate with a low agricultural growth rate was ' unsatisfactory '. The possibility of errors in both demographic and agricultural estimates was apparently not taken into account.

These comments do not represent mere historical reminiscences. They deserve to be borne in mind when considering the contents of the fourth Congressional Report, dealing with China's economy after Mao. This volume consists of five sections, dealing with all major aspects of the Chinese scene It was published when China had emerged from many years of doctrinal rigidity and had entered a phase of frank admission of past errors. As the publication of the Report preceded by little more than one month the signing of the Sino-American agreement on mutual diplomatic recognition, it may come as a surprise that by 1978 much of the ' optimism ' conveyed a mere three years earlier seemed to have evaporated. In fact, ' pessimism ' is the keynote of the introductory chapter to the Report of 1978, which is presented by Professor Dernberger and one of his graduate students at the University of Michigan. Dernberger presents his own alternatives to the projections given early in 1978 by Hua Guofeng for the then remaining eight years of the Ten-Year Plan. On the political plane, Dernberger expects infighting among various groups and individuals. In the economic sphere, he follows the earlier conservative estimates which he gave for the fifteen years up to 1990 in a book he wrote together with Allen Whiting.[5] Dernberger gives as his ' pessimistic ' forecast annual growth rates of 6·5 per cent overall and 4·7 per cent *per caput,* compared with Hua's ' optimistic ' projection of 8 4 and 6·5 per cent respectively—as reconstructed by the author.

Admittedly this assessment is followed in the Report by one presented by Nicholas Lardy of Yale who, though cautious in his judgment, seems to be ready on the whole to accept Hua's expectations, assuming that the political consensus within the Chinese leadership is not shaken. The Report's section on policy perspectives includes, apart from a speculative chapter by William Whitson on political vacillations, historical views expressed by Professor Eckstein in his last book; a sober factual account of the process of modernisation by N. R. Chen, a master in reading between the lines of Chinese statistics—who, however, leaves open the question whether China's performance between now and 1985 will follow Dernberger's or Hua's projections; and an interesting chapter by Leo Orleans on how the Russians view their

5 *China's Future Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post Mao Era* (New York: McGraw Hill for the 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations, 1978)

rival's development. The reader is introduced to the findings of Petrov and Molodtsova of the Russian Institute of Economics of World Socialist Systems, which is more realistic in its assessment of China's economic performance than is the Institute of the Far East, the fountain of Russian conventional wisdom about the Middle Kingdom.

Finally, the concluding chapter of the first section of the Report gives one more factual account of the main economic events of the past. As for the future, Arthur Ashbrook, the author of this contribution, rightly regards Hua's steel and grain targets for 1985 as unattainable. Like other contributors to the Report, he does not appear to expect a large expansion of imports or foreign debts. This was, of course, written early in 1978, when no member of the team had the slightest inkling of what President Carter and Chairman Hua were up to. Before the Report had reached a wider public, the world was faced with the results of the negotiations carried out by the two leaders (who had been thought to prefer open to secret diplomacy). The Sino-American accord which was reached before the end of the year invalidated some of the most recent and most authentic calculations. Some of those contained in the Report were not spared this fate either. In the final pages of his contribution, Ashbrook provides, as on previous occasions, his ' simplified accounts ' (p. 230). Until they are replaced by Dr K. C. Yeh's improved calculations in the forthcoming second volume of the Report, Ashbrook's estimates form—so to speak—the roof of the house in which the Chinese live. The remaining three-quarters of the Report cover the main aspects of China's development. The material contained in these sections provides the bricks and mortar of the edifice which is to house China's economy for a good many years to come.

Population, industry, agriculture and external relations are the main subjects which deserve some examination in detail. The nation's population is its most important asset. Its size, its composition and its growth rate are vital matters. Yet for China, the most populous country on earth, none of these details have been known, with any degree of certainty, for the last two decades. Whilst for 1975, Leo Orleans gave China's population as 809 million, John Aird estimated it to be over 120 million larger: i.e. 931 million. For the same date, the United Nations and the World Bank operated with figures of 823 and 862 million (excluding Taiwan) respectively. In the Report, Aird and others refer to China in mid-1978 as a land of about 1,000 million people. Yet, as recently as in May 1977, Ye Jianying, a Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, spoke of feeding ' our 800 million people ' (NCNA, 12 May 1977). This was a figure which was still used in early 1978 at the time of the first session of the Fifth National People's Congress. Not surprisingly, government departments concerned with the supply of rationed goods have always tended to give larger figures than the planning authorities, which at times operated with considerably lower figures. Thus Chinese politicians and officials, like Western analysts, have to live with enormous discrepancies in their population counts. The most recent figure of 975·2 million, announced during the second session of the Fifth National People's Congress, most certainly includes some 17 million for the island population of Taiwan; it may possibly also, in line with the census practice of 1953, allow for some 18 million overseas Chinese. Of course, in a situation like this, any estimate of national accounts and their main component parts loses much of its meaning.

For different reasons, the situation is not entirely satisfactory either in the case of China's industrial record. Robert Michael Field and some of his collaborators have done sterling work in collecting and analysing incomplete Chinese data of questionable reliability and in constructing indices of the gross value (Chinese definition) and the value added (Western definition) of China's industrial output.[6] As the latter accounts

6 See, for example, ' Industrial Output by Provinces in China ', *China Quarterly*, Sept 1965, No 65. See also, *China Economic Indicators* (Washington National Foreign Assessment Center, 1978)

for approximately one-third of the former, any errors in the original data or any changes in methodology can be of considerable consequence in any assessment of China's industrial and overall performance. Doubts about the validity of some of this work arose when the recalculations contained in the Congressional Report of 1975 showed an increase of 30 per cent for 1965 and of almost 50 per cent for 1970. Improved aerial surveillance of small-scale industries, previously covered only partially, possibly justified the reassessment of the output in some industrial areas, but the possibility of over-estimation cannot be ruled out. Apart from the question of the volume of production, its quality also has to be taken into account. This left much to be desired in some of the small-scale industries, such as those making hydroscopic nitrogen fertilisers or cement, where the lack of experience in processing, storing and marketing affects detrimentally the quality and thus the volume of the end product which can be used to its full extent. Output data may thus give a misleading picture. This also applies to the large sector of the machine-building industries. These cover both civilian and military needs, of which little is known beyond broad generalities. By all accounts, during the last decade the waste of industrial capacity, raw materials and finished products has been on a fairly large scale throughout the economy. Insufficient allowances seem to have been made by Field and others for these contingencies.

The record of China's agricultural performance is particularly unsatisfactory. It is in fact full of methodological anomalies and changes in coverage. Thus there have been switches from 'biological' yield (Soviet definition) to 'barn' yield (Chinese definition); from harvests including to those excluding soyabeans, and vice versa; from rootcrops being counted at a rate of 4:1 to one of 5:1 in terms of grain equivalent. These changes, often being unannounced, caused disruptions in the continuity of crop reporting and uncertainties about harvest results. These may never wholly be removed, notwithstanding the painstaking investigations undertaken by Professor Kenneth Walker, Robert Michael Field and James Kirkpatrick.[7] Moreover, during the first years after the revolution official harvest figures were almost certainly understated. To accept them at their face value is bound to result in a more favourable growth rate than seems justified. The effects of improved irrigation and the increased use of fertilisers were slow in coming through since sufficient water was not always available at critical periods of the season and the nutrients supplied to plants were deficient in phosphoric acid. Only in the last decade have multi-cropping and increases in yields been significant. Even so, current harvest claims are probably somewhat inflated by the presence of impurities. Taking the last twenty-five years as a whole, the growth rate of farm production is unlikely to have exceeded more than marginally that of the population. The same is true of the productivity of farm labour which, as a matter of policy, was not relieved to any significant extent by a growth in urbanisation. Even allowing for the possibility of substantial technological advances in the years to come, Thomas Wiens is unquestionably right in dismissing, in his contribution to the Congressional Report, as unduly optimistic Chairman Hua's agricultural growth target of 4–5 per cent a year.

Official Chinese sources are never very forthcoming about the contribution made to the nation's overall economic performance by the service sector, which includes trade, transport and other public utilities. As in the Soviet Union, so in the People's Republic of China planners and statisticians ignore in their calculations of the national accounts certain services which, by communist definition, are regarded as non-productive. Thus conceptional differences impede any comparison between communist and non-communist countries, unless allowance is made for items omitted from China's national accounts. According to Western analysts, who have devoted a good deal of

7 See, for example, Kenneth R. Walker, *Provincial Grain Output in China 1952–57* (London: Contemporary China Institute, 1977) Research Notes and Studies, No. 3, and Robert M. Field and James A. Kirkpatrick, 'Chinese Grain Production', *China Quarterly*, Jan. 1978, No. 74.

work to estimating the magnitude of this gap, it accounts probably for about 25 per cent of China's total domestic product. In the absence of Chinese data, Eckstein as well as Ashbrook have assumed that the service sector follows the trends and fluctuations of agriculture and industry combined. This short-cut, though ingenious, is open to question, since farming is exposed to exceptional vacillations in years of particularly good or bad harvests affecting disproportionately all trade and transport transactions. Thus, as in the case of agriculture and industry, a certain upward bias is likely to have crept into the calculations of the role played by the service sector, as contained in the Congressional Reports and the papers of the National Foreign Assessement Center.

In their calculations of China's overall economic performance, Ashbrook and Field have ignored the net flow of foreign goods, services and incomes. Their estimates thus show gross domestic product rather than gross national product—which is what they call their final results. Admittedly, because of China's continental dimensions and its long-standing policy of economic self-reliance, foreign trade accounts for a mere 5 per cent or so of the gross national product, but this ratio may well change in years to come. Even in the five years preceding the recent change of policy, the volume of foreign trade between China and the non-communist parts of the world increased in real terms (i.e. after allowing for inflationary trends) by about 12 per cent a year, or about twice as fast as the country's indigenous production.[8] Taking the domestic product as a whole, the National Foreign Assessment Center, whose calculations supersede those shown in last year's Congressional Report, estimates it to have been equivalent to US$ 340 and US$ 377 *per caput* in 1976 and 1977 (in prices of these years). For the same years, the World Bank, having revised earlier, higher estimates, quotes US$ 370 and US$ 410 *per caput.*[9] Comparing the two sets of figures, it has to be borne in mind that the World Bank operates with significantly lower figures for China's population and for its total gross national product than those used in the Congressional Report and by the National Foreign Assessment Center. Thus a great deal remains to be explained before trust can be placed in any of these global calculations (which may well exaggerate by at least 10 per cent China's gross national product per head of population). It is to be hoped that the forthcoming second volume of the Congressional Report will contribute towards clarifying some of these rather opaque features of the Chinese picture.

In the meantime, for the period from 1965 to 1975, the annual growth rates of agriculture, industry, the service sector and the overall gross domestic product may be given—somewhat more conservatively than by Ashbrook and Field—at 3·0, 8·5, 6·5 and 6·0 per cent respectively. As for the end uses of the domestic product, some three-fifths of the overall total were available for personal consumption (of which again three-fifths accounted for the family food budget). The remaining two-fifths were divided in varying degrees between the central and local authorities and the claims made on the gross investment funds, including working capital and changes in inventories. These are broad estimates. On the other side of the accounts also, no more than orders of magnitude are possible. Of the main sectors of origin contributing to the overall product, agriculture probably provided, during the decade in question, approximately one-quarter. The share of the service sector was of a similar order of magnitude, whilst the other half of the nation's product was provided by industry, including mining and construction. As for the rates of growth, they were impressive, bearing in mind the political upheavals and economic disruptions of the time, but they lagged behind the growth attained in such Asian countries as Japan and Taiwan. All in all, at the end of the Mao era, China ranked among the industrialised countries of the world, whilst farming was still the country's largest employer. In fact, in spite of a process of steadily

8. See, *Direction of Trade, 1971-1978* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1979)
9. *World Bank Atlas 1978* (Washington: The World Bank, 1978)

increasing industrialisation, China has become an even more agrarian community than it was at the outset of economic planning some twenty-five years ago. This is an aspect worth bearing in mind when looking as far ahead as the end of the Ten-Year Plan—or even beyond.

By 1985 China will obviously be a different country from what it was when Mao died, but in trying to anticipate its chief characteristics six years hence it is worth remembering that in spite of the dramatic changes of the last few years some essential features of the past will still be there. Though the Soviet model was abandoned in the late 1950s, many similarities to models practised in other communist systems still remain. They range from the pattern of political education to, say, the industrial wage structure, or the concept of centralised investment, or the State monopoly of fiscal, monetary and trading institutions, or the role of the cultivator's plot. Against this, China has developed certain models of its own. The most outstanding of these is the rural commune, which serves as an administrative centre with wide powers of control, ranging from the collection of obligatory crop deliveries to small-scale industrial activities as well as political and para-military training. Another important feature of the Chinese scene is the retention—for over a quarter of a century—of rationing, which includes cereals, tubers, vegetable oil, cotton cloth and at times some other agricultural and industrial consumer goods. This is a measure unparalleled anywhere else in the world—except in times of war.

These politico-economic tools are supported by the central and regional allocation of funds for communal services, such as hospitals and schools. These provisions have served the chief goals of Chinese planning, which combines high growth rates with a certain measure of equality of distribution unknown in pre-revolutionary China. While changes of emphasis may be expected in future, the basic principles are unlikely to be affected more than marginally by such institutional changes as the abolition of the Revolutionary Committees and by the delegation of certain managerial powers from the centre to regional administrative units. Of course, the major projects of the current plan will be under strict central control. This will apply in particular to plants of the modern industrial sectors, such as those producing fuel and power, transport equipment, petro-chemicals, telecommunications and military hardware, where foreign plants, know-how and finance are being sought by central government agencies. In real terms, the volume of foreign trade may well increase by as much as 15 per cent a year or by about two-and-a-half times the overall annual growth rate, which is not expected to exceed 6–6·5 per cent a year. Though more modest than Chairman Hua's target of about 8 per cent, even a goal of this order seems ambitious at a time when the country's resources are stretched all round. Whilst foreign projects will be valuable, indeed essential, in specific areas, most of them cannot be expected to come on stream before 1985. Similarly, the scientists and technicians who are to be trained abroad are unlikely to take up their professional posts in China before the end of the Ten-Year Plan. The training of local industrial managers and foremen may take even longer. As in the past, the bulk of the development of the economy will be left to domestic forces.

The share of the various economic sectors in the creation and use of the gross domestic product will need regular watching and careful recording.[10] No doubt, agriculture will be accorded a place of high priority. This is borne out by the plan and budget figures for 1979. Even so, its share in the overall total may well decline in years to come, because of the increased emphasis which is bound to be given to the production of civilian and military industrial goods. On the other side of the ledger, the authorities will be under a certain amount of pressure to improve the supply of

10 W Klatt, 'Economic Survey of the People's Republic of China', *The Far East and Australasia, 1979–80* (London: Europa, forthcoming 1979)

personal consumer goods as well as that of public utilities. However, in spite of foreign participation, the call for high rates of domestic savings and investment is unlikely to be relaxed. In addition, foreign exchange commitments will have to be met. The prospects of servicing the debts which arise from current imports of plant equipment with future exports of goods produced in these plants, should not be rated too high; neither are the quantities of mineral oil, natural gas and petro-chemicals which surpass indigenous needs likely to be as great as was once assumed. The concept of ' compensation ' or ' buy-back ' trade agreements is more easily presented than implemented.

Thus, as in the past, there will be a crying need for the full mobilisation of domestic resources and a tight squeeze for a fair allocation among competing callers. All in all, China is facing formidable hurdles in its race to reach its ambitious goals. In this situation, it will be even less able than in the past to afford political disturbances of the kind encountered after the Great Leap Forward and during the Cultural Revolution. In the last twenty-five years, upsets of this kind recurred every five or six years. In future, they will have to be avoided. Yet at this moment, the role which the ' lost generation ' of the Cultural Revolution, its intellectuals and its leaders, will expect—or be allowed—to play is far from certain. The process of political consolidation and economic normalisation does not yet seem to have been brought to a fully satisfactory completion.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

NOAM CHOMSKY AND CAMBODIA

Dear Sir,

In a review of François Ponchaud's *Cambodia Year Zero* in *International Affairs* (January 1979), Dennis Duncanson writes that ' the author reports, without rancour ', that the French original of his book ' was attacked by Professor Noam Chomsky . . . for relying on refugees' stories ' and on the grounds ' that we ought to give the Phnom Penh Politburo the benefit of its secrecy, and that as a positive fact no massacres took place in Cambodia '. This is Duncanson's embellishment of allegations by Ponchaud offered not only ' without rancour ' but without a shred of evidence and with no relation to the truth. Duncanson is basing his claims on the author's preface to the British translation. The author's note to the simultaneous American translation is virtually identical and dated on the same day. But the statements that Duncanson has embellished are entirely missing in the American edition, replaced by the accurate statement that in a (co-authored) review of Ponchaud's book I had described it as ' serious and worth reading ', and by a reference to ' the responsible attitude and precision of thought that are so characteristic of [Chomsky] ' As Ponchaud knew and Duncanson could have discovered, I wrote no ' attack ' on his book, my comments on refugee reports were virtually identical to Ponchaud's own, I surveyed a range of opinion all of which assumed that there had been massacres (as I explicitly did as well), and I offered no justification for the Phnom Penh government's ' secrecy '.

The British edition is unavailable in the United States, where the outright falsehood of Ponchaud's allegations would easily have been detected. This kind of petty deceit is perhaps too infantile to deserve comment. It is interesting to see, however, that it is finding its way—with some added flourishes—into what is called ' scholarship '. The example cited, incidentally, is only one of a number of interesting differences between the two editions, all related to queries raised in the United States that proved pertinent, leading to significant changes in the American but not in the simultaneous British edition—which retains the material that the author knew to be incorrect or dubious. In fact, the cover of the British (Penguin) edition features a misstatement by Lacouture of an allegation by Ponchaud that proved so flimsy on inquiry in the United States that Ponchaud deleted it entirely from the American, but not the British, edition—a fact that again bears on the credibility of this author and the credulity of those who rely on his undocumented claims. All of this and more is discussed in a book on propaganda now in press (N Chomsky and E. S. Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights*, vol. II).

Duncanson adds triumphantly that the ' Hanoi Politburo, whose honour . . . [I] . . . have vigorously upheld in the past ', estimates massacres at over a million. His allegation about my upholding the honour of the Hanoi Politburo is another outright falsehood. I have written extensively and very critically about the American intervention in Indochina. Propagandists have consistently been unable or unwilling to distinguish between opposition to America's military intervention and ' support for Hanoi ', although it is trivially obvious that the two are quite distinct—and in my case quite explicitly so Long-time apologists for imperial aggression and massacre have found this elementary distinction particularly difficult to master. If Duncanson had even the faintest familiarity with the writings of mine to which he alludes, he would know that they contain harsh criticism of Marxist-Leninist ideology and practice and

of the so-called ' Communist ' states. In fact, I have taken pains to discuss similarities between the practice of the ' Communist ' states and their ideologists on the one hand, and that of Western imperialism and its ideologists, past and present, on the other.

Duncanson makes similar charges against Gareth Porter, also false and indeed scandalous. One expects this sort of thing in the more unscrupulous segments of journalism, but it is perhaps a little surprising to find similar behavior in what purports to be a scholarly journal.

Sincerely yours,

Noam Chomsky
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
February 17, 1979

Dennis Duncanson comments:—

My use of the adjective ' vigorous ' is justified by the style of *all* Professor Chomsky's writing, including his letter of February 17.

The review of Ponchaud was naturally of the British edition, and my summary of the author's opening complaint against Professor Chomsky and Mr. Porter is a fair one. If Ponchaud's references to American publications are fabricated, Professor Chomsky ought to protest to *him*, not *me*.

Professor Chomsky's prevarication about upholding the honour of Hanoi is disingenuous. His contribution to Vol. V. of the Gravel *Pentagon Papers* (over Hanoi's hand in the insurrection against Diem) is but one of several occasions when he has upheld Hanoi's honour. For Gareth Porter, I would cite the latter's depositions at Senate hearings.

The burden of Ponchaud's complaint against his two critics is that they demanded of him standards they did not adhere to themselves. Professor Chomsky's description of me as ' a passionate supporter of the American intervention ' in Indochina (*For Reasons of State*: p. 81) and ' a committed ideologist ', etc. etc. (*ibid*: p. 186) when taken with this letter, bears Ponchaud out.

University of Kent at Canterbury,
April 20, 1979

REVIEWS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ORGANISATIONS

Towards Professionalism in International Theory: Macrosystem Analysis. By Morton A. Kaplan. *New York, London: Free Press. 1979. 182 pp. $15.95.*

AUTHORS generally vet publishers' blurbs. It is probable that Kaplan has done so in this case, for the blurb only states what Kaplan says at greater length in the text. ' Kaplan . . . demonstrates convincingly that [the critical literature in international relations theory] is substandard in professional terms—that it does not adequately represent theoretical work, that it misuses authorities, and that it fails to understand the problems of theory in social science . . . Kaplan shows how diplomatic historians have misunderstood their craft and misused evidence. The field of diplomatic history . . . is in a pre-professional state.' The first of these sweeping claims is based on eighty-nine pages of rejoinder to criticism of Kaplan and Galtung by Kenneth Waltz in Volume 8 of Greenstein and Polsby's *Handbook of Political Science.* The eighty-ninth page concludes modestly, ' Postcript: Now that I am reading reviews in political science journals of my two recent books in political philosophy, I am coming to the conclusion that I have been too harsh on critics in international relations '. The second claim about diplomatic historians relies upon an eight-page comment on two books. These are used to illustrate the statement ' accepted contemporary standards of scholarship . . . in diplomatic history are every bit as superficial as they are in the field of criticism in international relations theory ' (p. 176).

Kaplan rightly condemns selective use of evidence to support large general statements. In this book he does exactly that about scholarship in his field. This is a pity. While not everyone would agree with the publishers' claim that ' *System of* (sic) *Process in International Politics* . . . is generally acknowledged as the foremost theoretical work in the field ', it is none the less true that this book when published in 1957 was a ground-breaking work that gave a new thrust and direction to theory-building in international relations. Many did not recognise its importance at the time, and I regretfully confess that I was one of them, partly because of the seemingly remote abstractness of the method, and partly because of the tortuousness of the style. Kaplan's mature reflections, after twenty-two years of further thought and study, and taking account of the numerous commentaries upon, and borrowings from, his work, were to be eagerly anticipated. Sadly they disappoint, partly because of the narrowness of the front on which he chose to stand, and partly because of the discomfiting arrogance.

The major problem in the application of systems analysis (as Kaplan rightly calls it—not system theory) is that of isomorphism—whether the abstract system construct sufficiently resembles a real-world situation for the interplay of the components of the construct to tell you something about what is happening or likely to happen in the real world. Kaplan of course was and is fully aware of this problem. One of the major criticisms of his pioneering work none the less was that he tended too easily to assume congruence between one of his models and a possible real world referent. In this latest exegesis he compounds the fault. ' The models employed in *System and Process* ', he says (p. 134), ' utilize five sets of variables: the essential rules, the transformation rules, the actor classificatory variables, the capability variables, and the information variables '. Leaving aside the fact that he elaborated these variables only for two of his

six systems (the balance of power, and the loose bipolar), he now after a few helpfully clarifying comments about the six models goes on to write about what he calls ' mixed empirical models '. In these—called very loose bipolar system, detente system, and unstable bloc system—he does no more than speculate in a not very profound way about possible future developments in international relationships offering such statements as ' Relations between the USSR and China will influence Soviet policy ' (p. 151). These are by no stretch of the imagination models in his former sense. When he goes on to write about ' engineering the model 'one's heart sinks further: ' The years between 1870 and 1914, for instance are referred to as a " balance of power " period because the theory of the " balance of power " explains the observed behaviour, which differs from that postulated by the model, by adjusting the theory for the change that French public opinion caused at the parameter ' (p. 156). You have sufficient confidence that your balance of power system is isomorphic with the 1870-1914 pattern of relationships for you to claim to explain behaviour even though it deviates from that postulated by the model. To use the subtitle of his own first chapter ' How to Boggle Minds and Confooz a Discipline '!

Some would maintain that Kaplan's work is valueless. I would strongly dissent from that view. Even in this book, which is a touch paranoiac, there are illuminating ideas, tightly-knit arguments, sharp insights and thought-provoking juxtapositions. It is much to be regretted that the author has been unable to apply to his own writings the same brand of searingly rigorous criticism that he has so devastatingly applied to the writings of others and so has failed to produce a mature work more worthy of his brilliance.

University of Lancaster P. A. REYNOLDS

Dimensions of Detente. Edited by Della W. Sheldon. *New York: Praeger. 1978. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 219 pp £13·50.*

Broadcasting and Detente: Eastern Policies and Their Implications for East West Relations. By Gerhard Wettig. *London: C. Hurst 1977 110 pp. £5·50*

DELLA SHELDON is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Nebraska and has brought together in this book seven other American academics (though one is not identified) to discuss different aspects of the East-West detente. This, in the American manner, is defined solely in super-power terms; it is said to have originated when Nixon and Kissinger ' realised that the only way out of the foreign policy cul-de-sac was to change US relations with the Soviet Union ' (p. 32). That Winston Churchill and Harold Macmillan were pleading for summit talks with Moscow at a time when this was described as typical British appeasement by Eisenhower, Dulles, de Gaulle, and Adenauer, is not herein recorded

Dr Sheldon writes an introductory chapter on the ' Road to Detente ', which she seems to wish the West had never taken since detente has never implied Russia's ' acceptance of the international status quo ' (p. 19). Fred Warner Neal's ' Detente and US Foreign Policymaking ' briefly places the subject within the American domestic political context, though without much reference to its obvious electoral significance. Thomas Robinson has a curiously confusing, though highly relevant, essay on ' Detente and the Sino-Soviet-US triangle ', tracing, or attempting to trace, the 1984-ish *pas de trois* of the giant powers. In ' Detente and US-Soviet relations in the Middle East during the Nixon years (1969–74) ', Robert Freedman shows that, in that major region at least, detente has by no means served as the straight path to red revolution which Miss Sheldon fears. Then follow three chapters with a decidedly oblique relevance to detente: one on oil politics in the Middle East by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, which is mainly about where Russia gets her oil and what she does with

the surplus she does not want; one on 'East-West commerce and Soviet management' by Alice C. Gorlin, which is not about the economic aspect of detente, as one might expect, but what Russia has learned and could learn in the future from American management techniques; and a chapter by Elliot Goodman on 'Detente and the defence of Europe', though it really deals with the standardisation of military equipment in Nato. The true theme of the volume returns with a final chapter on the Soviet-American military balance by Jacob W. Kipp, which mainly deals with American views on the likely impact of detente on America's ability to deal with threats to Western security.

Through this book runs like an endless thread the nagging American worry that any kind of understandings with communist states are a snare and delusion because, as Dr Sheldon puts it, in Soviet eyes 'peaceful relations with the Western nations are envisioned as facilitating the unfolding of the international class struggle that will eventually usher in the age of world socialism' (p. 3). But can any objective observer really believe that the age of world socialism, at least on the Soviet model, is any closer now than before the detente began, or even than it was in 1945? The answer is given in the fascinating book by Gerhard Wettig, a West German political scientist, which records the efforts made by the Soviet bloc, except for Romania, to exclude broadcasting to Russia and East Europe by radio stations like Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, *Deutsche Welle, Deutschlandfunk,* and the BBC, and their endeavours to prevail on the United Nations to control radio and TV transmissions in general from one country to another. It cannot be said that to any considerable extent this campaign has succeeded. The communists are *not* winning the war of words, and it is doubtful whether they are winning the larger political war in the world either. If the Russians opted for detente because they thought it provided an easy road to world revolution, they have deluded themselves.

London School of Economics F. S. NORTHEDGE

Atlantic Community in Crisis: A Redefinition of the Transatlantic Relationship. Edited by Walter F. Hahn and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. *New York: Pergamon Press for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 1979. 386 pp. $28.50.*

THE contributors to this book, which is the outcome of a project undertaken by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, share and communicate a vivid concern at the loosening of the bonds of the Atlantic allies and they proffer numbers of not always unfamiliar policy proposals to reverse this deterioration. Their volume is divided into five parts, the first of which deals with the evolution of the Atlantic community. This contains an ingenious attempt by James Dougherty to apply a psychological theory of human motivation to the analysis of the different national needs at play in postwar Atlantic developments. As in other approaches to politics by way of other disciplines, what happens in this paper is that a suggestive taxonomy stimulates a fresh discussion of old issues. In the second part of the book two very businesslike contributions by Walter Hahn give a pessimistic account of Soviet strategic advances and stress the importance of strengthening United States-European strategic linkage or 'coupling'. In a third paper in this section Jacquelyn Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff present a detailed survey of Soviet-Warsaw Pact military doctrine, force posture and strength. They conclude that forward defence must remain fundamental to Nato and urge improvements in organisation and capabilities, including naval capabilities, in order to restore credibility to the structures which might be called upon to perform this function.

Technological collaboration is the theme of the volume's third section. Here three pieces by Frank Bray and Michael Moodie sharply describe the problems of different

modes of collaboration. These authors are clear on the inhibiting effects of traditionally protectionist American arms-procurement policies and suggest an American commitment to procure a stated percentage of military equipment from European sources. On the European side, they are inclined to see more possibilities of increasing collaboration in terms of complementary programmes rather than in highly complicated production mergers. In the fourth part of the book James Dougherty distinguishes ' Finlandisation ' (the transformation of Western Europe into a string of harmlessly isolated individual states) as the central purpose of Soviet foreign policy, to be achieved by the ' de-coupling ' of the United States from Europe. While Russia furthers this goal in all its international actions, Diane Pfaltzgraff argues in the next paper, movements inside many European states, principally forms of Eurocommunism, make further significant contributions to the same end. The book's final section deals with economics and resources problems. Brian Griffiths gives a lucid monetarist account of the inflationary troubles of the major industrialised countries—strict domestic control of money supply is, of course, his solution. Robert Pfaltzgraff's discussion of resources is a trifle pedestrian: ' if the United States and its major allies are to avert potential economic disaster, they must take steps to reduce dependence on oil imports ' (p. 311). In two papers on trade Lawrence Bell cogently develops a liberal case against economic nationalism. And in a concluding chapter Robert Pfaltzgraff emphasises the need for enlightened leadership and (particularly welcome to the present reviewer) the avoidance of comprehensive ' grand designs '.

This long book attains a measure of coherence rare in such collective efforts. It does so at some cost in terms of repetition on the subject of defence, and in a rather wearing tone of high alarm. When was the Atlantic alliance not beset by crises? However, the book develops a valid and timely position in a way which would be difficult to better. Many of the issues it fixes on could of course be given contrary interpretations: ' Finlandisation ' could be seen as a model for Eastern Europe; the inherent strength of a defensive strategy might be stressed; moderate inflation is not the worst of economic problems; Eurocommunism, however phoney, is some kind of triumph for constitutionalism; and so on. But no policy book of this kind can be reasonably expected to quarrel with itself

University College of Wales, Cardiff ROY E. JONES

The Changing United Nations: Options for the United States. Edited by David A. Kay. *New York: Academy of Political Science 1977. 226 pp. (Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4.) Pb: $6.50.*

IN the United States, public interest in the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies has been recently aroused by the clashes between American administrations and the governments of the economically underdeveloped countries about the structure of future economic relations; by anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist resolutions in various United Nations bodies; by the problems of Southern Africa; by the United States' withdrawal from the International Labour Organisation; and by the public activities of Ambassadors Moynihan and Young.

Partly in response to the critical debate that ensued about the importance of the United Nations and its specialised agencies to United States foreign policy—were these institutions now dominated by the United States' enemies and opponents who were misusing and perverting them or were they ineffective talking-shops, or were they both symbols of, and executive arms of, the co-operation that states continually needed if political, economic and social disorders were to be avoided?—the Academy of Political Science commissioned a project on the changing United Nations.

This book is one of the results. The seventeen major essays, which have been written by practising diplomats, academics and research scholars, cover the broad range of United Nations activities: the maintenance of peace; arms control and disarmament; the protection of human rights; and economic and social activities. Each author describes the role of the United Nations, evaluates the challenge of the Third World and discusses America's options within the changing United Nations. All the essays are of uniformly high standard—informative, analytical, reflective and politically sensible.

Of particular interest are papers by John Holmes on a non-American perspective of the United States' role in the United Nations; Robert W. Gregg on the apportioning of political power; Gene M. Lyons on the ' Politicisation ' issue in the United Nations Specialised Agencies; John Temple Swing on the Law of the Sea; C. Clyde Ferguson Jr., on the Politics of the New International Economic Order; and Edward C. Luck on the Arms Trade.

Most of the authors agree with the editor, David Kay, that the United States may respond in three ways within the United Nations. First, it could seek to accommodate the demands of the Third World. It is believed that if the United States could meet the challenges in the economic and political field, hostility would decrease and the United States could once more provide leadership within the United Nations.

The second option would be one of confrontation. It is contended that the United States lives in a hostile world, where its economic and political principles are being constantly attacked. Therefore, it is argued that the United States must wage, with its allies, a relentless battle to defend its interests and principles. Thus, in this strategy, there would be few areas of mutual interest and very little, if any, co-operation between the contending groups.

The third option would be a pragmatic one where the United States could seek accommodation in areas where new policies might advance both American and international interests, but also one where the United States would strongly defend its principles and interests if they were attacked. However, this policy option faces a number of difficulties. It would require subtilty in formation and execution, its successes would probably be limited, it could not necessarily guarantee goodwill or United States leadership within the United Nations nor could it provide a thrilling, adversary foreign policy. Nevertheless the weight of opinion favoured this option.

University of Lancaster DAVID TRAVERS

DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT

Anti-Personnel Weapons. By Malvern Lumsden. *London: Taylor and Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1978. 299 pp. £9·00.*

THE SIPRI publications on weapon systems are designed to provide information for the study of disarmament and arms control. This one consists of a comprehensive account of the weapons, with a preliminary section on their development from the earliest times and a concluding one on the history of arms control.

Anti-personnel weapons are, of course, those primarily designed to incapacitate human beings, as opposed to anti-materiél weapons whose lethal consequences may be as severe, but secondary in aim. Dr Lumsden reminds us that modern technology has responded to the need to increase the killing-power per unit soldier with a marked increase in the lethality [1] of non-nuclear weapons. Some of these are area weapons of a

1 ' Lethality ' has two meanings. In design it relates to hit probability, clinically to the severity of injury

horrible nature, such as napalm and exploding fuel-air clouds, but the majority are improved versions of old-fashioned kinetic energy systems, using bullets, pellets, ball-bearings, bomblets, grenades, flechettes and steel fragments to kill, or to inflict incapacitating wounds. It was not uncommon during the Second World War for men wounded once or even twice to continue to fight, but no longer. The high residual, or impact velocity of modern projectiles combined with their long, thin ballistic shapes inflicts terrible injuries, smashing bone and destroying tissue on a large scale. The clinical details are set out in Chapter 3.

The main part of the book is taken up with the details of a wide range of weapons including their number, design, characteristics, lethality and employment. One word of warning is necessary here. The bulk of the factual information provided is from United States sources, and in this context it gives the whole study, perhaps unwittingly, an anti-American bias. The trend towards higher lethality is common to all the advanced arms-manufacturing countries. This is the core of the study and most useful.

The historical sections are less satisfactory Seventeen pages are barely enough to cover weapon development from paleolithic times to 1945, and in any case the author makes a number of errors of fact or interpretation. Nor is one chapter of sixteen pages plus four short appendices enough to do justice to the history of arms control from the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868 down to the present day. If the *raison d'être* of this study is to assist the student of arms control this is inadequate. Admittedly arms control is full of innate contradictions, afflicted by special pleading, advocacy is often directed at users rather than weapons and effective action bedevilled by United Nations politics, but the author could have greatly improved the value of his book by including a longer and deeper analysis of his intractable but intensely important subject. Nevertheless, having made these criticisms it must also be said that he has made a valuable contribution to its literature.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts. Edited by Sheldon W. Simon. *Boulder, Col.. Westview Press; Folkestone, Kent: Dawson. 1978 348 pp £11·00.*

THE comprehensive coverage by this book of the military in the Third World is its principal virtue. It manages somewhat unusually to tackle simultaneously the roles of the military in domestic politics and external security policy. In so doing it ranges the world putting particular emphasis on Cuba, Indonesia, the Philippines, China and South-east Asia generally. Nor does it neglect Africa and mainland Latin America.

Like similar works, Part 1, which deals with military elites and domestic politics, has one irritating element—an author who claims to be pioneering in an area already at least initially explored. Samuel Decalo's book,[1] for example, in pinpointing the personal idiosyncratic element in military coups, made a similar impression This time Sam C. Sarkesian, who contributes the first two chapters (including that on Africa), picks on the need to define the term ' military regime '; ' one rarely finds ', he says (p. 3), ' a " total " civilian regime in developing areas—one that is completely divorced from military power.' It might perhaps be useful in this context to ask how many states in the whole world could be said to be civilian regimes in this sense. This does, however, lead, some would feel belatedly, to a refreshing emphasis on the performance of military regimes when in power. It would, however, have been

1 *Coups and Army Rule in Africa Studies in Military Style* (New Haven, Conn., London Yale University Press, 1976) Reviewed in *International Affairs* April 1977, p 319

interesting to see a spectrum of states, in which the military for the time being appear to rule, assessed in accordance with conventional democratic criteria relating, for example, to the rule of law, the operation of the courts, the existence of a relatively free press and broadcasting system and so on. Such an analysis would probably show an even wider and more confusing variety of military regimes than emerges here. They would almost certainly defy the statistical analysis of performance variables which is attempted.

The chapter by Jose Z. Garcia, however, provides some useful data on the penetration of the Peruvian bureaucracy by military officers in the early 1970s. What conclusions can be drawn from the knowledge that of 370 top positions in government agencies 81 were held by officers? At least it provides one kind of factual basis for the comparison of different cases. W. Raymond Duncan, by taking the Cuban case, provides an introduction to the development role of the military.

Stephen G. Walker's attempts in Part 2 of the book to apply ' garrison state ' theory to the enormous range of Third World cases seem to lead into a ' cul-de-sac ' but strictly empirical approaches to the Middle East and China's external security policy provide a number of insights. The military as a channel for intercultural communication is here discussed primarily in terms of American diplomatic relations. The notion (p. 327) of ' troops who are cultural virgins ' constituting a particular problem clearly has validity but the naïvety of the approach to this question typifies the uneven quality of this often interesting book.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Problems of Sea Power as we Approach the Twenty-first Century. Edited by James L. George. *Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1978. 364 pp. $11 75. Pb: $5.75*

ONE of the major problems that now beset navies is their cost; they are increasingly expensive to build and maintain. But there is a lot more to the matter than just that. The functions that they perform in war are now questioned extensively because, it seems, the nature and the probable duration of a future major war might well be quite different than in the past. If war is short and cataclysmic many of the jobs that navies have traditionally had to do may no longer need to be done. And the increasing lethality of modern weapon systems implies that even if a war is not over in a few days, or a few weeks, the ways in which navies would have to go about their tasks would have to be markedly different. Even small navies equipped with up-to-date weapons will be difficult and dangerous opponents to contain economically; and the development of the power and the reach of the Soviet navy makes it, prospectively, a very formidable adversary indeed. But there are lots of other functions which navies perform, in peace and in periods of tension, which also have to be reckoned with. The sea is growing rather than declining in importance as a highway and as a reservoir of resources; and it looks as if it may soon be parcelled up, as land was enclosed in earlier times, into restrictive zones. Navies will be involved in these developments, and in the problems that will follow.

What sort of navy will it be that can cope with these changes, and deal with the challenges they bring? Will it require new types of ship: will surface ships—particularly large and expensive ships like aircraft carriers—have the same sort of general utility they have retained up till now: and what will have to be done about new materials, new weapon technologies that are on the horizon, and new methods of propulsion?

There is more than enough here to keep naval staffs on their toes and legislators on the edge of their seats; and the conference which is reported in this book tried to deal

with most of these problems as they will affect the United States Navy. The papers are supplemented by commentaries and summaries of the discussions which followed: and although the perspective is ostensibly always an American national concern, many of the papers and all of the general questions have a direct interest for Nato states and alliance policies. The need for a strong and efficient United States Navy, which is the starting point of the analyses, is a need which extends beyond purely national, or sectional, concerns. It is an issue which like a lot of other strategic matters eventually comes back to shape, size and costs: how big, how strong, how much. The general concepts of function and utility have to be fitted into more limited, and rather different, conceptions of need.

Like most large conferences, the standard of analysis in the papers and discussion in the commentaries varies; and as a result, this is a difficult compilation to assess as a unit. But there is a lot of useful material, and many of the contributions will bear looking at again, as the United States Navy's battle for resources hots up.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL

The World Economy: History and Prospect. By W. W. Rostow. *London: Macmillan. 1978. 833 pp. £25·00.*

IN over eight hundred closely argued pages, Professor Rostow develops his distinctive approach to international economics. He is still concerned with extending his theories about the stages of economic growth, but he now ranges much more widely. In fact, the heart of this book is his analysis of the extent to which the longer-term rhythms in world economic activity are primarily determined by vagaries in the supply equation—be this the result of wars, demographic pressures or our over-straining global mineral resources. Rostow's strengths are his ambition, historical perspective and his ability to argue from evidence relating to any part of the globe.

There are six parts to this massive study. He begins by sketching in the main demographic trends since the mid-1700s, and then moves on to lay out the way the world economy has developed since the Industrial Revolution (both at the global and national level). A long section then follows in which he analyses the main trend periods since 1790 in terms of the way world growth has been affected by the relative tightness or otherwise of agricultural and raw material supplies; this section also deals with the way the development of lead-industrial sectors (railways, automobiles, textiles, etc.) and varying patterns of international migration have affected the relative dynamism of various national economies at differing times. He then goes deeper into the theory of short-run business cycles; analyses twenty countries in terms of his model of the stages of economic growth (he ranges from Britain to Russia; from the United States to countries such as Brazil, Taiwan and Iran). He finishes with a series of chapters in which he fits the troubled 1970s into his overall picture; looking at reasons why we may well be at the beginning of the fifth Kondratieff upswing. Virtually every page is embellished with some chart or table, which are universally relevant and touch on everything from historic illiteracy rates in the Western world to the research and development expenditures of twenty OECD countries during the 1960s and early 1970s.

Anyone interested in comparative economic history will want to have this book on their shelves. For one thing, there is a vast amount of information in it, and the readers of this journal should be reassured that he is just as informative about developments in the 1950s and 1960s, as he is about the era of the Napoleonic Wars. Secondly, he ranges so widely over the economic history of widely varying nations that one can put

both well-studied economies (say, the United States) alongside lesser-known ones (Argentina or Thailand) and start drawing one's own conclusions about the relative similarities or dissimilarities in national experiences. Finally, he is in the forefront of economists who believe that a sound understanding of the dynamics of technological and demographic change is an essential base on which to build good macro-economic analysis.

Although I doubt if any single person could have written this book any better, I do have some reservations. For instance, although his twenty country studies are useful, there is still a feeling of superficiality about his analysis. He is fine when dealing with objective facts about, say, the growth of the steel industry in each country. He is less informative about the social factors which determined that a country like Argentina was unable to convert its nineteenth-century resource-led boom into sustained industrial-led growth in the twentieth. This lack of social sensitivity matters when he deals with a country like Iran, which was converting its oil wealth into industrial projects under the Shah. In one breath he leaves the impression that Iran was well on the way to take-off: in another, he queries the country's absorptive capacities. However, his comparative empirical work is so concentrated on the outward manifestations of development (such as investment ratios and the relative balance of industrial sectors) that one cannot easily distinguish whether countries like, say, Iran and South Korea are developing soundly. His mechanistic approach would suggest that post-Shah Iran should continue to grow fast. We shall see.

One further reservation is that he becomes less authoritative as he moves into the 1970s. Certainly he asks the right questions about issues such as stagflation and resource constraints, but these chapters leave the feeling of having been tacked on for the American undergraduate market. His analysis remains sane, but the sophistication of his arguments and the quality of the evidence on which he relies noticeably declines.

However, this should not detract from a book which is an impressive intellectual and logistic feat. It is well designed, annotated and indexed. Even at £25·00 it is well worth the money.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

Economic Relations between East and West. (Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association at Dresden, GDR.) Edited by Nita G. M Watts. *London. Macmillan for the International Economic Association. 1978. 246 pp. £15·00.*

AT the end of June 1976 the International Economic Association held at Dresden a ' Round Table ' conference on economic relations between East and West. By the mid-1950s East-West trade had emerged as a comparatively new pattern of international trade, and by the late 1950s East European countries began to show a growing interest in expanding commercial relations with Western countries. Subsequently, East-West trade has evolved from simpler to more complex forms, and its composition and pattern have continuously changed. Yet East-West trade accounts for only a small percentage of total world trade because of the characteristics of East European domestic systems of economic organisation, and the obstacles these raise to the development of trade.

The book under review attempts to examine systematically the development of East-West economic relations in recent years, rather than taking as background a broader historical perspective which could have allowed the complexity of this new type of international economic involvement to have better emerged. The book is composed of a masterly introduction by Miss Nita Watts, its editor, and fifteen papers of various lengths, with summaries of the discussion on them. For a book whose topic

is of such importance to the academic, governmental, and business communities, its briefness is a handicap to comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, in her introductory chapter Miss Watts focuses on the main themes that such an analysis must cover. This is followed by chapters of differing quality and theoretical accomplishment, their contents explicitly and implicitly divided by the participants' theoretical positions. At the same time some Western and Eastern participants do have some common attitudes in their approach to various aspects of East-West trade. For allowing us to perceive so clearly the differences between Western and Eastern points of view on a number of key issues, we thank the book's editor.

The book's quality is uneven, and not only because of the differing quality of Western and Eastern contributions On the one hand, British and American scholars' analytical sophistication is juxtaposed to the business-like approach of German and Austrian economists and the institutional presentation of French and Belgian authors. And on the other, the mind deadening effect, on a Western reader, of Soviet, East German, Czech, and Bulgarian views—in which dogmatic inflexibility goes hand in hand with obsolete clichés—contrasts with the relative readiness of the Hungarian, Polish, and Romanian economists to adopt a somewhat more realistic approach. Nowhere is the East-West contrast more sharp than in the treatment of some economic issues with political implications.

Several participants refer to the increasingly contentious issue of Soviet and East European indebtedness towards Western banks and other financial institutions. Yet, no one mentions the possible ' crowding-out ' effect of an increase in lending to the centrally planned economies. In this context Professor Oleg Bogomolov of the Soviet Union expresses some unsubstantiated and groundless doubts about some aspects of Western capital markets, without, however, uttering a single word about the effect of his own country's borrowings on these markets (p. 169). A similar one-sided attitude is typical of other East European contributions. Thus, Professor Vladimir Wacker of Czechoslovakia picks out some examples of what he terms Western interference with East-West trade but fails to make any reference to the obstacles East European authorities have raised to these types of economic relations

In the face of much East European preference for, and incitement to, propaganda-oriented debate, rather than stimulating discussions, Western participants at the conference kept their composure remarkably well. Among the Western contributions, in addition to Miss Watts's chapter, papers by Carl H. McMillan, Franklin D. Holzman, P. Hanson, and Norman Scott must be singled out.

University of Reading IANCU SPIGLER

Transnational Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political Economy Edited by George Modelski. *San Francisco, Calif.: Freeman. 1979 438 pp. £12·00. Pb. £5·70.*

IN his Preface, the editor writes that this volume of twenty-six readings ' emphasises the political and social impact of Transnational Corporations ' (TNCs) and ' brings together the most significant classic writing on this subject, reflecting the principal schools of thought ' (p. vii). Although its eclecticism is a virtue, many of the writings are severely outdated, both by the march of events and by improved analyses of the problems. The latter point can be illustrated by reference to the section on Theories of the TNCs, which comprises two articles on dominance at world level (Perroux: 1948 and Galtung: 1971), two classic but largely superseded analyses of the firm (Kindleberger: 1969 and Vernon: 1971), and a paper on concentration in the oil industry (Blair: 1974). The former point can be justified by reference to the

introductory section, where a statistical analysis of TNCs is given from the United Nations' 1973 survey rather than its 1978 revision *Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-examination.*[1] Similarly, in the section on ' Effects on World Order ', the analysis of political friction caused by foreign investment is drawn from Eugene Staley's *War and the Private Investor.*[2] Although Staley's analysis is stimulating and interesting, it cannot be maintained that TNC-government confrontation today follows the pattern so ably analysed in 1935. The neglect of recent treatments of expropriation and disinvestment is extremely surprising in this context.

The volume is also highly United States-centred. There are no explicit analyses of the growth of non-American multinationals—even though Modelski's (1978) contribution on performance of the world's largest firms show non American parentage to be an important predictor of growth. An analysis of TNCs in Eastern Europe is given (Gutman and Arkwright: 1974, translated specially for the volume) and the volume pays some attention to Latin America, including the inevitable paper on ITTs misdemeanours and a number of papers on TNCs and development (amongst which is Hymer's excellent ' The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development ': 1972, and further useful translations of papers by Vicuna: 1973, and Amin: 1973).

Despite the inclusion of several papers (chiefly the translated ones) which are difficult to obtain, the collection fails in its primary aim of being a ' comprehensive treatment of TNCs ' (p. vii) if only because many of the current issues are omitted or dealt with in passing, and because later work has to some extent reshaped the analysis. However, the book is a useful supplementary collection of articles at a price which may well be worth its inclusion on reading lists.

University of Bradford PETER J. BUCKLEY

Technology and the Multinationals: Corporate Strategies in a Changing World Economy. By Jack Baranson *Lexington, Mass Lexington Books. 1978. 170 pp.*

DR BARANSON'S book looks at sixteen cases where American companies have entered some form of technology-transferring deal with non-American institutions. Funded by the US Department of Labor, the study's chief aim is to examine the impact of such deals on the American economy, and to throw light on the different forms such deals may take. Baranson achieves his goals and will interest those concerned with the multinational company and technology-transfer debates.

He takes his cases from the aircraft, automotive, computer, consumer electronics and chemical-engineering industries. The cases range from Motorola selling off its chronically unprofitable colour-television manufacturing subsidiary to Matsushita; to Piper Aircraft licensing the production of its small planes to Brazil, or Fluor's transfer of project-management techniques to Saudi Arabia.

Such cases make for fairly specialised reading, but they are clearly written and carefully chosen. As well as cases involving technology transfer between the United States, West Europe and Japan, he throws in cases involving American deals with East Europe and the Third World. Again, while illustrating cases where obsolete technology is shipped in its entirety to a less-developed country, he illustrates other variants of the technology transfer process, such as extensive cross-licensing which may bind the future of American and non-American companies together at a less extreme level than a full merger.

1. UN E/C 10/38
2. Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1935

Though sound enough, the cases are sometimes presented in a somewhat uninspired way. For instance, one case deals with the abortive negotiations between General Motors and Poland, without examining Fiat's established relationship with the Polish automotive industry. One accepts that this book was written for a Washington readership, but one would have been happier with a slightly less United States-centred approach.

Baranson's conclusions are somewhat pessimistic about the impact of such deals on the American economy. He clearly demonstrates why the individual companies were forced into such deals, but the picture he leaves is of the non-American participants in such deals growing ever more sophisticated in their bargaining techniques. But in leaving us with this negative picture, he has no convincing suggestions of how the trends can be reversed. Still, buy this book for the cases and for a clear analysis of the various ways technology transfer can be accomplished.

Chatham House LOUIS TURNER

The Nationalisation of Multinationals in Peripheral Economies. Edited by Julio Faundez and Sol Picciotto. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 238 pp. £12·00.*

THIS book consists of five papers which examine case histories of nationalisation and more generalised government intervention in four countries, together with an introduction by the editors and a concluding paper by Picciotto. The five case histories cover Tanzania, Cuba, the Norwegian oil industry and two papers on Chile under Allende.

No attempt is made in the introduction to provide either a context or a theoretical basis for the case histories: indeed a comprehensive theory is explicitly ruled out by the editors. Neither is an overview of expropriation given—we are left to search in a footnote to the introduction to find that very little expropriation of multinationals has occurred in manufacturing industry, the main incidence being in the extraction of raw materials. The conclusion on ' Firm and State in the World Economy ' attempts to trace the changing framework of relations between firm and state but helps us little to understand the forces which have led to the particular pattern of host intervention observed in the world economy. Moreover, there is little analysis of the newer forms of contractual arrangements involved in the host countries' attempts to ' unbundle ' or ' depackage ' the resources controlled by multinationals.

However, the case histories are interesting. Reginald H. Green on Tanzania provides a guide to acquisition for the host country derived from his own experiences as Economic Adviser to the country, though he does point out that such acquisitions were perhaps facilitated by the multinationals' perception of Tanzania as not economically or geopolitically critical Victor Robinowitz's study of the Cuban nationalisations in the American courts is a fascinating discussion of conflicts expressed through overlaps in national laws, the problems of extraterritorial implications of national decisions and the political role of multinationals. The two papers on Chile analyse the Allende government's handling of expropriations, specifically the ' excess profits ' clauses which threatened compensation payments (Faundez) and the role of law and economic coercion in copper nationalisation (Carlos Fortin). Finally, Petter Nore analyses the impact of oil on Norway's economic development.

Together, the papers show the totally haphazard nature of any international conflict resolution mechanism. The general principle of ' prompt, adequate and effective compensation ' is capable of almost any interpretation. The analysts make a useful attempt to distinguish between the actions of the multinational firms themselves and those of the source country but, not surprisingly, often find the two inextricably bound

together. This is an important area which deserves further attention—in particular more emphasis should be paid to integrating the literature on the aspirations of host countries to a more detailed analysis of the contribution of multinationals to development (or underdevelopment). This may lead to conclusions on the pattern of host government interventions (is market access to the advanced countries the reason for the lack of expropriations in manufacturing?) and on the correct stance vis à vis multinationals and their source countries *after* intervention. It may also lead to a new appraisal of policies by the multinationals themselves.

University of Bradford PETER J. BUCKLEY

The Future of Cultural Minorities. Edited by Antony Alcock, Brian K. Taylor and John M. Welton. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 221 pp. £12·00.*

THE importance of minority problems for international relations hardly needs to be emphasised in this journal: in the 1930s, they were the object of a number of important Chatham House studies. Recently, a number of scholarly compilations on the subject have been published in this country and in the United States, indicating the continuing vigour of minorities and their attraction for academics. While these have tended to concentrate on the history of minority conflicts or on their contribution to international affairs, this volume seeks to advance the discussion by surveying present minority problems under a number of different headings and then offering pointers to the future. The editors take their stand on the principles that minorities deserve to survive and prosper if they themselves wish this to happen, and that, even if they do not, their existence leads to the general enrichment of mankind and, as such, they ought to enjoy protection. No one, aware of postwar solutions like the wholesale expulsion of the Sudeten Germans or of the Chinese of Vietnam, can deny that the editors' concern over the future is justified.

The individual writers are well chosen, each making a distinctive contribution and giving numerous references to an extensive secondary literature Two of the editors, Taylor and Alcock, also contribute chapters, writing respectively on the relevance of cultural theory to minority positions within the multicultural state and on how governmental attitudes towards minorities have evolved in Western countries. Claire Palley, an unassailable expert in this field, writes authoritatively on the role of law, although it must be said that the tabular approach to parts of her chapter is a stylistic disaster. Fortunately, this approach is largely avoided by the other writers—Glanville Price and Terence O'Brien on the importance of language (an issue rightly regarded by the editors to be at the nub of the problem), Margaret Sutherland on the crucial role of education, F. Y. St Leger on the mass media, pointing to their potential for supporting minority positions and the potential threat they present, and K. R. Gladdish on the internal political dynamics within minorities.

The editors' general conclusions are thoughtful, if somewhat liberal concensus. Their final plea for devolved government as the solution for minority problems now reads oddly in view of the debacle over the Scotland and Wales bills, but it would be a mistake to think it invalid. It may well be given fresh relevance by the Canadian election results. Overall, this is a worthwhile guide. One could look for a similar exercise on the future of cultural minorities within the communist system, an issue hardly touched on here, but the impression is one of serious thought about a problem of worldwide interest and relevance.

New University of Ulster, Coleraine T. G. FRASER

Exit Visa: Detente, Human Rights and the Jewish Emigration Movement in the USSR. By Colin Shindler. *London: Bachman and Turner. 1978. 291 pp. £7·50.*

COLIN SHINDLER'S work tells again the harrowing tale of the Soviet Jewish emigration movement, updating earlier histories and relating it to the policy of detente. The latter is shown to be shallow in areas other than military hardware—though one wonders why anyone should ever have expected it to be otherwise.

The book has as its theme a policy of informing the world of this continuing case of persecution in order that none will, in future times, be able to justify their lack of response by claiming that they never realised—as many of the Western Left has so often said of the Gulag Archipelago, and the Germans of the concentration camps. The problems involved in such a position are however obvious. In the first place, who really listens and learns—especially in a world overflowing with groups suffering far harsher persecution? Then again, if the Soviet Union really cared about such reactions, one wonders whether it would imprison the Shcharanskys, Ginsburgs and Orlovs for decades at a time in the full glare of publicity. In handling those of its citizens of unreliable or dual loyalties, the response of such a zenophobic and prestige-conscious society as that of the Soviet Union is both unsurprising and endowed with a measure of continuity, however lacking in morality in Western eyes

Equally intelligible is the reaction of the West, especially in not allowing the cases of some rather insignificant dissidents to obstruct agreements in more vital areas. In any event, emigration is not merely a problem for the would-be emigrant, it is a problem for potential host countries. Most of the latter now have immigration quotas and can hardly be expected to respond with open doors to a situation which is certainly no worse than numerous others, particularly as fewer Soviet Jews head for Israel. Unimpeded travel may seem a desirable right, but neither exists nor is particularly practical in this century of mass repressions, and unparalleled population growth and movement

The lack of Jewish use of Birobidzhan is hardly justification for the introduction's claim that they have no national territory in Russia, while the obviously sizeable Khazar element of Soviet Jewry is already on home ground—there is no question of a ' return to Israel '. Such statements apart, the book is a useful compilation on the emigration movement, though less realistic about the impact it should have on detente.

University of Sheffield JULIAN BIRCH

The Many Faces of Communism. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan 1978 366 pp. $14 95*

THE past decade has seen some striking changes both within and between communist parties. What is less clear is the origin and direction of these changes. The slow but apparently sure march to power by two of the West European communist parties (the Italian PCI and the French PCF) has in recent years cast a long shadow over the whole debate, focusing attention largely on issues of foreign rather than domestic politics. This focus has itself been sharpened by the traditional view of communist parties—ruling and non-ruling alike—as alien forces in society, immune both to the political culture around them and also the categories, concepts, and methods of political science.

The chapters on China and Yugoslavia focus exclusively on this external environment. Several of the remaining contributions to this volume do tack on the obligatory foreign policy framework, although rather as an afterthought and presumably under editorial guidance. Yet the book is also a timely contribution to the

discussion of the deeper issues. Several common threads emerge: the cracks within the communist movement extend well beyond the boundaries of ' Eurocommunism '; the social, political, and economic pressures for change affect not only the non-ruling parties in Asia and Europe, but also the ruling regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus, for any sense to be made of these conflicting pressures, it is imperative to explore the national as much as the international environment in which these parties operate.

As the chapters on each of the non-ruling communist parties (the French, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese and Spanish) show, the impetus for many of these internal changes came from external events such as Khrushchev's secret speech and more particularly the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Yet the resulting fissures within the communist movement occurred largely along pre-existing fault lines Moreover, the varying responses to these external events have clearly been conditioned by a whole string of variables readily familiar to Western political scientists. Alongside the conventional discussions of strategy, theory, and party organisation, each of these chapters makes a valuable contribution to accumulated knowledge by exploring the impact of such factors as historical experience, variations in political culture, changing party composition and vote, and patterns of political leadership.

Although no cross-national comparisons are drawn (with the notable exception of the single chapter dealing with both the PCP and PCE), each of these parties has now evidently reached something of a watershed in terms of national political influence. Having made the painful transition from cadre party to mass party, and in the process achieved political respectability, several of these parties now find themselves limited by the diverse aspirations of their own enlarged membership, the coalition politics of pluralist political systems, and their own vote-catching commitment to the mechanics of the parliamentary process. Thus their march to legitimate power has left their flanks open to attack from the Left as well as the Right, and at the same time faced the larger parties with the dubious prospect of attaining partial political responsibility for an economic and social system which fails to correspond with traditional Marxist-Leninist categories and which is not directly amenable to communist party control The decision either to return to the political ghetto of the 1950s or to continue to adapt to a changing environment will to some considerable extent depend on the variables explored in these chapters.

Yet this reciprocal influence of political culture on ideology and the party also affects the ruling parties, as is suggested forcibly by the discussion of ' national Bolshevism ' and communism as two polar extremes within the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). More concretely, the ruling regimes in Eastern Europe must quickly find ways to channel the political pressures generated by socio-economic development, while at the same time adhering to the basic doctrinal assumptions from which they claim their authority to govern. Increasingly, therefore, it will be internal rather than external (i.e. Soviet) pressures which must take precedence in this exercise in regime security By concentrating primarily on these internal constraints this book makes a valuable contribution to the comparative study of communist parties, and one which will hopefully encourage further work in this field.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth EDWINA MORETON

Women Under Communism. By Barbara Wolfe Jancar. *Baltimore, Maryland, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1978 291 pp. £11·25.*

IN this book Barbara Jancar, an American political scientist, sets out to analyse the contemporary political position of women in various communist states. The author aims to explain why there are not many women in top political and administrative

positions in communist regimes despite their governments' commitment to equal educational and professional opportunity. By examining female participation in the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe (with some appendix data on Cuba) she also seeks to draw some general conclusions on the relationship between sexual equality and communism.

The book provides a wealth of material culled from printed sources, interviews with the citizens of the countries involved and with emigrés on women's conditions at work, at home, in the political process, on their treatment in law, in propaganda and in the socialisation process and, finally, on women's own concepts of themselves. There are four detailed appendices on women's positions in the governments of Eastern Europe, China and the United States and on women's roles more generally in Cuba.

Ms Jancar's conclusions are that woman's political position depends more on the level of industrialisation of the society in question than on whether it is capitalist, socialist or communist. For example, in an industrialising country (for example, China) women gradually attain men's roles while losing none of their own traditional roles; in an industrialised society, like those of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, these dual roles are reinforced; in a post-industrial society people have leisure time to consider their own personal fulfilment and sex roles gradually disappear. Ms Jancar sees the United States and Sweden as being in this latter stage. She does not, however, conclude that whether a society aims at communism or not has no effect on the position of its women. She finds an authoritarian society more progressive with respect to sexual equality in the early stages of modernisation than a pluralistic one; in the latter stages of modernisation she feels the reverse is true. Thus Soviet and East European governments helped their women to achieve the considerable educational and work opportunities they now have but do not encourage them to move into the next stage of looking for individual fulfilment. Western women's movements should therefore ' divest themselves of their Marxist economic revolutionary tendencies and concentrate on giving priority to women's interests, regardless of the economic base of society ' (p. 212)

It is clear from the above that the author's stance is not a simple, detached one. Her own position and hopes for an androgynous society where people are free to choose their roles regardless of their sex are explicitly stated in the opening chapter and do not intrude in the presentation of her data. The large number of countries discussed and the broadness of the author's theme mean that information is condensed to the barest essentials. There are only two sentences, for example, on contraception in the Soviet Union and the key area of sex-role socialisation is discussed in relation to all the countries concerned in only eight pages. As a result the text at times appears to be over-densely packed.

Nevertheless, *Women Under Communism* is an extremely interesting and informative book. Many of its data have not been published elsewhere in English and Ms Jancar relates her research findings to her theory in an effective way. This book will be of use and interest to political scientists and indeed to any people with a serious concern for sexual equality in today's world.

FELICITY O'DELL

Sport Under Communism: The USSR, Czechoslovakia, The G.D.R., China, Cuba. Edited by James Riordan. *London: C. Hurst. 1978. 177pp. £6·95.*

THE rise of communist states as powers in the world of sport is clearly of political importance in international affairs. Their supremacy may be indexed by the following facts: in the Olympic Games the communist countries won 29 per cent of the medals in 1952, 47 per cent in 1972, and 57 per cent in 1976. Even more remarkable is the

achievement of the German Democratic Republic as a competitor—in 1976 it won more gold medals than the United States, Canada, Britain and France combined. Riordan's book contains all these facts and much more besides. The chapters on each of the countries dealt with in this book cover: their history and development; the emergence of new features since their political watershed; the organisation of physical education in schools; and the major goals of sport and physical education. As one would expect, the chapters are uneven in length and quality, but those on the Soviet Union (by the editor) and the one on the GDR (by David Childs) are of considerable interest.

Riordan particularly brings out the political and social roles of sport. He points out that in addition to improving physical health, sport has been important in combating ' anti-social and anti-Soviet ' behaviour; the three principal ingredients of Soviet sports policy are ' for health, defence and integration '. He brings out the role of sport replacing war as a focus of competition. The Soviet citizen has been encouraged to transfer ' team loyalty ' to ' state loyalty '. The legitimating effects of successes by communist states in international competition could have been more brought out by the authors. The trend to increasing prosperity and leisure and family-centredness might lead in future to a declining interest in competitive sport; or as Riordan puts it, to ' getting away from it all ' rather than ' getting together '. It would have been interesting to have read more about how such social trends might affect participation in sport. One other caveat that I would add to the quantitative comparisons of levels of sporting achievement, is that many of the highest Western standards are reached in professional sport and such competitors are excluded from the Olympics: boxing and soccer are notable examples. But the book will be a most useful and timely addition to our knowledge of communist states.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge DAVID LANE

The Circumpolar North: A Political and Economic Geography of the Arctic and Sub-Arctic. By Terence Armstrong, George Rogers and Graham Rowley. *London: Methuen. 1978. 303 pp. £13·00. Pb: £5·95.*

IN recent years there have been rapid changes in the political and economic geography of the Arctic and sub-Arctic in response to the quest for raw materials, changing strategic requirements and the belated recognition of the rights of native peoples. *The Circumpolar North*, written by three authors, each of whom is actively involved in northern affairs, is a welcome response to the need to discuss these changes. It is designed for those ' with a more than superficial interest in the northern regions of our planet '.

Following a chapter highlighting the main features of the natural environment, the bulk of the book is devoted to regional chapters on northern Russia (defined so as to include half the total land area of the Soviet Union), northern Canada, Alaska, Greenland and northern Scandinavia. Each chapter discusses the physical background, history, resources, population, transport, industrial and political aspects of each region. In addition there is a chapter on the circumpolar oceans dealing with shipping, fisheries and sea-bed exploration. Overall, these chapters provide a full description of each area with an abundance of facts presented in the text, in tables and on maps. A final chapter views particular aspects on a circumpolar basis, for example, political and economic relations, scientific co-operation and the fate of the native peoples of the north.

The book fills an important gap. Much recent northern literature is contained in national journals or in special government reports little known outside their country of origin; in the Soviet Union information is often inaccessible or gleaned only from

perusal of news items. For these reasons it has been difficult to gain an overview of the northern lands. *The Circumpolar North* now allows the reader to make an informed study of the approaches and achievements of different nations. As such it is an unrivalled contribution to the literature.

One criticism of the book is that it overstresses detailed description at the expense of generalisation and/or analysis. For example, whereas there is a great deal of detail about the location and type of development there is little emphasis on the reasons behind such developments. Such key geographical issues as the tendency for development and the growth of infrastructures to be concentrated in certain areas at the expense of other areas is only mentioned in passing, while the reasons for the disturbing and differential effect of development on native peoples is treated only superficially. Perhaps these are unfair criticisms to level at a multi-authored book, but they are made only out of a sense of loss—a feeling that the authors are uniquely well-qualified to develop more general principles and that readers would have gained immeasurably from reading their views. As it is, the balance chosen for the book would seem to make its main role that of a source book for information—rather than one which might appeal to the student reader interested in understanding the Arctic, or to those interested in regional development per se. Perhaps such a view is fortified by the lack of any photographs except on the outer cover.

Nevertheless, the book is important because it answers a need in giving a northern perspective to the problem of development and in bringing together a mass of new information about the Arctic and sub-Arctic.

University of Aberdeen DAVID SUGDEN

The Third World and Press Freedom. Edited by Philip C. Horton. *New York: Praeger 1978. 253 pp. £14·25.*

THIS valuable collection of essays results from the gathering in spring, 1977 of a disparate group of ' news managers ', academics and international civil servants in New York. The meeting, held under the auspices of the Edward R. Murrow Center, was one of the many indirect results of the demand for a ' new international economic order ' from the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 which, in turn, led to the call for a ' new information order '. This seemingly simple phrase in reality embraces a host of complexities. Try, for example, to define what is meant by ' order ', and then try defining ' information ', and then try approaching these concepts from the points of view of, for example, the Tunisian Secretariat of State for Information and the International Press Institute.

This was exactly the problem the New York meeting addressed, and the resulting collection of attitudes and opinions makes this publication a basic text. Among the subjects contributors covered were news flow in the Third World; legal aspects of ' the right to communicate '; developmental journalism; Western wire services and the Third World; the non-aligned news agencies pool; censorship and freedom; and running throughout the text is the role of Unesco in the establishment of any new information order—perhaps the touchiest subject of all. Contributors include Peter Galliner, Director of the International Press Institute; Percy Qoboza, then editor of the now banned *World* of South Africa; Pero Ivacic, General Director of the Yugoslav news agency ' Tanjug '; Gunnar R. Naesselund, Unesco's Deputy Assistant Director-General (Communication), Sector of Culture and Communication; Hilary Ng'weno, editor of Nairobi's *The Weekly Review*; and Leonard Sussman, Executive Director of Freedom House. The sixteen papers cover an impressively wide range—not only of subjects but of biases and emotions as can be guessed from this selection of contributors. Technically the book has been well planned with, for example, a

thoughtful note on who the contributors and editor are. The only pity is that, especially at the price demanded, the proof-reading appears to have been done in haste resulting in at least one mis-quotation and, apparently, some missing lines.

JUDITH ACTON

Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance. By Elihu Katz and George Wedell. *London: Macmillan. 1978 305 pp. £7·95.*

BETWEEN September 1973 and April 1975 the authors of this excellent book scrutinised the functions and effects of the broadcast media in the changing societies of eleven ' developing ' countries—Algeria, Brazil, Cyprus, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Peru, Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania and Thailand. As too often happens there has been a long lapse of time between the field work and the publication of this book. Surprisingly, however, this does not detract from the scholarship offered. The authors had the foresight to approach their subject in a series of reflective essays far wider in scope than would have been the case had they simply presented what was happening in the subject countries, one by one. They have thus provided a mine of information which cannot soon be outdated on the transfer of broadcasting to these countries from models developed in the main by the United Kingdom, France and the United States; the structures of broadcasting; interaction of broadcasting and established institutions; the economic implications of broadcasting—such as the reliance of poor countries on imported and often unsuitable technology; the impact of broadcasting, amazingly not always disastrous, on indigenous cultures, and the subject around which this book is built, the role of broadcasting in national development.

The authors find that amongst the motives for the introduction of radio were ' the extension of empire, the making of profit, the rallying of independence forces, and missionary activity ' (p 9) and that, self-evidently, radio remains vastly more important post-independence than television which, by its nature, can affect or be enjoyed by only tiny, relatively wealthy minorities. Mainland Tanzania, for this reason, refuses to introduce television as yet. They find the flow of television entertainment programmes and formats and, most importantly, news is almost totally one-sided from the ' developed ' to the ' developing ' and that American imports such as Kojak, Ironside (or L'Homme de Fer) and Hawaii Five-O are vastly preponderant. They find a disturbing divide between what was hoped for and what has been achieved in the use of broadcasting for ' national development ' in its widest sense, and counsel caution in assessing what broadcasting policies developing countries require for the future.

JUDITH ACTON

Ten Years of Terrorism: Collected Views. *London: Royal United Services Institute; New York: Crane, Russak for the RUSI 1979. (Distrib. by Seeley, Service, London.) 192 pp. £8.50. Pb: £4·95*

THIS volume comprises six lectures, three seminars, and a retrospective review of a decade of terrorist activities. The result is a book co-authored by seventeen experts, assisted by an editorial team of six. Inevitably one of its problems is lack of coherence in style and approach. There are also considerable overlaps Most contributors seem unaware of other lecturers' views. Perhaps this is just as well because they do not spend any time arguing. However, although the collection offers a disconcerting variety of views it does have the merit of revealing the assumptions and confusions of the experts, and herein lies its considerable interest for the academic student.

In brief review one can do little more than highlight some of the more striking assertions that are never challenged or properly discussed in the series as a whole. For example, Professor Laqueur claimed that ' neither terrorism nor tyrannicide can be rejected in all circumstances as a matter of absolute moral principle '. Why should we imagine that the same moral rule must apply in both cases? Can one not distinguish between acts of terrorism and acts of tyrannicide? And is it not a prerequisite in a discussion of this kind to define one's terms? Laqueur only sows further confusion when he states ' I suppose that civil disobedience could also be regarded as terrorism of sorts '.

Dr Peter Janke's contribution on ' The Response to Terrorism ' is packed with sound and interesting points. He was one of the few speakers to notice the significance of computer technology as a resource for the police, and the importance of recent controversial West German legislation, including the attempts to legally define a terrorist organisation and to regulate relations between defence lawyers and their clients. Regrettably, none of these matters were taken up in discussion.

Perhaps the most revealing comments in the book come from the media men. Mr Robin Walsh, News Editor, BBC Northern Ireland, states: ' The BBC, argue the critics, should support law and order. I suggest that it is its duty to report law and order.' He also defends the decision to permit the broadcasting of interviews with two Provisional IRA leaders. Can even the most warped notion of ' public interest ' ever justify the public broadcasting authority carrying live interviews with men who are systematically murdering their fellow-citizens? This is followed by Mr Martin Bell defending ' neutrality ' as the guiding principle of BBC reporting in Northern Ireland—as if he is referring to some foreign war in which the British people have no moral or political involvement! At another point Mr Bell tries to claim that Provisional IRA terrorists cease to be terrorists when they attack members of the security forces! Thank God there appears to have been a change of heart since 1977 on the part of the broadcasting authorities. They are no longer so anxious to profess neutrality towards murderers.

In complete contrast is Professor Max Beloff's superb piece on ' Terrorism and the People ', containing the most perceptive comments both on the general conditions favouring the growth of terrorism, and on the reasons why successive governments have failed to carry out their moral obligations to suppress it.

In sum, RUSI has produced a very mixed bag of lectures and discussions but there is something to be learnt from most of them. One hopes that the Institute will be emboldened to publish further books on other important themes.

University of Aberdeen PAUL WILKINSON

LAW

The International Law of Detente: Arms Control, European Security, and East West Cooperation. By Edward McWhinney. *Alphen aan den Rijn· Sijthoff and Noordhoff 1978. 259 pp. Fl 75.00. $35.00.*

THIS book is based on three published articles and on lectures given in 1976 and 1977. Despite some minor duplication, for example the different usages of the terminology of peaceful co-existence (pp. 2-7, 23), the work offers a coherent commentary and reflection upon the developing strategic, political and territorial relations between the two super-powers and their allies or satellites up to the Belgrade Review Conference of 1978. Professor McWhinney's particular contribution comes from his skills in comparative law and legal philosophy, which enable him to illuminate

the non-ideological factors behind the different approaches to international law of the Soviet Union, the United States and the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. He emphasises that Soviet lawyers are, among other things, civil lawyers imbued with the continental approach to legal sources, codification and drafting, and that they therefore share some common ground with lawyers from Western Europe. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon common-law approach is pragmatic, problem-orientated and suspicious of general statements of principle. McWhinney sees the history of detente since the early 1960s partly in terms of a triumph for Western methodology—' a rigorously empirical approach, in which particular tension issues would be isolated from the general East-West differences, and specific solutions sought in them on a basis of balancing of the competing bloc interests '; an approach in which ' instead of being postulated in advance in a purely abstract way, the general rules of East-West relations would emerge empirically, experimentally ' (p. 25). He claims, and the claim is supported by the negotiations and agreements examined in the book, that it was the Soviet Union's discreet de facto acceptance of the Western approach, while maintaining a public appearance of insistence on codification of the whole doctrine of peaceful co-existence, which enabled the detente process to be started.

Separate chapters record the measure of achievement, by no means uniform, in the major areas which have been on the agenda. To list the items conveys the book's scope: nuclear disarmament and arms control; strategic arms limitation, SALT I and II; the legitimation of frontiers in Europe; East-West co-operation in space; the Helsinki Conference; mutual balanced force reductions and the outlawing of aggression. The story is told with brevity but the essential facts are given, and attention is focused on the legal end-product in the shape of treaty, informal agreement, General Assembly resolution, or Final Act. The harshly negative side of co-existence, its secular exclusion from internal relations in the Soviet bloc in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, is the subject of a separate chapter. McWhinney is critical of American observers who argue that the Helsinki Final Act has, in some sense, ' repealed ' the Brezhnev Doctrine. In view of the past history of tacit acceptance by both sides of ' spheres of influence ' in Europe and the convention of mutual non-interference, he would want more explicit acknowledgment than is given in the Final Act that the Declaration on Principles does apply to intra-bloc relations (pp. 126–27).

His concluding reflections include some generalised and unoriginal comments on the overall historical and political significance of the detente agreements. On the significance of the detente process for international legal method, he suggests that it vindicates the empirical, step-by-step approach to international law-making. This approach not only permits the resolution of particular issues (as in the Test Ban Treaty, the Space Treaty, or the frontiers of Europe), but also gains time which may be used to further the search for more basic consensus. He also points to marked differences not only in substance but in style and drafting technique, between the detente accords between the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc members and West Germany, and the Soviet-United States bilateral accords, on the one hand, and the multilaterally-drafted general instruments such as the Helsinki Final Act, the Declaration on Friendly Relations and the Definition of Aggression, on the other. The differences are not solely a function of numbers, but reflect differences in intellectual and professional skills in the negotiating teams, and accumulated expertise on the Soviet, American and West German sides. The gain in precision, however, may be at the expense of loss of insight and analogy from an area of international law removed from the particular aspect being considered bilaterally. An example is given from the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee of a valuable contribution from Poland by a ' non-specialist legal layman ' which resolved a deadlock between the super-powers. The author ends by canvassing possibilities for further progress in the changed circumstances of the late 1970s and beyond, including the implications of the new ' moral ' foreign policy of

the Carter administration. Over fifty pages of notes, and a brief but adequate index complete this readable and stimulating work.

University of Manchester GILLIAN WHITE

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Long Shadow: Reflections on the Second World War Era. By Lisle A. Rose. *Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press. 1978. 224 pp. (Contributions in American History 70.) £11·95.*

THE pretensions of Lisle Rose's study are immediately obvious. For ' some two hundred years . . . popular thought in the West has been shaped by a half dozen great secular messiahs: Jefferson, Adam Smith, Marx, Darwin, Freud, and Hitler ' (p. 3) Even a non-specialist can find much to query in the selection and analysis of this group: Jefferson and Smith united in ' genial assumptions about human nature ' (p. 4); while Marx is alleged to have placed ' materialism and material acquisition at the very center of human nature and human striving ' (p. 16). Hitler is given the greatest prominence, in accordance with the overt theme of these ' exploratory essays ' (p. 21): the cataclysmic impact of the Second World War upon the four subsequent decades.

Though Rose begins with ' Western man ' (p. 3), his main concern soon emerges as the War's particular effect upon United States society Thus the War as ' Holocaust ' (decidedly not a translation of *Endlösung*) and as ' Revolution ' (Chs. 1, 2) is discussed for its educative potential to Americans. Rose argues that the lessons were ignored (for example: ' Europe ' would not turn the cold into a hot war); but since he avoids structural or dynamic analyses of the American state and society and concentrates instead upon the alleged moral, spiritual and epistemological weaknesses of his fellow citizens, we are offered no clues for the reform of American policy and action.

Rose is on surer ground in examining American responsibility for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (Ch. 3); but he characteristically described the conflict in terms of emotion, psychology and idealism (p 67). Scattered hints of long-term contradictions between Japanese and American interests are not articulated into theory. To give an example: could Japan have been safely promoted as *both* a stabiliser and controller of China (and its various revolutions) *and* as a bulwark against Russia (Tsarist and Soviet) without eventually endangering the European and American empires in Asia and the Pacific? Historians who deprecate such questions will be relieved to find them absent from this study.

The conceptual core lies in Chapter 5: ' The Victims '. These are not (as we might expect) merely the dead and traumatised inmates of the Nazi concentration camps; they are also the ' veteran generation ' of Americans who grew up in the poverty of Depression, matured in the rigours of war and lived into complacent affluence to become rejected as models by their own children and the dispossessed of the Third World. ' Thus did the greatest victors of the Second World War at last become their own worst victims ' (p. 130). The comparison is grotesque—an offence against the moral sensibility which Rose frequently invokes.

Americans are depicted as facing a moral crisis—but an endemic one. American history moves in cycles: from Massachusetts Bay, Calvinism and the early seventeenth century to California, hedonism and the 1960s, success necessarily generates failure. What then is the particular significance of the Second World War? Rose answers with his eye on President Nixon and Watergate, which ' was only the most recent culmination of a recurrent national cycle of aspiration, triumph, decay, and disillusion,

and . . . as with many other aspects of national life, the . . . War played midwife to this latest cycle but did not create the cycle itself ' (p. 193).

Perhaps there are no a priori reasons why history should not move cyclically—or even epicyclically. (President Kennedy is portrayed as a ' cold warrior ' who matured into enlightenment: a deviant from the uniform course pursued by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon, Ch. 9.) If, however, history does move in such mysterious ways, then these ' reflections ' are at best observations of the inevitable.

University of Sussex MICHAEL DUNNE

The Politics of Wartime Aid: American Economic Assistance to France and French Northwest Africa, 1940–1946. By James J. Dougherty. *Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood Press. 1978. 264 pp. (Contributions in American History 71.) £11·95.*

JAMES DOUGHERTY has written an excellent monograph. It is thoroughly researched, rigorously organised and presented and, for the most part, clearly written in an economical style, which never strays from its brief. There is no ballast here, and in these terms and at current prices one receives very good value for money. Against this, the purchaser might very well demand a discount for the line or lines of text missing on pages 38 and 41, and the great number of misprints, some of which must be misspellings in the original ' Vacillate ' is only given correctly at the third attempt and the reader is treated to ' Equitorial ', ' plebescite ' and ' requrested ' (pp. 31, 47, 57–58, 125, 134). Even in context, I could not understand the sentence ' Through residential orders Admiral Esteva had effectively established the Germans ' (p. 128) and the ' deemphasization of Darlan ' (p. 63) was probably more painful than his subsequent assassination. The publishers have introduced lower case for ' state department ', ' foreign office ', ' treasury ' etc., for no apparent reason; even then they are inconsistent, since both ' State ' and ' Treasury ' appear on pp. 181–82. ' Congress ', an ' Assistant Secretary of State ' or a ' Former Governor ' clearly outrank the ' president ' of the United States whilst the latter gains an obscure relative, Archie Roosevelt, whose fleeting incursion onto page 129 leaves the reader desirous of an explanatory footnote.

These deficiencies ill-serve Mr Dougherty's assiduous scholarship and skilful use of a large array of primary sources, in particular the records of the Foreign Economic Administration. His study, while certain to remain the standard work on the third largest Lend-Lease programme after those of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, is far more than just this. Dougherty provides important new information upon many other aspects of the period 1940–46, such as the political, military and economic aspects of liberation; the bureaucratic proliferation in Washington; Anglo-American relations; and United States policy towards decolonisation and the postwar economic order.

The French Lend-Lease programme grew out of these pressures as well as the overall French policy of the Roosevelt administration, and varied markedly from those for other major recipients. From the outset ' the United States insisted that the French pay cash for civilian goods ' (p. 5). The much-delayed Master Agreement of February 1945 differed considerably from others concluded by the United States, since it ' specifically provided for furnishing civilian materials with a post-war utility ' (p. 189). The resultant Congressional hostility and amendment of the 1941 Act clearly contributed to Truman's abrupt termination of Lend-Lease. Given the economic cost of German occupation *and* Allied liberation, the French did badly from

the final settlement. Their debt plus interest was higher than both the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, both of whom received far more Lend-Lease aid. The final French payment is due next year (p. 220).

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945. By Vojtech Mastny. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1979. 409 pp. $21.20.*

I began reading this book with some trepidation. The author's fierce attack on the ' revisionist ' school of historians is soon followed by some heady and unsupported generalisations about the 1928-34 period in Soviet foreign policy. ' Moscow's failure was, of course, a failure of its Marxist ideology ' (p. 18), may rank as a self-evident truth in some quarters but it does not do so here. Yet these cold war comforts turned out to be passing asides in an otherwise fascinating and impressive study of Soviet foreign policy.

With the important exception of Werth's *Russia At War*, our knowledge of the subject has until now rested largely upon what American and British historians have unearthed from their respective national archives. However adept these scholars have proved to be, their results inevitably have reflected Anglo-Saxon preoccupations, whether conservative or revisionist. It is, to say the least, unfortunate that hitherto such historians have doggedly refused to learn sufficient Russian to make use of Soviet sources, whilst simultaneously purporting to explain Moscow's foreign policy.

In this crucial respect, Mastny is exceptional. By itself, his use of sources in languages such as Polish, German, Russian and Czech, is impressive enough, but that alone would not have resulted in good history. In this case, these sources have been used to give a dimension to the study which has been sorely missed in other works on diplomacy during the Second World War And it is not merely diplomacy which is covered. The vital issue of Communist Party activities in occupied Europe is also treated with great flare, though we would have benefited from some treatment of the Italian situation and the Far East (relations with Mao), even of a cursory nature. The strength of the book is its coverage of affairs in Central and Eastern Europe.

On one issue, there is considerable room for disagreement with the author, and that is the question of the Comintern's dissolution. 'A close reading of the Comintern's official obituary leaves little doubt that the intended audience was its followers rather than its adversaries ', the author states (p. 95). Yet the official obituary, and particularly Stalin's interview with the Western press on the subject, which passes unmentioned by Mastny, suggest that it was indeed to a great extent a gesture of appeasement towards the Allies. And Mastny's treatment of Soviet secret talks with the Germans leads one to guess whether it might not also have been designed to appease Junker sentiment in the German camp.

In conclusion, this work cannot be recommended too highly, and not only for its contents, but also for its great style.

University of Birmingham JONATHAN HASLAM

Thresholds of Peace: Four Hundred Thousand German Prisoners and the People of Britain 1944-1948. By Matthew Barry Sullivan. *London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979. £10·00.*

WHEN the European War ended, Britain had on her hands some 2,788,000 German prisoners. The last did not get home till August 1948. Barry Sullivan has put

together, partly from official documents and other printed sources, but even more from personal papers and reminiscences, an account of how 400,000 were handled and how they reacted. It makes a fascinatingly human story. Kindness was to be found alongside brutality, forgiveness alongside resentment, imagination alongside obtuseness, goodwill and an effort to understand alongside hatred and closed minds. These qualities were shown not only by British to Germans and by Germans to British but also on both sides to fellow-nationals. What is in fact here chronicled is the effort of half-a-million human beings to come to terms (or to resist coming to terms) with the most insistent political and moral problems of their time. Who was to blame for the Nazis coming to power? Was there any justification for the way they used power? Is ' my country right or wrong ' the last word in international relations? Are my country's enemies necessarily my own, even if in peacetime they would be my friends? Has any individual or country a right to sit in judgment over another? There is much to be proud of, there is a good deal to regret

Prominent in the book are of course the British efforts at ' re-education ', a term which was deplored as misleading by almost all who were engaged in it but which one of its originators declared to be the English word best suited to describe what the British public intended as a way of preventing another war, namely ' the cultivation in the Prisoner-of-war of a new and co-operative attitude to humanity. It was essentially the belief that Germans were better than Nazi doctrines that blinded them to morality by politics and was an attempt to give them a chance to see that.' The author of those words was paid the singular compliment of being invited by the German authorities to write a volume on the subject in their official history of prisoners-of-war.

The book reminds us, if reminder were needed, how hard it is for organisation man to be compassionate. Paradoxically this limitation results largely from virtues. A good staff-officer is trained never to act without thinking of the effect of his actions on his colleagues, whose concurrence he often has to obtain. He must consider not just the individual case but the consequences of applying the principles involved in it universally (the test, according to Kant, of a truly moral action). Both considerations inhibit the conscientious (not to mention the timorous or lazy) from taking on their own authority the line to which human-kindness might point. The heroes and heroines in Mr Sullivan's story are, as so often, the people who not only did not allow themselves to be held back from acting on the promptings of their hearts but went out of their way to find occasions for so acting. But such actions are what would in other circumstances be described as arbitrary!

MICHAEL BALFOUR

WESTERN EUROPE

A Community of Twelve? The Impact of Further Enlargement on the European Communities: Une Communauté à Douze? L'Impact du Nouvel Elargissement sur les Communautés Européennes. Edited by William Wallace and I. Herreman. *Bruges: De Tempel. 1978. 442 pp*

THIS is the most comprehensive work yet published on the issues arising from the second round of enlargement of the European Community, with the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain. The Mediterranean enlargement is likely to become one of the determining factors for the future of European integration The volume in hand performs a very useful function by contributing to our understanding of the problems involved and the implications for Community institutions and policies, as well as for the three applicant countries. It contains papers submitted at a conference held in

Bruges in 1978 by politicians, officials and academics from the Nine and the Three. Although there is an obvious advantage in the involvement of policy-makers in academic conferences, there is, however, a big risk in relying heavily on contributions made by people directly involved in decision-making. The analysis of various issues may become terribly anodyne while, at the same time, reflecting mainly official views. This is a dangerous trap which the editors have not really avoided.

The first part of the book contains the speeches made by official representatives from the Nine and the Three. With the exception of the candid and somewhat provocative remarks made by Dr Fitzgerald, in all other contributions there is a clear attempt to play down any politically controversial issues. As a result, the reader is not given any real insight into the political aspect of enlargement which, although of great significance, is not properly analysed in this book. The contribution made by William Wallace is well-written and thought-provoking but not sufficient by itself to fill this gap

The main part of the book starts with the legal and institutional aspects of enlargement. It includes a very comprehensive analysis by G. Olmi and two rather technical papers on problems of translation and interpretation which deal, among other things, with the size of cubicles reserved for interpreters! J. Miranda has written a very interesting paper on the compatibility of the socialist constitution of Portugal with Community law while D Evrigenis concentrates on the provisions made in the Greek constitution of 1975 in anticipation of entry into the Community. The task of their Spanish colleague was made more difficult by the simple fact that he was writing before the new constitution in Spain took its final form.

The part dealing with Community policies and the economic aspect of enlargement is by far the most successful. This is probably because, as Geoffrey Denton has put it, ' political scientists and experts in international relations tend to be so close to governments and politicians that they become very cautious in what they say. Objective analysis is a little easier on the economic issues ' (p 419) I am very glad to hear that economists still retain some of their academic freedom! There is an excellent paper on agriculture by John Marsh and two complementary papers on the problem of adjustment and industrial policy where C. Heimpel and W. Hillebrand raise some of the fundamental questions related to enlargement, which are avoided by most people simply because they can be embarassing for either side The chapter on the Community budget is too long and of limited use

Dieter Biehl has made a very interesting analysis of the regional problem which would have been even more useful if the author had gone below the macro level and devoted more attention to particular policies and sectors. His regional estimates for Portugal, Greece and Turkey often seem to be in sharp contrast with the observations of an unsophisticated traveller in the three countries. But appearances may be deceiving!

I would expect that the main chapter in the section dealing with the external dimension of enlargement would be on relations with other Mediterranean countries and those on the southern littoral in particular. But this proved to be a very serious omission in the book I would draw the attention of the reader to the chapter by Th. de Montbrial and A. Bressand who express very interesting and typically French views on ' organised trade '.

Overall, this book contains some very good chapters which by themselves make it a useful addition to a growing literature on European integration. But it is rather uneven. It would make more exciting reading if it were less conformist and if it relied more on ' academic ' as opposed to ' official ' analysis. This is not, I hope, only a syndicalist view.

St Catherine's College, Oxford LOUKAS TSOUKALIS

Sources of Information on the European Communities. Edited by Doris M. Palmer. *London: Mansell. 1979. 230 pp. £11·90.*

THE objective of this book is to offer a guide through the mass of information which is available on the European Communities. It does itself contain some elementary information on the Communities, but the bulk of the book is devoted to telling the reader what is to be found, and where.

All the chapters are written by professional suppliers of information on the Communities, and they divide into those which deal with what publications contain information on such matters as Communities' legislation, technical requirements, and company information, and those which detail what information sources may be found in such places as the British Library, other depository libraries European documentation centres, and the Statistics and Market Intelligence Library (as well as through HMSO). The chapters on what information may be obtained from the British Departments of Trade, Industry, Environment, Transport, and Prices and Consumer Protection really fall into both categories. There is also a chapter called Future Trends which looks at the ways in which methods of disseminating and storing information are changing, and what effect these changes may have on those seeking information about the Communities; and there is a chapter on the institutions of the Community and the services of the Commission office.

Overall the book seems to be aimed more at practical men of business than at the academic, though new researchers on the Communities might find it a useful introduction to potential research sources The major users though are likely to be librarians and other professional suppliers of information.

University of Sheffield STEPHEN GEORGE

Who Makes British Foreign Policy? By James Barber *Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 1976 132 pp. £1·85*

PROFESSOR BARBER has written a valuable book, one that has already become a standard text on many courses. It raises theoretical points of interest, it is packed with relevant detail and it is the kind of length, and written in a style, that students will read. The book suggests that we can approach British foreign policy making best by considering it in the light of four ' perspectives '. Two of these, which Professor Barber calls the ' formal office holder ' and ' departmental negotiated order ' perspectives, involve stressing the role of those who have a direct control or power over policy processes. The other two, the ' pluralist ' and ' public control ' perspectives, stress more those who have indirect influence on policy, such as the political parties, media, pressure groups and Parliament. He adds that all policy evolves either within a specific or ' sectoral process ' (energy or commercial policy, for example), or is managed within a ' general process ', involving a wider range of interests and individuals and more complex choices about goals and available means. At this second level the public and senior Ministers are more involved, but, partly for that reason, the general process can only handle a select few important issues at one time. ' High ' policy thus tends to be handled within the general process; ' low ' policy at the sectoral level. Barber argues that this provides a useful way of categorising policy and his approach does provide answers to the question the book sets out to answer.

However useful an introductory text this may be, both to students of British foreign policy-making and of the study of foreign policy as a whole, it invites two main comments. First, *Who Makes British Foreign Policy?* suffers from the painful complaint of soggy theory. In other words, it offers broad approaches or perspectives which are not developed or assessed very satisfactorily as theoretical constructs. The

scheme which he develops will annoy traditional writers on British foreign polic without recognising much of the more behavioural work done by other scholars. Here however, Barber has a strong defence: in order to conform to specified length limit and to retain an introductory character, the book can only touch on the issues it raises and it is perhaps not such a bad thing to disturb the comfort of those who tak entrenched positions on the discussion of foreign policy-making. If, as Brian White ha said,[1] the book wastes an opportunity to improve on the sometimes rather lov theoretical level of writing on British foreign policy, it does take the opportunity t provide a lively and theoretically alert introduction to the subject. To the secon criticism, Barber has rather less defence. The study perpetuates the myth that Britis foreign policy exists, and that it is actually made. Others might take the view tha British foreign policy takes the form of an often rather inchoate series of reactions t events in the outside world. Most students, and most practitioners, would agree tha there is no single overall ' British Foreign Policy '; but if one looks at specific polic areas such as relations with newly industrialising states, arms control, the Commo Agricultural Policy and the replacement of Polaris, it is often hard to detect an consistently followed particular policy either. Furthermore, one is sometimes led t suspect that the obsession with secrecy which haunts British foreign policy-maker conceals their uncertainty about their own business. Barber assumes throughout thi book that there are coherent British foreign policies which are made and controlled He does not consider the view that, whether through a failure in Britain or, as seem to me more likely, as a consequence of the nature of foreign policy and th international system, this is simply not the case.

Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham CHRIS FARRANDS

Cod Wars and How to Lose Them. By Andrew Gilchrist. *Edinburgh: Q Press 1978 (First publ. Reykjavik: Almenna Bókafélagid, 1977.) 122 pp. £5·50*

THE author was British ambassador in Reykjavik from 1956 to 1959, thu experiencing the first of the ' cod wars ' that were virtually to monopolise the work o his small embassy. He gives a racy but serious account of that experience, drawing du lessons from it—lessons he considers were all too little heeded in the two subsequen ' wars '. Particular force is lent to Sir Andrew's conclusions by the way in which hi pronounced empathy and affection for Iceland and its people (whom he goes so far as t call ' the most gifted in Europe ') are combined with a total freedom from illusion o sentimentality—no ' poor little Iceland ' stuff here! He fully acknowledges the exten to which a determination to maintain incongruously high standards of living in thi mono-cultural island has had to rely on blackmail and other unscrupulous tactics—whether over fisheries or the American base at Keflavik—and on the fact that in th Western world it is the weak who bully the strong. What he condemns is th unrealism, as he sees it, of British policy ever since the floodgates were opened b the International Court of Justice's decision at the end of 1951 on our fishing limit dispute with Norway, when by switching in the latter's favour from law to equity i made impossible any recognised international maritime regime. The Icelanders, i refusing even to go to The Hague Court, and in subsequently breaking thei agreement with Britain, were certainly vulnerable in terms of international morality Yet from the practical point of view Sir Andrew is surely justified in his conclusio that:

> Looking back on it all today, I feel it difficult to blame the British Government to severely for getting into the first Cod War. They thought right was on their sid

1 ' The Study of British Foreign Policy A Reply to Professor Barber ', *British Journal of Internationa Studies*, Vol 3, No 3, Oct 1977, pp. 340-48

> (it wasn't, though the law was), they were convinced that the threat to our fisheries was a very serious one (it wasn't, though the experts said it was), and they had been told (by the Navy, though not by me) that they could frustrate the Icelanders . . . But what about the next two wars? If some reasonable degree of excuse and explanation can be offered for the British Government's actions in 1957–58, surely it passes comprehension that, when confronted by an identical problem in 1972–75, the Government should have had recourse to the same measures that had proved so ineffective and counter-productive on the earlier occasion (pp. 109–110).

Part of the trouble he ascribes to matters having been left too much to the Ministry of Fisheries and to the Law Officers—a point worth bearing in mind in the light of the Think Tank's recommendations for transfer of international responsibilities to Home Departments, and of the extent to which this is already happening in the EEC context. He also admits the skill with which the Icelanders exploited the situation, including a rueful tribute to their leading diplomatic spokesman, Hans Andersen, whose ' fairy tales ' he used to warn the Foreign Office against, and whom he here describes as ' obstinacy pure and undefiled . . . he deserves well of his country '. Perhaps Sir Andrew tends at times to personalise the argument—quoting for example the comment of Foreign Minister, Gudmundur Gudmundsson, that the original fisheries dispute ' was not settled in Paris . . . it was settled here in Reykjavik by you and me, and if it could only be left to us we could settle the next one before it starts '; and President Asgeirsson's valediction, ' There were only two people who sincerely tried to stop this stupid war (and) understood how much harm it would do to both countries. One was you, the other was me '. But a former colleague can testify to the consistency of the advice Sir Andrew gave London at the time: and it would be difficult today to disagree with his general verdict, whatever the political problems facing British governments of the day.

What alternative solution would Sir Andrew have favoured? ' The only possible British scope for establishing a bargaining position was related to fish.' In the context of the 200-miles limit eventually adopted, he believes we could at one time have offered the Icelanders herring in replacement of their own depleted stocks and in return for special cod-fishing rights. Later there were other possibilities which he himself advocated when he was Chairman of the Highlands and Islands Development Board (1970–76), and revisited Iceland to assess the interest in blue whiting that might be traded for cod. Now however, he says, even this has been rendered too late by our ' blind acceptance of Common Market fishery regulations ', which have ruled out any such direct deal with Iceland. Nor does he believe that fish-farming on a commercial scale is really the answer, for all the potential advantages Scotland offers here. He would put his money on deep-sea Atlantic fishing, for which the industry should be re-equipped and the whole economic life of the Outer Islands reorientated.

This is a most readable and convincing little book—and for Gilchrist connoisseurs a ' must ' anyhow. Besides its main purpose, it also furnishes an excellent introduction to Iceland, its flora and its fauna (animal and human alike). It tells some good stories—incidentally scotching the canard about Sir Andrew's playing the bagpipes during demonstrations against his embassy—and contains a number of delightful portraits, culminating in a moving postscript on Bjarni Benediktsson, the former Prime Minister, who with his wife and grandchild was tragically burnt to death in 1970, as the Gilchrists were on their way to stay with them.

MICHAEL F. CULLIS

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. Edited by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes. *Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. 1978. 273 pp. $22.50.*
Soviet Military Power and Performance. Edited by John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 219 pp. £12·00.*

THESE two books bear many of the hallmarks of edited volumes. Herspring and Volgyes have brought together a collection of thirteen essays, at least six of which are reprinted from earlier publications. Three introductory chapters by Kolkowicz, Odom and Colton set out the contending approaches to the study of civil-military relations in the communist states with the remaining authors discussing which of these models best fits the experience of the various countries. In conception, the book is long overdue; in practice, the contributions are uneven, with the case studies not always referring to any of the three models supposedly under scrutiny

Erickson and Feuchtwanger claim that ' a common approach and coherence of opinion run throughout all the chapters of this volume '. Yet, in fact, although the volume adheres organisationally, the approaches and opinions of the authors are in fact quite contrary. Thus for example Stone and Erickson both dwell on the extent to which historical experience has made the Russian army defence-minded, with Stone writing that ' it was this ultimate defensiveness of attitude that made the plan of attack in 1914 such a feeble attack ' (p. 16) and Erickson adding that the primacy of defence requirements (' *oboronosposobnost* ') has been elevated to a ' pseudo-ideology ' fundamentally shaping Soviet military thinking (p. 39). Erickson maintains that Soviet nuclear strategy, therefore, is based on the survival of the Soviet system ' as a viable political entity, and as a working military-economic system, a doctrine predicated as SANE (survival and national existence) in contrast to MAD (mutual assured destruction) ' (p 28)! Yet several other contributors reject these views of the primacy of defence, with Helmsley maintaining not only that Soviet tactical doctrine governing ground forces is based on ' the primacy of the offensive ' (p. 55) but also that one of the major advantages enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact is that it ' possesses the aggressor's advantage of strategic and tactical surprise ' (p. 70) Richard Burt, while recognising the largely defensive emphasis of Soviet strategic deployment sees this development not so much as a reaction to Soviet perceptions of threat, but rather as part of Soviet efforts to develop a capability ' to wage and win a nuclear conflict ' (p. 159). John Moore claims (p 83) that the Soviet navy has access to ports in ' Cuba, Conakry, Luanda, Mozambique, Mauritius, Berbera, Umm Qasr, Aden, Hodeida and more recently, Libya '. Although this would seem to be an exceedingly short list of ports-of-call compared with Western resources, Moore goes on to state that ' with a well-entrenched KGB throughout the world capable of engineering a crisis on command, the presence of a ship or a squadron ready to answer any calls for help or support is, as history shows, a great step towards political success.' Yet this statement is at odds with Vigor's conclusion (p. 207) that the Soviet military ' is only capable of projecting force across more than trifling distances when there is no opposition to be expected from either the intended victim or from another protecting power '.

One of the discussions largely absent from the Erickson-Feuchtwanger volume was the subject of the Herspring-Volgyes book—that is, the relationship between the Party and the military, and in particular the factors affecting the military's role. The central hypothesis under discussion (or demolition judging from the conclusion) is whether with increased technology and mechanisation, the military will become more professional, less politicised, and more likely to be in conflict with the ideological aims of the Party. Almost all the authors rejected the thesis, with it being upheld only in the

case of Poland. In the GDR, a high level of politicisation has continued despite military build-up, a phenomenon which Herspring too readily attributes to the GDR Party leadership's memory of ' the excesses of German militarism ' (p. 137). There is no evidence either that the governing Socialist Unity Party (SED) considers the army, or that the army believes itself, to be the rightful heir to the Prussian, much less the Nazi, military tradition. Herspring himself subsequently appears to support this in his discussion of the way in which East German military history has been rewritten to emphasise the proletarian antecedents of the army (p. 136). What Herspring does stress is the difficulty involved in establishing a national tradition within a military, controlled and armed by Moscow, and forced to suppress nationalism in favour of internationalism, a subject also brought out in Volgyes's article on Hungary. Paradoxically, in Romania despite broad support for the Party's independent stand in foreign policy, the effect on the military has been mixed not only because defence budgets have been cut and arms imports decreased, but also, according to Bacon, because of continuing pro-Soviet loyalty of a group within the military at least up until Ion Serb was ousted in 1972. The articles by Remington, LeoGrande and Godwin on Yugoslavia, Cuba and China respectively all illustrate the effects of guerrilla antecedents on the post-revolutionary relationship between party and army. As Godwin rightly argues in terms echoed in other contributions, to draw a division between military professionals and party ideologies is not only incorrect, it also overlooks the mutual support, commonality of goals and bureaucratic interpenetration which largely characterises party-military relations in most communist systems.

University of Southampton KAREN DAWISHA

The Soviet Threat: Myths and Realities. Edited by Grayson Kirk and Nils Wessell. *New York: Praeger (Distrib in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 182 pp £12 00*

TO be effective, any state's deterrent needs to be perceived by potentially hostile states as a genuine threat. If this interesting collection of essays is a reliable guide, the Soviet Union's deterrent is most effective as far as its most likely adversaries are concerned, for all the contributors view the Soviet threat as considerably more reality than myth. Not surprisingly, among the most convincing are two recently retired servicemen, General Maxwell D Taylor, who writes a severe if by no means alarmist conclusion, and Vice-Admiral Miller, who argues that the Soviet naval threat cannot be considered to be totally realistic, but who nevertheless talks about it in such a bluff manner that he makes its imminent employment appear perfectly possible and thereby reduces its mythical qualities almost to vanishing point Among the most telling pieces from the civilians is that by Dimitri K. Simes, who writing on a rightly much-aired subject, human rights, comes to the final recommendation that ' the development of specific policies should be filtered through the prism of American foreign policy interests and the specific Russian traditions and circumstances. Détente should not preclude human rights diplomacy. It is, however incompatible with political crusades against Moscow under the banner of human rights ' (p. 147).

The collection is divided into three principal parts. In the opening section on the strategic nuclear balance, Paul H. Nitze reinforces his argument with some clear graphs, although he perhaps exaggerates the extent of Soviet civil defence preparations, while Barry E Carter pleads for an improvement in the level of the public debate on the issue, hitherto in his reasoned opinion not nearly high enough. Among the pieces in the second section, entitled ' Conventional Forces and Regional Balances ', John Erickson is among those fulfilling Carter's request in a well-informed account of the European military balance, and Peter H. Juviler and Hannah J.

Zawadska join others in the third section, concerning economic and political dimensions, to record a comparable achievement, in their case on the wrongly neglected topic of ' Détente and Soviet Politics ' which they rightly show to go far beyond the life expectancy of Leonid I. Brezhnev. All in all, an absorbing collection, although not reinforcing the reader's confidence that he may be able, say, at the end of the century to look back at how judicious were these worthwhile appraisals of its awe-inspiring theme.

University of Aberdeen PAUL DUKES

Oil and Gas in Comecon Countries. By Daniel Park. *London: Kogan Page; New York: Nichols. 1979. 240 pp. £15·00.*

DANIEL PARK'S study is a highly competent account of a subject that has suffered lately from a surfeit of controversy.

The first four chapters deal with the Soviet and East European oil and gas industries up to the end of 1975: chapter 1 reviews the development of the world petroleum market from 1960; chapters 2 and 3 cover Soviet oil- and gas-industry development from the end of the Second World War to the end of 1970, and in 1971—75, respectively; and chapter 4 deals with the same industries in Eastern Europe up to 1975. Chapter 5 outlines plans for the European Comecon oil and gas industries in 1976—80 and their achievements by the end of 1977. Chapter 6 discusses Soviet oil and gas trade in the 1970s, whilst chapter 7, reviewing Soviet relations with other oil and gas producers, has the largest foreign-policy content The final chapter combines a brief summary with some tentative projections to 1985.

The author's style is clear and succinct and his grasp of the economics of the industries and of the world energy market is evident His experience of working in the oil industry is a considerable asset. He has drawn on a wide range of Soviet specialist writings and has also made use of East and West German, Czech, Polish and Romanian material. Above all, his approach is moderate and judicious, and devoid of the Doomsday tone of some recent Western writings on the ' Soviet energy problem '

Dr Park dismisses the CIA forecast of a downturn in Soviet oil output by 1983. This forecast rests, as he observes (p. 133), on the assumption that none of the key problems will be solved. It also overlooks the existence of numerous explored, viable but so far unexploited fields in Western Siberia (p. 222). At the same time, he credits Soviet economic management with a greater capability for energy conservation and flexibility in fuel substitution than is sometimes suggested. He therefore does not subscribe to the view that the Soviet Union will shortly become a major net oil importer.

A second important conclusion of Dr Park's analysis is that in the Middle East the Soviet Union is not out to weaken the West by cutting its energy supplies (p. 207). He characterises Soviet policy on Middle Eastern oil as ' opportunist ' but argues persuasively that Moscow has not sought political advantage where this would conflict with its economic advantage. Indeed Soviet policies have had a ' sound economic rationale ': energy price rises benefit Russia as an exporter; they also strengthen the inducements both to the West and to Eastern Europe to co-operate in developing Soviet energy resources.

This judgment may well be correct, but it is perhaps a shade less secure than Park suggests. One of his main supporting arguments is that the Soviet Union needs an economically strong West as a trade partner. If Soviet leaders perceive Western grain and technology as absolute requirements, this is no doubt true. If, however, these requirements are seen primarily as a means to the end of ' catching up ', the need for

an economically strong West might not go unquestioned in the Kremlin. After all, weakening Western economies may be another way of catching them up.

It should be noted that the author has largely confined himself to the supply side of Soviet and East European oil and gas and has refrained from any systematic analysis of factors affecting the size and fuel-mix of energy demand. This is an understandable, and probably a wise, choice, since the study could not otherwise have been so concise or so timely. What we now need, though, is an equally solid analysis of the demand side.

Some minor errors have been left undetected in the text: a few of them, unfortunately, could be confusing (for example, the natural-gas conversion factor on page 15, and the substitution of millions for thousands in Table 6.6). Moreover the index is brief and not too reliable. But these are small blemishes in a balanced and informative study.

University of Birmingham PHILIP HANSON

Die Ostbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Von nationalstaatlicher Politik zu gemeinsamer Verantwortung. Edited by Eberhard Schulz. *Munich: Oldenbourg. 1977. 270 pp. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, Bonn. Reihe: Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft 40.)*

Economic Reform in East German Industry. By Gert Leptin and Manfred Melzer. Trans. by Roger A. Clarke. *Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1978. 200 pp. £12·00.*

DESPITE obvious Soviet and East European interest in expanded East West trade, and after the Helsinki Accords had laid the formal political foundations for such activity, a number of very practical problems persist which are likely to hamper the expansion of trade relations both within and between the two major economic organisations in Europe.

The transfer to the EEC machinery of authority to conclude external trade agreements has clearly had an impact on the East European states, both individually and collectively. Yet so far the talks about talks between the EEC and Comecon have produced little result. A book dealing with relations between the EEC and Eastern Europe would thus seem to be a timely contribution to our understanding of the problems and prospects involved. Are the obstacles to EEC-Comecon trade economic—for example, credit limits, levels of technology, pricing problems, etc.—or predominantly political? Despite its title, the Schulz volume offers little insight into such areas. Its real focus is not the EEC's relations with Eastern Europe, but the internal political problems of the Community. The two are obviously linked. However, with the notable exception of a chapter dealing with changes in the world economy as they affect the mutual trading capacity of both the EEC and Comecon (Pinder) and the editor's own concluding reflections on the political nature of the EEC's relations with the East, little new light is shed to illuminate the nature of this connection.

Musings are offered on the familiar history of West European integration (Van der Groeben) and the equally well-known history of détente (Royen and Schulz). Chapters on West Germany (Kreile), France (Hassner), Great Britain (Morgan) and Italy (Stehle) all deal to some extent with *Ostpolitik*. Yet their preoccupation is with the problem of reconciling national political identity with West European integration. Discussion of whether the EEC is to evolve as a transnational construction or a superstate (Menderhausen) is more relevant to the problem, yet the reader is left to do the hard work of establishing this connection.

Taking a narrower but deeper look at the politics-economics interface, the book by Leptin and Melzer deals in readable detail with another aspect of this problem area: economic reform in a planned economy, offering a detailed analysis of how East Germany in the 1960s and 1970s tried first to reform and streamline its economic model of a command economy and then to resolve the problems created by the initial reform.

The East German economic system has long been a focus of West German observers. Yet little of this material has recently appeared in English. The East German reform, the New Economic System (NES) outlined in detail in 1963, is important for several reasons: the GDR economy is technologically more advanced than any of its socialist allies; the East German reform followed the Liberman proposals in the Soviet Union but pre-dated the Soviet reforms, so that some observers concluded that the GDR experiment was designed to suit Soviet purposes; unlike their Hungarian and Polish neighbours, the East German leaders reversed the central elements of reform in 1970-71, thus allowing analysis of political and economic motives at various stages of reform and retrenchment.

On the basis of clear and comprehensive analysis the authors reach a number of conclusions. The original concept of NES, contrary to some assumptions, was not a socialist market model along the lines of Hungary or Yugoslavia, it was aimed at more effective execution of central state planning. Planning was to be ' scientifically based ', using economic levers to operate a differentiated incentive system. Although seen as a potentially plausible model for reform within the political constraints imposed by the party, the reform process soon ran into difficulties. Attempts in 1968 to restructure the economy by emphasis on priority planning and ' structure-determining tasks ', thereby achieving faster growth and technical progress, merely resulted in unbalanced economic development and serious dislocations in supply. Although the authors give a convincing account of the economic rationale behind the 1968 changes, the political motivation for such planned upheavals is left vague.

Surprisingly these disproportions in the economy in 1969 and 1970 were seen by the Socialist Unity Party (SED) as consequences of the original reform concept and not the 1968 revisions (perhaps the political motives of Ulbricht do deserve some scrutiny here). As a result the reform was abandoned and all aspects of planning and management recentralised. Yet many of the original problems of the early 1960s persist. Solutions to current problems will need rethinking in the medium term. In the meantime the magnitude of these problems has increased and been further intensified by the energy crisis. Thus the authors come to the general conclusion that ' the GDR economy will remain in this difficult position for a considerable time to come ' (p. 188) with a new reform both economically and politically inevitable over the long term.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth EDWINA MORETON

The Communists of Poland: An Historical Outline. By Jan B. de Weydenthal. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1979. 217pp. $7.95.*

DR DE WEYDENTHAL, son of a Polish officer killed in the Polish-Soviet War, was educated in Poland and at the University of Paris before receiving his doctorate from Notre Dame University, Indiana. He wrote his valuable book, the best to date on the subject, by using the rich collection of Polish newspapers, journals and government documents assembled at the Hoover Institution. The perusal of these sources enabled him to challenge many stereotypes and popular assumptions—and thus substantially revise the understanding of how communism actually operates in Poland. He also demonstrates that despite intensive communist efforts to stifle traditional cultural

values in Poland, including its strong religious heritage, these efforts have been unsuccessful.

Following the Russian October revolution, the Council of People's Commissars established a special Department of Polish Affairs charged with providing political leadership for the activities of Polish revolutionaries. On December 15, 1918, barely a month after the proclamation of Poland's independence in Warsaw, the KPP (*Komunistyczna Partia Polski* or Communist Party of Poland) was formed. Lenin's strategy was aimed at the destruction by the Red Army of the ' Polish wall ' separating Russia from Germany. The war, however, ended with a decisive Polish victory. The KPP, from the beginning severely impaired by its very narrow social base and its anti-national policy, survived as a small conspiratonal organisation to be dissolved on Stalin's orders in 1938 and its leadership ruthlessly exterminated. This elimination, writes Dr de Weydenthal, resulted from Stalin's contention that ' it would be wiser and tactically more effective to end the Communist movement in Poland so it would not obstruct possible rapprochement between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany ' (pp. 32-33).

When in the night of August 23-24, 1939, a secret Soviet-Nazi treaty of Poland's partition was signed at the Kremlin, both Stalin and Hitler believed that independent Poland would not arise again. After June 22, 1941, however, when Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin reversed his Polish policy. In November 1941 a small group of Polish communists—survivors of the 1938 massacre—were parachuted into German-occupied Poland where they contacted a few former KPP members who owed their lives to the fact that in 1938 and 1939 they were in Polish prisons. In January 1942 a new party was revived under the name of PPR (*Polska Partia Robotnicza* or Polish Workers' Party). In November 1943 Wladyslaw Gomulka became its first secretary. In the night from December 31, 1943, to January 1, 1944, the KRN (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa* or National Home Council) was formed in Warsaw with Bolestaw Bierut, an old Comintern hand, as president. At that time Stalin was certain to be victorious, and the future government of the Polish People's Republic was ready.

The Bierut era began on June 28, 1945, when the Polish Government of National Unity was formed in Moscow. On September 3, 1948, Bierut got rid of Gomulka accused of ' nationalistic deviation ', and succeeded him as first secretary retaining his post of president of the republic When on July 22, 1952, the Polish *Sejm* (Parliament) passed a Soviet-type constitution Bierut became premier. One year after death of Stalin, his protector, Bierut resigned as premier remaining first secretary of the PZPR (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza* or Polish United Workers' Party)—a new name from December 1948 when the historic PPS (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*) was eliminated by its compulsory merger with the PPR. Bierut died in Moscow on March 12, 1956, shortly after listening to Khrushchev's famous speech denouncing Stalin's crimes.

More than a third of Weydenthal's book is devoted to this period of Poland's history. The remainder deals with the next two eras: that of Gomulka which began in stormy October 1956 and ended ingloriously in December 1970; and that of Edward Gierek which extends until the present. The author's conclusion is that in spite of a gradual dissipation of revolutionary commitment, and of party's incapacity to fulfil the managerial requirements, its future seems relatively assured because Moscow's support constitutes ' the most crucial determinant of the continuation of Communist power in Poland ' (p. 175).

K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MIDDLE EAST

Nasser and his Generation. By P. J. Vatikiotis. *London: Croom Helm. 1978. 375 pp. £11·95.*

THIS is an account of the education and political development of President Nasser and his generation of army officers and of the various political forces at work in Egypt up to 1952, followed by an assessment of President Nasser's achievements and failures in power. Professor Vatikiotis is well qualified for the task both by his upbringing in the Arab world, the very world that produced Nasser, and by his mastery of the sources. He has made a profound contribution to the study of this fascinating subject.

The first part of the book, which sets the scene coming up to the coup of 1952, is unfortunately rather too detailed and repetitious, perhaps owing to the author's very immersion in the subject matter. But when Professor Vatikiotis gets on to President Nasser himself and his operations after 1952 he is absorbing. He brings out very well Nasser's intense drive for personal power, his political skill and ruthlessness in dealing with his opponents and the extraordinary rapport that he achieved with the Egyptian people. Nasser was exactly what the Egyptians wanted at that time—a great, tall, almost mythical hero who had slain the dragons of the effete monarchy, the British occupation and the land-owning Establishment. Above all he was an Egyptian—the first native Egyptian ruler for hundreds of years. He was the leader of the Arab world; with Tito and Nehru he was a founder of the Third World. He turned the defeat of Suez into a victory; he united Egypt and Syria. From 1956 to 1961 he seemingly could not put a foot wrong.

He was an effective ruler of Egypt, Professor Vatikiotis concedes. But was he any more than that, any more than a traditional Egyptian despot? The Professor's answer has to be no. There was a hollow at the heart of the regime. Basically, as Professor Vatikiotis puts it (p. 357), Nasser's view of politics was that of ' secrecy, distrust and conspiracy '. He could permit no independent life to any institution. In his efforts to prevent the army ever mounting a coup against him, he ruined it as a fighting force. He alienated the best intellectuals, though most of them were intense patriots, because he could not tolerate criticism.

From 1961 everything went wrong: Syria broke away; the Yemen adventure was a disaster; and finally Nasser fell into the Six Day War. Had his earlier success gone to his head, was it illness which was creeping up on him or was it sheer bad judgment due to the very nature of his method of government?

It is too early yet to make a final judgment and Nasser was himself a very secret person. But Professor Vatikiotis will have made an important contribution to whatever that eventual assessment may be.

COLIN CROWE

Israel, the West Bank and International Law. By Allan Gerson. *London: Cass. 1978. 285 pp. £12·50.*

THIS book discusses some of the theoretical problems arising from Israel's occupation of territory conquered in the wars between itself and its Arab neighbours, and, in particular, some of the practical problems arising from the administration of one of these areas—the West Bank of the Jordan. The work is, in fact, roughly divided between these theoretical and practical approaches. The first half is devoted to a brief excursus into the principles of international law relating to the conquest and management of enemy territory in war and to a brief historical survey of the development of the conflict in the Middle East, starting with the British Mandate and ending with the 1967 war. There is little new in this section. The second half selects

for detailed analysis the wider constitutional questions, namely the legal basis for Israeli jurisdiction over the area and the nature of the governing institutions of the West Bank. Thereafter the author examines two important aspects of Israeli occupation—the acquisition and management of property (in considerable detail) and the effect of that occupation on the educational system (in lesser detail). The book concludes with an interesting discussion on the future prospects for the occupied West Bank.

It is the author's thesis that Israeli rights over the occupied territories amount to those of ' belligerent or, at least, trustee occupation until the advent of a peace treaty establishing final recognized borders ', and he therefore tries to find some way out of the present impasse. This impasse he sees, and with respect it is suggested correctly so, as deriving from an apparent shift in popular feeling among the people of the West Bank away from wishing a return to Jordanian control and towards recognising the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as their true representatives, coupled with an implacable refusal by the Israeli government—intensified since the change in 1977 from Labour to Likud—to negotiate with the PLO. Nor, indeed, is this the only problem, since even if it could be established that the population of the West Bank clearly wished to be represented by the PLO—and here the author usefully analyses the scepticism that would attend a plebiscite to try to clear up this point—and a future Israeli Government was prepared to change its stance vis-à-vis the PLO, the respective attitudes on the future of Jerusalem make future negotiation seem impossible let alone capable of success.

The attitude of Israel to Jerusalem contrasts interestingly with that to the remainder of territory occupied on the West Bank. Its enactment of legislation immediately after the 1967 war, permitting the extension of ' the law, jurisdiction and administration of the State of Israel to any area of Eretz Israel (Palestine) designated by the Government by Order ', must be viewed as attempted annexation. Yet no similar Order has been passed in relation to any other occupied territories, a distinction based, according to Professor Blum, on political rather than legal considerations.

The author does not shirk an attempt at the way out of this impasse. With respect to Jerusalem he recommends joint administration by Israel and the proper Palestinian representatives of all aspects of the city of common concern. The author earns our respect for analysing clearly and succinctly the problems he tackles and above all for trying to see the way ahead. He has recognised the important duty of looking ahead resting upon anyone hoping to make a contribution to transform this part of the world from its present apparently intractable status quo.

King's College, London HARRY RAJAK

AFRICA

The Press of Africa: Persecution and Perseverance. By Frank Barton. *London: Macmillan. 1979. 304 pp. £12·00.*

WHEN at the University of Ghana, I used to put considerable effort into teaching my students the difference between academic writing and ' *Daily Graphic* ' writing—between the orientation of the social scientist and that of the journalist. This is a ' *Daily Graphic* ' book, full of names and events, but with more concern for effect than for continuity of story or accuracy of detail. It has large measures of history, politics, enthusiasm, despair, liberalism, paternalism and much else. Thus, readers will be satisfied or dissatisfied according to their expectations and tastes.

A few examples will demonstrate these points. The author tends to be weak on geography and ethnography: we are told that Cape Coast is 200 miles from Accra and (twice) that Kano is at the edge of the Sahara; the Ewe are reported (p. 36) to be ' a

major tribe around Accra '; readers are informed that ' Colonial Secretaries in London . . . had only the haziest idea where most of them [colonies] were ' (p. 59); that Dahomey/Benin is ' an improbable territory . . . still one of the least developed countries on the Continent ' (p. 60—this of the country that furnished a large share of French West Africa's clerks during the colonial era); and that the African interest in politics ' was born out of their colonial past ' (p. 8). This last ignores the well-documented political activities of hundreds of kingdoms and communities throughout the Continent for centuries before the Europeans came. Ivory Coast is reported, in a table for which no sources are given, to have fewer radio sets than Niger or Mauritania. It is claimed (p. 246) that the Swaziland *Times's* listing of detainees ' was an uprecedented act for newspapers in Black Africa '. Yet Ghanaian papers during the Nkrumah era often mentioned that certain people were in detention.

Gaps in the story and the shallow political commentary also detract from the book's value. The concern is mainly with daily newspapers, whereas weeklies have often made considerable contribution in informing the public. For example, *West Africa* is ignored, as is Ghana's *Catholic Standard*, which in recent years has been an important source of non-governmental information. The role of Rhodesia's Catholic newspaper in opposing government oppression is similarly unrecorded. Barton's own role as an editor in Lusaka is not mentioned. Contradictions go unnoticed. For instance, the discussion moves from West, to East, to Central and then to Southern Africa. Readers are told several times that the country under discussion has the freest papers on the Continent, only to be assured a chapter or two later that a new ' freest nation ' has been located. Examples of freedom and control abound, but there is no overall model of what can and should be expected, or at least what a reasonable goal should be. It is at this level of analysis, as opposed to reporting, that the book is weakest.

A final illustration of the level of hyperbole: ' Gradually as the bolder African editors ventured ankle, calf and knee-deep in the political waters of the times, the authorities began to take a more serious look at the press ' (p. 20).

University of Birmingham MARGARET PEIL

Brotherhood of Power: An Exposé of the Secret Afrikaner Broederbond. By J. H. P. Serfontein. *London Rex Collings. 1979. 278 pp. £7·00.*

Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of Ideology. By Gail M Gerhart. *Berkeley, Calif, London· University of California Press 1979. 364 pp. (Perspectives on Southern Africa, 19) £10 25.*

THE Broederbond is a secret organisation of Afrikaner nationalists, which was founded in 1918 to promote Afrikaner interests. It has approximately 11,000 members drawn from the elite of Afrikaans society. Hennie Serfontein is a well-known South African journalist who has embarrassed the Broederbond over the years by publicising its activities. In his book, Serfontein claims to dispel two popular but contradictory myths surrounding the organisation. One is that it is ' an innocent cultural organisation confined to non-political activities '; the other that ' the body has become a caricature of evil influence, seen as a " Mafia " dictating policy to the Government ' (p. 12). The truth is that the general political orientation of the organisation was apparent from its inception, while Serfontein's overblown exposé seems likely to promote rather than dispel the view that the Broederbond is an all powerful ' octopus ' (p 252).

The book abounds in typographical errors, amusing but trivial anecdotes, and journalistic hyperbole. It is more likely to mislead than inform the general reader, especially those prone to the superficial view of Afrikanerdom as a strange white tribe isolated from the main currents of Western thought. However, it is very far from being a book without value. The documents Serfontein quotes, particularly two speeches by

Dr Piet Meyer, chairman of the Broederbond from 1960 to 1972, provide a fascinating insight into Afrikaner nationalist thinking over the years. Since the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, the practical importance of the Broederbond as an organisation furthering Afrikaner interests has diminished. But it has remained important as a sounding-board of Afrikaner nationalist opinion.

Indeed, the most interesting part of the book is Serfontein's analysis of the relationship between the Nationalist government and the Broederbond over the past thirty years. After a decline in the early years of Nationalist rule, the Broederbond grew in influence when the ideologically minded Dr Verwoerd became Prime Minister in 1958. After Verwoerd's death the organisation was caught up in the conflict between *verkramptes* and *verligtes* within the Nationalist Party and lost influence. In the early 1970s there was a purge of *verkramptes* who had left the Nationalist Party to join a new right-wing party, the HNP. The organisation became increasingly subordinated to the government and was used to propagate and support government policy. Indeed, it is seen as having an important role to play today in preparing the ground for change the government considers necessary but which is likely to prove unpalatable to sections of Afrikaner nationalist opinion.

Perhaps in the long run of greater importance than the divisions within Afrikanerdom are the divisions within African nationalist thought. This is the subject of Dr Gerhart's meticulously researched book. Essentially her study consists of an analysis of the writings and speeches of four intellectuals and activists, Anton Lembede, A. P. Mda, Robert Sobukwe, and Steven Biko. All four belong, crudely speaking, to the ' exclusivist ' or ' Africanist ' strand of African nationalist thought. However, part of the strength of Dr Gerhart's book is in showing how superficial such labels can be. She places each thinker in the context of his time, from Lembede in the 1940s to Biko in the 1970s. Not only does she trace each man's thought with precision and clarity but she also evaluates it in relation to conflicting viewpoints of the time and the circumstances each faced.

But her book is more than a study of a strand of African thought in South Africa. It is also an explanation of the intellectual background to the growth of the Black Consciousness movement and as such provides an insight into the urban unrest that shook South Africa in 1976. At the same time, Dr Gerhart sees the events of 1976 as a watershed in African political life and like watershed events of the past such as the 1960 emergency after the Sharpeville massacre, having a profound impact on political thought. She is sensibly cautious about predicting the future, but clear as to the legacy of 1976:

> The generation coming of age today in South Africa is the embodiment of the Africanist vision of Lembede: proud, self-reliant, determined. The founders and stalwarts of the Black Consciousness movement, however heavy the price they have paid in death, imprisonment, bans and exile, have handed intact to their as-yet-undetermined successors their movement's major achievement: an urban African population psychologically prepared for confrontation with white South Africa (p. 315).

Her book is a very valuable contribution to an understanding of the present situation.

Queen's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

Malawi: The Politics of Despair. By T. David Williams. *Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1979. 339 pp. £13·75.*

DR BANDA has had the self-confidence to say he would be prepared to make an alliance with the Devil if necessary, so the sub-title ' The Politics of Despair ', seems unduly

pessimistic for a study of Malawi. If this small country has not yet struck gold or oil, its inhabitants have lived in comparative peace since about the turn of the century and have been noted for their industry and adventurousness. According to the proverb: ' The child who has not travelled praises his Mother's cooking '—so if Malawians prefer home fare it is not from ignorance of conditions abroad.

The boundaries of twentieth-century Malawi do not, as stated (p. 21) follow the watershed between the Zambesi and the Congo, but the Lake was a vortex into which a variety of people were drawn, some like the Yao and the Ngoni, by no means peace-loving. They were eventually given a sort of unity by missionaries like Scott and Laws and by Sir Harry Johnston. The Arcadian peace of the country was shattered in 1953 by what Dr Williams describes as a catalyst—reluctant inclusion in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the reaction to which was ' The Rise of the Phoenix ' (p. 161).

Dr Williams however does not predict that this Phoenix will last for five hundred years and is discerningly critical of the arbitrary actions of the present government and the sycophantic adulation of members of the Legislature to their Ngwazi. Political power, economic opportunity and the Judiciary are subordinate arms of the Executive with little or no right of appeal. In this respect conditions in Malawi are not unique. Official pronouncements have ruled that ' technicalities taught in the Inns of Court in London are not applicable in Malawi ' (p. 253) and that ' lack of evidence is not proof of innocence ' (p. 257).

Economically the country is said to have made a little progress: a few small-scale industries have been established; an attempt has been made to encourage improved farming; tea and tobacco production has been increased. Malawi's greatest resource is still the abundance of labour (p. 295), a strange euphemism for a high rate of unemployment. Economic development however takes second place to political strategy.

The ' Machiavellian calculus ' (p. 323) of Dr Banda's political strategy is to maintain his country's independence and to avoid entangling alliances. Malawi is too weak to be either a formidable foe or a valuable ally, but Dr Banda has not hesitated to speak critically of his neighbours and has resisted attempts by countries comfortably distant from the front line to make Malawi a potential battle ground or a haven for heavily armed guerrillas.

Malawi has been able to keep out of the headlines for some years, no mean achievement in these days of investigative journalism, and the once loquacious Dr Banda has been noticeably silent of late. This book can, therefore, be welcomed as giving an up-to-date account of the country he has done so much to mould. It is well-written and well-printed and has a useful bibliographical essay.

JAMES MURRAY

ASIA

Pakistan in a Changing World: Essays in Honour of K. Sarwar Hasan. Edited by Masuma Hasan. *Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1978. 258 pp. Rs. 75.00. $12.00.*

Bangladesh Today: An Indictment and a Lament. By Matiur Rahman. *London: News and Media. 1978 188 pp. £3·95. $8.00. Pb: £1·95. $4.00.*

MASUMA HASAN'S collection of eleven studies, by seven Pakistani and four other writers, covers themes of unequal interest or novelty, but as a whole is well worth reading.

The first essay, by Professor A. T. Embree, reaches back into Pakistan's pre history: it argues that the country's frontier problems and policies have been strongly

influenced by British antecedents, and illustrates this thesis by a discussion of how the western frontier in Baluchistan came to be drawn. Diverse views about the best methods of defence and the utility of an unadministered buffer zone helped to determine it. The next piece, by the editor, is also concerned with a frontier question, the rival claims put forward in 1947 when the Punjab was being partitioned, and the considerations underlying the Radcliffe award. The author draws special attention to the awkward scattering of the Sikhs over the province, with much land and some sacred places in the east, and is inclined to blame Sikh intransigence for the explosion that followed. More generally valid is the conclusion that ' the economic disparity between the Muslims and non-Muslims was the fundamental cause of the communal rift ' (p. 44). It is the same factor that has been setting Flemings against Walloons in Belgium, luckily without a feud of religions to add venom to the quarrel.

Professor K. B. Sayeed helps towards comprehension of what lay behind the partition by describing Jinnah's success in outflanking the Muslim landowners of the Unionist party in the Punjab and pushing the Muslim League into the lead. As Sayeed says, the League here was set moving by urban Muslims, some of them progressive, but lost any progressive character when the rural conservatives were manoeuvered into joining it. Jinnah proved himself a skilful tactician, but is open to criticism for not seeing the importance of building a firm party organisation: as a result, when Pakistan came there was nothing to dislodge the old bureaucracy from power. Such recognition of deficiencies in the ' Great Leader ' marks the appearance of a more critical spirit than most Pakistani writings hitherto have displayed. Sayeed goes on to contrast Jinnah with the dictator Ayub Khan, whom he dismisses summarily. He speaks of his ' enormous ego ', and ' contempt for the common people ', particularly for Bengalis (pp. 65–66). He quotes some ridiculously fulsome tributes to Ayub by American ' experts ', one of whom extolled him as ' a Solon or Lycurgus ' (p. 67); a good example of America's genius in recent times for backing the wrong horse, or mistaking geese for swans A far shrewder American, the late Wayne Wilcox, also deals with Ayub, in an enquiry into the Kashmir dispute and the 1965 war with India. Ayub tried to grab Kashmir because he ' needed real success to restore the confidence of his government ', and public respect for it; and he was egged on by sections of the army, and by his Foreign Minister, Bhutto, whose role in ' counselling a harder line towards India has been under-estimated ' (pp. 166–67).

Bhutto reappears in a study of foreign policy in the early 1970s, when he was in power, by Professor Khurshid Hyder. His Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore in 1974 is held up as ' a magnificent advertisement of the revived, vibrant and confident Pakistan ', triumphantly recovered from the debacle of 1971 (pp. 98–99). Since then Bhutto has been executed, and his country looks anything but vibrant and confident. It looks anything but a country that its former colony, Bangladesh, would wish to rejoin, as Dr Rahman exhorts it to do. In his picture of this second partition everything is inverted; Bangladeshi patriots are ' traitors ', led by a Judas named Mujib. All Bengali Muslims are derided, in the best Pakistani colonialist style, as hopelessly romantic, ' incurably fond of myths and fancies, strangely indifferent to realities ', and so on (p. 13), until one wonders why Pakistan should ever have wanted their company. Even this diehard cannot deny that the Pakistani army behaved atrociously in its attempt to crush revolt, but he tries to palliate its conduct by asserting that the Bengalis behaved even worse. India of course plays a sinister part, Russia a still more ' diabolical ' one; even President Nixon is reproached, ungratefully enough, with giving Pakistan only ' tepid ' support (p. 11). Since independence Bangladesh has no doubt displayed serious shortcomings, of which Rahman makes the very most; unfortunately his book is so excessively biassed and one-sided that even its more rational pages cannot inspire much confidence.

V. G. KIERNAN

University of Edinburgh

The Future of China: After Mao. By Ross Terrill. *London: Deutsch. 1979. 331 pp. £25·00.*

Mao: The People's Emperor. By Dick Wilson. *London: Hutchinson. 1979. 480 pp. £9·95.*

BOTH these books exemplify the tendency for ' China watchers ', since the opening-up of China over the past few years, to turn their hand to writing for non-specialist readers. Such literature flourishes, especially when it is combined with an assessment of the life and contribution of Mao Zedong. The death of such a renowned revolutionary leader, and one who stood at the head of his nation's affairs for so long and almost until the last gasp, provides the excuse, if one were needed, for a balanced and objective appraisal of his life and work. We can expect quite a spate of books on the subject, and the answers will vary. Does the spectre of Mao haunt his heirs? Not exactly. Terrill sees ' a new leadership of men (few women) who honor Mao yet must turn aside from him ' (p. 7). Wilson points to Mao's ideals, ' how he fought for them—against enemy and friend—and how in the end he failed ' (p. 16).

The book by Ross Terrill, an Australian at Harvard, is precisely an attempt to assess the future for China without Mao. He draws on his personal impressions from frequent visits to the country. He has excellent contacts, and seems at home in the most diverse company, from Wilfred Burchett to the British ambassador. He displays a perception of character and an insight into affairs that are most impressive. He knows the Chinese language and meets the Chinese at all levels. Why is it, then, that here and there one gains a lingering impression of naïvety? Did Mao really want ' a deeper moral community ' (p. 95)? Perhaps the author is telling us something about himself when he roundly declares that the Chinese revolution came ' to demystify politics and make the happiness of working people the true goal of politics, and to replace China's age-old gulf between rulers and ruled with a people's government ' (p. 102). Again, he feels that the fate of Chiang Ching (Mrs Mao) was partly because of ' the very sexist prejudices that the Chinese Revolution was born to sweep away ' (p. 119). He may be right, but the use of the prefix Ms before female names in this book surely has more to do with America than China.

Professor Terrill puts his finger on two most important points about contemporary China. The first is the discernable trend in recent years of the dying of the revolutionary fires and the increasing importance of economic development and modernisation internally, and power and prestige abroad. Here the author is at his best, and his judgment is most acute. The decline of ideology and the deference to power (or national interest) is neatly summed up in his phrase, ' The moral stature of China shrinks as the actual influence of China expands ' (p. 13). Secondly, he sees this process as burying Mao, who nevertheless continues to receive verbal genuflections from Chairman Hua. The dilemma of Hua is that ' he is Mao's man in an era of de-Maoization ' (p. 13). Part of the legitimacy of Hua's succession rests on Mao's deathbed note of six Chinese characters: ' With you in charge I have no worries '. To go too far in departing from or disowning Mao's thought, it is argued, might have unwelcome consequences for Hua's position. The comparison with Khrushchev after Stalin is not entirely valid if you see the problem, as Terrill does, as one of obsolescence and posthumous sainthood rather than expatiating the crimes of an evil tyranny. In this sense, Mao may indeed be regarded as China's Lenin and honoured in the breach.

In foreign affairs Terrill is again a most discerning guide. Almost any such book these days contains a chapter on the development of Sino-American relations. This one was written before the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries, a course advocated by the author before the appropriate Congressional Committee in 1976. Possibly more interesting is the prospect of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Various straws in the wind are considered here, though again the

chapter was written before the recent confirmation by Li Xiannian of talks in Moscow on the ' normalisation ' of relations. For some time now it has been increasingly inappropriate to speak of a Sino-Soviet ' dispute ' in any ideological sense. It may be that a Sino-Soviet detente will set the final seal on China's departure from the way of Mao.

Is it significant that Mao was nicknamed ' B52 '? It is certainly interesting that as an inveterate smoker he preferred State Express 555, and gave away packets of Lucky Strike, but later reverted to a Chinese brand. Dick Wilson's massive biography is a mine of information on the late Chairman that will surely become the standard work, especially if it is published in cheaper paperback. This is the life story, 1893–1976, told in chronological order, and very helpful it is to have each chapter marked with the exact years under review. The narrative is lively and readable, and illuminated with every kind of anecdote or recorded conversation culled tirelessly from all available sources, both Western and Chinese. The result succeeds, as the author intended, in capturing Mao's life, ' including its smell and flavour '.

Since the book essentially addresses itself to recording all the known facts and circumstances of Mao's life, both public and private, it is inevitably somewhat different in tone from Terrill's book, which is more concerned with opinion and underlying trends and forecasting what needs to be done by governments and what reaction will be. Here there is none of that, but in a short chapter of Conclusions, Wilson summarises most of the facets of Mao's character that have amply emerged from the preceding story and adds his own judicious comments. After all the details have been added up, however, he still finds Mao inscrutable. It must be lonely at the top. Although thrice married (four times if one includes his teenage, arranged marriage) Mao was hardly a comfortable family man, besides having his well-known estrangement from Ms Chiang near the end. Perhaps, in the end, it was not the happiness of the workers, nor a moral community, nor even sexism that motivated Mao. Perhaps it was as Wilson says, that ' the human emotions were for him subordinated to the lonely quest for power ' (p. 453).

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

The West and the Modernization of China. By Lawrence Freedman. *London: RIIA, 1979. 37 pp. (Chatham House Papers, No. I.) Pb: £5·00.*

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN, who is Head of Policy Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, has set a very high standard in this—the first of a new series of Chatham House Papers. Unlike many who have discussed the so-called ' China Card ', Dr Freedman's starting point is an analysis of China's current ' weight ' in international affairs, particularly in military/strategic terms and in international trade. He analyses with great clarity the strengths and weaknesses of China's armed forces in relation to the kinds of threats with which they are currently confronted. Their armaments, communication and logistical systems, air defences, etc., are described as ' obsolescent on a massive scale '. To modernise even a portion of the armed forces to the extent that it would make a strategic difference would be prohibitively costly—nearly as much as China's total gross national product. Thus he argues that the size of the armed forces should not obscure the fact that China is ' no more than a regional power . . . And China's military weakness is likely to persist '. With regard to trade Dr Freedman's careful and cogent analysis demonstrates that the growth in China's trade will not be sufficient to tie China to the West, nor will it lead to China making a major impact on the foreign economic relations of most OECD countries. Even in the case of Japan, at best China would represent no more than 10 per cent of its total trade.

As a result of this analysis Dr Freedman is able to dismiss the arguments that a Western-armed China could ease the West's security problems in Europe, or could militarily intervene against the Soviet Union in the Third World. Likewise he discounts the Soviet argument that such a China could turn on its benefactors. Instead he seeks to focus the discussion in the West, on identifying more clearly what are the common interests with China and on how to arrive at common principles among the Western countries for the sale of arms and the conduct of trade with China. Finally he suggests very strongly that the stage has been reached in which the West should encourage China to work out its own *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union ' as we have to do '.

This carefully prepared and thoughtful study is characterised above all by balanced judgment and unfailing good sense. It should be required reading for all who have dealings with China or are concerned with the international implications of China's new course of modernisation.

London School of Economics MICHAEL B. YAHUDA

The Korean Workers' Party: A Short History. By Chong-sik Lee. *Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1978. 167pp. Pb: $5.95.*

IN 1917, after a decade of Japanese occupation of Korea, a Korean Christian, Yi Tong-hwi, found the first substantial support from the outside world for Korean nationalism, in the Bolsheviks of Russia's Far East. There the main military adversaries of the Bolsheviks that summer were the Japanese. Yi Tong-hwi founded the Korean People's Socialist Party in Khavarovsk in June 1918, and the next year delegates of that party pledged to the Third International in Moscow that it would work for the communist cause in Korea.

As Chong-sik Lee says, to begin with an historical statement that communism in Korea originated other than in the leadership given by Kim Il-sŏng (born 1912) would be a ' cardinal sin ' in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea today, where ' all the evidence leads to the conclusion that the members of the KWP have unabashed and unswerving faith in the leader, and that this faith is refreshed daily by canonical readings ' (p. 133).

To understand the Korean Workers' Party, that is North Korea today, it is necessary to appreciate not only this contrast between its beginnings and its present state, but also how the two are related through the actual course of events in the history of communism in Korea over the intervening sixty years. It is not a simple story with a single theme, and this shorter account than Dr Lee's major work [1] does very well to make this plain.

The historical facts of the story are clearly set out here, and the account is informative on many subjects, of which this reviewer would mention particularly the Korean intelligentsia around 1920 and its ill-suitedness to absorb political ideology; the agrarian revolutionary movements of the 1920s—which it is common to belittle in both North and South Korea; The Korean groups in Yenan and Chientao in the 1930s from whom Korean communism finally developed; and the purgings and rebuildings of the party set-up by the occupying Russian army in 1945.

As if to emphasise the inconclusiveness inevitable in any study of North Korea, the final chapter is entitled ' The Party of Kim Il-sŏng in Transition '. The transition which it has been possible to describe here as having taken place to date is into a party

1 Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee *Communism in Korea* Part I. *The Movement*, Part II: *The Society* (Berkeley, London: University of California Press for The Center for Japanese and Korean Studies, 1972) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Jan 1974, p 159

based on a newly created tradition, a tradition centred on the party leader and his family, and fostered by myths and legends of guerrilla fighting in the late 1930s.

Dr Lee finds, as do lesser North Korea-watchers, an almost total lack of real information on North Korea since 1972, but this work of his does provide the best available analysis of the present for those who seek some clue as to the direction which the transition of the last twenty years might take in the next twenty years.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London W. E. SKILLEND

Southeast Asian Affairs 1978. *Singapore: Heinemann Educational (Asia) for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 1978 324 pp.*

THIS is the fifth in a well-established series of ' Southeast Asia Annuals ' from the Singapore Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). The aim is comparable in part to that of the January and February issues of *Asian Survey* each year: to give an overview of politics, foreign relations and (to a minor extent) economic developments in each country of the area in the preceding twelve months—in the present case, the year 1977, though the title somewhat belies it!

There are three basic differences between the ISEAS enterprise and *Asian Survey's* annual reviews. The first, obviously, is that South-east Asia, not the whole of Asia, is the area of focus. The second and third differences follow, in a sense, from the first (and from the readiness of the editors to countenance a volume of well over 300 pages): there are no less than six articles about the area as a whole and its relations with the wider world; and the annual reviews for individual countries are generally supplemented by specialised articles (two each for the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, one for Thailand). The fourth point of distinction is a negative one. Burma and Vietnam lack a general review; but at least political inferences may be drawn from the two articles on economics and foreign relations which each country receives. Laos and Cambodia, however, are simply omitted without a word of editorial explanation or regret. But Cambodia is designated in Khmer (' Kampuchea ') on the map—in contrast to the usage in *Southeast Asian Affairs 1977*—so one wonders whether something quite momentous had not been going on in that corner of Indochina during the year.

Admittedly a determination to include every country in an annual survey may mean a sacrifice of quality at certain points, as indeed the experience of *Asian Survey* shows. But poor quality has not stood in the way of inclusion for some of the contributions to the present volume: a piece on Malaysia's Parti Islam is characterised by all the inaccuracy and inconsistency for which the author is renowned in his own country, while a writer on the Kuala Lumpur ASEAN summit is as unexciting as in his contribution on Malaysia in the corresponding issue of *Asian Survey*. If the ISEAS annual exercise is open to lesser as well as greater talents, its editors should take a chance and try to produce a genuinely comprehensive record of the year. Besides, it is absurd, and casts an aura of unreality, to leave out a country which offered, in the words of the late Malcolm Caldwell ' one of the most significant portents for the future of all " free world " Asian countries '.

Nevertheless, revolutionary activity is not neglected entirely. If it is passed over in silence by all three Malaysian contributors the balance is partly redressed by William J. Duiker on Vietnam's foreign policy—a sober and sobering assessment—and by the redoubtable Somchai Rakwijit of Thailand writing on the progress of the Communist Party of Thailand since the October 6, 1976 coup. Other valuable work includes a comparison of the 1971 and 1977 elections in Indonesia (R. William Liddle) and an essay on Chinese Malaysians (Tjoa Hock Guan). The annual *Southeast Asian Affairs* has yet to become an ' event ' but it is a welcome addition to the Southeast Asian

Studies scene and, with a little more attention to structure, could become indispensable.

University of Kent ROGER KERSHAW

NORTH AMERICA

The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War 1941-1947. Edited by Joseph M. Siracusa. *Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 1978. 263 pp. Pb: £4·25.*

Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950. Edited by Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis. *New York: Columbia University Press. 1978. 449 pp. $31.25. Pb: $9.95.*

THESE complementary collections perform the very useful function of making accessible, in manageable individual volumes, a large number of the documents which are essential to any understanding of the origins of the cold war. All of the documents presented by Siracusa, which cover the period from 1941 to mid-1947, have been previously published, although those emanating from Congressional records will probably not be familiar to British readers. Of those selected by Etzold and Gaddis, all but three relate to the temporal span 1947-50, and more than a quarter have not been published before.

Siracusa's chief purpose is ' to delineate the constellation of ideas, beliefs and assumptions (both spoken and unspoken) of high level American and, to a lesser but important extent, Soviet policy makers '. Etzold and Gaddis seek ' to illustrate the first systematic attempt by the United States in peacetime to integrate political and military considerations in national security planning '. All editors are aware that no selection of documents is likely to win universal acceptance, but only the immoveably partisan would suggest that these volumes fail to fulfil fairly their stated objectives within necessary confines of space.

Once one moves from selection to editorial presentation a qualitative gap between the two collections emerges. Etzold and Gaddis have respectively written elegant and informative introductory essays upon ' American Organisation for National Security 1945-50 ' and ' The Strategy of Containment '. They provide the reader with a glossary of abbreviations and acronyms, an index, helpful summaries for each document and section, and explanatory footnotes in the text—although to describe the regime set up in Northern Greece in December 1947 as a ' Soviet puppet government ' (p. 122) begs more questions about the intricacies of the situation than it answers.

Siracusa also offers brief assessments of each document plus an extensive list of further reading, which omits the important studies by Paterson and Freeland.[1] However, Siracusa provides no index or glossary. His very few footnotes represent a mixed blessing. I suspect that, lazily, he appends them only when they appear in the original text. This is certainly the case with Harriman's report to Hull on September 20, 1944, yet in the notes to this on page 61, ' Mikolajczyk ' is twice mis-spelt and the reader is offered ' Edward Benes, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1930-1945 '. In the testimony of the American ambassador to Greece before an Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 28, 1947, there should at least be corrections to the (stenographic?) errors on

1. Thomas G Paterson, *Soviet American Confrontation Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore, London. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct 1974, p. 684; Richard M Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism. Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Internal Security, 1946-1948* (New York: Knopf, 1972).

pages 237–38, where ' Markov ' is given instead of Markos, ' Bulgaria is under the command of Mr Demitrev ', while ' Enderhovia runs Albania ' has only dubious euphony to recommend it.

The different class of editorial work is best caught by a comparison of one of the three documents common to both works, a paper from Kennan's Policy Planning Staff. Etzold and Gaddis date it correctly as May 23, 1947, provide an explanatory footnote on the Monnet Plan, and include the important section clarifying the implications of the Truman Doctrine; Siracusa does none of these things.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Kissinger and the Meaning of History. By Peter W. Dickson. *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1979. 197 pp. £8·50.*

THE prevalence of fat books, employing saturation techniques of total narrative history that lack discrimination about the relevance of when the sun rises, makes this short analytic volume welcome. It is not, however, without its own pretension. Dickson, a political analyst with the CIA, sets out to explore the ' hidden connection ' between Henry Kissinger's philosophical perspective on history and his role in the formulation and execution of recent United States foreign policy, so disclosing ' the " real " Kissinger to a wider public ' (p. ix).

His starting point is Kissinger's lengthy undergraduate thesis on ' The Meaning of History '. This early work has not been ignored by other writers but Dickson believes that he is the first to read it with care and that too much attention has been given to Kissinger's study of Metternich. He reminds us that despite Kissinger's admiration for Metternich, as rationalist, the Austrian statesman was seen to be essentially a manipulator whose technical virtuosity contained its own limitations. According to Dickson, Spengler's pessimism, and Toynbee's panoramic view of the rise and fall of world civilisations through a process of challenge and response, influenced Kissinger's world view, but the dominant influence on his personal search for a sense of purpose in history came from the third subject of the Harvard thesis, Immanuel Kant.

Strongly though Kissinger subscribed to Kant's idea of man as ' noumenon, as a personality endowed with a transcendental sense of freedom ' (p. 38), and generally accepted Kantian dualism, Kissinger's own personal experiences and the larger Jewish holocaust led him to distort Kant's moral philosophy by emphasising the necessity of maintaining freedom through the exercise of individual will. He rejected Kant's teleology, which he perceived contained an essential contradiction between his moral philosophy and his philosophy of history. The categorical imperative of the moral law, therefore, cannot of itself be a guarantor of peace.

Dickson moves from a condensed but perceptive analysis of Kissinger's response to Kant's *Critiques*, to the assertion that from his undergraduate studies stemmed two fundamental concepts: that rational calculation reveals the limitations of power, and that in any period of history there is a structural pattern to international relations that can be exposed. The ' doctrine of limits ' was deployed at a time of profound crisis for the United States, when fundamental problems had to be confronted about the relationship between national purpose and the historical process. Dickson briefly discusses the familiar policy-events of Kissinger's stewardship, as the country moved out of its cold war posture as a redeemer nation in the light of neo-Kantian imperatives, and concludes that Kissinger's existentialism bore some relation to the realist school of American foreign-policy thinking.

The thesis as a whole is of absorbing interest, but the argument contains a number of large judgments that arouse scepticism, for example, that ' the present moment in

the history of the American Republic and western culture is unique ' (p. 147) and that Angola was Kissinger's ' most bitter defeat ' (p. 111). There is throughout the book a curious identification of Kissinger as ' a national leader ' (p. 153), as a ' political figure ' (p. 4), and as conjointly ' a political leader ' (p. 142). Elsewhere he is called ' the first truly global statesman ' (p. 106). Part of the problem of the book is its divorce from the political environment within which policy was conducted and which necessarily conditioned Kissinger's responses to international events. The other is perhaps encapsulated in the title. Kissinger is seen, although not uncritically, as a giant whose stature cannot seriously be questioned. An alternative explanation of the recent past might be that Kissinger rode the waves of fate, rather than directed them according to a philosophy of history and a firm conception of his own role in a confused present inextricably linked to a chaotic past.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Human Rights and American Foreign Policy. By Noam Chomsky. *Nottingham: Spokesman Books. 1978. 90 pp. Pb: £1·25.*

CHALLENGE to the status quo is mostly unpopular. Professor Chomsky, a classical liberal, continues here a challenge to the American status quo begun earlier in *American Power and the New Mandarins, At War with Asia, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* and *For Reasons of State.* Essentially, this book comprises two essays written in June 1977; ' Foreign Policy and the Intelligentsia ' which appeared in *Images and Ideas: Essays in Contemporary American Culture* a memorial volume for Philip Rahv edited by Arthur Edelstein, and ' The Carter Administration: Myth and Reality ', published in the Japanese Journal *Chuo Koron* ' La Restructuration ideologique aux Etats-Unis ', Chomsky's contribution to *Le Monde Diplomatique* of March 1979, again summarised arguments advanced here as to the current reconstruction of ideology in the United States. The book at once widens the area of challenge yet restricts argument to a single issue: human rights.

It is a penetrating and trenchant examination of American ideological reconstruction, and a study of considerable merit tracing the shift in American foreign-policy emphasis from self-determination to human rights and also exposing the limitations of present policy. A trendy preoccupation with ' human rights ' might however tempt us to dismiss it as unfashionably censorious or the guilt-ridden outpouring of an idiosyncratic intellectual, for Chomsky does not suffer gladly the poverty of current human rights debate. In this persuasive dissent, his questioning among other things goes to the very heart of American democracy, touching the independence of the judiciary; the rule of law in the United States; the constitution; freedom of the press; and recognition of the rights of minorities (pp. 68–70). Further, he pillories the establishment for its devaluation of the human rights issue in the East-West ideological confrontation. He derides the intellectuals, notably Messrs Kissinger, Huntington and Arthur Schlesinger (but Morganthau escapes virtually unscathed) for their complicity in this depreciation and the media for abdication of its critical responsibility to the American people.

Chomsky focuses on the Trilateral Commission, the source of much personnel and policy content in the Cater administration and it is partly within this framework that he makes his indictment of the administration's human rights policy. He also highlights the more subtle variations within that policy, its separate interwoven strands comprising ideological use of human rights against the Soviet Union (which use Professor Chomsky realises makes human rights a two-edged sword), a lesser component derived from international law, and a certain naïvete and idealism evident in early enunciation of American human rights policy revealing a blissful unawareness

of shortcomings at home. Chomsky's own views obviously diverge from those of Messrs Brezinski, Vance and Carter, and especially on American political prisoners, the Black Panthers, and the Wilmington Ten are more akin to those of the American ambassador to the United Nations, Mr Andrew Young.

Professor Chomsky recalls some of the more melancholy episodes of American history, such as the postwar interventions in Iran, Vietnam, Chile, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. He reminds us of State Department support for many retrograde regimes and, lest we become too complacent in our human rights crusade, he confronts us with the spectre of predatory capitalism and an army of desperadoes propped up by the United States and multinational companies in Latin America in tragic disregard for human rights.

His is a plea for a more rational order in American foreign policy. But though meticulously researched, it may be that by dint of the very factors (the media, established scholarship, corporate and industrial interests, their interdependence and integration so ably assessed by Chomsky) this book will be slighted by public and policy-maker alike as has been the lot of the literature of advocacy (p. 26).

His conclusion which may ultimately be most valid, with the possible exception of the United States-Middle East experience, is that the Carter administration is unlikely to undertake any significant new initiatives in foreign and domestic policy, though there will be some new rhetoric largely for propaganda purposes (p. 88). But this is perhaps inevitably so, for as Chomsky has so well demonstrated, America's human rights policy in particular is perhaps an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. Yet, it may also be that Chomsky here partly impugns the motives of some policy-makers who although in a minority might yet be genuinely concerned with the plight of millions whose basic rights have been severely restricted and curtailed. And perhaps he also underestimates the inspiration which an articulate if inconsistent human rights policy can give to the internal activist working for political change in totalitarian states. Finally, the author is much embroiled in combating the negative approach to human rights, and as such, the redefinition of America's human rights policy such as his criticism requires is not clearly spelt out in the text.

CALEB M. PILGRIM

Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present. By Robert Justin Goldstein. *Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 1978 682 pp. $22·50.*

Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. By David J. Garrow. *New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1978. 346 pp. £10·80.*

THE United States, through its constitution and Bill of Rights, offers guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly, equality before the law, and due process, which strongly affirm and protect the practice of civil liberties. Of course, the text of a constitution may not ensure its application, as those foolish people who believed the Soviet Union to be free, because Stalin's 1936 Constitution said so, soon found out. But in the American case, both native and foreign observers have tended to argue that freedom of expression and tolerance of dissent are working principles of the American polity. Dr Goldstein's purpose is to qualify that view; and, through his monumental devotion to research, it seems at times that no instance of discrimination and harassment, perpetrated by federal or state authorities, goes unmentioned.

Political Repression in Modern America is an enormous book, in which Goldstein's argument is in constant danger of being submerged under the remorseless accumulation of detail with which he seeks to sustain it. A more selective approach would in no way have diminished the force of his case. And Goldstein's case is,

unquestionably, strong. He asserts that historians and social scientists have neglected the positive role of government in suppressing dissent and enforcing orthodoxy; and that, by means ranging from denial of civil liberties and political deportations to police surveillance and illegal harassment, federal and state authorities have been a powerful agent of social control, particularly when radical criticism of the existing order has been seen as a threat to the established disposition of power. In a series of case studies, dealing with the repression of labour unions before the 1930s, the Red Scare after the First World War, the restriction of liberties during the Second World War, the Truman-McCarthy period, and the Vietnam War, he builds up a picture of constant political action to contain opposition: action generally initiated by the executive branch, often enthusiastically supplemented by Congress and the state legislatures, and too frequently condoned by the courts.

The evidence cannot be denied, but how is it to be explained? Goldstein suggests that a series of variables are involved: increased tension in society, the availability of scapegoats, the attitude of elite groups, and most importantly, the decisions of the political authorities themselves. But, at times, he comes dangerously close to a kind of conspiracy theory, in which the politicians deliberately set out to smash opposition. It is surely better to see these actions as part of an interrelationship of forces. The repression of the unions was primarily the result of business and industrial leaders attempting to safeguard their position; the witch-hunting of the cold war period reflected a collapse of political authority in the face of demagogues who were believed to have tapped a powerful vein of popular sentiment. And while it is true that the Johnson and Nixon administrations exhibited a venomous attitude towards opponents, it is also apparent that many of the worst excesses were the product of over-enthusiasm in subordinate institutions, as the CIA and the FBI of J. Edgar Hoover went their own peculiar ways. The cohesion of the political class must not be overrated; and much of the most blatant, and ludicrously inappropriate, interference with political liberty was performed by ignorant state legislators and small-town mayors and police chiefs exercising powers, in a decentralised structure of authority, which, in Britain, they would not even possess.

The consquences of political repression, Goldstein believes, have been profound. Certainly, political and legal action greatly affected the growth of the Labour movement. But some of his other suggestions are rather more surprising. The American Socialist Party, while greatly damaged by the Red Scare, had been busily engaged for some time in tearing itself apart. The conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party, and its dependence upon Moscow, cannot be principally attributed to external repression. While, to take one of his most interesting points, self-censorship for fear of persecution may have contributed to the failure of American radicalism, there are causes, more deeply-rooted in American society, which were of greater significance. Goldstein's analysis is both powerful and plausible; it is the more important, then, to place it within its proper context.

Dr Garrow's subject is an investigation of the connection between protest action and legislative enactment, and in particular the effect of the demonstrations and marches in Selma, Alabama, on the passage by Congress of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. He considers in detail the events in Selma, the motives of Dr Martin Luther King and his associates, and the responses of the media and of members of Congress. Garrow places his account with a theoretical explanation of protest-group activity. Protesters and those against whom they are protesting are seen as participants in a contest, with the remainder of the nation as audience. Those with superior power—in this case, the Southern law-enforcement officers and white citizens—seek to conceal as much as possible from the outside world, which helps to explain the hostility expressed towards press and television reporters present in their midst. The protesters seek maximum publicity, in the hope of engaging the support of the audience, and

provoking political action on their behalf. What Garrow shows clearly is that, by 1965, King and his associates had become shrewd tacticians, with a fine appreciation of the value of the media, and a capacity to provoke violence which put them in a good light and their adversaries in a bad one. What he can suggest, but not really prove, is that the events in Selma did anything more than reinforce the determination of the Johnson administration and liberal groups in Congress to keep up the pace of reforming legislation. It is, however, useful to have, in this competent account, a reminder that, in Goldstein's terms, the victims of repression are not always on the losing side.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge. GERARD EVANS

American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964. By William Manchester. *London: Hutchinson. 1979. 793 pp. £9·95.*

GENERAL of the Army Douglas MacArthur was not only one of the most colourful personalities to emerge on to the world stage during the Second World War: he was also, as William Manchester rightly emphasises, a man of many paradoxes. A ' warrior ', as the author usefully puts it, he nevertheless had a genuine hatred of war; markedly lacking in racial arrogance towards the people of the Philippines, he displayed before Pearl Harbour, even so, a contempt for the Japanese military threat that derived in part from racist assumptions; widely revered among those same Filipinos, he succeeded, by contrast, in evoking in many of the Americans who served under his command in the South West Pacific a strong dislike. His insatiable lust for the limelight and praise was accompanied by a remoteness that few ever penetrated. His conspicuous indifference to personal danger on the field of battle (there may even have been in this, it is suggested, subconscious suicidal inclinations) did not prevent him from staying away from the scene of the fighting on Bataan and again at Buna (in New Guinea) in a way which caused bitterness among his men and handicapped his own military judgments. His demands for absolute loyalty from those under him were at odds with his own acts of intrigue and insubordination against those to whom he in turn owed obedience

In addition, as is well known, the austerity of some of MacArthur's personal habits was accompanied by a remarkable readiness to indulge in the purplest of prose; and there are times when his latest biographer appears bent upon reflecting this latter characteristic in his own writing. Yet Manchester's book is highly readable. Moreover, its judgments and suggestions are thoughtful and sometimes even shrewd, nowhere more so than when it is drawing out further paradoxes concerning MacArthur and politics. Thus, although, in Manchester's words, the General was ' not a modern man ', he did bestow, during his ' reign ' in Japan, much (Western) modernisation upon that country. Indeed, this idol of the American Right, this champion of Chiang Kai-shek and associate of wealthy and reactionary Filipinos like Roxas, set out to create in Japan a social structure that would ensure the wellbeing of the entire people ' from the cradle to the grave ', as he himself summarised it. This imperialist for the American way of life, and for America's destiny in Asia, acknowledged the strength and validity of anti-colonialism in that continent. The General who had scanned the world for political-strategic possibilities at the outset of the Pacific War, signally failed to do so in the context of his clash with Washington during the Korean one.

There are other aspects of MacArthur's career which Manchester draws out well: his great professional skills, for example. At the same time, the book does not gloss over the debit side of the General's character and record. This includes, for instance, military misjudgments in the Philippines and Korea, as well as soaring egotism, a taste

for sycophantic staff officers, and a pathological belief that ' they ', whoever that designation might embrace at any particular time (and the list included Marshall, Eisenhower and Bradley, in addition to Roosevelt and Truman), were out to do him down.

Not surprisingly, given the broad canvas which it has to cover, the book will not always satisfy specialists in certain, particular aspects of history in which MacArthur was involved. The present reviewer, for one, does not accept what it has to say about, for example, Stimson's attitude towards the possible use of economic sanctions against Japan during the Manchurian crisis, or about the intention of Australia's military leaders before MacArthur's arrival in 1942 to abandon that part of their country north of the so-called ' Brisbane line ', should the Japanese invade. Manchester also appears greatly to exaggerate MacArthur's prescience during the early stages of the New Guinea campaign,[1] and is wrong in stating that only the Soviet Union, of the victorious powers, objected to the virtually untrammeled authority exercised by MacArthur in Tokyo. Likewise, there is a serious gap in the book concerning changing wartime Australian attitudes—including those of Curtin himself—towards the role of the United States in the South Pacific, while Manchester's denial that MacArthur had money invested in the Philippines would have carried more weight if he had examined the unpublished wartime diaries of the General's enemy, Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, and had sought to refute the relevant information contained therein.

Even so, *American Caesar* is a valuable book, and it performs a particularly useful service in helping to emphasise the extent to which Truman and his advisers in Washington failed to arrive at and to enunciate, for the guidance of MacArthur above all, clear, firm policies regarding the aims and conduct of the Korean War. In this respect, Manchester's study provides evidence which can be set alongside numerous other examples from the history of America's dealings with the Far East of the ambivalence and ambiguities that were involved. It is worth recalling in that context that MacArthur himself, so eager to enlarge the scope and purpose of the Korean conflict, told Kennedy in 1961 that anyone wanting to commit American ground forces on the mainland of Asia ' should have his head examined '. This advice from the old soldier to the young President did nothing to avert the débacle in Vietnam. And yet that war, too, was to underline another of those paradoxes to which Manchester draws attention: that the majority of the American people, who gave MacArthur so frenzied a welcome on his return in 1951 from championing the cause of the United States in the Far East, had long before rejected the sustained effort and sacrifices which such a cause—at any rate, as interpreted by the General—would entail, just as they had turned away from the primitive conservatism in domestic politics which he was to parrot in the bathetic years following his recall.

University of Sussex CHRISTOPHER THORNE

America in Vietnam. By Guenter Lewy. *Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979. (First Publ. New York, 1978.) 540 pp. £9·50.*

WHATEVER else one faults the Americans for in Vietnam, it cannot be for failure to record what they were doing as they did it; there was much talk, and some reality, of ' cover-ups ', but the social system brought them all to light sooner or later. Professor Lewy analyses the mass of evidence on, first, the competence of the effort and, secondly, its morality. He concludes that on the whole American action was

1 See, for example, the recent book by David Horner, *Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat, 1941-1943* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979)

incompetent but not immoral. He shows that the poor quality of a crucial proportion of the officer cadre of the United States Armed Forces was due to deferments of the draft for men of higher education; soldiers tried for bad discipline by courts martial were often misfits at home before they began to be demoralised by battle or garrison experience in Vietnam—the majority of the 55 per cent found in the last years to be drug addicts were already addicts before they came. Professor Lewy finds a lot of poor American generalship but omits discussion of the thousands of civilian advisers in USAID; he does not question the corruption and unpopularity of successive South Vietnamese governments, nor does he go into the bearing on these vices of either American policy and action or communist tactics.

The half of the book dealing with ethical judgments reviews the information about bombing of North Vietnam, use of defoliants and incapacitating gases, commission of atrocities by American soldiers, and the treatment of American prisoners by the Vietnamese communists. It is written with the most dispassionate balance but has to conclude that the charge that American tactics were to single out civilian targets for demoralising raids lacked foundation in fact; charges of breach of conventions on warfare, foundation in law: American airmen lost their lives over North Vietnam through avoiding civilian houses, some from SAMs fired from buildings painted with hospital recognition signs. It was (with the exception of My Lai) less the real crimes for which American servicemen went on trial than the invented ones that stoked anti-war feeling in the United States; Professor Lewy shatters the ' revelations ' of bodies like the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, given respectability by Professor Richard Falk in Volume 2 of *The Vietnam War and International Law*.[1] Was the American public more gullible than the British or French in swallowing the falsehoods spread by folk heroes like Martin Luther King? Perhaps not, but the lies were more palatable than the truth to young men who did not want to get hurt. The American press does not come out of the book too badly: it appears that Mr Harrison Salisbury failed to receive a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on North Vietnam after it came out that he had amplified certain of his damning *choses vues* from disinformation in a communist handout (parallel texts given on pp. 402–403).

University of Kent DENNIS DUNCANSON

Africa and the United States: Vital Interests. Edited by Jennifer Whitaker. *New York: New York University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations 1978. 255 pp. $15.00. Pb: $6.69.*

THIS collection of essays grew out of a Council of Foreign Relations study group which discussed, in 1977, United States policy towards Africa. Most of the participants seem to have worked from the assumption that the existing situation in South Africa is morally repugnant as it ' has deliberately constructed an elaborate system based purely on the tenets of racism '. This apparently sets South Africa apart from other countries in Africa which ' routinely violate human rights ' (pp. 200–201). Events such as the massacre of a quarter of a million Hutu tribesmen by the ruling Tutsi in Burundi are not worthy of consideration. Indeed the conclusions of the editor reflect this double standard. She prescribes for the United States a short term policy in Africa concentrated on achieving a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, South West Africa (Namibia), and South Africa. But when referring presumably to the other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Jennifer Whitaker advocates that the ' development of democratic political systems . . . should *not* be a goal of U.S. Policy ' (p. 221).

1 Princeton, NJ. Princeton University Press, 1969; London Oxford University Press, 1970 Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1971, p 400

The contributors are agreed that the United States has to balance the importance of Nigerian oil, of which the United States is a major importer, against the strategic value of minerals such as uranium, gold, platinum, columbium, vanadium, antimony and chrome from South Africa. The only significant alternative source of supply for many of the minerals would be Russia. There is also the question of United States investment in South Africa: although considerable, and offering good returns, its loss could probably be sustained. But the United States would be forced to consider the interests of its ally Britain. British investments in South Africa amount to 10 per cent of Britain's total foreign investment. In his essay Andrew Nagorski points out that no British government could ' afford to pay the political price of taking action to drastically curtail British business interests in South Africa, thereby adding to Britain's unemployment problems and its general economic troubles ' (p. 192). Although some of the authors argue that South Africa has overestimated its strategic importance to the West, and in particular the defence of the Cape sea route, there is general agreement that the prospects for a direct invasion or blockade of South Africa are militarily unrealistic, and are likely to remain so for some time. South Africa has the most effective military forces in sub-Saharan Africa.

The general conclusion of the work is that the United States faces the predicament of an increasing Russian military influence in Africa, and is likely to lose out in the overall power position. And indeed there is little that the United States can do about this, for, after the traumas of Vietnam, most Americans view the prospect of sending troops to fight almost anywhere outside their country ' as utterly foolish ' (p. 215). The most that the United States can hope for is a peaceful evolutionary change in the White South, so it is not confronted with a choice between defending its interests in the White South at the expense of alienating the Black North.

Much of the futurological and predictive content of this work has already been overtaken by events. It does, however, constitute an interesting record of the acceptable views on the situation in the early years of President Carter's administration.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy. By Selig S. Harrison. *New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1978. 468 pp. $21.95 £11·95.*

SELIG HARRISON, formerly a foreign correspondent with a long record of service in Asia, and now a Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has produced a review of Asian nationalism and American policy to which those overworked and abused adjectives ' stimulating ' and ' provocative ' can, with some justification, be applied. As one would expect from a journalist who has had experience of countries throughout the length and breadth of Asia for something like twenty-six years, the book is full of information, with interesting perspectives and wide-ranging analysis. It is, according to the author's Preface, ' about the American encounter with nationalism in Asia, past and present, and about some of the ways in which future American policy could be more sensitive to nationalism '. Two comments must be made on this claim. First, the author's view of the past encounter is a rather strange and limited one, for the book is essentially about the period from 1945 onwards and one of its weaknesses is that it does not place contemporary American policy on a sound historical base. Secondly, while there are interesting references to India and Indonesia and a good brief analysis of relations with Pakistan, the focus is mainly, as one might expect, on four countries in Asia, China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam.

Mr Harrison begins with some observations on the meaning of nationalism in the Asian context, and then, in section two, goes on to discuss nationalism and communism. He argues that only in China and Vietnam have the two ' fused into a combined force of extra potency ', and he takes the United States to task on two counts, first, for misunderstanding what was happening in China and Vietnam and underestimating the staying power of the Peking and Hanoi regimes, and secondly, for overestimating the expansionist potential of communism in other parts of Asia, where communist parties have failed to achieve the leadership of nationalist movements. In his comments on the fusion of nationalism and communism in China, the author firmly supports the ideas of Chalmers Johnson, first put forward in 1962 in *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power.*[1] He provides a most useful review of the arguments for and against the Johnson thesis. His criticism of the United States for overestimating the expansionist potential of communism is rather less than convincing. Not least, it is by no means certain that communist expansion in Asia, or elsewhere for that matter, depends to any great extent on communist parties achieving the leadership of nationalist movements.

In section three, ' Nationalism and the American Experience ', the author attempts to do ' a hatchet job ' on recent American policy in East and South-east Asia. The United States is attacked on all counts, both general and particular: on general points, it is criticised for insensitivity to the ' real ' power of nationalism, and for an outdated emphasis on traditional balance-of-power concepts; on particular issues, America is under fire for its policy in Korea which has left a legacy of bitterness, for its conduct in Vietnam which alienated Asia, for the security treaty with Japan, and for the alliance with Pakistan. On this last point, Sir Olaf Caroe is rather surprisingly made something of a scapegoat, and is roundly condemned for his ' topi-and-jodhpurs approach '! Harrison makes some good points, has some original insights and deploys some clever arguments, but it is difficult to reconcile his tale of mistakes and failure with the many successes that the United States has enjoyed in the Far East since 1945. Of course much depends on how you define success and failure.

The book concludes with a consideration of some alternative policies—diplomatic, economic, military—favoured by the author for the United States. In addition, issues such as charges of racialism against the United States in its attitudes, and the possibility of a grouping of the ' Eastern Three ' of China, Japan and Korea, are discussed. All in all this is a most welcome addition to the scholarly literature on the international politics of Asia since 1945 and on American policy there. Mr Harrison's approach is positive and challenging, he raises and tries to answer important questions, and his arguments are always thought-provoking even if not always convincing.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth DAVID STEEDS

LATIN AMERICA

The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule. By Christopher Mitchell. *New York: Praeger. 1977. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 167 pp. £11·25.*

CHRISTOPHER MITCHELL has written a useful and in many ways admirable book which sets out the social, economic and political scene in Bolivia before the *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario,* led by Victor Paz Estenssoro, was formed and came to

1. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1963. Reviewed in *International Affairs*, Oct 1963, p. 639

power, briefly but adequately. Against this background he tells the story of the MNR's early reforming zeal which had some notable achievements to its credit; its difficulties in reconciling the conflicting interests and aspirations of the groups and individuals on whose support it originally relied; and how its leaders were forced to play one group against another so breaking its tenuous unity, eventually paving the way for a military take-over and ultimately the brutal dictatorship of General Hugo Banzer Suárez. Underlying his account Mr Mitchell develops the theory that populist political movements are inevitably led by members of the middle class and that ultimately it is middle-class values and interests that they believe themselves compelled to defend. That this was true in Bolivia cannot be doubted. One of the problems with theories of this sort is that political development is so much dependent upon the economy and so substantially affected by outside interference (in the case of Bolivia, as in so many countries of Latin America) by the United States and, to a much lesser extent, Brazil.

Examples include Mr Mitchell's suggestion that although the American ambassador supported Paz Estenssoro, the American military mission may well have encouraged the army coup which ousted him in 1964 (p. 96); the United States undoubtedly supported Paz Estenssoro's successor, General Barrientos, with a military mission to train an army battalion in counter-guerrilla tactics (p. 101); Chief of Police Antonio Arguedas openly admitted a working partnership with CIA (p. 102); ' Some . . . believed ', writes Mr Mitchell, ' that the United States embassy could make and unmake Bolivian governments ' (p. 105); the nationalisation of the Gulf company's oil holding was met by the refusal of the world's giant oil corporations to purchase Bolivian oil and eventually to a payment to Gulf of $78 million which as Mr Mitchell says, was ' a very generous settlement ' (pp. 112–13). It would be tedious to list the remaining examples.

Mr Mitchell has an easy narrative style and particularly his account of Paz Estenssoro's two terms of office and the intervening one of Hernán Siles Zuazo (Chs. 3, 4 and 5) in particular makes compulsive reading. But he has not been well served editorially or in proof-reading: for example, ' bring ' for ' being ' (p. 43), ' immune *to* ' (p. 75) ' *in* behalf ' (p. 77). Spanish words are often used indiscriminately, sometimes in italics and sometimes not. *Realizadores* are not those who make policy but those who carry it out (p. 51) and *oficial* has only one ' f ' (p. 76). The word ' agribusiness ' (p. 121) will be new to many.

Mr Mitchell is not so happy in his attempt to relate the experience of Bolivia's MNR to other populist parties and governments in Latin America (Ch. 8). As he himself writes ' populist coalitions follow no single path of development and leave no single preordained political legacy '. Nevertheless his book is a valuable contribution to the study of politics in Latin America.

The bibliography is impressive but the index barely adequate.

J. A. CAMACHO

The Rise and Fall of the Peruvian Military Radicals 1968–1976. By George D. E. Philip. *London: Athlone Press, University of London for the Institute of Latin American Studies. 1978. 178 pp. (Institute of Latin American Studies Monographs 9.) £8·00.*

The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective. By Alfred Stepan. *Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1978. 348 pp. £12·40. Pb: £2·90.*

THE military regime which assumed power in Peru in October 1968 has been repeatedly scrutinised from many different points of view, at first with some puzzlement at the time when its policies were being formulated, later with passionate conviction from very different political perspectives. Certainly the military regime of

Peru represented a radical departure both from previous Peruvian experience of military government and from Latin American experience as a whole.

Between 1968 and 1975, when the regime began to veer sharply to the Right in terms of its economic and social policies, a series of measures was adopted which the government itself regarded as ' revolutionary ' and which were to liberate the Peruvian nation from the trammels of dependency and from the weight of the traditional oligarchy. An ambitious programme of agrarian reform, a vast extension of the public sector, including the nationalisation of major basic industries, banking and the fishing industry, and participation even in retail distribution, together with the promotion of workers' co-operatives and profit-sharing, were the most obvious features of the regime.

But economic and industrial policies alienated the private sector while failing to gain active popular support. Agrarian reform destroyed the rural oligarchy, but at the same time alienated much of the peasantry. The initial stand against foreign influence and investment in Peru, exemplified above all by the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company, by the nationalisation of important foreign-owned enterprises and the successful intervention to preserve a 200-mile maritime limit for the benefit of the Peruvian fishing industry, was replaced by a very heavy reliance on foreign credit, increasing indebtedness and the subordination of financial policy to external creditors. By the time that the military regime announced its intention to allow elections to be held, the economy was in crisis and the military regime widely discredited.

George Philip presents a balanced, pragmatic and eminently rational view of the regime and the course of its development from 1968 to 1976, charting the balance of forces among the radical elements within the military, the developmentalists, and the hardliners of the Right. His study begins with a balanced analysis of various interpretations of the nature of the regime both from the Left and from the Right. He sets the scene with a discussion of the course of Peruvian politics between 1948 and 1968, and a more detailed analysis of the complex issues involved over the question of the International Petroleum Company and its relationship to the military coup of 1968. He looks closely at the attitudes of the leaders of the coup and traces the emerging balance of forces between the radical military and the developmentalists over the early years of the regime, when a fair degree of unity was achieved. The operation and organisation of government are analysed, and he looks carefully at the deterioration of relationships between government on the one hand and the middle class, the organised working class and the peasantry on the other. A critical situation, evident in the riots in Southern Peru in 1973, was rapidly accentuated by the economic problems created by the decline of fishing and by the world-wide economic situation following the rise in oil prices and recession in the industrialised world.

In his conclusions, Philip suggests that some, at least, of the changes created by the radical military are irreversible—for example, the large state sector, deeply involved in the basic export-generating sector of the economy in mining and irrigation, and the major achievements of the agrarian reform programme. But he also addresses the wider problem of the military role in government, stressing the idea that it was precisely because of the weakness of the civilian Left that military radicalism became possible and was seen to be necessary by a substantial and influential section of the military themselves. But redistributive policies, while alienating the middle class, failed to mobilise support from those who were intended to benefit from them. As the author suggests ' the problem of participation is the Achilles heel of radical military regimes '.

This is also one of the major conclusions of Alfred Stepan's book on *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective,* but Stepan works on a much wider canvas, using Peru as a case study in a comparative study in which reference is made particularly to the experience of other Latin American political structures, notably

those of Mexico, Argentina and, of course, Brazil. But the major themes of Stepan's book revolve about the role of the state, and more particularly the relative autonomy of the state as a positive actor in the political process rather than as an institution simply reflecting the balance of class interests or acting as an arbiter in the expression of interest groups. The first part of the book is devoted, in fact, to the role of the state in general terms and is concerned to analyse the shortcomings of both the liberal-pluralist and the classical Marxist approach. Stepan focuses on an organic-statist approach to the state, drawing upon the history of political thought from Aristotle and Roman law, through medieval natural law, to contemporary Catholic social philosophy, and based on a vision of the common good and an organic, harmonious political community in which it is the state's role to mediate among essentially self-managing functional groups within it. This implies a strong and interventionist state which is not, in his view, necessarily to be equated with the established order. The essential problems, however, in such a model of the state lie precisely in its relationships with interest groups and with class groupings, and their relative power in the community as a whole.

It is clearly a short step from such a concept of the state to corporatism in its various forms, and Stepan devotes a chapter to a consideration of corporatism, distinguishing it from organic-statism and elaborating a further distinction between ' inclusionary corporatist ' regimes of which the military regime in Peru, the PRI in Mexico, and the *Estado Nôvo* in Brazil are examples and ' exclusionary corporatist ' regimes—of which modern Brazil and Chile are the most obvious examples.

With this somewhat elaborate theoretical and methodological structure, and with respect to Peru and other examples from Latin America, Stepan then proceeds to distinguish between the problems of installation of inclusionary and exclusionary regimes and their problems of institutionalisation once in power. There is a detailed study, in general terms, of the most relevant systematic variables favourable to the installation of such regimes, with a brief examination of the Mexico of Cardenas, Argentina in 1966, Brazil after 1964 and Chile in 1973.

Part two of Stepan's analysis is specifically devoted to the Peruvian military regime from 1968, labelled as an inclusionary organic-statist experiment. In many ways his conclusions about the situation precipating the installation of a radical military regime are similar to those of George Philip. Stepan provides a study in depth of the changing attitudes of the military in the 1950s and 1960s, culled from the military literature, and argues that the role of military intelligence services in the change of military attitudes has been much underrated compared with that of CAEM (the Centre for Higher Military Studies). He pays attention to the institutional and economic context of Peru in the late 1960s, and his view that the military were able to step into a power vacuum with a relatively large degree of autonomy is consistent with George Philip's conclusion that a radical military regime was possible precisely because of the weakness of the Left in Peruvian politics.

The institutionalisation of the Peruvian military regime proved more difficult than its installation, however, but whereas George Philip charts the crisis of 1973-76 as the failure of the regime to gain support from a wide spectrum of the Peruvian population, Stepan performs a similar function by considering three specific aspects of policy: first with respect to the urban squatters, where the regime was relatively successful in ' organising the weakly organised '; secondly with respect to the sugar co-operatives in the reformed agricultural sector, where the programme of ' reorganising the organised ' was considerably less than successful in the face of trade union opposition; and thirdly in the relationships of the regime to foreign capital, where the ' chains of dependency ' were ultimately to be strengthened rather than broken, in spite of the nationalisation of some foreign enterprises. But for Stepan, no less than for George Philip, the weakness of the Peruvian ' organic-statist inclusionary

experiment ', as Stepan describes the radical military, was its inability to ' institutionalise ' the regime—to consolidate political patterns of succession, control and participation. Structural reforms lost the regime much of the support which it had on achieving power, but also failed to secure support from the constituency of workers, peasants and even professionals that the reforms were intended to benefit.

Both of these books are basically concerned with the same theme, yet they are complementary, perhaps in a rather unusual way. George Philips' book is lucidly written and is free from the jargon of political science. With a broadly chronological framework it tells the story of a fascinating episode in Latin American history, and the analysis is perceptive, but unobtrusive. Alfred Stepan's book is directed to a more theoretical framework, the methodology is explicit and the style is correspondingly laden with the terminology of political science. Both make a valuable and balanced contribution to the literature.

University of Liverpool CLIFFORD T. SMITH

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Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights. Vol. 19: 1976. *The Hague: Nijhoff. 1977*

THIS yearbook follows the pattern laid down in previous volumes and is divided into three parts. They are, first, basic texts and general information, secondly, decisions of the European Commission, Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers and, thirdly, the convention within the member-states of the Council of Europe. The appendix contains Council of Europe documents and a selective bibliography. The section concerned with decisions which in 1975 was in just over three hundred pages, in 1976 takes up over a thousand although the total number of applications has dropped slightly. The great increase is caused mainly by the applications dealing with the treatment of detainees in Northern Ireland.

Chatham House D. H.

Encyclopedia of the Third World. 2 Vols. By George Thomas Kurian. *London: Mansell. 1979. 1694 pp. £40·00.*

THESE two large volumes contain a great deal of factual information on practically every aspect of life in Third World countries. It is clearly presented and as up to date as could be expected. However, special and the larger general libraries will already have most of it in standard works such as the statistical publications of the United Nations, the *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey* of the IISS and the invaluable *Statesman's Yearbook*, and it is doubtful whether smaller libraries will have the money to buy the encyclopedia or the space to shelve it.

Chatham House D. H.

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THIS new annual aims at taking on the task which was so ably carried out by the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University in its *Middle East Record*, which covered the years 1960–70. Part 1 contains a series of signed articles on current issues; Part 2 country-by-country review. There is an

impressive list of tables and documents and in many cases the tables of statistics give comparative figures for earlier years. It is however as an analysis of the year's development with a record of fact that the work will prove valuable especially as volumes covering later years are published.

Chatham House D. H.

Kenya: Subject Guide to Official Publications. Edited by John Bruce Howell. *Washington: Library of Congress. 1978. 423 pp. $10.00.*

THIS new subject bibliography covers official publications of Kenya issued by the Republic of Kenya, Kenya Colony and Protectorate, the East Africa Protectorate, Great Britain and the East African Community and its predecessors for the period 1886–1975. It is based on the holdings of the Library of Congress and other major libraries in North America and Great Britain and contains over three thousand entries.

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